National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Canadian Theses Service

Service des thèses canadiennes

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

NL-339 (r. 88/04) c

Canada

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

Quebec: The Making of an Imperial Mercantile Community, 1760-1768

©

BY

LINDA KERR

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Department of History
Edmonton, Alberta.

Spring 1992

National Library of Canada
Canadian Theses Service
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada
Service des thèses canadiennes

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-315-73081-1

Canada

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

RELEASE FORM

NAME OF AUTHOR: **LINDA KERR**

TITLE OF THESIS: **QUEBEC: THE MAKING OF AN IMPERIAL MERCANTILE COMMUNITY, 1760-1768**

DEGREE: **DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED: **1992**

Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Library to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only.

The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis, and except as hereinbefore provided neither the thesis nor any substantial proportion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatever without the author's prior written permission.

Linda Kerr

517 Michener Park
Edmonton, Alberta T6H 4M5

23 APRIL, 1992

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Quebec: The Making of an Imperial Mercantile Community, 1760-1768" submitted by Linda Kerr in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Philip Lawson

D.R. Owram

Ken Munro

K.J. Munro

J.E. Foster

J.E. Foster

E.B. Titley

Dale Miquelon

D. Miquelon

C.M. Small

To Jimmy, Kirstie and Kenny

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the growth of a British mercantile community in the town of Quebec under Governor in Chief, James Murray. It contends that British merchants were not particularly successful in this period because of the interplay of local, imperial and international economic circumstances. In order to explore this assertion fully the thesis is divided into three sections. The first section sets up the background to the transatlantic trade in the French period to give context to a discussion of the changes and continuities in economic practises in the 1760s. The second section provides the political framework, both local and imperial, that merchants had to operate within. It also delves into the impact of the army on the ability of the merchants to utilize the economic opportunities they found in the colony. Section three is a study of the economy of Quebec and covers the local, colonial and imperial scope of the import-export business before settling down to an examination of the merchants at work in Quebec. Historians have in the past claimed that British merchants at Quebec had little difficulty establishing themselves in business. This work seeks to reopen the debate on this flawed assertion.

ACKNOWLEGEMENT

I wish to acknowledge the help and support of my supervisor, Philip Lawson, and the other members of my supervisory committee, Ken Munro and Doug Owram.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

SECTION ONE. BACKGROUND TO THE IMPORT-EXPORT TRADE

1. The Structure of the Transatlantic Trading Community at Quebec before 1760 7

SECTION TWO. THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

2. The Political Background to the British Conquest of Quebec 37

3. The Evolution of the Post Conquest Economy 58

4. Interactions between the Local Administration and the Merchant Community at Quebec 88

5. The Economic Impact of the British Garrison on the Town of Quebec 109

6. The Impact of the Army on the Town of Quebec 138

SECTION THREE. THE ECONOMY OF QUEBEC IN THE 1760S

7. The Structure of the Transatlantic Trade After the Conquest 164

8. Quebec and the International Economy in the 1760s 194

9. An Analysis of Consumer Goods Entering the Colony in the 1760s and an Analysis of Changing Export Patterns From the Port of Quebec 221

10. Part One. A Comparative Examination of the Mercantile Experience in Quebec and the Empire 258

Part Two. Case Studies of the Quebec Experience - Business Successes and Failures 1760-1768 278

11. The Inner Workings of the British Merchant Community at Quebec in the First Decade of British Rule 297

POSTSCRIPT 321

BIBLIOGRAPHY 323

APPENDIX ONE 346

APPENDIX TWO 347

APPENDIX THREE 348

INTRODUCTION

The present state of historical debate on the activities of British merchants in the colony after the conquest is flawed; this community did poorly in the first decade of British rule. Previous work has failed to take into account the local and international circumstances within which the merchants operated. Earlier work on the merchant community of New France has established the preconditions for a successful and healthy economy. These studies have generally been ignored by historians working on the post conquest era who have attributed the subsequent success of the British merchants in Quebec to factors which have not been noted in the French mercantile experience. It also has to do with the focus of historians. We have been more concerned with explaining why the French Canadian merchants did not play a more important role in the post conquest economy than in discovering more about the economy itself.

This work has been set up in three sections in an attempt to address some of the critical lapses in our knowledge of Quebec in the 1760s. Nothing can be said with any certainty about the British merchant community until we can establish what types of trade the merchants were involved in and place this commerce within the context of the larger colonial and imperial trade. Throughout this work the term Canadian will be used to refer to French Canadians and the term local British merchant to refer to English speaking merchants working in the colony.

There is only one chapter in section one. It draws on the work of specialists to create a synthesis of the structures of the transatlantic trade and reiterates the conclusions that the involvement of Canadians in the import-export or overseas trade was limited by the effectiveness of the resident agent who acted on behalf of French merchant houses. This chapter provides the backdrop against which British merchant involvement in the overseas trade can be judged. The intent is to show that merchants living in the colony and working on their own account did not necessarily have an advantage in trade.

The second section discusses the political framework of Quebec in the military period and after. Not only did the merchants have to deal with the Governor but their interests were often hindered by changes of policy and by political appointments made in London. It is necessary to explain what this settlement, the Proclamation, meant to merchants and look at how they were able to adapt to boundary changes. There is also a detailed examination of the Governor's personal interferences in the economy in everything from duties to currency regulation. The governor was concerned with the overall economic well being of the colony whereas the merchants were interested in their own economic viability. They never understood that the one was necessary for the other. Another element of this political framework was the relationship of the merchants to the other sources of power in the colony, the political appointees. Merchants had to find their way through a complex web of local and British officials as well as deal with their new environment. In addition, before 1763 this included operating under the watchful eye of the military governors of the three towns (Quebec, Montreal and Trois Rivières). It was only natural that with so many different groups of officials to deal with that there would be some tension develop between the merchants and the British civil and military officials. The breakdown of good relations between the merchant community and the army can be traced to a few clashes which occurred in Montreal.

Indeed, no discussion of the problems merchants faced in the formative years in their new environment would be complete without a discussion of the impact of the army and the garrison on Quebec. The lucrative provisioning contracts available in New France during the war years ended with the end of the French regime. The British handed over their contracts to leading London merchants, therefore British merchants in Quebec could not benefit directly from the presence of a large armed force in their midst. If anyone did benefit it was the Canadians. They were initially told to provide wood for the garrison and were paid market price. Satisfied with this arrangement, the British continued to purchase wood from the Canadians and since wood was the largest expenditure on the army budget, this commerce brought a much needed infusion of hard currency into the colony. While provisioning contracts in the Niagara area made fortunes for local merchants in the 1780s this trade did not materialize in Quebec in the period under study where local Canadian merchants provided fuel for the army. Indeed, from an analysis of the available evidence it can be argued that in the competition with the army for scarce resources (boats, warehouses and harbour facilities), the merchants fared badly. The four years of competition with the army did nothing to enhance the merchant ability to operate effectively within the colony. This second section attempts to give some sense of the constraints and restrictions that the community faced in the colony. In the military period the merchants were forced to compete with other groups who were given top priority because they looked after the needs of the army. Quebec was the central depot for the provisioners and the military governors were responsible for the trans-shipment of goods within the colony. This placed an intolerable strain on the river trade and on the merchants involved in the import-export trade.

The last section (chapters seven to eleven) is an analysis of what chance a British merchant, newly arrived in the colony would have participating in the import-export trade of Quebec in the 1760s. First the shipping records between Quebec and Britain, Quebec and the American colonies are examined and comments are made on the nature of the river traffic. Comparisons are made not only with New France but with studies of colonial and British shipping in the eighteenth century. Shipping and cargo ownership, incidence of return voyages, cost and involvement in transatlantic trade and changes in crossing times are all examined in detail to show there was little chance of entering this trade and explains why British merchants did not participate as fully as historians have implied.

The focus of the discussion then shifts to the British scene and speaks to the financial crises and credit problems which rocked the banking houses of Europe and made credit in London available only at a premium. The impact of the strained circumstances of the Fleet street and Strand bankers had a profound effect on transatlantic trade. The only conclusion to be drawn from this material is that even the mercantile elite, the London overseas traders, were affected by this series of financial strains. London merchants showed little desire to contract with British merchants at Quebec to send them goods. British merchants in Quebec therefore had trouble making good commercial connections. Despite the problems of credit however, there is no doubt from the customs records that large volumes of goods were sent over to Quebec in each year of the period under examination. A comparison of cargoes shipped to Quebec with American colonial cargoes sailing from British ports shows that the types of goods sent were virtually identical, although Quebec naturally received smaller volumes. Consumer preferences are clear in the variety of goods shipped over in each of the main commodity categories. As with the shipping chapter a breakdown of the cargoes by point of departure allows a comparisons of colonial and British cargoes and the river trade. This analysis shows that despite the financial crises, London merchants, through agents did service Quebec as a regular colonial market.

The ability to move vast amounts of goods by sea to Quebec can be placed within a broader analytical context. In this case the organization of the British trade networks is examined. Not only do experiences with India and America offer valuable insights into the nature of this trade within the Empire but their lucrative and long standing trade with Portugal demonstrates that this was the most effective means of trading overseas. The evidence from this brief survey suggests that the use of residents proved successful in each case. An examination of the careers of the small core of successful merchants who arrived in the colony as junior partners and agents of British merchants throughout the decade suggests this group did very well because they had capital, credit and lines of supply. The rest of the British merchants at Quebec were not as lucky because they were not a part of the traditional British trading network. The final chapter in the study looks at both the agents of London-based merchant houses and local British merchants involved in this import-export trade to demonstrate convincingly that only the former were successful. The analysis focuses on where the merchants lived and where and how their businesses worked. It notes a number of changes in their circumstances most of which were not positive. Basic assumptions about what British merchants were like, how they operated, and in what way their business environment changed are examined. Merchants were plagued by some very practical problems from 1761 onwards and their lack of political voice exacerbated their unease with their situation. Not only did the administration and the Governors interfere in the economy, there were also a series of financial difficulties in Britain which worked against local interests. By the closing years of the decade the merchant community was in the throes of a crisis. It may well have become a driving force in the Quebec economy in the next decade but in the 1760s it was in deep trouble, with merchants located in Britain doing well and local resident merchants faring badly.

INTRODUCTION - SECTION ONE

This section which relies heavily upon the work of other historians is a necessary part of the overall structure of this thesis. The argument that transatlantic trade ventures, and the nuts and bolts of this trade, varied little whether controlled by the French or the English would be meaningless unless this comparison could be made. This chapter therefore seeks to set out the dimensions and parameters of the trade between New France and France. The eighteenth century was a time of great change in this transatlantic trade. This change was brought about by two factors, the growing inability of the colony to feed itself and the changing status of the colony within the empire. First in the 1740s and again in the 1750s New France became a theatre of war. As the French regime drew to a close, the economy had been transformed from a standard trade in raw materials for manufactured goods to a system which dumped men, munitions and foodstuffs into the colony. In the midst of these changes in the import-export business there were changes in the amount of participation by Canadian merchants. The patterns of change have been analyzed in this section in the hopes of providing a framework from within which it will be possible to examine the import-export business of the colony after the conquest.

CHAPTER ONE - THE STRUCTURE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADING COMMUNITY AT QUEBEC BEFORE 1760

This chapter attempts to create a synthesis of published and unpublished works of historians who have examined the various aspects of trade patterns between France and New France. From these sources it is possible to build a picture of transatlantic trade patterns and lay the foundation for a study of trade in the first period of British rule. All of these studies conclude with the end of French rule thus creating an artificial barrier in the study of the economic history of the colony.[1] The other barrier to an examination of the workings of the economy in the post conquest era has been the preoccupation of historians with the debate on the existence or nonexistence of a bourgeoisie in the colony at the time of the conquest.[2] It is the intent of this work to pick up the gauntlet thrown down by the economic histories of the period up to 1760 and to carry it through the transitional period which ends in 1768 when James Murray was replaced as Governor in Chief of Quebec. The pages that follow are an overview of the structure of the economy and of the transatlantic trade between the port of Quebec and France.

Ships on the transatlantic run were usually between 100 and 200 tons; otherwise, profitable operations were difficult since larger ships required larger crews and had trouble lading for the return trip. The mean tonnage of ships sailing from Bordeaux to New France from 1676-1760 was 178 tons which when considered for the shorter period, 1700-1750, drops to just under 100 tons.[3] The most striking changes in the last decade of the French regime were not only the sharp increases in the volume of goods sent to the colony to fill government contracts but the increased ships' tonnages which rose to 273 tons during the Seven Years War. The dramatic changes in volumes of goods leaving Bordeaux for the colony did not begin until the 1740s, therefore statistics from La Rochelle, which was the main port of exit for New France from the mid 17th century until the 1740s, are more indicative of what was normal in trade between France and its North American colony. Ships' tonnages there ranged from 130 tons to 230 tons. In the colony itself, vessels of this size were useless in the river trade or for intercolonial trade. Far smaller vessels were used, including small prefabricated boats brought from Europe on the large ships. The most common boat built in the colony was the chaloupe, also called the shallop. Many of these smaller boats could still be seen en route to Gaspé and Montreal in the 1760s and were manned by a captain and crew of two.

The voyage to New France could take up to three months and it was only between January and June that European ships could use the westerly winds that would take them across by the more direct northerly route.[4] The St Lawrence also had a short navigation season spanning May to October. It was only from June until late October that the Quebec harbour was in full operation.[5] The opening of the river and the arrival of the first ships never ceased to be an exciting event for the town residents. Not only did ships arrive with European cargoes, but the summer months saw the population of Quebec city swell with seamen as they waited for return cargoes to be found and loaded.[6] Sailors did relief work on farms and in the shipyards. The length of the voyage on the outward leg depended not only on the winds but on the month of departure, the earlier the better, and on navigational difficulties encountered en route. The prevailing winds could hold ships off the French coast for weeks and this was one reason for the very long outward voyage compared to the return trip of as little as 18 days and the average of 30 to 40 days. One problem common to French and British merchants was that even fair winds brought troubles. The 'easterlies' usually carried with them fog and rain causing ships to go off course and lose valuable time. The London, Paris and colonial newspapers recorded arrivals and departures, kept track of when ships reached their first landfall and also reported shipwrecks.

Navigational troubles were not over once the St. Lawrence river was sighted. It was well known for its dangerous currents, fog banks and, as

Pritchard points out, for its " strange deflections of the compass that are now attributed to the iron ore deposits in Labrador and Northern Quebec". Throughout the eighteenth century, because the river is so wide at Anticosti Island, most ships called in at Riviere du Bic, then sailed on to Tadoussac to take river pilots aboard to guide them to Quebec city. In the 1760s strict regulations meant that ships had to take on pilots and not just follow in the slip stream of the ship ahead. There had been a system of licencing pilots in operation since the late 17th century.[7] Once in the St. Lawrence the hazards that lay ahead came from the Red Island channel where the force of the Saguenay could upturn vessels, and again at the upper end of Ile aux Coudres where whirlpools were so powerful that ships had to wait for winds strong enough to propel them through.[8] The last barrier was at the Traverse and having safely navigated all these obstacles, the ship arrived at port. The mouth of the St. Charles river became a favourite place to anchor because it was shielded from the wind.[9] During the French regime there was a port captain whose job it was to provide sound berths for ships, edit channel maps and to keep the locals from dumping their garbage into the water.[10] This post was resurrected by the British after 1760. The care with which the British Navy entered the St. Lawrence in 1759 continued to be observed in the years following the capture of Quebec. The risk of losing ships and cargoes so close to the final destination remained high unless good local pilots were hired.

In the French period the bulk of the shipping arrived between July and September and landed goods at the network of quays and landing areas at the Cul de Sac, a practice continued after 1760. Once landed, the goods were stored in a number of warehouses in lower town where they had to remain for one month unless directly imported by Montreal merchants. At the end of one month the goods which remained (only 1/10th could be sold wholesale and any amount retail within the month) were divided evenly between the town of Quebec, Montreal and Trois Rivières.[11] Lower town was the focus of most economic activity in the colony's sea-borne trade with a combination of businesses, houses and storehouses. It functioned as the trans-shipment point for the whole colony.

It took on average six to eight weeks to unload and reload vessels depending on whether or not there was an agent resident at Quebec who had already gathered in the cargo for the return voyage. The reason for the rush in autumn was because this was when the canoes from the western interior were due at Montreal. But it was not uncommon for a vessel bound for France to be held up for weeks if the fur boats were delayed. Fur traders were usually tied by credit arrangements to one or other of the French merchants through their Quebec agents and therefore the fur prices were set in lower town by these agents.[12] Incoming cargoes were usually made up of a number of lots of mixed goods each with a mark on them to let the agent know which consignee they were for and also to help to speed up customs clearances and decrease confusion when unloading.[13] The cargoes of the French regime were as varied as those sent by the British after 1760. In 1757 imports encompassed oils, spices, hams, vinegar, olives, soap, candles, paper, string, window glass and trunks as well as the ever present textiles. The occasional American colonial traders brought in beer and cheap manufactured goods, and from the French West Indies came sugar, molasses and rum, but also luxury items which included sugared almonds and fruits preserved in alcohol.[14] Crews were paid for all time spent away from port including turn-around time at Quebec. Transatlantic trade was therefore very costly in terms of wages and victualling both of which were charged against ships earnings.[15]

Another risk of the business was delinquency. In short, the captain or master of the vessel could sail away with the ship. One tactic that was commonly used to guard against this was for the shipowner to employ a family member as captain or, when this was not possible, the captain's income would be topped up by tying it to commission sales. He might also receive a percentage of the freight charges or free cargo space for private trade. The responsibilities of a captain however, extended beyond getting the ship safely to its destination. He was also responsible for the good condition and proper delivery of the cargo at the other end. It is possible through the use of a British example from 1766 to show some continuity with the French period. On 26 June 1766, the ship London (Captain Moore - master) arrived in the port of Quebec. Most of the cargo on board was damaged and the subscribers of the goods were asked on the 28 of July to go aboard and inspect the ship. Their findings were that the ship's seams were not properly caulked and that rats had made the vessel less than watertight. The subscribers concluded that the captain had taken all due care on the voyage and that the fault lay with the builder of the ship. This team of eight subscribers was augmented by two carpenters. [16] This decision freed the captain of a verdict of negligence and financial responsibility for the ruined cargo in the eyes of the subscribers.

Whenever the owner of the cargo had no agent in the colony the master of the ship was responsible for selling the cargo for the best price and buying exports from the port of call. Many of these trading voyages, especially in the first three decades of the 18th century, involved a third stage which included lading at a West Indies port. It was therefore a necessary condition of successful trade that captains were as well informed about market conditions and prices as resident agents.

Once at the port of Quebec the vessels were still within the control of the French customs system and paid licencing fees there. These fees ranged from under 20 sols for vessels of less than 50 tons capacity to 30 sols for over 50 ton ships engaged in the river traffic and rose to over 7 livres for vessels travelling to France.[17] The rules of the customs system were enforced by the French Admiralty court which had operated in the colony since 1719. To help to protect trade, no export duties or port duties were exacted from ships trading to New France until 1748.[18] Captains had to provide trading permits issued by the Admiralty in France before being allowed to unload. All cargo had to be declared within 24 hours and receipts for duties already paid were checked. A pass was granted for all non-dutiable items and the remainder of the cargo was issued separate permits for each set of goods, the duty on which was then paid for by either the agent or the consignee.[19] All goods were declared at the Bureau du Domaine in the Intendant's Palace. In theory no landing passes were issued until the duties were paid but in practice some of the imports had to be sold before the duty could even be raised. There had been no basic tax until rising war expenses saw a general 3% tax levied on all imports and exports from 1748 onwards with only salt and rope being exempted.[20] After 1760 the English customs system was put into place but the main difference was that there was no Admiralty court at Quebec at first and this hampered the ability of the authorities to collect duties.

The first half of the eighteenth century witnessed a number of significant changes in the trade between France and New France arising from the years of prosperity in the colony, especially in the 1720s and 1730s. These changes have been brought to light by the work of historian Dale Miquelon. The basis of this new found prosperity in the colony can be found in agricultural surpluses and a steadily increasing population. The stability of the agricultural surplus of the colony brought Canadian merchants into the shipping trade, not as transatlantic traders but as intercolonial traders with Martinique and Louisbourg. This new-found economic freedom was short lived however, ending abruptly in the late 1730s with a series of agricultural disasters and accompanied, within a short time, by a change in French policy towards the colony precipitated by the War of Austrian Succession (1744-1748). The population of the colony had increased steadily from 1700 onwards through natural growth reaching approximately 65,000 by 1760. By the end of the French regime, one quarter of the people lived in the three towns and the rest on seigneuries.[21] There were also 12,000 soldiers in the colony in the last years of the French regime. Agricultural output in the colony was no longer sufficient to sustain the local population or the steady influx of troops in the two periods when the colony was a theatre of war (1744-1748 and 1754-1763).

From 1713 to 1743 transatlantic trade remained stable overall. Commercial failures at La Rochelle in 1715 decreased the number of ships sailing for New France but it remained the leading port. Throughout the period, 41% of the 296 ships to New France came from La Rochelle with one third of the total French tonnage concentrated in the hands of four La Rochelle trading houses.[22] Most merchants would send one ship per year and, while this remained unchanged, the tonnages of the vessels increased at the beginning of the 1740s. In the earlier part of the century the Catholic traders of La Rochelle were in control of the trade with New France and had either lived in New France, intermarried with Canadian fur trade families, or worked in the colony as agents for other traders. It became standard practice for both the Rochelais and Bordelais merchants to establish agents or have partners in Quebec but they also traded to the French West Indies and to Louisiana. From the outports of St. Malo, Marseille and Bayonne where trade with New France was only occasional, no agents were active in the colony. Instead, the captains performed all necessary functions for the owner.[23]

Trade was conducted through modern formal partnerships only when necessary (in the form of regulated companies and joint stock companies and limited agreements). It was normal practice for a series of family networks to conduct business together. The extended family continually reinforced by marriage alliances was the standard business unit. Examples abound of the intricate and extensive kin relationships involved in the New France trade and these examples far exceed those of formal limited partnerships. Merchants of one town were also more likely to own ships and cargoes in common and engage in insurance ventures together but also be involved in similar activities with family members at other ports. Recent work on these merchant groups by Bosher and by Pritchard has found that the goal of this economic activity was the accumulation of capital and the desire to purchase royal office. Trade with Canada in the first quarter of the eighteenth century was the domain of Catholic merchants at La Rochelle and these merchants were able to use their ecclesiastical and official connections to further their business careers.[24]

Although noblemen were not supposed to become involved in trade, Louis XIV had declared that maritime commerce was a respectable livelihood, not as demeaning, for example, as shopkeeping, and therefore noble families were encouraged to become involved in shipping. This had the almost revolutionary effect of allowing army and navy officers to dabble in trade to supplement their incomes. In the King's service only the common soldier was regularly paid. Officers were rewarded on occasion but were generally responsible for their own living expenses and this was a great drain on family resources. The opportunity to make money was welcomed. Officiers de Plume, from Intendants down to King's storekeepers, who could usually be found in colonial postings, were also involved in the transatlantic trade dealing in government merchandise. This type of trade was not profitable except in wartime when larger than normal amounts of goods were exported to the colony. Guillaume Estebe, King's storekeeper for New France in the 1740s made his fortune by acting as an agent for metropolitan merchants. In partnership with the former storekeeper Francois Foucault, he owned a Bordeaux ship which regularly came fully laden to Quebec and the two also had a number of private deals with Bordeaux merchants.

French naval and army officers also dealt in transatlantic cargoes. This practice stands in direct contrast to the British example where all army supplies throughout the British empire were handled by contractors in London. In England, government contracts were not an object of speculation by officers. British soldiers and officers were paid regularly and on a standard scale and were unlikely to become involved in army provisioning. In the France of Louis XIV where religious uniformity was demanded, officers were part of official society and were therefore likely to have connections with well established merchant networks. British officers tended to have stronger connections to men in politics rather than men in commerce. This did not mean that the opportunity to engage in trade did not arise and Deputy Quartermaster General, Gabriel Christie of Montreal, was thought to involve himself too much in this business. One problem for the British once civil government was established, was the rising tension between merchants and the army which was in marked contrast to the French regime. This is not to suggest that the trouble came from a lack of officer participation in trade. It was because the merchants saw little economic return from having a garrison in the town.

One of the many examples of military involvement in the overseas trade in the French regime can be seen in the activities of Michel-Jean-Hugues Pean, adjutant at Quebec. His father was a military man who had started a successful business while a commanding officer at a number of forts in New France. Pean was a friend of Francois Bigot who had been a commissaire at Louisbourg in 1739 and was made Intendant at Quebec in 1749. The Pean family agent in Paris handled Bigot's funds by investing them under different names in France. Pean shared in the commercial activities of Bigot, Breard and Cadet and with these associates was part owner of several vessels. He was involved in supplying wheat, flour and munitions to the troops in the colony including those away in the western outposts. He worked in partnership with the Bordeaux merchant Jean Patrice Dupuy and had a share in Joseph Cadet's lucrative supply trade in the late 1750s. Others involved in the trade with New France ranged from the Farmers General of Taxes who collected customs and revenues to Purveyors to the forces. Victualling companies were known by the name of those who ran them, for instance that of Joseph Cadet who was Purveyor General to the French forces in Canada from 1757. His contracts brought merchants who had been reluctant to stay involved in the trade, to their knees, begging for lucrative government contracts.

Protestant merchants played a limited role in the trade with New France before the 1730s when a change in government policy and a need for an infusion of capital brought them into the trade. Dale Miquelon broke new ground in his study of the Dugard company which not only explained how the overseas trade worked but shed light upon the economic activities of the resident agent. Miquelon's study of Dugard provides the best example of a Protestant firm entering the transatlantic trade. Robert Dugard of Rouen and his Compagnie du Canada was a six-man partnership which sent 33 vessels to Canada from 1733 to 1749 before retiring from the trade. Within six years of this withdrawal fourteen Huguenot firms were involved in trade with New France and the merchants who traditionally controlled this trade had all but gone.

Dugard and Company worked from Rouen and sent their first ship on an exploratory trade voyage to New France in 1730. Two years later they began to trade in earnest using not only a fleet of ships but establishing two permanent agents in Quebec.[25] Francois Havy and his cousin Jean Lefebvre, the Dugard and Company agents, were stationed in lower town Quebec where they worked from the house of Louis Fornel from 1732 until their return to France in the late 1750s.[26] From 1747 when Dugard and Company wrapped up its business in New France, Havy and Lefebvre acted as commissioned agents for Bordeaux and Bayonne merchants and became involved in other ventures such as the seal trade.[27] They had started to work on their account as early as 1743 even though they were salaried employees of Dugard and this was not standard practise for agents.[28] It was unusual enough that they received good salaries for most agents worked for the standard 5% commission on incoming and 2.5% on outgoing cargoes.[29] Their private business network included Pierre Guy in Montreal who acted as an agent for another French merchant Jean André Lamaletie. They were responsible for selling the incoming cargoes at the best price and had to be aware of local market conditions. Agents had to buy and store fur cargoes and make sure they were properly laded to reduce the turn around time in port.[30] The normal profit margin was at least 20% for most goods, not including wine which could bring in over 100%.[31] Typical of most merchants, they kept a huge variety of goods on hand in their warehouse and volume purchases brought access to greater amounts of credit. It was usual to pay for half and be given credit for the rest.[32] For most types of business a promissory note was enough but the fur trade was higher risk and often required more security and with debts due as soon as the furs reached Montreal.[33] Most business was done on short term credit settled annually and usually given only to other merchants which made it very stable except in times of crisis when one bankruptcy could potentially affect the whole merchant community.

Although trade had looked so promising in the early 1730s that Dugard and Company had thrown themselves wholeheartedly into the Canada trade, economic conditions changed dramatically in the later years of the decade with the first of a number of poor or failed harvests. This was a terrible blow to the colony because so much effort had been put into building new grist mills and improving the quality of exported flour by special labelling and inspection.[34] In the 1730s more land was cleared and cultivated and this caused an overall increase in production and a surplus.[35] Agricultural techniques were not altered but more land under cultivation meant in theory that surpluses were always possible and that in bad years the colony would not be so hard hit. This did not prove to be the case when the crop failures came in 1736 and 1737 and were followed by a poor harvest in 1741 and then by two more failures. When the bread supply faltered the whole economy was brought to a grinding halt. Wheat surpluses created conditions for colonists to pay for imports and allowed merchants to accumulate capital by trading surpluses not necessarily to France but to the French West Indies. The intercolonial trade was born of the wheat surpluses and died when this could no longer be counted upon. There was a lot of commercial activity in the agricultural sector because merchants could compete for harvest surpluses. Wheat could be processed into other commodities and since it was a bulky export in its original form, it was normally brought to Quebec and made into flour before leaving the colony. Surplus grain was used to make beer and this was officially encouraged to decrease the amount of wine and brandy shipped annually to the colony and to increase the space available for manufactured goods.[36]

If an economic model was to be built for New France in this period what the colony needed was a diversification of goods for export. The French government was not bothered about how this was achieved as long as the colony kept buying imports and as long as it did not compete with France in any key commodities. The merchants needed goods to fill the ships' holds because although the fur canoes all came in at about the same time, they did not produce full ladings for all the ships at Quebec waiting to return to France.[37] What New France really needed was an array of other items to fill the holds of ships returning to Europe and by 1732 this included flour, biscuit, fish and seal oil.[38] Another way to diversify was to build and export ships, but this activity had often proved costly in the colonies unless subsidised by the government. In the 1730s shipbuilding bounties were announced and taking advantage of this subsidy, Havy and Lefebvre bought and exported six vessels for Dugard and Company between 1736 and 1745, valued at 300,000 livres.[39] The Company also tried to establish a trade link between New France and the French West Indies using Louisbourg as a centre from which to gather suitable cargoes for sale in the Islands. This proved to be a sensible tactic because what New France could not find a market for in the West Indies was very likely a commodity in demand in Louisbourg. Dugard and Company could then buy commodities in Louisbourg that would sell for more in the Islands. All of this activity depended on a healthy surplus from the harvest. There was no agricultural hinterland at Louisbourg and what it needed was wheat, flour and biscuit - when the surplus ended so did this trade. In the end only 10 of Dugard and Company's 68 voyages from Quebec to the French West Indies included Louisbourg as the last landfall. The Company was badly hurt by the crop failures of the late 1730s but the decisive blow came when, after some healthy competition, the government contract to supply the King's warehouses in New France went to Antoine Pascaud of La Rochelle. After this loss, Dugard began to pull back from the Canada trade until withdrawing finally in 1747. Even in the 1740s the importance of a government contract could not be underestimated, although it was worth far less than contracts handed out later during the Seven Years War.

Havy and Lefebvre stayed on in Quebec and became involved with Louis Fornel (whose house they occupied in lower town) in seal fishery concessions at Baie des Chateaux and Baie des Esquimaux where they suffered financial losses after being cut off from the area during the War of Austrian Succession. There was a lot of money to be made in the seal business because of the good prices in France for seal oil. They sold what was produced from their concessions back to Dugard. Fornel died in 1745 but they continued to do business with his widow, Marie Anne Barbel who kept the posts going and also received the concession of Tadoussac, one of the King's Posts, from Intendant Bigot in 1749.[40] She owned a large amount of property in the town of Quebec including a pottery and seven houses in lower town valued in 1759 at 45,000 livres.[41] The bombardment of the town destroyed much of her property and she withdrew from trade but owed a debt of 12,000 livres to Havy and Lefebvre which she finally paid in 1769.[42]

Havy and Lefebvre are a good example of the kinds of agents that French merchants liked to have in Quebec. These resident agents held sway over the import-export business of Quebec and controlled the credit and facilities necessary for entry into the transatlantic trade. Once in the colony however, it was not unusual for the agents to use the capital at their disposal to engage in other ventures. Canadian merchants were hard pressed to compete with men who had capital, credit and an excellent supply system at their disposal and who could use all of the above not only for the good of their company but for themselves. These agents formed a permanent kind of settlement and while the men themselves came and left, someone was always in the colony representing outside interests. The goal of most merchants was to prosper, then to return home and perhaps become a merchant in their own right; none intended to end his days in New France. This type of agency was similar to the British system practised in India in the same period. Havy returned to France in 1756 but Lefebvre who followed later, died on the way home. In the last decade of the French regime, Canadian merchants faced not only this kind of stiff competition from resident agents but also from an official French foreign policy, which poured men and materials into New France and changed the rules of the trading game beyond recognition. From 1740 onwards cargoes began to shift away from manufactured consumer goods to foodstuffs. Canadian merchants did not play a substantial role in controlling this 'new' overseas trade.

It has seemed so far from this discussion that the only ports involved in the trade with New France were La Rochelle and Bordeaux but this is not entirely the case. Trade from the outports made up 26% of total trade to the colony in the period 1713-1743.[43] Vessels from Nantes travelled across the ocean and up the St. Lawrence in the 1720s, then this trade link faded to almost nothing in the wake of changing trade patterns. The port of Marseille was allowed to trade with New France from as early as 1719 and although it did not send ships to New France until 1723, it did maintain a regular link with the colony, sending 20 vessels over the next 20 years with cargoes of wine, soap, textiles and olive oil. In neither of the two ports did any one trader establish regular contact - it was more a series of individual enterprises. The outports did participate in the colonial trade and so cannot be ignored, but because they failed to establish regular contact their activity is not truly indicative of trends in the trade between France and New France.

Economic activity directed towards New France was centered on the two ports of La Rochelle and Bordeaux and the greatest change in shipping patterns came from the increased participation of the Bordeaux merchants in the colonial trade. One interesting aspect of shipping activity from

Bordeaux was that, at first, almost one third of vessels in the Bordeaux-New France trade were Quebec owned. Bordeaux began to replace La Rochelle as the favoured point of exit when the harvests in New France began to fail. The quality of the first wheat shipments from La Rochelle was dubious and when it was discovered that French wheat was going to turn into an annual export, the French government looked for better quality grain to send. It was to be found in the rich agricultural hinterland of Bordeaux. By 1742 this area was able to send 400,000 livres weight of flour annually to New France. As the export of foodstuffs began to take precedence over French manufactures, La Rochelle lost the position it had held for almost one hundred years as the leading exporter to New France. The merchants of La Rochelle had engrossed so much of the colony's trade and had their trade so well organized through the system of resident agents that the turn-around time of their ships was much less than that of the Bordeaux merchants and they also made more direct voyages. There was less need for Rochelais captains to sail on to the French West Indies because they had enough goods waiting in Quebec to fill the holds of their ships. Bordeaux merchants made far more trips to the French Islands to pick up full ladings. At first this was because these merchants were just starting out in business. Later, in the 1750s, the Bordeaux merchants were still unconcerned with the consumers in New France unless they happened to be recipients of government contracts. The Bordeaux example shows that it was not only the pattern of trade that had changed but also the purpose of trade with the colony that had radically altered. From 1713 to 1743 three quarters of all shipping for New France came from the four La Rochelle houses of Antoine Pascaud, Simon Lapointe, Charles Policarpe Bourgine and Charles Fleury. All had long established, direct and enduring ties with New France through birth, marriage or just through business but by 1756, as historian James Pritchard has noted, a number of events had caused them to end or limit their contacts with the colony.

Canadian merchants in New France had trouble participating in the transatlantic trade, but this was not the only type of shipping activity that caught the eye of merchants in the colony. In the early part of the century there were various attempts made to create an intercolonial trade - these focused mainly on Martinique and did not start out successfully. This island was a more popular trade destination than Guadaloupe because it was easier to reach. Ships could reach Martinique by taking the north east tradewinds to the correct latitude, and then running down the wind until reaching the island, but if the first destination was Guadaloupe then the ship had to fight the winds to gain Martinique. The problem was not in reaching the island or the fact that only one trip a year was possible, but the limited market for colonial exports.

Most cargoes bound for the French West Indies were sent as speculative ventures and were sold on the docks rather than being promised in the hope of repeat business, to any particular merchant.[44] New France was encouraged to send pitch, tar, planks, boards and flour. These were items that would again be exported from Quebec to this area in the late 1760s. No regular trade was established until 1727 when roughly nine ships voyaged there every year until 1739. There had always been an imbalance in the values of cargo between the two ports. A Martinique merchant could make three times the value of his cargo at Quebec but unfortunately the reverse was not true.[45] At first timber was the top export because there were no wheat surpluses until after 1725. The main problem was the bulkiness of this type of cargo. It was loaded on deck as well as between decks after the rest of the cargo was on board. Planks were brought into Quebec and stored until ready for export, but poor storage facilities and the damp weather meant that at least some wood was either rotten or cracked by the time it was needed. To prevent this problem and to help to utilize cargo space more effectively, the wood was processed into staves and hoops, much in demand and easily built into barrels once delivered.[46] Competition from New England kept timber prices low; so that Quebec merchants did not have a monopoly, and in some years prices were so low that it was not worth making the trip at all.

The French West Indies were not the only possible market for the colony - Louisbourg was much closer and became dependent on Quebec for grain. There was less risk involved in sailing to Louisbourg; two voyages per season were possible and freight rates were favourable since they were half of those charged for Martinique.[47] Even Robert Dugard kept a permanent commissioned agent at Louisbourg and tried to tie his New France - West Indies operation to Louisbourg by picking up dried cod there to sell in Martinique.[48] In this matter the company was marginally successful with only 10 of their 68 trips sailing via Louisbourg.[49] The trade between New France and Louisbourg was only possible when there were grain surpluses and this trade was handled for the most part by Canadian merchants. In Louisbourg few French merchants were involved in trade and an indigenous merchant group controlled trade by acting as agents and by owning the cargoes.[50] Merchants here controlled their own import-export business.

In the trade between New France and Louisbourg the local merchants in both places tried to make the best of their resources, fish and agricultural produce. In the 1730s there was more shipping going on between these two areas than there was between New France and France.[51] The annual requirement of Louisbourg in flour, peas and biscuit has been estimated at a minimum of 20,000 quintals (one quintal equalling a hundredweight). In 1732 New France supplied over half of this amount but later in the decade sent 25,000 quintals annually.[52] For its part, most of the goods traded from Louisbourg originated in the West Indies, especially the rum and molasses. The trade worked in the following manner; grain and biscuit, processed from the lower grade of grain, were traded at Louisbourg for dried cod and sold for molasses, sugars and syrups. When there was not enough cod, merchants had to be content with bills of exchange or promissory notes for the purchase of French goods. Whether planned or not the trade between the two areas had to involve a third party. Their trade grew annually until a series of poor harvests in New France caused shipping to drop off and their trade had virtually ended by the outbreak of war in 1744. For the Canadian merchants, the combination of the loss of their main trading item, grain and its by-products, and the improving economic conditions in Louisbourg as it tapped into the New England economic network, ended this intercolonial trade.[53] It had provided Canadian merchants with the opportunity to participate in shipping but it was conditional on good agricultural surpluses and when these could not be produced, the trade ended.

The other change which affected colonial trade, between New France and France, came during the Seven Years War. The numbers of ships crossing the Atlantic increased from 25 per year to as many as 70 in 1758.[54] Most of these were French ships, although the government gave in to merchant pressure in 1756 and issued passports to neutrals - a privilege not exploited, as outsiders failed to participate in any great number.[55] Because of the increased number of government contracts and the need to supply troops in the colony, the structure of metropolitan trade was altered. Contracts were no longer handed over to Catholic merchants, no matter what their political connections. There was for the first time too much business and it required the modern equivalent of retooling; larger ships, different insurance ratings and the ability to buy and organize huge amounts of cargo. This change came as bankruptcies swept through the ranks of the established Catholic colonial traders.[56]

As mentioned earlier, these changes opened the door for the increased participation of other merchants. Abraham Gradis is a good example of the 'new men' in action. He became a partner of Francois Bigot in 1748 and, upon the latter becoming Intendant of New France, they bought a ship for the West Indies trade. [57] Gradis was given favoured status by Bigot after offering to ship government stores to the colony at his own initial expense. He out-manoeuvred the well established merchants Pascaud and Lapointe by foregoing the normal advance. French finances were severely stretched, and such offers came as a welcome relief and were sure to bring more business for the merchants involved. No one thought for a moment that the French treasury was empty. Gradis was able to gain control of most of the lucrative grain trade to New France sending 89% of all flour and grain that reached Quebec in 1752.[58] The total volume of goods crossing from French ports to Quebec between 1744-1755 increased by 147%.[59]

In the 1740s insurance rates and other rising costs had left their mark on merchant activity, but even rates of 35% had not depressed trade too badly. In 1748 with the return to peace, trade began to pick up and many new families became involved in trade with New France. Jean-Andre Lamaletie, in Quebec from 1741 to 1758, was part of the metropolitan network which formed partnerships at La Rochelle and with other French merchants at Quebec. He also traded with his cousins Mounier and Lee of Quebec. His trade was extensive and his family network linked him to the leading merchants of Bordeaux and La Rochelle, including Simon Lapointe and Jean Patrice Dupuy.[60] Lamaletie was related to the King's storekeeper Estebe and the former storekeeper Foucault. He was also partners with Jean Latuiliere and together they sent six ships worth of goods to Quebec in 1759 to Mounier and Lee, and another three the following year to government officials in the colony.[61] He was well placed through his network of connections to take advantage of government business which included the patronage of colonial officials. Lamaletie is just one of many instructive examples of the French merchants who were active within the trading network that had New France all to themselves.

The entry of a whole new group of merchants into the New France trade brought with it a few fundamental changes in the volume of trade and in the dominance of La Rochelle. Bordeaux which had been sending approximately 250 tons of goods per year in 1738 was by the late 1750s sending 9300 tons of goods annually. La Rochelle could not match this but sent 31 ships from 1756-58 with 5000 tons cargo.[62] In the last year of hostilities in New France, La Rochelle was able to outfit only three ships and was hardest hit by wartime shipping losses.

The last decade of the French regime, half of which were war years, saw a dramatic increase in annual volume of goods shipped to the colony. Bordeaux became the most important port in the trade and the trade of the outports was now virtually nonexistent. It was as though the normal trade of France and her colony was now a thing of the past and this new trade was not really trade at all but an outpouring of men and supplies. New France was a possession to be guarded and kept out of reach of the enemy and it no longer functioned normally in the economic sense. Merchants who dealt with the colony in the 1750s were not looking for return cargoes nor were they worried about the consumer demands of the habitant. They made their money from government contracts and from deals with officials in the colony.

The radical changes in the colonial trade initially began in response to the poor harvests in New France and continued because of the garrisoning of troops there in the 1740s. From 1756 onwards, as a result of specific government demand to supply troops, munitions, foodstuffs and other necessities to the colony, trade was transformed. It required the participation of merchants with extensive capital who could pay the spiralling freight and insurance rates while not expecting immediate payment. This demand was beyond the ability of most of the merchants traditionally involved in this trade. By 1755 all the old La Rochelle merchants were out of the business and their agents were returning to France. The Bordeaux merchants who replaced them were not interested in trade with the colonists as much as trade with the government. In 1755 however, even these contracts were not enough to entice French merchants to freight goods to Canada, after 300 vessels were lost at an estimated value of 30 million livres.[63] La Rochelle sustained more losses in 1756 and insurance rates hovered around 40%, a cost that was almost prohibitive. Even Bordeaux sent less than 50% of its 1755 tonnage and of that, half alone was shipped out by Abraham Gradis. If the cargo sent in combination with a Bayonne relative is added to this total, then Gradis was responsible for 65% of all tonnage from Bordeaux in 1756. Gradis' business improved further once his partnership with Francois Bigot ended and he won contracts from the Ministry of Marine. He was the only Bordeaux merchant to have a major food contract and controlled over 90% of the flour, 50% of the alcohol and 90% of the salt pork contracts. In contrast, the contracts handed out at La Rochelle were evenly spread out but worth less in total than Gradis' single contract. It was not until Joseph Cadet became Purveyor General for the Kings forces in 1757 and began to order goods directly from France that the huge government contracts began to roll in.[64] Cadet had agents in French ports buying up cargoes and under his guidance, New France received more goods in these last years than it had in its entire existence, approximately 25,000 tons of shipping.[65]

French merchants were able to achieve this remarkable feat because they had the whole West Indies fleet at their disposal. The Bordeaux merchants were loath, because of the war, to send their fleet over to the Islands. Rather than leaving it to rot in the harbour they decided to put it to use in the trade with New France, and so in 1758, it set sail in three groups. Gradis' contribution exceeded the total tonnage that had sailed from Bordeaux in 1756. The first and third groups to leave managed to get through with a minimum of trouble, but the other group was sighted by the British Navy and practically wiped out. Gradis had sent eight of his own ships and six hired ships with a large order for Joseph Cadet (3860 tons). The problem was that he ordered them to return via the West Indies and he lost all but one of his own and all of his hired ships. His fleet was ruined and he was owed nearly three million livres by the Crown. Since payment seemed unlikely, Gradis all but withdrew from the trade. Joseph Cadet was forced now to turn to other merchants, including Lamaletie, to fill his contracts and together they managed to ship more than ever before. This effort shows that France did indeed support the colony and the amount of trade reflected the degree of government spending on the colony.

Bordeaux merchants rose to prominence in the trade with New France because they were willing to exchange credit for contracts, but no one foresaw the collapse of royal finances in 1759. The signs had been there for all to see. The government had not fully cleared its debts since 1748. From 1744 onwards many merchants traditionally involved in the trade with the colonists of New France left the trade as it became increasingly geared towards taking the sharp edge off of the continually inadequate harvests and less towards satisfying normal consumer needs with manufactured goods. Most of the merchants in the Canada trade were also involved in trade with the West Indies and Louisbourg, but as grain surpluses ended, so too did the possibilities for greater levels of intercolonial trade. It had always been difficult to lade return cargoes and this was the function of the stops at Louisbourg and Martinique where cargoes from New France could be sold for fish and sugar. Normal trading patterns of the type practised since the late 17th century were all but gone by the early 1750s. Still it would be foolish to maintain that no pattern at all can be discerned. Whether the trade was from La Rochelle or Bordeaux, it was carried on by merchants tied together by intricate networks of kin and business who had capital, credit and connections. They relied on partners or agents in the colony to sell their cargoes at the best price and to do their best to keep the turn around time to a minimum by planning in advance for return cargoes. There was steady and unbroken trade throughout the first half of the 18th century between the colony and France and it reached undreamed of heights during the last three years of the colony's existence. Canadian merchants played little or no part in this transatlantic trade unless working on commissions in Montreal where French agents tended to exert less control. British merchants arriving after 1760 faced some of the same problems that had plagued their Canadian counterparts. They did not have the necessary capital, credit or connections and they operated from a town that had been physically battered into submission in 1759. There was no way to change the basic pattern of overseas trade between Europe and New France. The British merchants, in Britain and in Quebec, inherited this pattern and were forced to learn to operate within its limits as had their French counterparts.

The transatlantic trade would continue to be run by merchants operating long-distance. These merchants were forced to revert to an earlier international practice of relying on captains until they could establish reliable links with British merchants in the new colony. British merchants faced many of the same problems as their predecessors. Long voyages, hazardous passages and short shipping seasons were to be expected, but there were additional problems which added a degree of uncertainty to the whole process. Knowledge gained during the period of military government brought a recognition that the lack of storage facilities, coupled with the absence of resident agents, meant that London merchant houses would have no more than an inkling of consumer needs. Problems of language and currency added to the difficulties that merchants would encounter in Quebec. The end of the Seven Years War saw Britain plunge into a series of financial crises which severely curtailed the ability of merchant houses to set up their normal type of overseas operation. Such ventures involved establishing a factory which employed resident agents with a specialized knowledge of the area and its export-import needs. One major difference from the standard practice of the French regime was that the contracting for the garrisons was not locally controlled. This very lucrative business was not thrown open to British merchants in Quebec, but was contracted out to the army provisioners in London who had successfully provisioned the British army in North America until 1763. Profits from this lucrative branch of army trade were not to be found in the colony. After 1760 there would be no repeat of the practices of the last years of the French regime where a web of colonial officials in cahoots with French merchants would make their fortunes in the army provisioning trade.

The structure of transatlantic trade did not change after 1760 - profits still ended up in the pockets of merchants in another country and not in colonial pockets. In the French regime the stability and progress of the economy were not a product of events within the colony, but were of course deeply affected by other unpredictable events, especially war, financial crises and disruptive market forces in the metropolitan centre. The first decade of British rule, which included both a military and civilian phase, saw a remarkable degree of stability in the economic structure of the colony. The location and resources of New France and the similarity of merchant activities in the Atlantic trading network ensured that although the players had changed, the game remained the same.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER ONE

1.This refers to all of the works cited in the endnote section of this chapter.

2.Dale, Miquelon, *Society and Conquest. The Debate on the Bourgeoisie and Social Change in French Canada* (Toronto : Copp Clark Publishing, 1977), Fernand Ouellet, *Economic and Social History of Quebec 1760-1850* (Ottawa : Gage Publishing Ltd., 1980), Michel Brunet,*French Canada and the early Decades of British Rule 1760-1791*(Ottawa : CHA Booklet #13, 1981), Guy Fregault, *Canadian Society in the French Regime* (Ottawa :CHA Booklet #3, 1981), Jose E. Igartua, " The Conquest and the Marchands of Montreal" (CHA Historical Papers, 1974).

3.For a full discussion of the structure of Transatlantic shipping in this period see the Introductory chapter (pages 1-47) in James Stewart Pritchard, "Ships, Men and Commerce : A Study of Maritime Activity in New France" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1971).

4.J.F. Bosher *The Canada Merchants 1713-1763*,(Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 16.

5.Allana Reid, "The Development and Importance of the Town of Quebec. 1608-1760 " (Ph.D. Thesis, McGill University, 1950), pp. 143-144.

6.Pritchard, Introductory chapter pp. 1-47. and the quote that follows below.

7.Reid, p.146.

8.Bosher, p.35.

9.Reid, p.142.

10.Ibid., p.145.

11.Ibid., pp.164-165.

12.Dale Miquelon, *New France 1701-1744 "A Supplement to Europe"* (Toronto : McClelland and Stewart, 1987), p. 133.

13.Bosher, *The Canada Merchants*, p. 17.

14.Reid, p.191.

15.Pritchard, "Ships, Men and Commerce", p. 17.

16.*Quebec Gazette*, 28 July 1766.

17.Pritchard, "Ships, Men and Commerce", p. 43.

18.Reid, p.160.

19.Pritchard, "Ships, Men and Commerce", p.45.

20.Reid pp. 162-163.

21.Bosher, The Canada Merchants, p.12.

22.James Stewart Pritchard, "The pattern of French colonial shipping to Canada before 1760," Revue francaise d"histoire d'outre-mer, LXIII (1976) p.195.

23.The account that follows in the next five pages is indebted to the work of Bosher, The Canada Merchants, pp. 18-81 and page 130.

24.Bosher, The Canada Merchants and Pritchard, "Ships, Men and Commerce".

25.Dale Miquelon, "Havy and Lefebvre of Quebec : A Case Study in Metropolitanism particularly in Canadian Trade 1730-1760," Canadian Historical Review, 56 (March 1975) p. 2.

26.Dale Miquelon, Dugard of Rouen French Trade to Canada and the West Indies. (Montreal : McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978), p.70.

27.Miquelon, "Havy and Lefebvre", p. 17.

28.Miquelon, Dugard, p.71.

29.Miquelon, "Havy and Lefebvre", p. 3.

30.Ibid., p.4.

31.Ibid., p.5.

32.Miquelon, Dugard. p. 76.

33.Ibid., p.77.

34.Dale Miquelon, New France 1701-1744 "A Supplement to Europe" (Toronto : McClelland and Stewart, 1987), p.4.

35.Ibid., p.205.

36.Reid, p.239.

37.Pritchard, "Ships, Men and Commerce". p. 476.

38.Miquelon, Dugard. p. 82.

39.The discussion that follows in the next page is based primarily on the Miquelon article, "Havy and Lefebvre". pp. 11-18.

40.Lilianne Plamondon, "Une Femme d'affaires en Nouvelle France, Marie Anne Barbel" (M.A. Thesis, Universite de Laval), 1972. p.104.

41.Ibid., p. 73.

42.Ibid., p. 79.

43.The discussion of French trade which follows in the next three pages is heavily indebted to Pritchard, "Ships, Men and Commerce", Chapter Seven, pp. 305-340. and Chapter Eight, pp. 344-386.

44.Reid, p.189.

45.Pritchard, "Ships, Men and Commerce", pp. 352-353.

46.Reid, pp. 249-250.

47.Pritchard, "Ships, Men and Commerce", p.372.

48.Miquelon, "Havy and Lefebvre", p. 11.

49.Ibid., p. 12.

50.Christopher Moore, "The other Louisbourg : Trade and Merchant Enterprise in Ile Royale 1713-58," Histoire Sociale/Social History XXIII (1979) p. 88.

51.Pritchard, "The pattern of French colonial shipping", p. 196.

52.Pritchard, "Ships, Men and Commerce", p. 364.

53.Ibid., p.383.

54.Bosher, The Canada Merchants, p.14.

55.Pritchard, "Ships, Men and Commerce", p.442.

56.Bosher, The Canada Merchants, p.186.

57.Pritchard, "Ships, Men and Commerce", p.416.

58.Ibid., p.425.

59.Pritchard, "The pattern of French colonial shipping", p.196.

60.J.F. Bosher, "A Quebec Merchant"s Trading Circles in France and Canada : Jean-Andre Lamaletie before 1763," Histoire Sociale/Social History X (1977) pp.27-28.

61.Ibid., p.43.

62.Pritchard, "The pattern of French colonial shipping", p.197.

63.The discussion of the business of Abraham Gradis is based on Pritchard, "Ships, Men and Commerce", Chapter Ten, pp.430-474 and specifically pages 438-442.

64.Bosher, The Canada Merchants, p.96.

65.This page is based upon the work of Pritchard, "Ships, Men and Commerce", Chapter Ten, pp. 447-452.

INTRODUCTION - SECTION TWO

The chapters in this section lay out the political framework within which the British merchants in Quebec had to operate. The first three chapters in this section deal with the political settlement for Quebec from the Proclamation of October 1763 itself down to the choice of James Murray as Governor in Chief. The reason that we know so much about Quebec in this period is because Murray had extensive correspondence with his Commander in Chief, Jeffrey Amherst, with the English ministry and with the various departments of government in London responsible for Quebec. Special attention in this section is paid to Murray's reports on the potential of the colony, especially in terms of its possible economic contribution to Britain. Chapter three continues with a discussion of the nature of the problems faced by merchants in the community under Murray who often had to work without much direction from London. Many of these difficulties continued long after Murray was gone and questions whether or not it is right to continue to blame Murray for the merchants' economic and political predicament.

Murray was not the only power broker in the colony and this makes it necessary to look at other interactions of the merchants with the administration. Merchants had to deal with London appointees and military governors until 1763. The imperial offices chosen for discussion are those which had an important impact on the merchant community, Receiver General, Harbour Master, Auditor General, and Naval Officer for the port of Quebec. An examination of each in turn shows the responsibilities of the post, the patronage involved and the impact of each on the key areas of customs and duties. This chapter also speaks to the political instability in London throughout the period and the effect this had on decision making for Quebec. There were critical breakdowns between the British civilian and military population. An examination of key disputes between Murray and the merchants in Montreal serve as a window on the problems caused by the many different sources of power and patronage within the colony.

There was another official presence in the colony over which the merchants had no control, the army. The final two chapters in this section discuss first, the economic impact of the garrison on the town and secondly, the impact of the army on the colony. Such an approach is necessary in order to gain a fuller understanding of the economic environment. The infrastructure of Quebec in terms of storehouses, warehouses, harbour facilities and the availability of vessels had been rendered virtually useless because of the war. From 1760 to 1764 the business needs of the merchants stood in sharp contrast to the food and clothing requirements of the soldiers. Vessels were taken on impress warrants, and the captains in the river trade were entrusted with the task of providing the necessaries for the trans-shipment of goods to Montreal and the upper posts. The provisioning of the army is examined in detail to show not only that it remained outside the control of the British merchants in the colony but that even shortfalls and periodic crises were dealt with from the American colonies and not from local resources. The port of Quebec was made the central depot for army provisions sent for all of the posts and this placed an almost intolerable strain on its facilities. The last chapter in this section analyses the impact of the soldiers on the community. The army did not bring much in the way of direct benefits to the local economy at first, and after 1764 the army engaged in a series of cost-cutting measures. The wood contracts which were a large expenditure for the British garrison brought steady amounts of hard currency into the colony, but not directly into the hands of the merchants.

Relations between the merchants and the soldiers were strained at times. At Quebec relations were generally cordial, but at Montreal the problem of billeting raised tempers on both sides. After 1764 Murray was Governor in Chief. The British community was dismayed to see that soldiers still had to be billeted on private homes. Merchants had not profited directly from the presence of an army and now that peace was restored they wished to be rid of them. Thus, this section attempts to bring a new understanding of the constraints and barriers the merchants faced while trading and working at Quebec. They were affected by the lack of an infrastructure in the colony and by competition for scarce resources with the provisioners. They were also affected by decisions taken in London which brought changes to the east and west boundaries of the colony.

CHAPTER TWO - THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO THE BRITISH CONQUEST OF QUEBEC

Anglo-French hostilities in Canada ended in Montreal with the capitulation of New France led by the Marquis de Vaudreuil on 8 September 1760. The global war between these two European nations continued for two more years and, therefore, Quebec was held by the British under a military regime until the Peace of Paris was signed in March 1763. At first Canada was divided into the three administrative and military districts of Quebec, Montreal and Trois Rivières. James Murray stayed on as the Governor in Chief of the new colony because of political lobbying by his friends in London, confirmed by the hasty retreat of the other two potential candidates, Brigadiers Monckton and Townshend.[1] Murray held this post from 1763 until 1768. To observers in London, Murray seemed the perfect choice for the post of military governor of Quebec, but a less obvious choice to head the civil government. In fact his aristocratic background, his family's political connections (though some of these brought notoriety) and his long service in the British army made him the perfect candidate for such a colonial posting. In the eighteenth century it was often the case that political patronage rather than ability was responsible for success in the job market. While it is true that Murray obtained the post because of his good connections to the ministry in London, it is clear from his correspondence that he was very interested in, and conscientious about, his posting.

A brief look at Murray's problems in Quebec from the beginning of civil government shows the mixed signals which he received from London and the practical barriers that stood in the way of the efficient running of even one small corner of the empire. The chaos and uncertainty in Quebec in the 1760s had less to do with Murray and his temperament than with the intransigence of successive English ministries who wanted to reach a reasonable settlement for the new colony but seemed incapable of completing this task. In this chapter then the study of the economic problems of Quebec will be broadened into a detailed assessment of the larger political and economic framework within which Murray operated. This approach will, in turn, reveal the conflicting forces at work in post conquest Quebec.

By the articles of the negotiated peace, Quebec became a British colony - part of the newly forming empire - but the home government took another year to send instructions and commissions to the new Governor. By the Royal Proclamation of 1763 George III and his ministers treated Quebec the same as his other new acquisitions. In choosing a unitary settlement the Crown overlooked the potential problem of assimilating a European people within the bounds of a British empire and ignored the economic needs of the colony. Murray came to understand Quebec in a way that the men who framed the Royal Proclamation did not. In an age of political patronage it was lucky that Murray was chosen for the post, because at the very least, he had been resident in the province since 1759 and was aware of its potential problems. Most political appointments to Quebec were sold to deputies in London and the patentees never caught sight of the shores of the St. Lawrence.

A military man from the age of sixteen, Murray's experiences with merchants were limited to the sutlers who supplied the army. There were no well educated and well informed London or Glasgow merchants, ledgers and cashbooks in hand in these ranks. The sutlers foraged for the army and monopolized the soldier's buying power with their tinker-like variety of necessaries and extras such as liquor. Amherst had invited such a group of merchants from New York and Massachusetts to come to Quebec and promised them a captive market.[2] All of Murray's dealings with merchants to date came from his military experience. This experience could not all have been adverse for sutlers played an important role in the well being of the army, and usually travelled with the same regiment time and again. In the first season of the British occupation, merchants were called upon to help during the severe food shortages of 1761, but the good will from their effort did not last long. One reason why merchants were regarded with such suspicion was because they were selling goods in towns where there was little or no specie in circulation and compensated for this by buying up French bills of exchange at very high discounts. Murray thought that this was not quite honest and worried even more when he learned that he was to be responsible for registering these bills in anticipation of a future settlement by the French crown.[3] He was to record who had the bills and in what quantity and then examine under what circumstances the bills had been purchased.

Throughout his tenure at Quebec Murray involved himself in every possible detail of the regulation and smooth running of the economy. Through his letters we can see that he thought the economy was something to be planned and controlled. Murray was happiest when he felt that he had ultimate control, meaning that any unwelcome measure could be enacted with the full weight of military power if necessary, although he never envisioned having to do this.

Murray believed that the continued good will of the Canadians towards the British was a necessity but because of his military background and recent war experiences, he was also sure that the best way to keep the Canadians loyal was for a Governor to be able to call on his military power. There were also various attempts to settle soldiers in the colony, and while the land grants offered were generous, there were rival schemes aimed at having soldiers return to their homelands. In Dublin a society offered £5 premiums to the first 100 soldiers who would settle on life leases in Ireland, while in Scotland the Trustees for the Forfeited Estates promised soldiers and sailors free land or fishing boats. Several villages were settled through these offers.[4] There were many other opportunities for disbanded soldiers and therefore no guarantee that a large number of them would settle in Quebec.

Murray's letters reveal his belief that in order to keep Canada within the British Empire, the British had to earn the respect of

Canadians; this viewpoint took precedence over pandering to the merchants by allowing an assembly to operate in the colony. This position posed a dilemma - Murray could not give the British in the colony a general assembly because it would be unfair to the Canadians, yet by denying this right to the British settlers he was showing both groups how arbitrary British rule could be.

In the final analysis, the political settlement in Canada was not controlled by Murray but by his political masters in London, and the 1760s were a decade of political instability. The search for the meaning and purpose of empire was well underway, but the differences between a theoretical settlement in London and its actual effect on the empire was soon to became apparent. This dichotomy was especially true of the debates in the House over the East India Company and the empire in the East. It should be kept in mind that these were the early days of the global British empire and broad settlements from one end of the earth to the other were practical only when they showed some flexibility locally and when they were closely supervised.

The fate of Quebec was one of many items on the ministerial agenda after the war ended. Until the recent work by Philip Lawson on the peace settlement, it was argued that there was some debate about whether the British government should seek to keep Canada or Guadaloupe. Contemporary opinions ranged from using Canada as a bargaining chip in negotiations with France, or keeping it and halting French presence, and so end its threat to the Atlantic empire.[5] Neither the lobby of the West Indies merchants against the keeping of Guadaloupe nor the strategic argument for keeping Quebec tell the whole story. Lawson has shown in his most recent work, which examines the decision-making process at the peace negotiations from the Hague conversations to the actual signing of the treaty, that the French did not want New France back and that British negotiators were well aware of this. From as early as 1761 British ministers were conscious of the fact that they could be left with Canada.

The road towards peace had not been straightforward since the hardliners in Cabinet, Pitt, Temple and Halifax had wanted to continue the fight but the King wished for peace. Pitt and Temple had to resign late in 1761 after the cabinet rejected their war aims. The new ministry included Bute, Newcastle, Halifax and the Earl of Egremont with Grenville in the Commons. Murray had some connections with this group of politicians, as we can see from his appointment as Governor in Chief, but even this ministry, which had the ear of the King, would not be enough to produce a clear policy for the newly acquired territory. First of all, the decade was one of political upheaval, changes of ministry and more than one reorganization of colonial responsibilities. It was not until the end of the decade that the position of Colonial Secretary was created and even then it would be virtually powerless in its first year of operation because of the jealously guarded jurisdictions of other departments. There were many questions outstanding on the role of overseas possessions that still remained to be thrashed out and policy decisions were a matter of juggling information from a variety of sources and passing them on to the Treasury and Customs Board. Nothing was done quickly because there was no colonial office to plan things - power was vested in ministers and there was no separation of domestic and colonial issues. The possessions of Great Britain were Great Britain. Colonial issues were not handled as foreign affairs; they had no special claim on the time of the House of Commons and no specific ministers in charge of them. Finding solutions to problems was not helped at all by the power struggles between the Treasury and the Secretary of State for control on matters of executive policy. The Board of Trade, the Customs Board, and the Plantations Committee of the Privy Council were all attempting to gather some control over colonial affairs for themselves. It was generally agreed by all three bodies that military rule had to be ended in Quebec and civil government established, but there the agreement ended.

In May 1763 the Earl of Egremont passed on a report on North America to the Board of Trade and asked for an answer that would include views on the political settlement for North America. The response of Shelburne with its recommendations for boundaries and civilian rule came in June of the same year. By the time the reports were made public Egremont had died. The government would probably have continued to procrastinate had it not been for the crisis caused by Pontiac's rising. Instead, they were forced into action before they were ready. Shelburne's recommendation of a government-in-council was thrown out by Halifax, the new Southern Secretary, in favour of representative government. Such action illustrates that little account had been taken of the realities of governing Quebec. The reports of Burton, Gage and Murray which shall be discussed later, were not even considered until after the Proclamation had been publicly declared. A high turnover in the decision-making personnel involved with the new acquisitions was a recurring problem in policy making for Quebec. Egremont had initially wanted civil government with legislative powers vested in a governor and council. Shelburne did not like the idea of an assembly and wanted power to rest with a governor in council, but this position was anathema to Halifax who was a staunch Whig and believed an assembly was the only way to proceed. The contest was over which department would be the final arbiter in the Canada question. Halifax and Egremont were loath to see the Board of Trade increase its status at their expense and both doubted its ability to find equitable solutions to colonial problems.

In the end, the personal view of Halifax prevailed - he believed that to make the new territory a place where British people would want to settle, it was necessary to provide them with the same constitutional settlement that they would have had at home. All that was left was to find a suitable man to put into practice the hastily formulated policy of London. Murray was at Quebec, and he felt that his talents were not being suitably rewarded; he saw this as his chance to prove himself. He proudly refused to curry the favour of anyone but Pitt and the King, but he wanted the job.[6] If he had understood that he would not have both civil and military control of the province it is doubtful that he would have been so anxious to assume these responsibilities. He was first and foremost a military man. It was standard procedure that British troops overseas were always under military and never under the civil command of a governor and Murray must have been aware of this fact.[7]

As soon as Murray was placed in charge of the colony there were a number of issues that he had to deal with, but before he could take any practical steps, he had to wait for his instructions to arrive. The Instructions and his Commission did not reach him until the autumn of 1764, although his letters are full of frenzied enquiries about them.[8] The Instructions themselves show that the British government really had no idea that the scope of its acquisitions from the late war had moved the British empire into a new era. The Proclamation also showed little regard for the local economic strengths of Canada when it cut off its eastern and western hinterlands.[9] Of the two documents the Instructions are the most helpful in understanding the approach of the British government to its new acquisitions.

The eighty-two clauses in the Instructions cover everything from the most fundamental issues of the need for an assembly to making sure that the laws on blasphemy, fornication and other vices are upheld.[10] Only in clause 28 on the liberty of Catholics to worship, clause 41 allowing anyone to return to France and clause 42 allowing those who owned land to register it, are the Canadians even mentioned. Neither the British ministry nor the British people were totally ignorant of conditions in Quebec. Even after the military victory Murray had kept the ministry well informed of the social as well as the geographical state of the colony; yet little of this information was taken into account in the decision-making process. There was, though, nothing unique in British policy-makers making mistakes in their policy decisions covering imperial matters as would be seen in the case of the administration of India in the 1760s.

The first half of the Instructions set out who should be on the council, how much land newcomers should receive, how to do the provincial accounts and how to hand out offices. These were perfectly normal instructions for a place with a large English population, but were hardly fit for Quebec. Murray's Commission was not much better. It gave him the power to call an assembly whenever circumstances allowed, one to be duly elected by the majority of freeholders. It is obvious from its references to cities, boroughs, ports and harbours that this was a standard format and was not one put together specifically for Quebec. Why had Murray's report and the reports of others, including merchants, on the state of Quebec failed to have any impact at Whitehall? This is a difficult question to answer but some general comments can be made. It took almost two years after the Proclamation was published for ministers to address the question of the Quebec settlement. This was partly because they had been rushed into a settlement in 1763. There were too many departments handling colonial affairs and issues from the colonies arrived in the various departments in a jumbled heap. In the end it took the British government until 1774 to respond to the very special demands of Quebec.

Even before the settlement had been framed Murray was in control of the colony and an examination of the colony under his steady hand in both the period of martial law and under civilian government provides an excellent opportunity to see the merchant community at work and to discuss the impact of the army upon the economy. What follows, therefore, is a discussion of the army and the economy in general, with the emphasis on the interventions of the military governors; and how these actions affected the formation of the early mercantile community in Quebec under British rule.

The first problem that Murray faced was in the winter of 1759 when he had to find food and shelter for over 7000 troops and an equal number of civilians.[11] This was no easy task in a town devastated by war where over 500 houses had burned, including almost all of lower town.[12] The troops therefore had to camp on the Plains where they were kept well away from the civilians. By all accounts it was a severe winter not helped by the chronic shortages of food, fuel and shelter and Murray's letters detail the scurvy and dysentery among his men which even imbibing spruce beer could not prevent. [13] In his correspondence with Governor Whitmore of Louisbourg in the summer of 1760, Murray showed he was not willing to let these problems go unattended. He ordered a supply of coals for the winter and "a large amount of grates to burn them in and vessels to carry it all".[14] He requested that these supplies be sent no matter what the expense, and if it were true that the Louisbourg garrison was to be dismantled, then he would take all their bedding as well. He made the request again at the end of the month but this time offered the Good Intent to freight it back to Quebec.[15]

During that first winter only three thousand of the seven thousand men could be relied on to be fit for active duty.[16] To maintain order the sale of liquor was restricted. Ships' captains were ordered not to dock anywhere but Quebec and to unload their full cargoes in case they tried to provision the habitants who could use these goods to feed the enemy.[17] On September 22, 1760 Murray, Gage and Burton were put in command of the three towns in the new territory and soon got down to the business of running them under martial law. The first regulation to be passed was on currency, closely followed by a consultation with Canadian and British merchants on fair market prices for grain and flour; the regulations were then published.[18] A census was also ordered of all livestock and grain in the parishes.[19] At Montreal, Gage regulated liquor sales by requiring responsible citizens to apply for licences and he ended the wanderings of the country peddlars who kept the price of provisions high. There were a number of people who set themselves up in the countryside as retailers despite this order and had to be brought to heel by the commanding officers in the parishes and courts of inquiry, like the one held in St. Aubin which Sir William Hervey described so vividly in his journals; helped control the problem.[20] The arrest of peddlars and confiscation of their goods brought the rest of the merchants into line and helped stop the monopolization of provisions in times of dire need. Such interference in the workings of the economy continued well into 1763 when Gage ordered that merchandise could not be sold in the streets or squares. This was in response to merchant criticism that artisans could make better profits because of lower overheads, whereas merchants had to rent premises to work from because their operations involved such large amounts of merchandise.

From the very beginning there was a problem with a shortage of funds in the colony. It was only in May 1760 that the colony received any cash, a lump sum of £20,000 and Murray complained that it was not much considering the garrison had been without pay for nine months.[21] There were so many different kinds of coins in circulation that tables of equivalencies had to be set up. The Halifax rate was in use in Quebec and the New York rate in Montreal until Murray reorganized both in 1764 to bring some form of standardization to the whole colony. The British also limited the use of leather money to a maximum value of one shilling.[22] Murray suggested to Egremont in his 1762 report that the lack of currency should be one of the home government's top priorities. He explained that because of the lack of specie the English merchants could not sell their goods, and that the best response would be for the government to send a lump sum over to allow commerce to continue unabated. Murray proposed that the tidy sum of £100,000 sterling would do, but indicated that even then his problems would not be over because the Canadians would likely not use the money in case it proved as unreliable as French paper had been in 1760. To build confidence in English currency he thought some of it could be handed out as home repair loans, merchants could use it to pay duties and the civil government could use it for public works.[23]

Another general concern of the military administration was to maintain a contented population. One way to do this was to fix prices. In 1760 the sale of wheat and bread was regulated in the town of Quebec and there were heavy fines for any violations.[24] Clerks of the court became inspectors of bakeries and butcher shops, they stamped the goods that passed muster and these were then sold for amounts determined by a standard chart of prices.[25] Even bread came in three categories each with its own price. Licences were also a necessity in the provisioning trade.[26] There was a very real chance of famine in the winter of 1759-60 and again the following year. The British merchants gathered £500 and handed it over for the purchase of provisions while Murray and Amherst corresponded regularly about which colonial city could best provide supplies. The Quebec garrison also chipped in by handing over some of the soldier's provisions each week to help fend off famine.[27]

A number of measures were taken to ensure that there was a minimum of contact at first between the army and civilian population. When the guard was mounted in the town the men were not dismissed until they were back at the garrison.[28] Any non-commissioned officer who owed money to the merchants for goods purchased on credit and who did not pay was to be reduced to the ranks.[29] To maintain good will between the occupiers and the occupied, it was ordered in November 1759 that any measures having to do with the general population were to be published in both languages so that there were no misunderstandings. The task of the governors, and especially of Murray, was to keep order in Quebec until the peace was signed. Murray managed to accomplish this by maintaining good relations with the Canadians. Despite problems with the currency and with food shortages Murray did a remarkably good job. He established a council of seven which included two well respected Canadians, a few merchants and his most trusted companions. Throughout the period all instructions for Murray came through Jeffrey Amherst with whom he was on the best of terms. He appears to have been devoted to Amherst and took it very badly when Amherst returned to England and was replaced by Thomas Gage, former Governor of Montreal.

Murray wrote to Pitt on October 22, 1760 with his observations on the colony. This was one of his first deliberations on the newly conquered territory and it provides us with his first impressions of Quebec and its people.[30] This letter has been generally ignored by historians in favour of the Report of 1762; this lack of interest is unfortunate because his observations paint a vivid picture of the potential of the colony. In Murray's estimation there did not appear to be any trouble looming on the horizon, especially from the hard working habitants. He estimated the population at 80,000, most of them landholders, except for the small urban populations found in the three towns. Habitants were portrayed as self-sufficient farmers who could turn their hand to anything but who were easily led because they had been so isolated. He gloried in the magnificence of the St Lawrence and the potential the land held for the production of naval stores. This preoccupation with naval stores was typical - colonies were most often judged on two criteria: their ability to absorb and pay for British manufactured goods or on their ability to give the Navy a secure supply of naval stores including pitch, tar, hemp, flax and most of all, masts. In fact Quebec had neither the immediate ability to absorb manufactured goods nor could it fulfill the second criterion.

Murray extolled the virtues of the east coast fisheries. He saw great potential for the future as did the merchants at Quebec. The east coast fisheries were the town of Quebec's equivalent of the fur trade. The fisheries had been very productive in the French regime and at first were targeted by those British merchants who had large amounts of cash at their disposal. Interested as he was in the east coast, Murray was also very interested in the fur trade. He jumped, quite naturally, to a number of conclusions about the fur trade and the economic merit of the colony when he assumed that it was the corruption of former French governors that had kept it from being self-sufficient. Murray's letter to Pitt was optimistic, emphasizing how diligent the Canadians were, how rich the resources of the province were and how only mismanagement would cause the colony to be a financial drain on Great Britain. He expressed the hope that the example of his well regulated management of Quebec would somehow end a century of attachment to the French Crown and bring the colonists into the orbit of British influence. In the meantime he opened the fur trade to all, promised to keep watch in case the Indians were mistreated and put an agent in charge of the King's Posts to maintain some continuity of local trade practices. The agent, Thomas Ainslie, was told to go there and compile an account of furs already there, as well as compile a census of all grain and cattle, and then find out what trade goods were necessary to run the posts. If the commissary clerks there refused to comply, they were to become members of the ranks of the unemployed.[31] At the same time Murray wrote to Lord Colvill of the Admiralty, explaining the importance of the posts and how they operated and asked for a passport for Ainslie to move freely to and from the area.[32] This did not have the desired effect for later in the year Murray told Pitt that Colvill had allowed the produce of the posts to be claimed as a Navy prize and sold by Colvill's order.[33] Murray was also kept busy with the question of dutiable goods, and with the difficulties of supplying the garrison, but his main task in the early years was to compile a comprehensive report on the colony.

Murray's report of 1762 is well enough known to historians but there are a few sections which are of special interest.[34] In his observations he pointed out that the Intendants had fixed prices on provisions to the detriment of the colonists; the fact that he fixed prices himself seems to have escaped his notice. He gave an excellent account of the revenues and expenses of the government before 1759, including all duties that were customarily levied, and this information gave the British government a sound basis from which to impose duties after 1763. Overall the report confirmed that New France was a normal and well regulated colony which in either regime would require a similar type of handling through the same political and practical infrastructure - public works, crown officials, courts, forts and garrisons. Murray then produced a well thought out plan for the colony which focused first on its potential to create income. He expected that a duty on spirits would bring enough to support the civil establishment. He would have liked to revive the duty on wine but he thought the habitants could ill afford it, and, more importantly, thought this would not endear them to the British. He would have liked to keep the old tax on houses which used to be collected to help support the barracks, but because of the post war state of the town, this was not possible. There had been a duty of 3% on dry goods before 1759 but he counselled that this should not be revived. He shared the European prejudice against the habitants keeping too many horses - both the French and the English felt that this was a luxury and that more importantly it decreased the amount of fodder for the cattle in winter - therefore he toyed with the idea of imposing a tax on horses. Murray introduced the idea, later followed up by Carleton, that the civil officers be given small salaries rather than fees. As in the report to Pitt, he discussed in detail the land and what it was capable of producing. His estimation of the habitants had changed radically in two years because he now claimed that they were not skilled in farming, but made up for this deficiency by hunting and fishing. His attitude was typical of eighteenth century European reflections on farmers who did not practice new techniques and use the new agricultural tools available.

Murray was interested in scientific agriculture and practised it at his Quebec farm, Sans Bruit. He wrote to his brother George that he was going to improve his new farm systematically and to send him ploughmen, milkmaids, a farm bailiff and seeds.[35] Murray had a personal interest in agriculture and he corresponded on a number of occasions with John Watts, a prominent New York merchant, and as early as October 1762 Watts was ordering for Murray, "12 gallons of the best Sainfoin grass seed and 30 lbs Lucern grass seed" from Moses Franks in London.[36] In a letter to Murray, Watts told him that he was sending up carrot seeds as soon as he could get a vessel and wondered if the camomile seeds had reached Quebec yet.[37] A more interesting exchange between the two took place in 1763 when

Murray asked for black slaves to be bought and sent to work his farm and Watts responded: "I can find none that can be recommended who will go, they look upon it as an exile whence they may never return". He went on to point out that it was the custom in the northern states for slaves of any character to choose their new masters and concluded that "there is no persuading them to leave their country, their acquaintances and friends, to explore to what their narrow minds appears a New World".[38] Murray had asked Watts for black slaves because he had thought better of using soldiers as farm workers and had found that the Canadians "will only work for themselves". He enquired in the northern colonies for slaves because he was aware that southern slaves would not survive the extreme climate of Quebec and he was willing to buy wives for the slaves to keep them happy and help them on the farm.[39] On the subject of enslaved colonials being unwilling to come North, Watts was also unable to persuade even a black cook, who when informed of his destination, "has gone out of the way... if we find him we'll send him to Albany" but later when found, turned sullen and " has taken to drinking". Watts was afraid to send him in case he disgraced the Governor.[40] Murray often ordered goods from England through Watts who was well connected through marriage to the Franks family who held the army provisioning contract for North America, and to the New York mercantile elite: the Schulyers, Van Courtlands and the DeLanceys. Watts dealt in Quebec mainly with William Brymer who was the Victualling Agent for the contractors in England but who also procured goods for Murray which ranged from the mundane request for wire cages to guard meat from the local insects, to procuring a variety of seeds.[41]

Murray was keen on farming but for the purposes of the Report of 1762 it was not agriculture that caught his eye but the possibilities of mineral deposits and the production of hemp. Much has been made of Murray's sympathy for the Canadians but nowhere is this less apparent and nowhere do his eighteenth century mercantilist leanings shine more clearly than in the pages of this report. As previously mentioned, he was aware that the hemp and flax supply of the Navy was subject to interruptions during wartime and he suggested that Canada could, with encouragement, become its major supplier. Hemp-growing had been encouraged during the French regime since France as a major European power had the same requirements for its Navy as the English. For two decades after the War of Spanish Succession hemp was a protected industry in New France and the huge cash bonuses brought hemp production up from 200lbs. in 1722 to 44,000lbs. by the end of the decade. In the decade following, prices dropped and, as the price of wheat increased, the amount of hemp harvested dropped radically until by the late 1740s it had faded to nearly nothing.[42] Murray was unaware of all of this information and his interest in reviving the hemp trade would have involved a change in the habitants' farming practices that would have forced women and children to work through the winter preparing the hemp for export. This revival, of course, would have a double bonus for the British - the change in labour practices would not allow them time to make their own clothing anymore and so they would have to buy British manufactures which they could now afford after the sale of their hemp. The British would have a stable supply of hemp and sell more manufactured goods, and the Quebec countryside would have been turned from self-sufficiency and towards cottage industries. Such a scheme is particularly interesting because the British merchants in Quebec were at the same time trying to work out how to gain a foothold in the seemingly self-sufficient world of the Quebec countryside. Some of them came up with different solutions which ranged from potash factories to distilleries.

Murray and his contemporaries believed that there was money to be made in furs and fish and that agriculture ran a distant third. This attitude towards these three natural resources is another interesting point and one that will resurface later. As we have seen before, the only time that Canadian merchants fully participated in the international economy was when there was a wheat surplus in the 1730s. In the first years of British rule there was trouble enough fending off famine, but full agricultural recovery was not long in coming although prices stayed low until 1766.[43] There is scanty documentation on the price of wheat within the colony but the letter books of Samuel Jacobs which cover the period from 1761 until 1768 indicate the changes in price and we know the value of wheat exports to England and can fit this into the wheat tables kept in the English counties. One way for merchants to keep their businesses profitable was to trade British manufactures for the habitants' grain. At first even this trade had not been possible without permits from the military governor. After all, with little or no money in circulation there had to be something to trade for imports.

Murray emphasized once more the importance of the fisheries, especially those in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and pointed out from these settlements, harbours and shipbuilding facilities could easily grow. In effect, he accepted the idea of wintering. The fact that he was so well informed on the benefits of the East coast fisheries shows clearly what types of contacts he had made in the colony. It was the seigneurs and well to do Canadian merchants who had fishing concessions on the coast and who knew exactly how much could be made from exports, not only in fish, but train oil, sealskin and whalebone. In another area Murray erroneously led the ministers to believe that wood suitable for masts could be provided at a lower cost from the colony than from New England. He did not, however, provide any details of how he had come to this conclusion. In fact New England masts were far superior to those found in Canada. The French had held the same idea believing that the quality of Canadian wood varied so much that it could not be relied upon and was neither strong or long enough to replace Scandinavian masts.[44]

In the report Murray did manage to pin-point some of the potential growth areas in the economy which the British merchants would apply themselves to in the near future - hemp, flax and potash. He thought that potash in particular could be produced more cheaply in Quebec than in

England, but there proved to be too many obstacles to overcome for potash to be a profitable venture in the early years. Potash production had been encouraged as far back as the mid 17th century under Jean Talon. The first potash factory was built in 1670 and not only did it fail to prosper but an earthquake cracked its furnaces and it did not last until the end of the century.[45] The trouble was that potash production was expensive and the habitants would not cooperate by bringing in their wood ashes. Overall, the report exuded enthusiasm for the great potential of the country. In England this exuberance spilled over into the pages of the British press which extolled the virtues of the colony and showed it worthy of the attention of British entrepreneurs.[46] Along with this report Murray also sent a letter to Egremont, Secretary of State which stated in no uncertain terms some of the most basic difficulties he faced in the colony and it was here that he declared the Canadians not yet ready for the typical forms of British colonial government.[47] Clearly, the British did not have to start from a position of ignorance when they took control of New France in 1763. The report of 1762 and ministerial correspondence of Murray shows that the economic condition of the colony was one area that had been examined in detail in the years leading up to the transfer of power. Many of the problems which would plague Murray in his years as Governor in Chief had already been identified by 1762, but it was the slow response of the London ministry that caused them to drag on for upwards of a decade.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER TWO

1.Stephen Usherwood, "Conquered Canada. General James Murray's Impressions, 1762", History Today, XXIX (1979) p.350.

2.A.L. Burt, The Old Province of Quebec 1760-1778 (Toronto : The Macmillan Company, 1957), p.91.

3.MG 11 Q Series Vol. 1., 9 December 1763. Halifax to Murray.

4.David Macpherson, Annals of Commerce, Manufactures, Fisheries, and Navigation Vol.3. (Edinburgh : Mundell and Sons, 1805), p.378.

5.The account of British politics in the 1760s which follows in the next four pages is indebted to Philip Lawson, The Imperial Challenge. Quebec and Britain in the Age of the American Revolution (Montreal : McGill-Queen's Press, 1990), pp.13-36 and page 104.

6.Cromartie Correspondence Bundle XXII. 17 July 1761. Murray to George, former Earl of Cromartie.

7.Wetherell, p.293.

8.MG 11 Q Series Vol. 1., 27 September 1763. Murray to Egremont. and MG 11 Q Series Vol. 2., 24 April 1764. Murray to the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations.

9.Adam Shortt and Arthur G Doughty eds., Documents relating to the Constitutional History of Canada 1759-1791, volume one (Ottawa : Printed by order of Parliament, 1918), pp. 163-167.

10.Ibid., pp.181-204.

11.Hilda Neatby, Quebec the Revolutionary Age, 1760-1791 (Toronto : McClelland and Stewart, 1966), p.18.

12.Wetherell, p.69.

13.Usherwood, p.351.

14.MG23 GII Series 1, Vol.1., 9 June 1760. Murray to Whitmore.

15.MG23 GII Series 1, Vol.1., 9 June 1760. Murray to Whitmore.

16.Wetherell, p.75.

17.MG23 GII Series 1, Vol.1., 29 May 1760. Murray to Pitt.

18.Burt, p.19.

19.MG23 GII Series 1, Vol.1., November 1759.

20.William Hervey, Journals of the Hon. William Hervey in North America and Europe From 1755 to 1814 with Order Books at Montreal, 1760-1763 (Bury St. Edmunds : Paul & Matthew,1906) p.180. 23 March 1763.

21.MG23 GII Series 1, Vol.1., 19 May 1760. Murray to Amherst.

22.Fernand Ouellet, Economic and Social History of Quebec 1760-1850 (Ottawa : Gage Publishing Ltd., 1980), p.60.

23.MGII Q Series, Vol.1., 7 June 1762. Murray to Egremont enclosed with the Report on the state of Quebec.

24.Wetherell, pp.93-94.

25.Ouellet, p.54.

26.MG23 GII Series 1, Vol. 1. January 15, 1760.

27.Wetherell, p.87.

28.MG23 GIII 23 Vol.4., 17 August 1762. John Nairne Papers Orderly Books, Folio number 5.

29.MG23 GIII 23 Vol.4., 26 November 1762. Orderly Books, Folio number 5.

30.MG23 GII, Series I, Vol.3., 22 October 1760. Murray to Pitt.

31.MG23 GII Series 1, Vol.1., 23 June 1760. Instructions to Thomas Ainslie, Agent for the Posts.

32.MG23 GII Series 1, Vol.1., 26 June 1760. Murray to Colvill.

33.MG23 GII Series 1, Vol.1., 22 October 1760. Murray to Pitt.

34.MG8 EI. 5 June 1762. Report of the Government of Quebec and dependencies thereof 1762.

35.Mahon, p.314.

36.Letter Book of John Watts merchant and councillor of New York (New York : New York Historical Society Collections LXI, 1928), 27 October 1762. Watts to Franks.

37.Ibid., 10 April 1763. Watts to Murray.

38.Ibid., 4 July 1763. Watts to Murray.

39.MG23 GII Series 1, Vol.1., 2 November 1763. Murray to Watts.

40.Letter Book of John Watts, 4 July 1763. Watts to Murray.

41.Ibid., 16 December 1762. Watts to Franks.

42.Reid, p.246.

43.Ouellet, p.55.

44.Reid, p.248.

45.Ibid., p.251.

46.Philip Lawson, " 'The Irishman's Prize' : Views of Canada from the British Press 1760-1774." Historical Journal 28 (1985) : 586-87.

47.MGII Q Series, Vol.1., 5 June 1762. Murray to Egremont.

CHAPTER THREE - EVOLUTION OF THE POST CONQUEST ECONOMY

The Proclamation had come as a great relief to the British population in Quebec. It meant the end of martial law and the promise of an assembly. The British merchants of Quebec, many of whom had now been there since 1760, felt confident that the future held good prospects. Some had been in regular contact with London merchants and this contact extended past their business transactions into the realm of politics. Their petitions to the ministry in London of 1764 and 1765 show exactly what economic prospects they saw for Quebec and what difficulties lay in the way of prosperity. By the terms of the Proclamation the merchants had lost the east coast fisheries and Pontiac's rising had effectively closed the west to most traders. The only mercantile occupation left untouched after 1763 was participation in the transatlantic trade as consignees, retailers or wholesalers of imported goods. But the costs of participation in this trade were high. Civil government did not bring merchants the freedom that they had hoped for; they still had to abide by the rules laid down by the Governor and his council. Economic activity in the colony must therefore be considered within a framework which examines in detail the involvement of the Governor in the economy.

Murray did not receive his commission until August of 1764 and the year before passed slowly for him because while he realized that military rule should have ended, he could do nothing until his instructions arrived. The British merchants were upset at the speed of change but the business of governing had to go on and merchants were forced to vent their spleen in a petition to the Board of Trade in December 1763.[1] The Governor for his part, was forced to address the major problems in the economy from late 1763 until late 1764 without much in the way of help from the English ministry.

Murray corresponded regularly on a number of issues with the English ministry, with Burton at Montreal, and with George Ross his agent, in his first unofficial year as Governor. First of all there were the settling in problems to deal with, such as the need for an Admiralty court (which he could not have because he had not yet been made Admiral, though this was later rectified in the Instructions). Murray argued that although he had asked the Lords of Trade for a customs house and a collector, his hands were virtually tied because, even if smugglers were caught, there was no court of justice to try them in. He cited the case of two Jersey captains who, once informed that they were to be searched, put down anchor at Bic and brought him bills of lading claiming their cargoes were prize goods. It was obvious to Murray that these were in fact goods imported from France in violation of the Navigation Acts but, as he had no court, he had to let them go. The ships were later taken, condemned and sold by the Admiralty court at Halifax. The reason that Murray did not act was because he had been warned by the recently arrived Customs deputies, Tarrand and Crossley, that if he seized any vessel it had to be passed to the nearest Admiralty court and if anything happened en route, he would be personally responsible. On three occasions Murray mentioned this fact to the Lords of the Treasury but received no reply.[2]

Contraband trade continued to be the subject of much of his discussions. Halifax wrote in November 1763 to give his approval to Murray's plan to crack down on this activity by using cutters and shallops in the Anticosti area and of having all Naval officers examine boats at the fishing posts in the lower St. Lawrence. Ironically, Halifax counselled that since Murray's Instructions would be leaving London within a few days his troubles would soon be over because he would be given all the powers that he needed to run Quebec efficiently, including a commission as Vice Admiral. The knowledge that he was actually going to be given all the necessary powers for snuffing out contraband and the tantalizing thought that notice of these powers would be arriving soon, must have made the long wait of almost a year seem all the harder.[3] One reason that Murray was so keen to suppress contraband trade was because he had been reprimanded for not being careful enough with his control of the river trade in the first shipping season in consequence he wanted to crack down now to show that he was concerned to follow orders. In a letter to Newcastle in 1761 he explained that he had allowed wines from Spain and Portugal to come directly into the colony because he "did not know the plantation laws and thought it [his] duty to encourage imports of wines to a country deprived of every comfort by the ravages of war".[4] He had also allowed prize brandy from Gibraltar and some from the continent to clear the port because he had been willing to give the importers the benefit of the doubt and not accuse them of smuggling. In 1760 merchants in Quebec petitioned him to allow imports direct from Spain and Portugal and he responded by handing out eight passports for importing wine and fruits but not for brandy; and he removed duty on imported British spirits, except rum, in 1761. In a series of letters to the Treasury in 1762 he was forced to point out that huge amounts of brandy were entering Quebec illegally, despite his efforts to stop this practice. The reason that this was important was because the one source of revenue for the crown was from duties levied on alcohol imports and if the level of duty free British brandy remained at its 1761 level, revenues would suffer. This explained why the amount of duty collected that year was so low. He suggested an imposition of a 6d per gallon duty on brandy and an increase of 6d on spirits.[5]

The question of charging duty on liquor plagued him during his tenure as Governor in Chief and continued to confound the courts long after he was gone. Murray thought that since Canadians liked to drink a great deal this might well be the one and only way that he could legally, and without an Act of Parliament, raise revenue. As we have already seen, he was keen to show that Canada would not be a financial drain on Great Britain. Again, in 1763, in a letter to Egremont he pointed out that it would be possible to import a large amount of spirits and wine from Jersey and Guernsey, and at the same time the vessels could bring salt for the fisheries and return to England with a cargo of fish.[6] The response indicates that he was told to resubmit this proposal at a future date, it was soon all academic because it was decided that all foreign wines must clear customs in London before continuing on to the colonies.

Murray continued to collect the old French duties on wines and spirits, and, in return for a 5% commission, John Gray was appointed collector in November 1761.[7] The main bone of contention within the merchant community at Quebec was whether or not the government had the right to collect duties or taxes when there was no assembly, and whether or not British brandy came within the definition of brandy at all since French brandy was made from wine and the British spirit was made from corn. There was general agreement that the British equivalent had no right to be called brandy at all and that it could not be taxed, as it had not existed in Quebec during the French regime. The merchants quickly realized that they had a good argument and wasted no time in taking advantage of their sound legal position. In fact, in his Instructions, Murray had been directed to do nothing to affect the liberty of the King's subjects, including imposing duties and taxes and the merchants attempted to use this directive to their advantage by saying that maintaining the old French duties that they were unused to was wrong. John Gray informed Murray in November 1764 that merchants in Quebec were about to prosecute him for the amounts that he had already collected.[8] Murray swore to get Gray the best legal representation possible after receiving word from England that the original decision to collect the duty was to be upheld.[9] In London the government had its law officers Norton and DeGrey take Murray's action over duties in Quebec under consideration, and they declared it legal in August of 1764.[10] One year later Murray was still explaining his actions to the Lords of the Treasury. He pointed out that he had been unaware, until receiving his Instructions in 1764, that he was not to impose any duties. In the face of silence on the issue, by the Lords of the Treasury he had gone ahead and imposed duties and now, as a result, had to appoint the Attorney General to defend the collector John

Gray against the merchants.[11] It had been clear from correspondence between Murray and the English ministry, after his report of 1762 reached London, that duties were seen as the most favoured way to raise funds to support the civil establishment, and there was nothing in the letters from England which could have led Murray to believe that this was going to be a problem. The government eventually decided that only the amount necessary to cover government expenditure would be raised from the collection of duties. Murray was disappointed because he had hoped the revenues would bring in enough funds to allow for some reconstruction in the colony. At the same time, the British response speaks volumes about how optimistic the government in London was about the expected windfall from liquor duties, although the revenues from this sector had fallen from £13,000 during the French regime to £3,000 under Murray.[12] A full account of all duties paid amounting to £11,897 Halifax currency was made public in the Quebec Gazette on July 18, 1765. This list in the Gazette is an impressive collection of the variety of spirits and included ports of origin most of which were in the thirteen colonies. These colonial merchants felt that they were the victims of double taxation. In 1769 the two principal importers of rum from the New England colonies were Isaac Werden and John Mercier. It was such a lucrative trade that it continued to bring in over £1000 a year in 1763 and 1764, although this was far lower than the £9000 from the first two years of military rule. Murray made Thomas Ainslie Collector of Customs with the power to collect duties on spirits. This appointment was seen as a temporary measure to assert some control over the customs system and this responsibility was taken over by the Receiver General, upon his arrival in 1766.

In 1765 the Board of Trade began to examine how Murray had raised revenue since 1764.[13] The recommendation made to the Privy Council was that in future, proper authority should be given in one form or another to collect these duties. The government was sullied by being taken to court by its loyal subjects, but official thinking saw a self supporting colony as a necessity for the empire and this assumption meant the payment of duties was unavoidable.

A constant theme in Murray's letters to the English ministers was the chronic lack of funds. He complained to the Lords of the Treasury in July 1765 "that it is impossible without money to carry on the King's service" and, to emphasize this point, said that not only had he spent all the duties collected but had also drawn on the Treasury for £300 to pay some local merchants for services rendered. [14] Murray also wrote to the Lords of Trade, complaining of the impossibility of carrying on government in Quebec without a shilling. When they failed to respond, he contacted Halifax to bemoan the task of governing with no funds.[15] It is clear from his correspondence that by 1765 he was near the end of his tether.

Murray showed his impatience with the creakings of the government machinery in a tetchy letter to the Treasury in the autumn of 1765 where he pointed out that because of their lack of response and failure to make provisions for the province, he had been obliged to draw on them through his agent George Ross for £3000. [16] He also wasted no words in his explanation of why the duties had not been sufficient: there was approximately £3000 outstanding in liquor duties because of the pending court case. The Privy Council stepped in and tried to resolve the matter of duties. The merchants were put at arms length from the Governor by following Murray's lead and Grenville's plan of 1764 which had suggested giving a resident Receiver General and his collectors the power to collect the revenues previously collected by the French government.[17] This order was sent to Quebec at the end of 1765.

The Receiver General arrived just as Murray left for England but ran into trouble immediately with Colonel Paulus Irving who had been left in charge of the administration of the colony until the new Governor General, Guy Carleton, arrived. Irving informed Murray that this newly appointed official was an unfortunate choice because of his obstinacy and his inability to work with the council.[18] Thomas Mills, Receiver General, issued a proclamation almost immediately to warn the merchants that the collection of French duties was about to be rigorously enforced. Irving felt that rather than be so confrontational it would be better to have the Collector of Customs take in the duties and then pay them to the Receiver General.

Francis Maseres who replaced George Suckling as Attorney General in 1766 argued, in a report for the government that was suppressed, that any taxation of the inhabitants of Quebec should be done by an Act of Parliament so that its legality could not be questioned. Once in Quebec, Francis Maseres issued writs against the merchants who had yet to pay their duty. In the meantime, the merchants continued with their legal challenge. Their case was heard in October 1766 by the newly appointed chief justice who asked the jury to return a special verdict allowing him to refer the whole matter to London. The jury refused and returned a verdict of not guilty and repeated this two years later when Maseres tried once more to resolve the issue.[19] In 1767 Cramahe was made Acting Receiver General and was told by Mills to begin a suit for the collection of duties in June 1768. Instead of following these instructions Carleton wrote to the Treasury for further directions because he did not want to upset the merchants during the navigation season.[20] In the early months of 1769 a group of merchants began an action against the Collector of Customs, Thomas Ainslie, for overcharging them by 2d per gallon.[21] In the end, almost one year later, the charges were dropped when the Treasury offered to refund the excess.[22] This question of duties did not end with Murray, rather it outlasted two administrations.

The whole problem of the liquor duties and the problem of raising revenues to allow the civil government to run properly provides us with a window into how the bureaucracy worked both in Quebec and in London. Murray began collecting duties in 1760 and regulating the contraband trade by carrying on the French practice of using duties to raise the necessary revenues. It took the government in London five years to say, yes, this procedure is what we want and we will give you the power to continue. At times the ministers did say that this practice was indeed what they wanted and on occasion they hinted that they may give the necessary powers to the Governor in Chief to collect duties. But the constant turnover of ministers and the changing circumstances in Quebec meant that approval of the tactics and the power to implement them never coincided. Once military rule was ended, the last thing the merchants wanted was to be taxed; they had put up with taxes until 1764, but in essence, by not honouring their notes to pay duties they had voted against such a system. If they had been given a vote as soon as civil government was established they may have seen it differently because then they would have had a stake in the system and a voice in how the money was to be used. This point was made even more starkly in the presentments of the grand Jury of 1764. Refusal to pay the duties was more than just an argument over semantics - it was their way of saying that they would not cooperate in what seemed to them to be a dictatorship by Murray. Merchants in Quebec had contacts with London merchants with sound political connections. They knew that it had been Murray's idea to levy duties on British spirits and that he had tried to shut down the illicit trade from Guernsey. The ministers in London could only really respond once per season, twice at the most, to Murray's problems and requests. Thus these issues dragged on in a way that only continued to exacerbate bad feelings between those merchants involved and the Governor. It must have been equally frustrating for Murray who not only was unable to collect the duties properly, but was also held accountable for these revenues in London.

Another issue which consumed much of Murray's time and energies in the last year of military rule was the Mackenzie-Crokatt business. Simon Mackenzie was a Quebec merchant who ran into a little personal financial difficulty in 1763. Edward Harrison who acted as the agent for Charles Crokatt of London applied to Murray on behalf of Crokatt for debts owed.[23] Murray thought that this was rather odd and was worried about complying in case other people had claims on Mackenzie in his partnership with Montreal merchant, Forrest Oakes. Instead of acceding to the demand he immediately set up two boards representing the interests of both Mackenzie and Harrison. The ensuing discussions make for very interesting reading because of the care that Murray took to settle the matter fairly and because of the political pressure exerted from London to reverse his final decision. Halifax wrote that Crokatt had been to see him and that it looked as though his interests were being ill served, and he reminded Murray that Lord Egremont had already written to him on this same matter: Crokatt "asks me to remind you to look again so I remind you he is a merchant of credit and reputation in the city of London and I recommend you give every legal and proper assistance towards his obtaining justice".[24] In November 1763 Harrison sailed from London to Montreal via New York and had Oakes sign over the necessary monies to cover the debt. The issue had been brought to the attention of Murray by the time Mackenzie arrived. Since the two parties concerned were in the colony and Mackenzie felt that his interests had been misrepresented, Murray was asked to decide the case. Within each group of merchants chosen to decide on the matter there was a split. Some felt that the bill of sale from Oakes to Harrison was valid and decided that someone should be appointed to sell the effects of Mackenzie and Oakes while the other group said that the bill of sale was invalid because it was questionable whether or not a merchant could legally assign his effects to discharge one debt in preference to another. Eventually it was agreed by all that the effects of the partnership should go into the hands of a trustee with the money from the sale to be deposited until all claims on the men were settled.[25] Early the next year Murray told Halifax that those involved had reached an agreement and he sent a record of all stages of the proceedings along with the caveat that he was not being humble when he said he was not well versed in this type of dispute.[26] A trustee did indeed sell Mackenzie's goods at public auction and the money was held by Thomas Dunn, agent for the Deputy Paymaster of the Forces, while creditors worked out what they were owed.

More light was shed on the issue when, in 1765, Mackenzie wrote to Lord Bute giving his version of the events and in the process showing exactly why it had become such a contentious issue. When Murray set up two merchant boards to deal with the case, they handled it as a local problem, but Mackenzie's account raises some interesting new points. First, he was in London at the home of Charles Crokatt whom he employed as his London factor when the latter had him jailed for £24,000 in debts owed. Mackenzie made the case that this had come out of the blue and that he was in fact good for the sum mentioned if payment was due in the normal manner. Crokatt had tried to re-negotiate their agreement in his own favour and Mackenzie had threatened to change factors. Crokatt, to make a long story shorter than Mackenzie did, had him jailed, then used his political connections and his good name to have Bute, Egremont and Halifax all put pressure on Governor Murray to have the matter settled to his own satisfaction. The case was dismissed in England in February 1763 and it was then that Crokatt sent his agent Harrison laden with the letters from Bute and friends to Montreal where he arrived a few days ahead of Mackenzie who had recently been released from prison. Within three days of receiving these letters from three of the most influential political men in England, Murray had Mackenzie's books taken away to be examined. Mackenzie's version does not discuss the numerous meetings of the two boards and all the thought that went into deciding his case: he merely complained that his goods were sold in an arbitrary manner and for half of their real value. The crux of his argument was that Murray acted in an arbitrary manner influenced by letters from Bute and the others which were obtained under false pretenses. Mackenzie was careful not to offend the sensibilities of Bute or to accuse him of interfering with the wheels of justice; instead he used Murray as a scapegoat.[27] Perhaps because he was well aware of the bad blood between Murray and Gage, he chose to rub salt into Murray's wounds by pointing out that when he approached Gage, legal advice had been sought in New York. The result was that Mackenzie's goods were returned.

From Murray's correspondence we know that he felt himself too ignorant of the law to make an arbitrary decision and thus had "referred it as I always do to a Body of merchants".[38] Murray had also pointed out that he had not interfered initially because the goods in question were in Montreal, and that was outside his jurisdiction, and that he had been told that it had been settled by mutual agreement.[39] The letter of Mackenzie to Bute should be seen less as a searing indictment of Murray and his economic policies than as Mackenzie's attempt to use some measure of political manoeuvering. His case was before the Board of Trade in June 1765 and it was resolved in his favour. In the final paragraph he told Bute that he hoped to meet with him and convince him of the hardship he had suffered.

Both Crokatt and Mackenzie had tried to use the judicial system to their own good. When they had been unable to reach a decision in England they chose to move to the colonial sphere where the British system would perhaps not run the same course. They were right. It did not, and could not because it was at the time a British acquisition by the skin of its teeth and rudimentary problems such as the justice system were still unresolved. If he had thought that he could beat the system then Crokatt was disappointed because his letters did not have the desired effect. We have only Mackenzie's letter to Bute to show that he was the wronged party, but the fact that the case against him was dismissed should count for something. Interestingly enough, it was one of the few times when important political figures chose to exert any pressure on the outcome of anything happening in Quebec, and, unlike all other problems in Quebec, it was as quick a response time as anyone could have asked for. This political pressure, expressed in the pages of the letters he received on the question from various politicians, must have made Murray take notice and try to settle the affair quickly. High level interference made this one of the few areas of dispute that was settled quickly. Without it, the case would undoubtedly have dragged on long enough for Murray to have seen it resolved in England and not in Quebec.

The two merchant groups given the task of resolving the Mackenzie-Crokatt business concerned themselves with a very different problem than either Mackenzie or Crokatt who simply wanted a decision on whether or not Crokatt should receive the money that he claimed he was owed. The merchant body was, instead, in an uproar trying to decide whether or not it was legal for one merchant to be paid back while there were other creditors to pay. Mackenzie must certainly have been frustrated by this outcome because it was like haggling over a disbursement and ignoring whether or not it should have been made in the first place.

The Governor always operated at a disadvantage: he was in charge of a new acquisition and the rules which he had to follow were made in reaction to crises. The merchants thought that civil government would allow them the freedom to control their own affairs: instead, it seemed that it brought with it the same high degree of observation and intervention by the Governor they had been subject to under the military period. In what other province or colony would a Governor be in charge of so few subjects that he could have personal knowledge of all their affairs? This is not to say that he was corrupt, the very opposite could be said; he was obsessively conscientious. Not only did he really want to do a good job, but as one historian has gone as far as to claim, it was his loneliness that made him so receptive to whatever group would befriend him and look to him for direction.[30] This was not to be the merchants. He did in fact write to his wife Delia twice between November 1763 and April 1764 and ordered her to come to him in Canada. He could not understand why she hesitated to join him and said that "8 years ago if someone told me you'd refuse to follow me anywhere I would have given them the Lye".[31] This came after a vain attempt to have his agent George Ross persuade her to sail for New York in early spring.[32] When Delia failed to respond he contacted his friend, Sir James Cockburn, who was coming out to take over a seigneury in Quebec, and asked him to bring Mrs Murray with him.[33] He had lost patience with Delia by April and accused her of pretending not to have received his letter of the previous November, requesting her company and he ordered her either to come to Canada or go to Scotland "if not there is an end to all intercourse betwixt us and you know the best and worst of it".[34]

Delia never came to Quebec and Murray had to cope with running the colony alone. He seems to have become interested in endowing his position with a little pomp and circumstance and to live as a Governor should, but his wife refused to join him. This was a blow to his plans and from his correspondence it is clear that, before Delia's refusal to join him, he had intended to settle permanently in Canada. His problem controlling Delia's behaviour must have seemed to him symptomatic of his new circumstances: all talk and no power.

Murray experienced trouble from the beginning raising money to support the newly established government but he had other money troubles to worry about that were related to the French regime all centered on the issue of the Canada Bills. This issue would not be fully resolved until after he had returned to England, though his role in this case was more in an administrative capacity than anything else. The French government was in the midst of a deep financial crisis in 1759 and ordered the suspension of paper money. The Ministry of Marine had run up a deficit of nine million livres in 1756, which had increased to twenty one million in 1757. In 1759 alone the French government spent twenty million livres more than it received in revenues.[35] The bulk of this deficit came from the bills from Canada which totalled thirty million livres by 1759. The French government decided to put some of the key figures involved in the provisioning of Canada on trial for corruption. The intent of the trial was to show that much of the Canadian debt was money that had gone right into the pockets of the Intendant and his clique. If true, this case became a simple matter of corruption and the government could avoid settling the sum. Eventually the French crown recognized only thirty seven of the ninety million livres debt it owed and converted this amount to bonds bearing 4% interest. All the speculation in paper was for nought because the government declared itself bankrupt in 1771.

When Murray took over as the military governor of Quebec the situation he faced was inflation, high prices, lack of specie in circulation and a plethora of apparently worthless paper money. British merchants accepted this paper currency at a 50-80% discount.[36] It soon became clear that paper money was the object of speculation and that merchants were gambling on the French government paying back a substantial amount on the bills. Local merchant Samuel Jacobs told his storekeeper Charles Curtius to sell part of the store's goods for paper money: "if you sell at 80 livres to a dollar that'd be selling at good profit, take it, paper money is 100% profit". [37]

By late 1763, Murray was ordered to find out how many Canada bills were in the colony, for what amount, and to note how each bill had been acquired. He was also instructed to keep track of any claims from the Canadians that they had been hoodwinked into selling at a low rate.[38] Murray was well aware that local merchants were indeed speculating in the bills and in a letter to Halifax, made no bones about it, going as far as naming two agents working for the London merchants, Francis Rybot and Isadore Lynch. He noted that "there is hardly an English merchant who has not taken of this specie and an considerable amount encouraged to it by the great prospect of gain if a part is even paid".[39] Murray also wrote that he had assembled the Canadian merchants and told them that it was senseless to sell so low and that they should instead register their money. It has been estimated that the losses from this speculation were £300,000 to Canadians and £110,000 to British traders but because the latter were fewer in number and most of the bills had been held within the colony, the losses were more severe for the British.[40]

Lord Sandwich, the Northern Secretary, was in charge of the British side of the negotiations with the French over the Canada bills between August 1763 and July 1765.[41] The French government had already used the Affaire du Canada as an excuse for not repaying their obligations in full and by now they were well aware that a substantial amount of the bills had been sold at a huge discount to British merchants. These sales did not endear them to the idea of a quick settlement. Even Sandwich wondered aloud about the character of merchants who sold goods for Canada bills or bought bills at high discounts. Successful London merchants Brook Watson, Charles Crokatt, Isadore Lynch and Francis Rybot, to name but a few, were deeply involved. It was not only British merchants in Quebec who managed to sell to the London merchants, but successful Canadian fur trade families, such as the Babys, passed large amounts to Francis Rybot.[42] Throughout 1764 Murray continued to tally and send in the amounts of paper money registered, but at the end of the year he received a brief letter from Halifax which in an unusually sharp tone lamented that Murray's total was now two million livres over the previous one and that unfortunately it was too late to hand this over to the French government.[43] The Canada bills issue caused Murray to believe that the British merchants were taking advantage of Canadians. But was this really a fair assessment of what had happened? Merchants came to Quebec with goods but they found themselves unable to sell their merchandise because people mainly had paper money and either had no specie or were hoarding. The inhabitants were willing to hand over money, paper money, which they were used to having devalued every year. In fact in 1762 French merchant houses were themselves accepting this paper money at a 65% discount.[44] The futures market in Canada bills was merely an attempt by London merchants to cash in on something with good prospects and the criticism of Murray and Lord Sandwich did not extend to them but was reserved for the British merchant in Quebec.

Remarkably enough there is little in Murray's correspondence about the impact of the closure of the West in 1763, followed by the restrictions imposed on the Indian trade in the interior, and the loss of the East Coast fisheries which he had been so keen on in the 1762 report. The decision to reduce the boundaries of Quebec was taken at the peace talks in February 1763. The Province of Quebec was to revert to its original borders. All lands outside of these boundaries and not in the hands of Indians were to be reserved to them; there was to be no white settlement there. Licences were to be issued free of charge to traders who applied to the Governor. Traders were no longer to range far and wide but were forced to trade at designated posts.[45] These restrictions dealt a terrible blow to fur traders and merchants involved in the trade in auxiliary roles. Hardest hit was Montreal, the hub of the fur trade, but the ripples were felt all the way to Quebec which was the emporium for the whole colony.

The decision to change the structure of the fur trade had its origins in the report that Thomas Gage, Lieutenant Governor of Montreal, sent to the Secretary of State in 1762.[46] Once again this issue showed not only the British government's tendency to take its time making policy decisions but also its unerring ability to miss the mark altogether. It had created a policy best suited to the Albany merchants and applied it to an area unsuited for such restrictions. Early in 1761, Jeffrey Amherst, Commander in Chief for North America, proclaimed that trade with the Indian nations was now open. He put into place, along with Sir William Johnson, a four point plan for the regulation of the Indian trade that included the practice of licencing, trading only at military posts, fixed prices for goods and enforcement of the regulations by commandants at the posts.[47] The Board of Trade, after taking both Amherst's proposal and Gage's report which criticized monopolies, the sale of permits and the problem of trading in Indian villages, came up with its own plan.[48] All the elements of Amherst's plan were to be implemented except that the trade was to be supervised by an Indian Department rather than be controlled by the military. When trade did reopen in the spring of 1765 licences were issued by the colonial governors, trade was restricted to the forts, prices were fixed and there was to be no wintering. This spelled disaster for fur traders for several reasons. Licences to operate in the interior were still free but a bond of good behaviour was now necessary. This bond was to be for double the value of the goods taken into the interior.[49] This policy went against the unfettered nature of the trade and ignored what a century or more of experience had shown worked best.

Recognition of what this policy meant for business of the fur traders came best in the 1766 memorial of Benjamin Frobisher to the Board of Trade on the state of the Indian trade. Frobisher not only pointed out the difficulties for Quebec merchants in the fur trade but the ill effect the new policy was having on the Indians. He concentrated on explaining the need for wintering and said that "perhaps this will appear incredible, but it can only be to those, who are entirely unacquainted with the situation of the country, and the advantages it has by nature, for carrying on such a commerce".[50] Such well thought out memorials belied Murray's often vitriolic attacks against merchants he claimed were uneducated and ignorant.

By 1766 the Board of Trade, headed by Shelburne, investigated the petitions it had been receiving on the perils of a fur trade which did not allow wintering or monopolies.[51] The system in place had proved so inflexible that the government found itself under increasing pressure to make some changes and in 1767 Sir William Johnson, Superintendent of the Northern Department, yielded on the question of wintering. This signalled the beginning of the end for the Board of Trade plan which by 1768 was in tatters. The management of Indian lands was handed over to the the local control of the Thirteen Colonies and Quebec, but this policy was reversed in 1774. The closure of the trade after 1763 had affected a large number of Montreal merchants but Murray never took as much interest in the fur trade as one might have expected, especially since he had initially recognized that great profits could be made for Britain if it was executed properly. Perhaps this disinterest was because the trade fell, for the most part, within the jurisdiction of Gage whom Murray perceived as his enemy. The fur trade was too ordinary for Murray: there was nothing noble about racing around Indian villages with the habitants and spending all of one's energies bartering. Given his general attitude to merchants, it is unlikely that he would have seen the fur trade as the highest calling to which a merchant could aspire. The fur trade was centered on Montreal and he never felt that he was in control there, consequently he usually stayed well out of its problems. The merchants, sensing this attitude, found their heroes and champions in others, like Major Robert Rogers, who shared their vision of how the fur trade should be run. The changing nature of the trade after 1765 which involved bonding for double the value of goods, facilitated partnerships of experience and capital and brought the British merchants into the fur trade in a lasting way. But it would be wrong to say that the problems of this trade were not resolved during Murray's days in Canada.

Murray was far more interested in the potential of the east coast fisheries and their loss was a source of immense aggravation to him, not least because of the petitions he received for the restoration of the boundaries.[52] This issue would go unresolved in the first period of British rule. From the earliest settlement of New France its inhabitants had fished the lower St. Lawrence up to the coast of Labrador. As early as 1713, these waters were likened to the richest gold mines in Peru. It was the Quebec equivalent of the fur trade, producing a rich mix of fish, seals, oil and whalebone, all of which could find ready made European markets. Seal skins, for instance, were used to cover boxes and trunks and the oil was used in lamps.[53] During the French regime the sealing posts, operated usually as partnerships, produced annual returns of £10,000 in skins and oil. The posts were held by seigneurs and French factors, and some were sold to British merchants after 1763. The St. Modest post held by Jean Tache was leased to Quebec merchant John Ord in 1762 and he owned some small vessels which he used for fishing there.[54] Cape Charles was granted in 1763 to William Brymer, and the partnership of Moore and Finlay established themselves at the Baie des Chaleurs.[55] The fact that a number of grants had been made to British merchants in 1763 only added to the general alarm when it was discovered that the coast of the Gulf of the St. Lawrence was to be part of the jurisdiction of the Governor of Newfoundland. It was not until the Quebec Act of 1774 that the borders in the east and west were restored.

The case of Daniel Bayne and William Brymer offers some insights into the effect of the boundary change in the east. On 26 April 1763, Brymer was granted the use of the seal post at Cape Charles for four years. Brymer had access to considerable money and goods through his position as the Quebec agent for the army provisioners in London. He was able to use this position to help establish himself in the business which involved a large outlay of capital for building materials, labour costs, provisioning and maintenance of vessels. The Governor of Newfoundland, Thomas Graves, was replaced in 1765 by Captain Hugh Palliser who took a different view of what he saw as interloping on the part of Quebec merchants; he did have the Proclamation on his side. The boundaries after all had been reduced and the east coast was to become part of the British Atlantic possessions for the use of British fishermen. The boundary changes were not enforced until the arrival of Palliser. All land in Labrador was made crown property on 8 April 1765 and private property was no longer recognized. Bayne and Brymer had their post destroyed and its equipment seized, taken to Newfoundland and auctioned off. They were also warned that they were not welcome and their vessels would be seized if they attempted to work the area again.[56]

The partnership spent the next five years petitioning the King and suing Palliser for £5000. The case moved from the Board of Trade to the Privy Council to the Court of King's Bench to the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations and back to the Privy Council. In the end, however it was left to Lord Hillsborough to decide the issue. He found that while there was nothing wrong with the original grant, neither was there anything illegal in Palliser's actions. Bayne and Brymer had won, but because Palliser had been acting within his powers the government paid his damages. The tribulations of Bayne and Brymer sent the message to others that however lucrative this business had been in the past, there was no percentage in investing in it now until the borders were reconstructed. The British government had originally listened to submissions from fishermen at Bristol and other outports before enforcing the boundary decisions and again ignored the petitions from merchants and officials in the colony. Murray had handed out land grants in good faith and after merchants had invested valuable time and money, they had been cast adrift with their losses. Murray was neither powerful enough to take on the English ministers nor able to square off against Palliser. This case offers another insight into the muddle that was colonial policy at this local level.

There was some confusion over the matter of the currency and on a few occasions tables of equivalencies had to be published. It was still difficult for people to make the necessary adjustments and so Murray decided to set the rate for the whole province which was to go into effect on 1 January 1765.[57] Before that date when any price was mentioned the type of currency had to be specified whether Halifax, New York, or New England. Throughout the year the Quebec currency varied. Troop payments were befuddled by the different types of payment during the Seven Years War until in 1757 they were standardized. Payment was to be in coins that were easily transferable to other currencies for instance, four shillings and eight pence equalled a Spanish dollar (a discrepancy of 2d from its value in England).[58] North American troops used local currency, usually

Halifax, in which a dollar equalled 5 shillings. After 1760 Trois Rivières and Montreal did not use the same ratings as Quebec. Murray chose to use Halifax currency probably because as a soldier this was the one he was used to. It rated the dollar at 5 shillings whereas the New York currency chosen by Gage and Burton rated the Spanish dollar at 8 shillings.[59] This unusual condition remained until Murray became Governor in Chief in 1764 when he abandoned both and set the Spanish dollar at 6 shillings, the New England rate. This was not compulsory unless there was a dispute. The Spanish dollar was the most common currency in the world at the time and since there was a chronic shortage of specie everywhere, it remained the most common coin.

In Nova Scotia under Cornwallis the colonists set up their own system which valued the dollar at 5 shillings but there is no official information on when or why.[60] This system is first seen in 1756 in the accounts of ships hired to deport the Acadians, and one of the first acts passed by the House of Assembly in 1758 was to establish the dollar at the 5 shilling rate.[61] There are some references to suggest that going off the Halifax standard was not well received in Quebec and petitions for its return appeared in the years up to 1767. The merchants did not like the new system so Murray strengthened it on 1 July 1765, making the new currency standard for all formal transactions. This had not worked out as well as hoped, so, in 1768 the merchants again petitioned the Governor, Carleton, and the ordinance was revoked, allowing them to keep their accounts in whatever currency they wished.[62] Years later Quebec did pass a new currency act that was based on the Halifax rate.

In a letter to James Oswald (Member of Parliament and friend), Murray pointed out that while it was the general impression abroad that the Halifax currency was the most popular and therefore the rate of choice, "[it] really was not the case, as may appear by the different petitions presented to the council before the ordinance for settling the currency had passed".[63] There were other problems: so much copper coinage was arriving in the colony that Murray had to take steps to undervalue it. In contrast to copper coins, he overvalued French coins to stop the locals from hoarding them and hopefully forcing them back into circulation. Once French coins again became the norm for cash payments of small amounts, Portuguese coins were allowed to float back to their normal value. Merchants survived the shortage of small coins by issuing notes known as Bons. Ordinances were also passed rating silver higher than gold. Every aspect of the currency situation was examined and regulated to promote a healthy economy.

In the merchants' view, Murray's regulation of the currency system looked like an arbitrary measure, undertaken in reaction to an imaginary crisis. Once it became possible to exchange goods for cash the problems were not over. In dealing with Montreal merchants it was necessary to consult conversion tables, but in storefront sales to Canadians it was necessary to change livres for dollars. Murray believed that his actions in this area could serve to extend his influence in the other two towns especially since Gage and Burton were no longer in control there. His hope was that by standardising the currency he could knit the commerce of the towns together and this common system would lead to fewer problems. His reasons for choosing the New England rate are a mystery and he never alluded to them in his correspondence. It may have been just a matter of convenience - the dollar would be 6 shillings, therefore one shilling and one livre were virtually interchangeable.[64] Murray was trying to make life as easy as possible for the Canadians and giving them every encouragement to get their coins into circulation. The merchants, who would suffer the most inconvenience, were also those who had the necessary skills to adapt quickly to a new system. It was not the interests of one lobby group that Murray was concerned with, but the overall good of the colony, Canadian and British. When the establishment of the new rate is assessed by its stated aim of levelling out the value of the shilling and the livre then it can be seen as a sensible long term settlement rather than as a misguided intervention. Uniformity was the key to a well run colony and coins were something used by all participants in the economy, not just the merchants. The system made sense with a small army regularly on the move and spending what money it had, taking into account the number of financial transactions between merchants in the towns and countryside and the colony's dealings with the rest of the empire and the standardization is understandable. Murray did not make the decision alone but in consultation with the council and only after hearing petitions. Merchants complained that it was an arbitrary measure, but in this case, as in others, it was well thought out and its intent was not to hurt either the merchants or the economy.

Murray was just as concerned with the amount of currency in circulation as he was with its rating. In the report of 1762 he had floated the idea that it would be best if a large amount of money was brought to Quebec and put into circulation. In an anonymous memorial of 1765 a similar plan was suggested.[65] It called for an Act of Parliament to coin £5000 sterling in silver sixpences and shillings but these were to be marked Quebec. It was an ingenious plan because they would be worth the equivalent of one livre and one-half livre and while in Quebec be equal to the value of the English shilling but would decrease in value if taken out of Quebec. It would also be a great benefit to merchants because these were the two coins most used in the retail trade and it would help the Canadians who were used to calculating everything in livres. This document shows that Murray was not the only one thinking along these lines but it does not appear that anything was ever done to implement this scheme.

A further problem facing the Governor and his successors concerned trading rights. In 1766 the Receiver General, Thomas Mills, soon had to deal with the explosive issue of who had the right to trade in the King's Domain. Mills left access to the posts with the lessees Dunn and Gray in the face of the rising ire of the Montreal merchants who had stated in a petition that because of the Proclamation this area should be opened to all. After the arrival of Carleton in September of 1766 Mills' decision was overturned. But in a further decision taken by the Lords of Trade in April of 1768, the original lease and the decision of Mills was upheld. It was not often that the government supported the actions of its officials. It had taken two years, a lot of bad feeling and some financial loss before it was settled. Mills first ran afoul of the council because he thought that his instructions gave him the power to operate in the province independent of the Governor and council but he was soon to find out differently. Although this time Murray was not responsible for this arbitrary measure, but rather an official whose appointment had nothing to do with the Governor nevertheless, blame fell on his shoulders.

In the midst of the acrimony between the merchants and the Governor on the issues of duties, the Stamp Act came into force on 1 October 1765. In England there had been stamp duties since the 17th century and although it had often been proposed that they should be extended to English colonial possessions, it was not until 1763 that this came before Parliament in the form of a bill.[66] It was not so much opposition to the idea of taxing the colonies that caused delay in passing the bill as much as the debate over an alternative bill introduced in October of 1763.[67] There was little real opposition to the bill left by 1765. The Stamp Act affected an incredible range of mercantile activity from licences for public houses to newspaper advertisements, legal documents and, more importantly for Quebec, ships' clearances. In Quebec, the only newspaper, the Quebec Gazette, shut down completely while the act was in effect. The new duty had raised the price at the newsstand from a half dollar to two dollars.[68] Quebec merchants were part of the international brotherhood of merchants and as such were not in favour of the imposition of any taxes. The Quebec Gazette published a letter from the merchants on 28 July 1766 which stated that they could not protest the act because they had no assembly and therefore no political voice - a good opportunity to express their displeasure with the Governor. The merchants thought that Murray could give them an assembly but was being deliberately obstinate.Their perceptions were wrong, because, in reality, the Board of Trade had in 1765 dealt with the question as it related to the collection of revenues and in a report that was never made public, admitted that it did not foresee an assembly for Quebec in the near future.[69] The letter of protest published in the Quebec Gazette was denounced in a rival letter and since British merchants in Quebec were never silent on issues which affected them, assembly or no assembly, it seems unlikely that they did actively oppose the tax. The merchants had no quarrel with this act in principle but they did oppose both the duty on dry goods and the liquor duties because they were part and parcel of the French regime. It is possible that given a choice between fighting over the 3% duty, the liquor duty, and the stamp duty which was gathering on the horizon like a thundercloud, it was more politic to accept those measures passed by parliament. Yet, strangely enough, of the three duties it was the Stamp Act that fell by the wayside while the merchants expended their energies railing against the others. Contemporary experts consulted by the government on possible opposition to the Stamp Act in Canada responded that unless the crown had specifically exempted the colony, parliament could "tax them as they want".[70] The Stamp Act was repealed on 18 March 1766 after less than one month of debate in both houses.[71]

We have examined in some detail the involvement of the Governor in the day to day running of the economy, whether at the insistence of the ministers in London, or in consultation with his council which contained representatives of the merchant community. Each issue raised for discussion took years to resolve and most were not within the powers given to the colonial governors. The currency settlement was one difficult issue where Murray actually took the initiative and while it was one problem solved before he left for England, it proved troublesome later on and again had to be referred to London. In his capacity as military leader before 1763, Murray was forced to become involved in every detail of colonial life and he carried on this commitment after 1764. He was continually held accountable to a variety of ministers and boards, all with different interests and agendas, and seems to have spent a huge amount of his time writing detailed memoranda to politicians. The Governor exerted another level of control in the economy through his appointment of officials, although even this power was subject to outside interference. It is to the Governor's appointed officers and to his relations with the merchant community at large that we now turn our attention.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER THREE

1.Copy in the Shelburne Manuscripts, 66 : 1-4.

2.MG11 Q Series Vol.1., 27 September 1763. Murray to Egremont.

3.MG11 Q Series, Vol.1., 12 November 1763. Halifax to Murray.

4.Amherst Papers. W.O.34/1. 17 July 1761. Murray to Newcastle.

5.Treasury I vol 421. Seizure of Foreign Brandies 1762. 9 March 1762. Murray to the Secretary of the Lords of the Treasury : MG40 D9 TS II Vol 419. 4 November 1762. Murray to the Secretary of the Lords of the Treasury.

6.MG11 Q Series, Vol.1., 25 February 1763. Murray to Egremont.

7.CO42 MG11 No.1, Part 2, Vol.4, p.136. 16 November 1764.

8.CO42. 2. Part 1. p.107. 16 November 1764. Gray to Murray.

9.MG23 GII Vol.1 (2) 1763-65. November 1764 Murray to Gray.

10.Lawson, The Imperial Challenge, p.56.

11.MG23 G11 Series 1, Vol.(1) 2, 20 July 1765. Murray to the Lords of the Treasury.

12.John Mappin, "The Political Thoughts of Francis Maseres" (M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1968), p.22.

13.Board of Trade Journal 72 : 183. June 1765.

14.MG23 G11 Series 1, Vol (1)2. 20 July 1765. Murray to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury.

15.MG11 Q Series Vol.2, 3 March 1765. Murray to the Lords of Trade: MG11 Q Series Vol 2. 24 June 1765. Murray to Halifax.

16.MG23 G11, Series 1, Vol(1)2. 31 August 1765. Murray to the Lords of the Treasury.

17.W.W.M. R62-12.

18.Shelburne Mss. 64 : 302. 23 August 1766, Irving to Murray.

19.Mappin., p. 30.

20.MG11 Q Series. 12 October 1768. Carleton to the Lords of the Treasury.

21.Morgan., p. 75.

22.Ibid., p.77.

23.MG11 Q Series Vol.1., 27 June 1763. Murray to Egremont.

24.MG11 Q Series. Vol.1., 12 November 1763. Halifax to Murray.

25.MG11 Q Series Vol.1., 27 June 1763. Murray to Egremont.

26.MG11 Q Series Vol.2., 13 February 1764. Murray to Halifax.

27.Board of Trade Journals copy in the Portland Manuscripts 9704. University of Nottingham Library. 26 January 1765. Mackenzie to Bute.

28.MG11 Q Series. Vol.2., 27 June 1764. Murray to Halifax.

29.MG11 Q Series. Vol.2., 13 February 1764. Murray to Halifax.

30.Wetherell, p. 209.

31.MG23 G11. Series 1. Vol (1)2. 6 November 1763. Murray to Delia.

32.MG23 G11 Series 1. Vol(1)2. 23 October 1763. Murray to George Ross.

33.MG23 G11 Series 1. Vol(1)2. 26 January 1764. Murray to Cockburn.

34.MG23 G11 Series 1. Vol(1)2. 14 April 1764. Murray to Delia.

35.The following account is based on Bosher, "Affaire du Canada", pp.71-75.

36.Isabel Craig, "Economic Conditions in Canada 1763-83" (M.A. Thesis, University of Ottawa, 1968), pp. 206-207.

37.Jacob's Estate Papers Vol.8. 1760-63. June 1763. Jacobs to Curtius.

38.MG11 Q Series Vol.1., 9 December 1763. Halifax to Murray.

39.MG11 Q Series Vol.2., 14 February 1764. Murray to Halifax.

40.Fernand Ouellet, Economic and Social History of Quebec 1760-1850 (Ottawa : Gage Publishing Ltd., 1980), p 68.

41.Lawson, The Imperial Challenge, p.57.

42.Dale Miquelon, "The Baby Family and the Trade of Canada, 1750-1820" (M.A. Thesis, Carleton, 1966), p.35.

43.MG11 Q Series Vol.2., 8 December 1764. Halifax to Murray.

44.Elizabeth Arthur, "The French-Canadian under British Rule, 1760-1800" (Ph.D. Thesis, McGill, 1949), p. 235.

45.E.E. Rich, The Fur Trade and the Northwest to 1857 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1967), p. 133.

46.Marjorie G. Jackson, "The beginnings of British Trade at Michilimackinac," Minnesota History XI (September 1930) : 232.

47.M.G. Lawson, Fur - A Study in English Mercantilism, 1700-1775 (Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1943), p.52.

48.Jackson, p. 234.

49.A. L. Burt, The Old Province of Quebec 1760-1778 (Toronto : McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1968), p.124.

50.Shelburne Mss Vol. 50. p. 351. 10 November 1766. Memorial on the State of the Indian Trade.

51.Jackson, p.252.

52.MG11 Q Series Vol.2., 14 February 1764. Petition on the loss of the Fisheries.

53.Peter Kalm, Travels into North America (Massachusetts : The Imprint Society, MCMLXXII), Entries for August 25th and 31st.

54.DCB III. Entry - John Ord. p. 608.

55.Isabel Craig, "Economic Conditions in Canada 1763-83" (M.A. Thesis, McGill, 1937), p. 127 and p. 142.

56.G.O. Rothney, "The case of Bayne and Brymer", Canadian Historical Review XV (September 1934) : 270.

57.MG11 Q Series Vol.2., 29 October 1764. Murray to the Lords of Trade. and Quebec Gazette 4 October 1764. Ordinance on Currency.

58.A.B. McCullough, Money and Exchange in Canada to 1900 (Toronto : Dundurn Press Ltd., 1984), p.286.

59.Ibid., p.67.

60.H.A. Fleming, "Halifax Currency", Nova Scotia Historical Society Collections 20 (1928) p.117.

61.Ibid., p.118.

62.McCullough, p. 72.

63.MG23 G11 Series 1, Vol.3., 11 November 1765. Murray to Oswald.

64.McCullough, p. 70.

65.MG23 GI I. No Collection. Anonymous - Hints of Regulations that might be useful in the Province of Quebec.

66.P.D.G. Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1975), p.71.

67.Ibid., pp. 71-85.

68.W.B. Kerr, "The Stamp Act in Quebec", English Historical Review, 47 (1932) : 648.

69.Lawson, The Imperial Challenge, p.70.

70.W.W.M. R65-5d 1765. Dr. Fothergill's Consideration on American Affairs laid before Lord Dartmouth.

71.Thomas, pp. 233-243.

CHAPTER FOUR - INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE MERCHANT COMMUNITY AT QUEBEC.

An examination of the administrative structure of the colony in the 1760s shows that the English Ministry was not the only source of political patronage. Murray was able to hand out local offices until 1766 when the Rockingham administration decided to formalize and regulate official appointments. This procedure did not end the problems of governing Quebec; in fact, they were temporarily increased. There were too many people involved in governing the new colony. There was also the difficulty of parallel power sources within the colony in both the military and the civil periods. It is within this framework of multiple power structures that Murray's strained relationship with the new British civilian population in Quebec, especially in Montreal, must be considered.

Colonial Governors in North America usually had to contend with their elected assemblies, as well as the government in London. Murray had only his hand picked council to work with and he was able to appoint most of the officials that he needed to help run the colony. There were many official positions to be filled; however only those with a direct impact on the economy of the colony will be examined in this chapter. Made on the spot, even these appointments were not free of the patronage frenzy of the day. Walter Murray, his relative, was given the post of Receiver General and in turn he made his son deputy, although he had no authority to do so.[1] Robert Cholmondeley, the Auditor General, was allowed to chose whomever he wished to fill the position, but instead allowed Murray to use his own discretion. His own preference was for another merchant in Quebec, George Alsopp, and he was not thrilled with Murray's choice of Walter Murray.[2] The responsibilities of the job included receiving all the revenues, quit rents, fines and duties. Most of the actual accounting work was done by Richard Murray, Walter's son, who really had no qualifications for the job, nor had he been given any patent for the post from the English ministry.[3]

Not all the positions were lucrative and though at the time Walter had indicated that the £200 a year salary had been enough, he complained bitterly after losing the post. He argued in fact, that the financial reward had been minimal and that he had expected more. In a letter to Murray in London he wrote in a petulant tone that Canada was "fit only for exiles, punishment for a past ill spent".[4] He pointed out that he had only left Maryland because Murray was his relative and he had expected that his interests would be looked after. Murray had also given the son Richard the post of Vendue Master in Montreal, but Walter claimed that it had not brought any financial advantage. He ended this diatribe by lamenting that other positions handed out had not gone to him, and begged for his old job as Receiver General or something in another colony. Nepotism was not confined to ministers in London, but Walter's letter shows that it did not always bring the expected returns. Walter was ousted as Receiver General when the former town adjutant of Quebec and the man whom Murray had once claimed was like a son to him, Thomas Mills, received the post.[5] The Governor had never claimed that the job would be Walter's forever. In a letter to Cholmondeley in August 1764, he had explained that he would keep Walter in situ until the Auditor General made a final decision.[6] Clearly Murray had expected that Walter would keep the job.

Mills had been well liked at Quebec but had been unable to secure the position he wanted. He had returned to England in 1762 with the primary objective of lobbying for a good posting in Quebec. Mills was a friend of Colonel Haldimand who had been military Governor of Trois Rivières and whose correspondence indicates that as early as 1762 he was trying to obtain a position for his friend Mills.[7] Eventually Mills was successful. On his last day as First Lord of the Treasury, 10 July 1765, Grenville signed the commission and Mills was officially made Receiver General. The Rockinghams chose to let this appointment stand, endorsing the commission on 19 July. Mills took the posting, although instructions were not drawn up by the new administration until March of the following year.[8] This then was the first official appointment to the post and while it carried the same salary as that paid to Walter Murray, Mills was obliged to pay a lump sum on appointment, as a bond of good faith. It does not appear that there was any hint of wrongdoing on the part of Walter Murray, but while he had merely been told that he had all the normal powers of this office, they were spelled out in detail for Mills. His first and most difficult task, of course, was to collect the old French duties that had been a source of bad blood between the merchants and the administration. The Ministers in London expressed the hope that he would be able to collect enough in revenues to cover the expenditures of the colony. Such policy direction was a commonplace, so nothing sinister should be read into Mills's instructions. Mills was to be held accountable to the Exchequer and the Treasury in an annual report. To underline the hazards of the sea passage he was told to send his reports on a number of different vessels to make sure that at least one reached its destination.[9] This was typical of the care taken to ensure that administration of the colonies was efficient and well regulated. Yet it had taken three years to settle on the personnel for the position officially.

Mills arrived to take up his office on the same day that Murray left for England and it is perhaps a testimony to their friendship that Mills left the decks of the Commerce and boarded those of the Little William to meet with Murray.[10] All was not well though, for Mills crossed swords almost immediately with Irving and the council once he had arrived in Quebec. The trouble was that Mills declared his intention to impose the 3% duty on the import and export of dry goods which had lain dormant since 1759. This had only been imposed in desperation by the French in 1748 to help pay for their war efforts. In July of 1766 Irving sent a letter to the Lords of Trade pleading with them not to impose this duty.[11] It is clear from Irving's correspondence with the ministers and Murray that he resented an outsider coming in and dictating to the council on matters of policy. He told Murray that he could not understand why he vouched for the character of such an ignorant man.[12] Mills disregarded the council's wishes and in a proclamation in the Quebec Gazette he informed the public of the crown's willingness to collect these French duties. The idea of collecting the duty was opposed by the merchants, however, on the grounds that it would ruin their business, and Mills decided to drop the issue because he had unwritten instructions to do so if there was trouble.[13] The actions of the government's officials shows that the administration in the colony continued to intervene in economic affairs after Murray was gone.

The next position which for the purposes of this dicussion is important is that of auditor. The Auditor General, Robert Cholmondeley, had no representative in the colony until October 1765 when he appointed the garrison chaplain, Reverend John Brooke. He was appointed in January 1764. Brooke was in Quebec at the time. In this case Brooke was already there though made no attempt to take up his new position for two years.[14] Usually delays in taking up appointments came from the need of the candidate to wrap up his affairs and sail for Quebec. He was told in his instructions to examine and state the accounts of the revenue once a year. He did so three days after taking office.[15] The reason that so little is known about the workings of this post is because Brooke did practically nothing while he held the position.

Appointments were given out as political rewards and were either hereditary or for life. The position of Auditor General was held by the Cholmondeley family as an hereditary honour. Custom dictated that a deputy was appointed who would then take a percentage of the fees. The holder of the patent was responsible to the government but the deputy claimed that he was responsible only to the patentee. Murray's power to intervene in case of a problem arising was not clear, although it had been laid out in his instructions. He was required to report to the Board of Trade if he thought that something was amiss or suspend the person, he never had cause to use this power.

Another important position, and one which has often been ignored, was that of Harbour master. From 1760 to 1764 the Port Book of Quebec which contained records on all incoming and outgoing vessels and their cargoes was kept by Zachary Thompson, ship's carpenter, until made Harbour master at the insistence of Lord Colvill. One of the main reasons that the port of Quebec had worked so efficiently in the French regime was because of the presence of the Admiralty court which had jurisdiction over all maritime commercial matters. There was one other office to be filled at the port and Murray contacted Edward Bishopp, Naval Officer for the Port of Quebec, to enquire about his choice of deputy, suggesting Isaac Werden take it until the post was filled.[16] From his next letter to Bishopp it is clear that the decision was to be left to Murray and he confirmed Werden in the position.[17] Triplicates were kept of the harbour traffic but none of the copies for this period have been discovered in the Canadian archives and those in London were destroyed by fire in the early nineteenth century.

While these officials had influence, the government in London made policy affecting the whole community in Quebec and expected this policy to be carried out by its representatives there. Murray was the ultimate authority in Quebec in his role as Governor in Chief. He ran the colony with the help of his hand picked council. There were, however, a number of alternative or parallel power sources in the colony. Official positions had to be filled and Murray thought that, as he was already there and knew the character of all the candidates, he should be allowed to choose. Personal intervention by Murray did not mean that he planned to interfere, but there was less chance of problems and internal conflicts if the deputies were part of his circle. In the beginning he had his way with the appointment of Thomas Ainslie as Collector of Customs, Walter Murray as Receiver General and Isaac Werden as Deputy Naval Officer to the Port. These were the three key positions that related directly to the British settlers, most of whom were merchants or in businesses which depended on the merchant community. In 1765 Doctor William Williams was appointed waiter and searcher of all ships at Montreal. Even this position had been solicited for on his behalf by George Macauley, cousin to Zachary Macauley of Quebec and Reverend Brooke (deputy auditor general of Quebec). In a letter of congratulations to Dr. Williams, George Macauley mentioned that he had tried to procure a better position for his friend by interceding with his friend Thomas Mills but had been unsuccessful. He also warned that relations between the Governor and the Reverend Brooke were strained and that he had best leave well enough alone.[18] Such exchanges show that the patronage system was working, with officials in Britain as ultimate arbiters. The Harbour master during the military regime was appointed by the Admiral, Lord Colvill, but Murray was never happy about this. Murray wrote to Amherst that they could probably save money by paying Zachary Thompson a pittance since he had only previously been a ship's carpenter for the Navy at Halifax. Amherst, however, saw no reason for this stinginess and Thompson received the normal salary.[19]

The other post over which trouble arose was the position of Receiver General. Murray was always quick to see a personal slight and may have construed the ousting of Walter as punishment of himself by the Board of Trade for the low revenues produced by the province. The official appointment of Mills was the government's final word on the matter. In this light it is clear that it really took the ministers three years from the establishment of civil government to fill the position. It was the Rockingham administration that put an end to much of the dilly dallying that had prevented the resolution of many problems in Quebec. It was only after Mills' appointment that full instructions were sent; perhaps a sign that the ministry thought it was time that such positions and their responsibilities were regularized in practice as well as in theory. Instead, the appearance of a new character armed with his own set of instructions at a time of upheaval, uncertainty and under an acting Governor was unfortunate. These unsettled conditions continued well into the winter while Guy Carleton underwent a settling in phase.

In most cases the deputies would lobby the office holders in England for the positions and there was no guarantee that the man best suited for the job would be successful. The victor was often the one with the best political connections. The case of the Receiver General shows that even when left to the Governor's discretion it was not a certainty that the best man for the job would be successful. Walter had no qualifications, he just made sure that he was in the right place at the right time. On the other hand, Mills who hankered after such a position and who had much experience in the province in a position of responsibility but had weaker political connections there, was forced to go to England to lobby for the post. In the end he was successful and although there was no bad feeling between Mills and Murray this attitude of goodwill did not extend to Murray's supporters in the colony. Mills had not only become Receiver General but also Major of the Brigade for the Southern district in North America. He gave this latter post to a deputy and instead took on the position of town major at Quebec.[20] There was some loss of continuity in official positions in the transition from military to civil government but in the latter case these were filled by political lobbying. These examples show, therefore, that the British system of patronage was operating smoothly in the colony at a very early stage.

Another source of power which unintentionally rivalled that of the Governor before 1764 and which continued unofficially was the military governorships of the other towns. Gage had been in charge at Montreal until he took over from Amherst as Commander in Chief for North America in 1763. Murray believed whether rightly or not that Gage was ambitious and wrote to Amherst: "I know Gage wants to be Governor of Canada", then expressed his desire to join his mentor in New York if this happened.[21] Instead, Murray won round one but lost the decision when Gage leapfrogged up the military ladder and left Ralph Burton as his replacement in Montreal. Relations between these two men and Murray were strained because of a number of issues that were both personal and professional. Murray believed that he should have been promoted before Gage and Burton. He was unhappy that his mentor, Jeffrey Amherst, was not going to continue as Commander in Chief for North America. He was incensed to find that Gage had been offered this posting. Murray always had trouble dealing with the issue of whether or not he was still as much a military man as ever after accepting the post Governor in Chief. He wished to have the power of both military and civil status. He was enraged to find himself virtually stripped of his military powers at the same time as his rivals had reached the pinnacle of theirs. He wrote on this subject at least once to Halifax, pointing to how upset he was at losing his military command.[22] As late as 1765 when Cramahe was in London giving Murray's account of the goings on in Quebec, he felt obliged to warn Murray not to hint at resignation or it might just be accepted.[23] Murray had written to Cramahe to ask him to tell Lord Bute that he was upset about the Gage appointment. Cramahe passed on the message and was told to inform Halifax of Murray's displeasure. When Burton was ordered to serve with Gage in the Northern department he did so without leaving Montreal, thus the military presence could still be felt.

The issue of rivals to Murray's power and therefore of his belief that he was not in total control can best be addressed by an examination of the key events which disturbed the calm between the British merchants and the army in Montreal. Many of the examples of ill will between Murray and the merchants can be narrowed down to a few incidents which occurred in Montreal. The striking thing about them is that with the exception of the Grand Jury presentment of 1764 the clashes were on specific issues. They are notable for their localized nature and for the small core of men involved. First there was the Lantern Ordinance affair of 1764 when two merchants, George Alsopp and Joseph Howard, were stopped at two a.m. for not carrying a light and therefore breaking the 1762 regulation.[24] This meeting turned ugly when the corporal of the guard and Alsopp got into a tussle. The merchant accused the corporal of robbing him during the scuffle and had him arrested although the next day was forced to admit that he had made a mistake.[25] This incident was just one of many between the two groups which showed that neither had much respect for one another.

The more serious incident that reverberated all the way to London was the Walker affair of December 1764. Historians have made far too much of this incident, some going as far as to cite it as the reason for Murray's recall.[26] Such linkages cannot be made. The Walker incident highlighted the problems Murray had in controlling Burton and his cronies in Montreal. Thomas Walker was a justice of the peace, and as such, had refused to allow the house he was a lodger in to be used to billet an officer. The fracas occurred at the height of the billeting crisis in Montreal, tempers flared and Walker was beaten up in the house by some hooded soldiers. In each case the trouble had occurred in Montreal where Burton was in charge and where Murray's influence was weak. Murray was shocked at the breakdown of discipline in the army in the Walker case but neither was he pleased at the response of the justices to the problems of billeting. The army was facing its worst crisis in years but Walker's attitude merely mirrored that of the other Montreal merchants. Military rule was ended and this affair was one way of showing that they would not put up with nasty things like billeting. It was indeed true that the house of a magistrate could no longer be used for billeting but it was not Walker's house; he was just a lodger. Murray travelled to Montreal to sort it all out and sent the regiment involved to Quebec. The case could not be tried at Montreal because tempers were still high so it was moved to Quebec, but Walker refused to attend. The case dragged on until the summer of 1765 when Walker sailed to London to put the case before Lord Dartmouth, President of the Board of Trade.[27] In October 1765 the Privy Council heard the case at approximately the same time as Murray received word to return to England. Throughout 1765 the merchants petitioned for his recall on the grounds that he could not control the military and because he passed arbitrary measures. In 1766 the Board of Trade decided in Walker's favour.[28]

The merchant petitions and Murray's correspondence underline the fact that the Governor's problems with the merchants were indeed narrowly focused on Montreal and usually had to do with the military. Murray had from the beginning recognized the risks inherent in taking his military command away and everyone else, including his friends, thought that he was overreacting. The merchants were upset with the boundary changes and the duties but recognized that these changes had been imposed by their King through his government and they used what means they could to petition for changes. They petitioned against Murray, as well, when he did not control the army in Montreal but they did not recognize that this matter was just like the boundary changes, something that he did not have complete control over. It was easy to forget that only the garrison at Quebec and in a very general way the other troops in the province had to answer to the civil authorities. The man with the final authority for the troops was Gage and he was kept well informed by Burton at Montreal.

In the town of Quebec the relationship between the merchant community and the Governor at Quebec appears to have been stable and virtually trouble free, but it was not always 'high tea and empire biscuits'. This merchant community was not as vocal as their Montreal counterpart but when crossed, they too could be uncontrollable. Murray wrote to Burton in early 1764 that "if your merchants at Montreal are wild ours are mad", but such comments were unusual.[29] By June of the same year he was writing that he had no idea why the merchants in Montreal were so upset and wondered why they kept writing to the Lords of Trade.[30] There was no hint of trouble at Quebec and to Burton he said that "any trouble should have been sorted out by you".[31] In a letter to Halifax on the behaviour of the merchant community he promised that "it will not spread here because I'm not like Burton".[32] Murray commented only to his friends on the inability of Burton to control the merchants in Montreal.[33]

Murray tried to impose some control on Montreal by placing one of his closest aides in a position of power there but this was not well received. Murray had recommended Cramahe to his political connections at home and to Burton at Montreal for the position of Lieutenant Governor of Montreal and was under the impression that the Canadians were wholly behind this suggestion.[34] This was a sensible move from Murray's point of view but met with some resistance. Montreal would remain a source of trouble for the Governor until the day of his departure. He was Governor in Chief of Canada but in reality his power existed in the town of Quebec and he was challenged constantly in Montreal. Not only was he not as familiar with Montreal and its British inhabitants but the boundaries of responsibilities were smudged. By the end of 1764 the behaviour of the Montreal merchants had deteriorated so much that Murray felt obliged to write to Halifax on the matter.

Burton gave up his position in Montreal in July 1764 to become a Brigadier in North America. But Murray still had trouble in Montreal, this time with Gabriel Christie the Deputy Quartermaster General. Not only did Murray feel that Gage and Burton colluded against him, but in a letter to Burton blamed his recall on Christie.[35] Murray believed that Christie was to blame because he had shown a studied lack of respect for the Governor in their correspondence. Christie's actions had fanned the flames of discontent both among merchants and the Canadian population at Montreal. Christie had managed to cause unrest by imposing arbitrary measures and by not paying the customary market price for military necessities such as wood. Christie was repeatedly warned to pay a fair price for goods and to stop using impress warrants for services needed by the military, but he was, it seems, hard to control.

Murray's description of the merchants as "Licentious Fanatiks" is perhaps the one which has survived thus far as Murray's final word on them.[36] Yet is this a fair analysis of Murray's views on the whole mercantile community after the conquest? At various times he had no fault to find with the merchants and was even in their debt. His relationship with them as a group cannot be considered without understanding all the other crises in the colony, including the basic problem of running the government with no funds; looking after the welfare of the army in its various garrisons, and trying to maintain the goodwill of the Canadians. On the other hand, it is easy to overstate the importance of the petitions against Murray and take these statements of his arbitrary rule at face value. The British merchants in Quebec were not always aware of decisions taken in London nor did they fully understand the workings of that government. Murray was not likely to go to the merchants and tell them that he was having some trouble enforcing his orders or that he could not force Burton to obey him. Merchants in Quebec were well aware of the seasonal nature of shipping and therefore, of information, and chose deliberately to ignore the political reality that distance from London meant delays in sending and implementing instructions. The time lag in communicating orders and requests did not just affect the colony in its relationship with London but also affected internal communication links.

Murray survived even the furor that Walker had caused in London because of his high political connections. But with the dismissal of the Grenville ministry in July 1765, warning bells should have sounded in the council chambers in Quebec. It no longer mattered, as his sister had put it only months before, that "you are the darling of your countrymen and in high favour with the present ministry".[37] Murray was not unaware of the political turbulence in London, for he had been warned of as much in a letter that "things are in confusion here, disunion and faction in the administration and opposition".[38] Anyone connected to Lord Bute was in danger but Murray was not an immediate victim. Cramahe was in London throughout this period trying to counteract the work of the London representative of the merchant community, Fowler Walker. He sent Murray a list of hints on how best to serve his cause, including some very down to earth instructions such as writing to the First Lord of the Treasury and President of the Board of Trade by name and told him who to contact in case of any extraordinary matters. It was in this letter too that he warned Murray not to hint at resignation.[39]

It is fascinating to read in these letters just how difficult it was to obtain an audience with the appropriate politicians in London. After one month Cramahe had still not been received by Lord Bute and had spent all his time sitting outside doors waiting for his chance. Waiting became a normal experience in his attempts to see others in influential positions: when received it was usually for only a brief meeting and ended in promises that the right people would read his reports. Even Grenville had not read the account of revenues that Cramahe carried with him and so there was not much to discuss when they met in February 1765.[40] It was not until August, after the change of ministry, that Cramahe was received by Lord Dartmouth. Compared to the Grenville ministry, the new administration worked quickly, but even so, Cramahe was told by Mellish, Secretary of the Treasury, that the administration had so much business on hand that they could not review the question of the Quebec revenues for a while.[41] It is likely that Cramahe was at least suspicious that his friend might be in trouble because he told him to "act only as requires immediate decision and refer such as can admit of Delay home for instruction but give your own thoughts along with it".[42] He also warned in August 1765: "You cannot be too cautious".[43] He was still in London when the ministry changed and realized that this meant starting the process all over again. His letters show Canada was not high on the new ministry's list of priorities, yet this Rockingham administration appointed officials to the colony. Murray welcomed the words of advice from Cramahe because he did not understand why it took so long for him to receive any response from the government on basic questions of common concern to both. In November 1765, Murray complained to his friend, the Member of Parliament, James Oswald, that he had not heard from the Board of Trade since August 1764 and it was now over one year later.[44]

Despite the troubles between Murray and the merchants the original observations made by Murray on the potential of the colony still held true. Testimony to the promise and usefulness of Quebec could still be seen in the many independent reports and observations on the colony made in 1765.[45] One such report goes further than the usual accounts of population and length of the growing season and is lyrical in its description of the countryside. It discusses the one remaining industry, the forges at Trois Rivières in glowing terms but reserved the ultimate accolade for the town of Quebec, "one of the most agreeable Quarters in North America". The one element that runs through each of the reports is the lack of comment on the workings of the new government with the exception of the casual mention of its structure. The reports could be talking about the English home counties, so familiar are the descriptions. There was no sense that they were dealing with a wild new land and an unknown people with its own distinct culture. The observers always seem to comment on the familiar, not the different. This picture of an idyllic Canadian countryside gives no real sense of the harshness of the climate or the problems of agriculture, nor do they seem privy to any of the turbulence within the merchant and administrative bodies. Perhaps this idyllic view resulted from the pastime of officers and gentlemen travellers to make such reports no matter what the place. The first were loath to report troubles with the military, the latter troubles among the gentlemen.

The report of Wentworth, future Governor of New Hampshire, focused on its potential, noting that it produced all types of English corn, but he also pointed to the wealth of timber, naval stores, fisheries and furs - all of which could be exchanged for British manufactures. As an American colonist, Wentworth understood how important the transatlantic trade was to the well-being of the economy. His report mirrors Murray's report of 1762 and shows that the new administration had not destroyed the economy of the colony.

In comparison to all the reports which held themselves aloof from the troubles one exhibited some bad feeling between the merchants and the garrison at Quebec after Murray was asked by the Rockingham administration to return home, but even then it was said that "never was there a more united Garrison than that of Quebec, nor nowhere did the Military submit more readily to the Civil Powers than here".[46] Clashes between officers and merchants had been confined to one on one encounters until the Walker case. The attack on one merchant by a number of soldiers brought fears that such acts of terrorism would become widespread, but the transfer of the regiment involved made any repetition of such an act unlikely. This last report was obviously not written by a traveller but by someone well aware of the inner workings of government because it continued with a discussion of the revenue, customs and the use of any left over monies for road construction. This memorandum is likely a shortened version of the 1762 report in that it discussed the Canadian nobles, clergy and habitants and specifically examined why the Canadians did not want the British form of civil government and had been happier with military rule.

Murray also wrote a report on Quebec late in 1765 which concerned itself only marginally with the economy. It was written in his usual matter of fact style and contained population statistics, livestock numbers and amount of land under the plow. He disavowed any knowledge of any disorders with the exception of the Walker case and reiterated the point he had made two years before, that it was difficult to function when dealing with "a conquering army, a conquered people and British merchants who felt superior to both".[47] The report soon degenerated into a statement of the problems which he had faced since becoming Governor in Chief, including losing command of the troops, lacking suitable candidates for the magistracy, barracks and support from London against the petitions and presentments against him. He also laid the blame on the English administration for the poor choice that it had made originally for the posts of Attorney General and Chief Justice. He even complained about the basis of the whole structure of government and the patronage system which had seen to it that all of the important offices were given to "monied interests in England who let them out to the highest bidder". He complained that it was "hard to avoid disorders when establishing civil government by your instructions". These criticisms are testimony to the degree of Murray's disillusionment. This report was written after he learned of his recall. The merchant community did not fare well in this heated report. Murray had spent most of the year embroiled in the Walker case and the final decision had gone in favour of Walker. To make matters worse Murray was informed that the Board of Trade had reached this decision because of his lack of input.

In this bitter mood Murray lumped the merchants of Montreal and Quebec together and typified them as "followers of the army, of mean education, or soldiers disbanded". The trouble that they had brought led him to characterize them as carpetbaggers ready to suck the life blood from the Canadian population. British merchants at Quebec would have been glad to make fast fortunes, but unfortunately for them, the combination of internal controls and decrees from London made this unlikely. Murray had in the old tradition of garrison government, always felt that the military when properly guided could do a better job running a colony than could narrow commercial interests, and to be brought down by this element hardened him to the community as a whole. Murray was well aware from Cramahe's letters that merchant petitions and the agent working on their behalf in London were attempting to work against him; consequently he was incapable of keeping the rancour out of his report. It was one of Murray's weaknesses that he had to paint everything in black and white. The merchants had to be all bad. This element of his character can be seen at work in almost all of his dispatches. If this report is contrasted with the 1762 report on the state of Quebec there are clearly a few things missing, including economic prognostications and the detailed analysis of each sector of the economy. Rather than an analysis of the state of the colony, it is the ramblings of a man betrayed. He was not going to leave Quebec a hero. His tenure in Quebec had not even been financially viable since he had not yet been paid, and at one point, drew on the Treasury for the amount of his salary to pay the bills of the civil establishment. He later became involved in an acrimonious debate with his old friend John Nairne over money because his financial affairs were in such a state of disarray.

The real state of the colony is to be found in an anonymous report penned in 1765 or 1766 entitled "Hints for Regulations that might be useful in the Province of Quebec".[48] This document addresses the problem of the shortage of coin; asks for an Act of Parliament to collect liquor duties; asks for direct trade with Southern Europe in any suitable commodities, and trade with France in wine. The report points out that it would be a great benefit to both England and Quebec if a shipyard for the construction of naval vessels was opened in the colony. Many of the points made in the report deal specifically with the economy including the plea for an enlargement of the garrisons to increase the circulation of money and the construction of a road to Massachusetts to keep the soldiers busy, healthy and out of trouble. The unknown author of this report understood well the most pressing problems in the colony.

The official report for the English ministry was written by by Maurice Morgann in 1766 and is the most comprehensive since the 1762 report by Murray. It is interesting that one of his first comments was that he had found no commission for Gage and Burton to act as military Governors. He gave Murray full marks for quelling the mutiny in 1764; he pinpointed the merchant - military tensions and placed them specifically in Montreal. He concluded that "by steering the middle course he seems in some degree to have disgusted both Parties".[49] Morgann's report recognized that it was impossible to run the country without a tax base, but did not want to see the French duties continue, preferring, instead, the imposition of new taxes by prerogative or by an Act of Parliament.

Despite the tensions between the civil and the military in the province, it was clear that even when there was not a question of the area being under direct military threat, having a number of garrisons scattered equally throughout the colony was one way to keep goods and money circulating. Merchants were not really opposed to garrisons in the colony for they recognized that this meant the availability of hard currency and good business. Whether or not they liked each other on a personal level, or approved of one another's presence on a theoretical level both the groups needed one another to survive. The age old tensions over the presence of standing armies in peacetime were still running high in England, Scotland and in the colonies; it was only natural that in emigrating to Quebec all this cultural baggage would be landed at the quayside in Quebec along with the merchants who carried it to all the outposts of the empire.

Whether or not the merchants were the bane of Murray's existence as he sometimes claimed, the colony itself ran quite smoothly. Successive English ministries were interested in solving the problems of Quebec, but a variety of circumstances held them back from a quick definitive solution for many decades. Murray did his best to keep the peace among the inhabitants of Quebec, old and new. One of the troubles which plagued him was the unrest among British merchants who could not bring themselves to believe that there would be no assembly. The other was the ever present tensions between the merchants and the army, especially at Montreal. The presence of the army changed the dynamics of town life and created a number of headaches for Murray - many of which outlived the changeover from military to civil rule.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER FOUR

1.MG23 Gll Series I, Vol(1)2., 8 September 1764. Murray to Robert Cholmondeley.

2.Mildred Morgan, "The Office of Receiver General and Its Tenure by Deputy in the Province of Quebec 1763-1791" (M.A. Thesis, McGill, 1937), p.21.

3.Ibid., p.22.

4. MG23 GII Series 1, Vol.3., 15 March 1767. Walter Murray to James Murray.

5.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/2. 14 July 1762.

6.MG23 GII Series I,Vol(1)2., 8 September 1764. Murray to Cholmondeley.

7.Morgan, p.29 : Haldimand Papers B68. 24 July 1762 Mills to Haldimand.

8.Morgan, p. 35.

9.Ibid., p.38.

10.Quebec Gazette, 3 July 1766.

11.MG11 Q Series Vol.3., 7 July 1766. Irving to the Lords of Trade.

12.Shelburne Mss. 64 : 302. 23 August 1766. Irving to Murray.

13.Morgan, p. 58.

14.Morgan, p.26.

15.Ibid., p.27.

16.MG23 GII Series I. Vol (1)2., 20 February 1764. Murray to Bishopp.

17.MG23 GII Series I. Vol(1)2., 17 April 1764. Murray to Bishopp.

18.Haldimand Papers. 21844 f.414. August 1765. George Macauley to Dr. William Williams.

19.Amherst Papers W.O. 34/3. 1 October 1761. Amherst to Murray and W.O. 34/1. 1 November 1761. Murray to Amherst.

20.Morgan, p.71.

21.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/2. 24 March 1763. Murray to Amherst.

22.MG11 Q Series Vol.2., October 1764. Murray to Halifax.

23.MG23 GII Series I Vol.3., 12 January 1765. Cramahe to Murray.

24.Alice A. Burke, "The English Merchants in Canada, 1759-1766" (M.A. Thesis. University of Ottawa, 1968), p.29.

25.Albert Anthony Wetherell, "General James Murray and British Canada", p.195.

26.G.P. Browne, "James Murray" Dictionary of Canadian Biography pp 572-578. and Hilda Neatby, Quebec The Revolutionary Age 1760-1791 (Toronto : McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1971), pp. 38-44.

27.R.H. Mahon, Life of General the Honorable James Murray. A Builder of Canada (London: John Murray, 1921), p.342.

28.Philip Lawson, The Imperial Challenge , p.158.

29.MG23 GII Series I. Vol(1)2., 8 January 1764. Murray to Burton.

30.MG23 GII Series I, Vol(1)2., 9 April 1764. Murray to Christie DQMG Montreal.

31.MG23 GII Series I, Vol(1)2., 11 April 1764. Murray to Burton.

32.MG23 GII Series I, Vol(1)2., 30 October 1764. Murray to Halifax.

33.MG23 GII Series I, Vol(1)2., 3 October 1765. See for example, the comments in Murray's letter to Lord Adam Gordon.

34.MG23 GII Series I, Vol(1)2., 11 April 1764. Murray to Burton and MG23 GII Series I, Vol(1)2., 27 October 1764. Murray to Lord Elibank.

35.MG23 GII Series I, Vol(1)2., 17 October 1765. Murray to Burton.

36.MG11 Q Series Vol 2., 29 October 1764. Murray to the Lords of Trade.

37.SRO. GD 32/24/18. 19 February 1765. Mary Murray to James Murray.

38.SRO. GD 32/24/19. March 1766. Unknown correspondent to Murray.

39.MG23 GII Series I, Vol.3., 12 January 1765. Cramahe to Murray.

40.MG23 GII Series I, Vol 3., 9 February 1765. Cramahe to Murray.

41.MG23 GII Series I, Vol.3., 10 August 1765. Cramahe to Murray.

42.Ibid.

43.Ibid.

44.MG23 GII Series I, Vol.3., 11 November 1765. Murray to James Oswald.

45.For a good cross-section of such independent reports see; MG21 Add. Mss. 35914. ff 43; King's Mss 213. ff. 52-62. Journal of an officer who travelled over a part of the West Indies and of North America in the course of 1764 and 1765 and "Some thoughts on Canada, as it appeared affected in 1765"; W.W.M. R65-11. Mr. Wentworths Considerations with regards to America 1766 (written in 1765).

46.Shelburne Mss. 64 : 439-49. 21 October 1766. Mabane to Murray.

47.MG11 Q Series Vol.2., 24 April 1764. Murray to the Commissioners of Trade and Plantation. All quotations which follow are taken from this account.

48.MG23 GI I. No Collection. Anonymous - Hints of Regulations that might be useful in the Province of Quebec.

49.Shelburne Mss. 64 : 525-551. An account of the state of Canada from the Conquest to May 1766. Maurice Morgann.

CHAPTER FIVE - THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE BRITISH GARRISON ON THE TOWN OF QUEBEC

It is one thing to assume that the presence of an army has an impact on the local economy and quite another to prove this assumption. Recent work by Bruce Wilson has shown that by the 1780s, at least in the Niagara region, local merchants did indeed profit from garrison provisioning contracts and that for local communities the garrison was one of the few sources of cash income.[1] This was not true for the early period of British rule in Quebec. Accounts in official documents make it clear that all provisioning was expected to be handled by the London contractors. These contractors believed that all the problems had been worked out of the provisioning system over the course of the Seven Years War, but their first year of provisioning Quebec showed that they still had some work to do. Since provisioners did not supply all the soldiers' needs, there were some opportunities for local entreprenuers. It was, however, not a market which would make any fortunes. The real fortunes came from the actual provisioning contracts and not from occasional purchases made by soldiers. This chapter will examine both the official and the unofficial provisioning of the army and analyse the key issues which faced both types of providers in their efforts to meet the needs of the British army in Quebec. The impact of provisioning failures was felt directly by the soldiers but also created nightmares for Murray and Amherst and for the contractors' agents in the colonies who tried to avoid becoming entangled in periodic crises of food shortages. Another important issue was spoilage, especially in the flour shipments. This problem became one of the underlying causes of the poor relations between administrators at Quebec and at Montreal. At the outset, however, it is best to begin with a discussion of troop numbers and locations before turning to their provisioning.

The economic impact of the garrison depended on its numerical strength. There were approximately 12,000 British soldiers in Canada in 1760 but this number dropped to 4,000 by 1763 and stood at just over 1,000 in 1766.[2] The distribution of troops remained stable, with the town of Quebec always having the greatest troop strength; 9 battalions of 700 men each in 1760 with 7 battalions at Montreal.[3] By the middle of the 1760s, the Quebec garrison maintained twice as many troops at Montreal and this ratio remained stable for the rest of the decade. In 1766 there were 700 soldiers at Quebec and 350 at Montreal.[4] Not only did the number of troops vary throughout the decade, but so did the regiments. Quebec was both the embarkation point for wherever the next theatre of war happened to be and also the last stop on a Canadian tour of duty before the trip to England, Ireland or Scotland to be disbanded. Most regiments reached the colony via Quebec and all left through its port. The town of Quebec was therefore far more influenced by troop movements than any other place in the colony but its function as a military centre was a continuation of the tradition first begun in the French regime.

After 1764 troop movements were reported in the Quebec Gazette. It was not only a major event logistically, but such movements were an opportunity for merchants to have officers settle their debts. The Quebec Gazette published a note from the officers of the 2nd Battalion which was due to ship out in January 1765 for Montreal stating that they would settle their debts before moving.[5] Credit was often extended to soldiers, but it was localized and this fact itself shows that few strong credit networks existed between the merchants of Montreal and Quebec outside the fur trade.

From 1762 onwards two companies of the Royal Regiment of Artillery alternated between Quebec and Montreal until in 1767 they were relieved by two new companies from Woolwich by way of Boston. This regiment had been in Canada since the conquest, an eight-year stint.[6] Because of their responsibilities for the ordnance it was necessary not only that they work as small independent units, but that they stay in the one place. From 1763 to 1767 the strength of the regiment at Quebec never exceeded 56 men, with a slightly higher number at Montreal.[7] There were at least eight other regiments besides the Artillery in Canada in the period up to 1768, but by 1767 most had been sent home and replaced by newcomers. When the troops switched from Quebec to Montreal and vice versa it took almost seven weeks, and, if they were posted outside the town of Quebec, soldiers were billeted in villages until barracks could be provided. There seemed to be a steady ripple of troop movement. The 15th regiment moved from Quebec to Montreal and the 27th returned to Quebec from New York after an extended tour of duty in the Caribbean. The 28th regiment was involved in the civil unrest in Montreal at the end of 1764 and as a result, was moved to Quebec in 1765. It was later involved in the Hudson Valley insurrection after which it was sent to Ireland. The wholesale turnover of troops continued in 1767 when the 10th regiment arrived from Ireland to relieve the 27th who returned directly to Cork.[8] Within the colony, the 15th regiment returned to Quebec and the 52nd moved to Montreal and Trois Rivières, as did the six companies of the Ist battalion Royal American.[9] In 1768 the 8th regiment arrived to relieve the 15th which then returned to England.[10]

All eight regiments which had been in Canada for the conquest and stationed there afterwards had been replaced by 1768 at the latest, though some had left as early as 1765. Internal troop movements show that soldiers were alternated regularly so that there was never time to become attached to one locality. The main troop movements between Canada and Cork took place after Murray had returned to England and thus the infusion of troops with no previous experience in Canada was high after 1766. This dramatic turnover in troops could not but have helped Carleton after he took over as Lieutenant Governor in the fall of 1766. It signalled a new era in civil-military relationships. Colonel Irving who had been in charge of the colony between the departure of Murray and the arrival of Carleton returned to England with the 15th regiment in 1768 and, with the exception of the Royal Americans, this departure marked the last of the regiments which had been in Canada in 1759.

The number of troops in Canada varied from the full fighting strength of 1760 to the holding pattern of the late 1760s. Regiments were rotated between Quebec, Montreal and the upper posts, but by 1768 all the regiments active in the colony since 1759 had been replaced by troops either from England or by way of New York and Boston. This turnover meant that while there was a stable if dwindling military population, as far as provisioning contractors were concerned, there was minimal stability for local merchants who wished to deal with the soldiers. Credit, when extended at all, was confined to the local posting. The exception was the Commanding Officer whose favour was courted by Quebec merchants.

All of the troops, no matter what their location within the colony, had to be fed and, as in the case of the Atlantic colonies, this necessity was not left to chance or to the locals. In 1759 when troop numbers were at their peak, the slightest hitch in the supply line could have serious repercussions. From the beginning Quebec had its own agent who was responsible directly to the London contractors. This policy was not the result of a belief that Canada was different or special but stemmed from practical financial reasons; it cost more to provision troops in Canada than in the American colonies because of Quebec's greater distance by sea from London, its shorter shipping season and the lack of transportation networks inside the colony. For these reasons the contract for Quebec was special in the sense that the contractors not only charged more per man but were responsible only for shipping from England and Cork to the port of Quebec and then the Crown was responsible for the re-shipment of the cargo to Montreal, Trois Rivières and the upper posts. This was a sore point with Murray who, during the years of military government, bore the brunt of the responsibility for feeding all the troops with a minimal number of vessels and under very trying circumstances.

The provisioning contracts were made by the Treasury. This office controlled public revenues and expenditures and within this mandate was responsible for army finances. Military spending was handled by the Comptroller of army accounts, through the commissariat service.[11] Muster roles gave the numbers to be met from the annual supply. The contracts, in turn, were for a six month period, giving both sides enough time to revise estimates. The muster roles were provided by the Secretary at War. The commissariat service was operational in Britain only in wartime, but was a full time service in North America because of the logistics of providing food and lodging for the troops year round.[12] It was the responsibility of the Treasury to make sure that the contractors fulfilled their obligations, and, as part of its control mechanism it appointed commissaries and deputies to inspect all deliveries before they were stored in the warehouses. At Quebec, Jacob Rowe was the commissary for the government and William Brymer was the contractor's agent. Daniel Weir had been commissary at Quebec from 1759 until 1761 when he left for England.[13] Murray wrote to Robert Leake who was commissary of stores for North America that, since he had declined to name a deputy, things were at a standstill in Quebec; therefore, he would give the job to Rowe but only unofficially.[14] This letter marked the start of a rancorous exchange over the years with Leake who never seemed to grant official recognition to Rowe as commissary.

The contracts were drawn up on a cost plus commission arrangement during the war, but after 1760 this system was changed to a fixed cost per day basis. The Commissary General for North America to whom Rowe was responsible was Robert Leake stationed at New York. William Brymer was responsible not to the contractor's New York agents but directly to the contractors in London. The provisioning contracts for North America, overall for 15 battalions, added up to £68,000 once spoilage and transportation were factored in to the basic cost of £22,000.[15] In the American case, once the profit was skimmed off by the contractors, the rest went into the hands of colonial agents and suppliers. In Canada the merchants were not so lucky. The provisions, with the exception of rice, were all purchased either in England or in Ireland and that was where the profits were to be found. William Brymer, as agent for the contractor, was the only merchant who was in a position to profit in any substantial way from the provisioning trade.

The contractors in England were well connected to figures at Westminster who were already wealthy men. The contract held by Sir William Baker and Christopher Kilby to provision North America and Nova Scotia at 6d per day per soldier ended in 1760. Baker was a London alderman and one of the leading America traders. He held victualling contracts from 1746 to 1760 when he became the Governor of the Hudson's Bay Company. His advice on American colonial matters was often sought by the Treasury.[16] Christopher Kilby worked as the London agent for the colonial house of Hancock, and for Benjamin Faneuil from the late 1740s.

The next contract was awarded to Sir James Colebrooke, George Colebrooke, Arnold Nesbitt and Moses Franks for 4 3/4d per day for the colonies and 5 1/2d per day for Quebec. The first three men were members of parliament. James Colebrooke ran his father's bank and by 1758 had bid for, and received, the contract to victual Louisbourg. The following year, along with his partners, he received the contract for Guadaloupe and North America. He died in 1761. George Colebrooke was a staunch supporter of Newcastle, ensuring the contracts remained within the family until the Newcastle ministry fell in 1762. One contract was lost immediately and he was faced with the knowledge that when the other ran out it would not be renewed. George turned his attention back to the family bank and became a director of the East India Company from 1767-71. Arnold Nesbitt the third partner, was the nephew of a prominent London merchant who was connected to the Newcastle family through marriage. Arnold became a partner in his uncle's firm and a member of parliament when he received the contract to remit money to America in 1759. He was also a partner in the Colebrooke contract. Nesbitt provided huge loans to the government throughout the 1750s and 1760s. After George was forced to drop out, Nesbitt continued with another partner Adam Drummond. The Drummond family became heavily involved with Quebec, although some of its members had 'come out' in the

1745 Stewart Rising and were therefore unlikely candidates for leading army contractors in Hanoverian society. The Drummonds had been on the losing side and Adam did not reappear until later as a merchant in the colonies before returning to politics in London. He was a friend of John Watts, the principal contractor's agent in New York, and he married into the Duke of Bolton's family. His family members were given jobs as collectors of the stamp duty in Quebec and as agents for the contracts. After the Colebrooke brothers lost the contract because of political changes in London, it was awarded to Samuel Fludyer and Adam Drummond. Fludyer was one of the leading cloth merchants in London who had turned his talents to politics, becoming Mayor of London in 1761 after a number of years as a Director of the Bank of England. He had been promised a lucrative American contract after the end of the Seven Years War, but had to wait until 1764. Not only did he receive an American victualling contract, but one for the West Indies, and a lease of all the coals on Cape Breton. His new contract was 4d per day per man for the colonies and 4 3/4d for Quebec.[17] Fludyer's political star did not shine long and with the Rockingham triumph he was given notice that his contracts would end in July 1766.[18] The money contracts were held by virtually the same men, first by Colebrooke, Nesbitt and Thomlinson, and then in 1766, by Fludyer and Drummond. [19] Contracts for the hard currency needed to pay the troops usually went to merchants who either owned banks or had access to their funds; they received a 2% commission.[20] This percentage came to a substantial amount when the totals in question were upwards of £76,000 even in the later part of the decade. The only record of troop payment for Canada is in a receipt for £9,000 in 1764 for the effective subsistence of Lieutenant John Murray's regiment; the agent was Colin Drummond.[21]

The 1766 victualling contract saw Nesbitt and Drummond in control of provisioning the army. Throughout all these changes, at the core of the partnership was Moses Franks. He provided the continuity necessary for the smooth running of the business. The Franks were a prominent New York mercantile family. Moses and his brother Naphtali moved to London to work as the English link for their father, Jacob, in the New York business and for a brother, David, in Philadelphia. The family was connected to the top colonial families by marriage, including the Delancey's and the Watts. Oliver Delancey and John Watts had been the New York agents for Baker and Kilby and stayed on under Colebrooke, Nesbitt, Drummond and Fludyer; and, finally, worked for Nesbitt and Drummond. David Franks was the Philadelphia agent.[22] Political connections were necessary for obtaining government contracts, and in fact, there were eight M.P.s returned in the 1761 elections who had colonial contracts.[23]

This tale of the intricacies of the American colonial provisioning networks, while interesting, does not really have much to do with Quebec. The Hancock's and Apthorps of Boston had contracts for Louisbourg and Nova Scotia and had business ties with the Kilby, Baker, Watts and Delancey families, but they did not manage to obtain the Quebec contracts. These contracts were held in London and the provisions were sent directly to Quebec where they were inspected by the commissary and by the contractors' agent. Once inspected and approved they could not be returned to the contractor. The Montreal agent for Fludyer and Drummond was Jacob Jordan who was also the distributor of stamps before the repeal of the Stamp Act. At Quebec, Colin Drummond acted as distributor of stamps and as the contractors' agent. Colin became commissary general and later paymaster to the forces in Canada.[24] His son, John, later took over Adam Drummond's seat in the House of Commons. The reason that the contract for Quebec was set up as it was had to do with the practical matter of expense. It cost too much to buy and send the provisions from the colonies. If this high cost had not been the case, then the whole network of colonial provisioning and finance would have no doubt become active and controlled the Quebec market. As things stood, even when there were some very serious problems with fulfilling the terms of the contract in 1761, Delancey and Watts of New York told Amherst that they knew nothing about the Canadian contract, and that Brymer (the Quebec agent for the principals) had refused their offer of help.[25] Amherst wrote a cutting letter in response in which he pointed out that just because London had not given them control of the Canadian contract, they were not exempt from responsibility if any misfortune befell his troops in Quebec as a result of a lack of provisions.[26] The failure of provisions to reach their destination on time was one of the most pressing problems of the early years. As long as Amherst remained Commander in Chief of North America, he did not hesitate to use what influence he had to rectify problems of supply for Canada. But this type of direct intervention must have been unnecessary after 1763 because Gage does not seem to have indulged in it.

How did this provisioning trade work? The contract of 1760 did not go off without a hitch as many had hoped. The contractor sent the six month's supply agreed upon, but the Victualling Office had done exactly the same; the result was a surplus of provisions. Murray chose to accept the provisions sent by the Victualling Office (Navy) and not those sent by the contractors under the guidance of the Treasury.[27] Colebrooke, Nesbitt and Franks had sent Pierre Bellivier to Quebec on their behalf and he wrote in June 1760 that although he had been well received by the Governor, he had known nothing of their contract and already had supplies for 260 days. He did allow them to store their provisions in the Jesuits' College. The problem was that Murray had received orders from Admiral Saunders that the arrival of the army provisions were imminent.[28] Murray obeyed this directive but needed to use the storage facilities in the Jesuits' College so he provided alternative storage in lower town for the contractors' goods which he thought had been sent to Quebec by mistake.

The Admiralty Victualling Books have the records for the ships sent by the Victualling Office to Quebec in the summer of 1760. London merchant Anthony Bacon was paid £103 sterling for freighting provisions up the St. Lawrence in March 1760 on the Charming Sally. He had performed a similar service the previous year.[29] John Bland was paid £1758 for freighting provisions to Quebec and his cargo was certified by Daniel Weir at the port.[30] The record of monies owed is broken into its various elements - a cost of £1479 for freight, one month's pay after discharge of £293, 155 days interest at 4% with a small deduction for short measure. There are eight such entries in total for 1760 which cost the Admiralty £8120 plus £160 for the freight of three flat bottomed boats to Quebec.[31] These ships did not belong to the contractor but were owned by the competition, hired by the Navy to provision the garrison. In 1761 two ships used to take prisoners to La Rochelle, the Seahorse and Joseph, were sent to England and returned as victuallers.[32] Murray complained to Colvill that the Navy Victuallers wanted a certificate from Colvill that they had discharged their goods and confirmation from Murray that they were still active. He saw immediately that this meant the shippers would receive one month's pay from the Navy and one from the government and therefore, were double charging. He warned the Admiral about this danger.[33] In the meantime, Bellivier wanted to land his provisions and have them signed off, thereby making the Crown responsible to his principals in London. He was worried that the whole contract would be lost because there was already enough food to feed 10,000 men for 15 months and there were only 2000 soldiers present. Bellivier was waiting for the arrival of William Brymer who was carrying the official instructions from the contractors and the Treasury to the Governor. Although Murray refused to accept Bellivier's goods, he claimed, at the end of July, that he did not have enough provisions and needed extra supplies for 2000 men for two months.[34]

There is also another reference to the shortage of provisions at Quebec. Murray wrote to Amherst in July that he had one month's supply for his garrison and so he had bought the whole cargo of the first vessel in from Philadelphia just in case.[35] Later, Amherst received word from colonial merchant, Charles Apthorp, that Murray had drawn on Apthorp's Boston agent for the sum of his Philadelphia purchase, and he assumed that it should be passed on to the contractors in London.[36] Moses Franks sent a memorial in August to the Lords of the Treasury in which he pointed out the terms of their contract - the Duke of Newcastle had given the order to send provisions for 10,000 men for 8 months to Quebec as soon as the season permitted. This order had been carried out by the contractors. At the same time the Duke of Newcastle sent word to Lord Anson that the Navy victualling service was to be cancelled for Quebec to prevent any confusion. Moses explained in the letter that the contractors' ships had been delayed because they had to wait for a convoy. Ready to sail on 28 March, the ships waited until 28 April when they were told to sail without convoy. They reached Quebec just before the vessels sent by the Victualling Office.[37] The matter was finally resolved in October 1760 when the Lords of the Treasury decided that the contractors were not to blame and paid them for the goods sent.

The new contract was sent to Murray and he in turn passed it on to Amherst. The contract went into effect on 20 December 1759 at a rate of 4 3/4d per man per day and was valid for six months. By the terms of the contract all goods were to be delivered by the contractors who took all the insurance charges and paid the freight to Quebec where the goods were to arrive by 20 June 1761.[38] They were to send provisions for 7000 persons for six calendar months. The rations were 7lbs flour, 7lbs beef or 4lbs pork, 3 pints of peas, 1lb cheese or 6oz. of butter, 1lb of flour or 8oz. of rice per week, per man. Part of the agreement was that there would be a six month supply at all times in the storehouses. This requirement proved to be an onerous task since only one voyage a year was possible. In practice huge amounts of provisions would arrive sometime in the summer months and then rundown through the course of the year. The problem with this arrangement was that the system only worked properly if the provisioning ships arrived when they were supposed to, in mid-June. By June the provisions were at such a low level that there was a serious risk of widespread hunger.

This condition was not easily remedied since the shipping season was so short. Because the colonial agents knew to keep their hands off the Quebec contract, there was no chance of ships arriving from the colonies with provisions. When problems occurred it was very difficult to gather in the necessary amounts of foodstuffs in the colonies in time to have them shipped up the St. Lawrence before it became impassable in November. The provisioning contract also had a mechanism to sort out problems of quality control. The goods were inspected by three appointees and when any two of them agreed that the item was no good, it was sold off and replaced at the contractor's expense. This seemed be a very sensible arrangement but it did not have the desired effect for two reasons. The commissary did not have the manpower to inspect all incoming cargoes, and the system was open to abuse because there was many a dollar to be made in the resale of damaged goods. The key element in the contract which was overlooked initially by everyone was the condition that the contractors would only deliver to the port of Quebec.[39] As soon as Murray realized the implications of such a clause in the contract he pointed it out to Amherst who, in turn, contacted the New York agents and they responded that,

> as Quebec by their late contract is to all intents and purposes the Magazine for Canada, from whence all deliveries on their part must be made and the certificate immediately given, it becomes no part of consideration and of course no expense to them, who are to receive and issue them at the other posts and precedents seem to plead universally for this reasoning.[40]

Murray kept writing about the problems unloading all army provisions at Quebec would cause but was continually put off by the contractors' agent.[41] Once unloaded and stored the provisions were handed out in 2 to 4 day bundles to the soldiers.[42] The biggest headache in 1761 was that the provisioning ships were late and there was a general suspicion that they might not arrive at all. Murray frantically told Amherst that he kept only 29 days provisions for his own garrison because the other garrisons were so difficult to supply that they took precedence.[43]

The ships that arrived from Cork in mid-July that season brought only enough for 3400 men for 242 days, and the garrison at Quebec alone, not counting officers, was 3200 strong.[44] Murray had to deal not only with the late arrival of the ships but soon realized that he did not have enough vessels to transport goods to the other garrisons. The trip from Quebec to Montreal took four weeks on average. By September, Amherst himself was in a state of panic over the supply problems in Canada and told Bradstreet, the Deputy Quarter Master General for North America, to be prepared to supply the Western garrisons himself because of the lateness of the season.[45] The shipping season of 1761 gave both the contractor and the army staff an inkling of the problems it would face in providing sustenance for the soldiers in the Canadian posts. The first hint of trouble came when news reached Quebec that some of the victualling ships had been separated from their convoy, although they did eventually arrive at the end of August.[46] In the meantime, Amherst had not left anything to chance and, as early as March of that year, had ordered Governor Whitmore of Newfoundland to send what extra provisions he had to Quebec.[47] Amherst also contacted colonial merchant Thomas Hancock and told him to lay on whatever vessels he could at Louisbourg to ship goods to Quebec. In total he requested over one thousand tons of shipping.[48] The cost was to be billed to the Navy Board, but a year later it turned out that the Navy Board refused to pay the bill because Amherst had not followed standard procedure.[49]

Murray tried to stave off disaster by planning to buy up what he could locally if the ships had not arrived by the end of July; he told the merchants of this possibility.[50] The first victuallers arrived on the 17th July and made his gathering in of local surpluses unnecessary. There was no question that the contractor was at fault for not fulfilling the conditions of the agreement and having the supplies at Quebec by the middle of June. Amherst decided that this failure was a good enough reason to bill the contractor for all the goods purchased in the colonies and give them the New York, not the Quebec, price. Earlier in the year the New York agents Delancey and Watts had offered some of their stock if there were any supply hitches, but were chastised by the London contractors who informed them that Canada could be supplied more cheaply from England than from anywhere else.[51] The New York agents were also aware of Amherst's plan to use stocks from Louisbourg. As soon as the crisis appeared in July, the New York agents came under attack from Amherst for not providing him with the huge amounts of flour, rice and peas that he had requested. They felt that because he had looked to Louisbourg and Newfoundland, and because they had trusted the contractors' ships to arrive on time, their services would not be called upon. In fact Amherst turned rather nasty in his correspondence and told them to come up with flour, butter, rice and peas for 6000 men for eight months immediately.[52] He followed this request with another for 22,000 barrels of flour and poured scorn on their feeble offerings of 1600 barrels.[53] Not only were the New York agents coming up short in their search for such large amounts of the necessary commodities, but they were also having trouble finding vessels in which to put the foodstuffs. In addition, time was running out for shipping on the St. Lawrence. Another problem cropped up at the end of the month when it was discovered that in his haste to please Amherst, the contractors' agent at Louisbourg had sent more than he could afford and now their own supplies would last only until October.[54] Consequently, Amherst had to order the New York agents to supply enough provisions for 800 men for the period 24 October to 1 July 1762 at the risk of that garrison perishing.

The contracts themselves give the amounts of daily rations per man but it is not until the amounts for a six month period are discussed that the staggering volumes that had to be gathered, sent unloaded and transshipped are apparent. When the ships had not arrived by the beginning of July, Amherst had called on the New York agents for 22,000 barrels of flour (210 lbs each), 700 barrels of butter (210 lbs each), 495 bushels of rice (205 lbs each), plus 15,000 bushels of peas.[55] The poundage of each is mentioned here because flour and butter were usually freighted in different volumes per barrel.

The American colonial network was very efficient and yet it could not respond quickly or efficiently to a demand as great as Amherst's. It was not until October that the agents were able to send over 5000 barrels of flour, most of the butter and rice, and some of the peas. By November all the victualling ships had crossed the Atlantic, but the St. Lawrence was filled with ice so the provisioning ships had to winter at Halifax.[56] The strictest accounts should have been kept, especially since everything was so muddled, but Murray was forced to admit (before the commissary Daniel Weir, who was returning to England, beat him to it) that there had been a problem in 1760 with keeping track of the provisions brought into the colony. It seems that since there were no instructions on the matter and only one storage area, that the provisions unloaded from the Navy Board had not been counted. Canadian labourers were used to cart the goods up to the Jesuits' College and because of the confusion about currency and Canada paper, Murray had paid them in provisions. He had also used provisions to pay the river pilots. Not only had he not counted the goods landed but he had handed out unknown amounts to locals for services rendered and had handed some out on humanitarian grounds. In a letter to the Secretary to the Commissioners of the Treasury Murray wrote that "We had to use the Canadians for carting and bringing in fuel for the garrison and these could not have worked had I not given them provisions". He also pointed out that the use of provisions was necessary because of the combination of dearth and the lack of paper currency. Murray closed by stating that it was necessary to "show some generosity to a conquered people" and said that as soon as the country had been subdued he had ended the practice of giving provisions in return for labour.[57] The naval officers had kept a general account of amounts landed, but it did not tally with the amounts sent. This state of affairs was not repeated after the first shipping season.

There were a few problems of supply and spoilage every year but within one or two years the contractors had learned their lesson the hard way and did not have to pay again for the panic buying of the army staff in the colonies. The victualling ships were eventually sent out earlier in the year, but even so, they seldom met the June deadline. Late arrivals meant that it took longer for goods to be passed down to Montreal because the north east winds lasted only a short while and after their disappearance, it became harder to push provisions up to Trois Rivières and Montreal.[58]

William Brymer, the contractors' agent at Quebec, had refused all offers of assistance in 1761 from the New York agents but this rejection did not mean that they did not help one another out at other times. John Watts kept up a regular correspondence with Brymer which did on occasion address itself to the problems of supply. It is through this correspondence that we occasionally learn some of the details of trade. Rice, for instance, was one of the commodities supplied to Quebec from the colonies. It was ordered from the partnership of Smith and Nutt of South Carolina, and in 1762 Watts acted as the postman for Brymer's inquiries on the amounts to be expected for that year.[59] The bulk of their correspondence, however, was of a private nature dealing mostly with their mutual business interests. Watts would send up his surplus personal stocks of rum and sugar for Brymer to sell for him and send the remittances to London.[60] In 1761 relations between Murray and Brymer were strained because of the uncertainty of the quality of provisions sent from England. It seemed to all concerned that the worst of their difficulties had passed and the following shipping season was expected to go more smoothly. This was not to be the case.

The 1762 shipping season opened with no sign of the contractors' ships, and, by July, the word was that they had probably been lost in the fog off the Isle of Bic.[61] In 1760 the contractors' ships sailed from England at the end of April but despite worries about the timetable of the transatlantic passage in 1762, they did not sail with their convoy until 7 May and did not arrive until August. When the ships did not arrive in

July of 1762, Murray wasted no time in gathering what supplies he could; he sought help from the local merchants. Their quick response caused him to write to Amherst: "I must admit the Traders of this place have behaved with more generosity than I expected as they have sold their flour to the contractors agent at as cheap a rate as the contractor could have imported it".[62] In the meantime he shipped his remaining stocks, over 1,000,000 lbs of flour and 1,500,000 lbs of pork, to Montreal.[63] The sheer volumes are staggering; when Amherst asked for a report on the state of the provisions in flour alone the total was approximately 919,000 lbs with almost 200,000 lbs of this commodity earmarked for Trois Rivières. He was told that the local merchants could add over 500,000 lbs more to this total.[64]

The trouble with flour was that it spoiled so easily. In this time of need eleven Quebec merchants brought forward 1184 barrels of flour, but on examination, only 148 of them were found fit for use. This problem of spoilage had been recognized early on when, in 1760, Amherst had issued instructions on how flour and rice should be packaged for transport. He even detailed what type of barrel should be used for each commodity.[65] The quality of flour sent on the first two of the contractors' ships was so poor that it had led to the necessity of buying up as much locally as possible. The local supplies left much to be desired, thus all Murray's hopes were pinned on the ships the Oxford and the Lyon which arrived on 4 August. The final tally was made on 24 September by the Deputy Commissary who found that of the 2025 barrels of flour on the Oxford, only 72 could be used, and on the Lyon, only 58 barrels were fit for the troops.[66] Matters deteriorated further when an inspection of the contractors' stores was ordered which showed that of the 320 barrels, only 4 were passable.

The high number of poor quality barrels of flour posed very serious problems for Murray; but there was also the possibility that there was an element of fraud involved on the part of the contractors' agent at Quebec. Once a barrel was declared damaged the agent could sell it off and Murray suspected that Brymer was involved in some shady deals. The only way that he could stop Brymer buying the flour cheap and profiting from this purchase was to accept bad flour. Here was the dilemma: Murray would rather have musty flour than none at all, but if there was a chance that he could obtain good flour instead, and at the expense of the contractor, he would rather do that. Murray mentioned to Amherst that Brymer and his partner Daniel Bayne were in business for themselves and were buying up the condemned flour and selling it. They were not the first to think of this scheme; some of the colonial agents had been buying condemned flour from Halifax and then sending it back to feed prisoners of war. What worried Murray was that unless he inspected every barrel, and he did not have the manpower for such a task, Brymer might get a lot of reasonably good barrels condemned by mistake.[67]

The problem of poor quality flour did not end at the Port of Quebec but continued down the supply line. There were a series of complaints made in August that the flour that reached St. Ours and Montreal was not edible. This issue soon became a flashpoint between Generals Gage and Murray at one level, and between their assistants Irving and Christie on another. It was Gage who first began the practice of having flour inspected at Montreal and sending it back to Quebec where, each time, it was found to be fit for use by the inspector there.[68] At the end of August, the Quebec inspectors looked at the barrels of flour returned and decided that 62 of the 68 had been damaged by water on the return trip from Montreal and were consequently unacceptable. Murray counselled Gage to choose more experienced men as inspectors and to stop wasting the Crown's money. The suspicion in the back of his mind again was that it was all part of a money-making scheme for someone, though this time he did not know who to blame. When provisions were sent back, it was too late to expect more from Quebec; therefore, supplies were bought locally. But local quality and availability were unpredictable. Consequently, it was the soldiers who always suffered in the end. Irving explained to Christie that the packaging and quality from England had been so bad that it came as no surprise to them that more and more was turning out to be poor quality. Jacob Rowe, the Commissary, was overworked and had not been able to inspect any barrels that looked alright on the outside. The inspectors were only opening damaged barrels because there was only the quartermaster and 12 coopers to help him. They generally had to unload 3 vessels at a time, and any delay meant that they were taking the chance that no supplies at all would reach Montreal before transportation became impossible.[69] The problem of the returned provisions reached such a height in 1763 that Murray ordered a court martial of the people employed as inspectors.[70]

In each instance the flour returned was not of high enough quality for the upper posts, yet it was good enough for the use of the Quebec garrison.[71] The troubles did not end there because, in the spring of 1764, Murray called for the surveyor at Montreal, Monsieur Porteous, to be sent to Quebec to save the cost of him returning so many barrels of flour.[72] At the same time, Murray wrote to Burton that he suspected that something untoward was going on. Earlier, in 1762, Joseph Howard, the deputy town major of Montreal, had been accused of profiteering by selling provisions from the King's stores. Murray mentioned the rumour that merchants at Montreal were buying up wheat to supply the upper posts but could not be sure of a reliable market for their goods unless a substantial amount of the government flour was found to be bad.[73] It may well have been true that the merchants were trying to sell at the posts but it would have been too blatant for them to pay off two of every three inspectors (usually army officers) to achieve this end. The most likely explanation is that it was well known that the flour supply could be counted on to be of fair to poor quality when unloaded at Quebec and that a four week passage to Montreal could turn a fair barrel into a poor one and a poor one into one unfit for further shipment further north or west. Exposure to bad weather or transport on a leaky boat increased the chance of damage and there was always the risk that the soldiers might buy locally grown grain whether or not the provisions were good. Samuel Jacobs, a merchant in Quebec, was indeed buying up as much grain as possible from the countryside and he gave instructions to his own employees in the rural areas to take grain rather than cash for goods sold in his retail trade. In October 1763 he received a letter from his agent at Crown Point giving him a list of what would make good sales items there. In the list he told Jacobs to send 20 or 30 barrels of flour, "as these soldiers do not draw their provisions if they can help it for they want none of it but the bread".[74] Even in 1763, one of the incoming contractors' vessels had shipped over 200 barrels of flour inspected at Quebec and found them not fit for the use of the troops, and it was sent to Robert Leake (Commissary General for North America) at New York where six weeks later it was inspected. Thirty four barrels from this shipment were judged good enough to ship back to Quebec.[75] Such judgements of the condition of provisions were obviously very subjective and the Quebec garrison ended up eating most of the flour rejected at Montreal.

All of these troubles stemmed from Quebec being used as the only depot. The more spoilage there was and the more transportation bottlenecks within the colony, the greater the expense to the crown. This financial matter was what really worried Murray. As the years wore on, the issue of severe shortages worked itself out and from 1765 on there was even an occasional commissary sale from the Jesuits' College in Quebec. In 1765 the agent had 2500 barrels of flour and other necessaries for sale at 25% down, with the balance in two weeks.[76] There were similar sales at Trois Rivières and Montreal. By the mid-1760s such sales were not the result of large amounts of condemed goods on hand, they were normal surpluses from the respective garrisons. This surplus, by itself, indicates that provisioning was on a solid footing by then.

The provisioning of the British troops in Canada was not left in the hands of colonial merchants or British merchants in Quebec. Experience had shown the British government that it was cheaper and more effective to feed the troops with ships full of goods laded in England and Ireland. There were, however, still a number of issues which had to be taken into account. The short navigation season on the St. Lawrence, the lack of vessels for internal transport and the inability of the merchants in the grain trade to gather a reliable amount for the use of the army show why the provisioning contracts made in the 1760s were the most suitable solution. There were also difficulties associated with transporting large amounts of perishable goods over the Atlantic, but these problems were outweighed by the difficulties of feeding an army from a precarious local harvest.

Army provisioning was not handed over to the control of local merchants when the garrison was at full strength; with an ever-dwindling number of soldiers stationed in Quebec after 1763 provisioning still remained outside local control. Consequently, local merchants would not benefit from the one potential steady source of income in the colony. Merchants could, however, provide soldiers with those goods not covered in the London contracts. These opportunities were not considerable. However, before going into any depth on what merchants could provide, it should first be noted what soldiers had and what they lacked. Soldiers were issued kits that included a brush and comb, wormstoppers, a screw of rag for a gun, a hammer and flint, and clothing that included a leather cape, four shirts and a nightcap.[77] The provisioning contract gave each soldier flour, rice, meat, butter or cheese and one gill of rum per day. There were many other items on the soldiers' shopping list. One important item seems to have been a pair of sturdy shoes and other items of clothing including leather gloves and woollen stockings. Staples such as tobacco, alcohol, snuff, sugar, coffee and tea were popular, as was soap. We know the types of things that the men of the garrison purchased because of the merchant books and correspondence which survive from the period.

To offer another perspective on the economic benefits of an army in the towns and their environs we can examine individual interactions between merchants and soldiers. The Lawrence Ermatinger cash books for 1764-70, for instance, show that he had a small but steady clientele of army officers.[78] Perhaps the best collection is the Samuel Jacobs papers because they contain his letters to his employees in a variety of posts and villages in which we find signs of the types of economic interactions with the army that he found profitable. Jacobs lived in the town of Quebec and while he left no record of how much he sold to the garrison, he was well known to the officers and to Murray.

The Jacobs letters in 1761 deal mainly with his inability to find the necessary vessels upon which to send provisions to the willing and captive market of soldiers at St. Antoine and Crown Point.[79] He was at the same time supplying his employee Charles Curtius with alcohol for the local tavern keepers. The special place that he kept in his heart for the army can be seen in a directive to his employee at St. Denis that "Any thing they [army officers] want for their own let them have it as low as possible or if you can do anything for them in regards to Eatables, Drinkables or Wearables please to give my compliments to them and let them know I am ready to serve them from here or Montreal".[80] His attempts at country trading ran into trouble with Gage's order that prevented travelling merchants from buying up goods and selling them in the towns. Jacobs worked his way around this difficulty by applying for a tavern licence for his employee and planned to continue selling goods without official sanction.[81]

In his quest to corner as much of the officers' market as possible, Jacobs made direct contact with the Commanding Officer at Crown Point and offered to supply his garrison as cheaply as anyone else. He followed up this claim by appointing a man in his employ to run a small business there. He reminded Colonel Blist that they had met in New York and talked of his long years of practice in supplying officers which had included a stint at Louisbourg.[82] By the spring of 1762 he was supplying a wide variety of goods ranging from socks to wine at the upper posts. In

1763 he had established such a good relationship with the officers at Crown Point that soldiers were laid on to help unload his battoes and he was allowed to store his goods in the old magazine.[83] Soldiers were buying from his stores: sugar, coffee, tea and hundreds of pairs of socks while officers ordered port, wine and New England Rum.[84]

The sheer volume of trade in spirits gave Jacobs the idea of operating his own distillery but it was not until 1768 that he became part owner of such a venture. In the meantime he watched a steady amount of money flowing out of the colony to pay for purchases of New England Rum which by 1769 ran at around 250,000 gallons imported every year. The soldiers at Crown Point had their own brewery which in 1759 broke even. It brewed 6658 barrels of beer at a cost of £2200 and the sales covered the costs. In 1760 the brewery produced only a fraction of this amount. The cost of molasses plus the huge amounts which went missing between Albany and Crown Point meant that it actually cost more to produce it at the garrison than to have it imported.[85]

The merchant faced the same problems in his dealings with the soldiers as he did in his regular business. An agent had to stay at the various posts, there needed to be vessels ready to transport the goods, the ships from England had to arrive on time to make transport within the colony possible and there was always the unexpected - a vessel could be put under impress orders just when it was needed most. Only a few trips were possible per season, and credit had to be given to officers though no payment might be forthcoming until the following season if at all; and apart from these drawbacks there were the eternal problems of spoilage, shipwreck and theft. Although the local merchants did not deal in the huge volumes of the London contractors, their business ventures still involved tying up substantial amounts of capital. No merchant devoted himself entirely to the needs of the army and because merchants faced the same string of problems, no matter who their buyers were, the business of selling was a delicate balancing act. The civil establishment tried to help merchants to collect debts by establishing mandatory debtor's bonds for anyone leaving the province in the hopes of preventing large scale fraud, but this did not deter everyone. In order for trade to be lucrative for local merchants there had to be a stable harvest surplus and a good infrastructure such as proper harbour facilities with storehouses, and an internal transportation network that would regularize the carrying of provisions. In addition, there had to be enough vessels for the merchants to use. Quebec did not meet any of these requirements and this deficiency made it difficult for the merchant community to function effectively.

Experiences early on in the Seven Years War, especially the Shirley campaign, had taught the British army hierarchy not to rely on local suppliers; they had pulled back all their contracts to England in the last years of the 1750s. This meant that from the start they had no intention of relying on Quebec to provide the foodstuffs for local garrisons. Provisioning did not run smoothly however, in the first two years after the conquest because Britain was still at war and because the contractors had to get used to working within the confines of the short navigation season on the St. Lawrence. The conditions of the provisioning contract allowed the contractors to leave the provisions for the whole colony at the port of Quebec and this regulation put the onus on the local administration to see that provisions reached their destination. The need to transport army provisions within the colony put a great strain on an already inefficient internal transportation system. Merchants at Quebec who were hoping to capture at least part of the provisioning contract not only lost this battle, but at times experienced difficulty obtaining cargo space on their own vessels within the colony. By the end of the military period the provisioning problems had been sorted out but merchants were no further along than they had been in 1760. They had been unable to compete with official army contractors on one level and with the shipping requirements of the army on another. They had neither made fortunes from the soldiers nor had they been able to extend their own economic interests while the colony remained under military rule. This inability to prosper in the first years of their business careers at Quebec gives some indications of the problems they faced.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER FIVE

1.Bruce Wilson, The Enterprise of Robert Hamilton : A Study of Wealth and Influence in Early Upper-Canada, 1776-1812 (Ottawa : Carleton University Press, 1983).

2.Fernand Ouellet, "The British Army of Occupation in the St.Lawrence Valley, 1760-74 : The Conflict between Civil and Military Society". p.38 in Roy A. Prete and A.H. Ion Armies of Occupation (Waterloo : Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1984).

3.John Shy, Towards Lexington The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution (New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1965), p.97.

4.Ibid., p. 238.

5.Quebec Gazette, 10 January 1765.

6.Quebec Gazette, 25 June 1767 : Charles H. Stewart, The Service of British Regiments in Canada and North America. A Resume based on Regimental Histories held in the National Defence Library (Ottawa : Department of National Defence Library, 1964), pp. 41-48.

7.Ouellet," The British Army of Occupation", p.40.

8.Quebec Gazette, 6 August 1767.

9.Quebec Gazette, 11 June 1767 and 11 October 1767.

10.Quebec Gazette, 21 July 1768.

11.Carol M. Whitfield, Tommy Atkins : The British Soldier in Canada 1759-1870 (Ottawa: National Historic Parks and Sites, 1981), p.31.

12.Ibid., p.32.

13.MG23 GII Series I Vol(1)3. 28 August 1761. Murray to the Secretary of the Commissioners of the Treasury.

14.MG23 GII Series I, Vol(1)2., 25 October 1763. Murray to Leake.

15.Shy, p. 339.

16.The discussion of the army contractors's is indebted to the work of L. Namier and J. Brooke, eds., The House of Commons, 1754-90 vol 2 (London : Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964), pp. 39-41, pp.237-239, pp. 194-195 and pp. 340-342.

17.Shy, Towards Lexington, p. 334.

18.Namier and Brooke, pp.442-444.

19.Shy, p.336.

20.Shy, p.336.

21.Molleson Papers. National Library of Scotland. Ms 5500. No. 5. 1764.

22.Shy, p.334.

23.Lewis Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution (London: Macmillan and Company Limited, 1961), p.241.

24.Namier and Brooke, pp. 344-345.

25.Amherst Papers. W.O. 66. 28 March 1761. Delancey and Watts to Amherst.

26.Amherst Papers. W.O. 66. 26 July 1761. Amherst to Delancey and Watts.

27.P.R.O. 30/8/66.

28.P.R.O. 30/8/66. folio 230.

29.Adm. 20/242. Victualling Service. Entry 1335. 14 May 1761.

30.Adm. 20/242. Victualling Service. Entry 3178. 14 October 1761.

31.Adm. 20/242. 1761. Entries 1335/ 3178/ 3179/ 3182/ 3328/ 3330/ 3331/ 3432/ 3628/ 3698/ 3703.

32.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/60. 25 July and 26 July 1761. Amherst to the masters of vessels.

33.MG23 GII Vol(1)1., 23 June 1760. Murray to Colvill.

34.MG23 GII Series I Vol(1)3., 29 July 1760. Murray to Colonel Fraser.

35.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/1. July 1760. Murray to Amherst.

36.Amherst Papers. W.O.34/70. 1 September 1760. Apthorp to Amherst.

37.P.R.O. 30/8/66. folio 233.

38.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/1. 31 July 1760. Murray to Amherst.

39.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/1. 14 March 1761. Contractor to Murray.

40.Amherst Papers. W.O. 66. 19 September 1761. Delancey and Watts to Amherst.

41.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/1. 1 November 1761. Murray to Amherst.

42.William Hervey, Journals of the Hon. William Hervey in North America and Europe From 1755 to 1814. with Order Books at Montreal, 1760-1763 (Bury St. Edmunds: Paul & Matthew, 1906), p.127.

43.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/1. 25 June 1761. Murray to Amherst.

44.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/1. 18 July 1761. Murray to Amherst.

45.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/57. 26 September 1761. Amherst to Bradstreet.

46.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/1. 22 August 1761.

47.MG23 GII Series I, Vol(1)3., 6 March 1761. Amherst to Murray,

48.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/62. 22 March 1761. Amherst to Hancock.

49.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/62. 6 June 1762.

50.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/1. 1 July 1761. Murray to Amherst.

51.Amherst Papers. W.O. 66. 30 January 1761 and 28 March 1761.

52.Amherst Papers. W.O. 66. 9 August 1761. Amherst to Delancey and Watts.

53.Amherst Papers. W.O.66. 13 August 1761. Amherst to Delancey and Watts.

54.Amherst Papers. W.O. 66. 30 August 1761. Amherst to Delancey and Watts.

55.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/3. 29 July 1761. Amherst to Murray.

56.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/1. 15 November 1761. Murray to Amherst.

57.MG23 GII I Vol(1)3. 28 August 1762. Murray to the Secretary of the Commissioners of the Treasury.

58.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/2. 9 June 1762. Murray to Amherst.

59.Letter Book of John Watts, 29 August 1762. Watts to Smith and Nutt.

60.Letter Books of John Watt, 24 April 1762; 15 May 1764.

61.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/2. 14 July 1762.

62.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/2. 4 August 1762. Murray to Amherst.

63.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/2. 27 July 1762. Murray to Amherst.

64.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/2. 4 July 1762. Account of Provisions.

65.Amherst Papers. W.O. 66. 12 March 1760. Amherst to Delancey and Watts.

66.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/2. 24 September 1762. Murray to Amherst.

67.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/2. 8 October 1762. Murray to Amherst.

68.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/59. 7 August and 18 August 1762.

69.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/59. 26 August 1762. Irving to Christie.

70.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/2. 17 October 1763.

71.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/2. 10 July 1763. Murray to Gage.

72.MG23 GII Series I, Vol(1)2., 11 May 1764.

73.MG23 GII Series I, Vol(1)2., 11 May 1764. Murray to Burton.

74.Jacobs Papers. Volume 8. 1760-1763. 16 October 1763. William Webb at Crown Point to Samuel Jacobs at Quebec.

75.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/67. 30 June 1763. Leake to Mair.

76.Quebec Gazette, 4 April 1765.

77.John Nairne Papers. MG23 GIII 23. Orderly Books Vol.4. Folio No.5. 1762.

78.MG19 A2 Series 3. Vol. 81. Cash Book 1764-70.

79.Jacobs Estate Papers. Vol.8. 12 October 1761. Curtius to Jacobs; 3 November 1761. Jacobs to Curtius.

80.Jacobs Estate Papers. Vol.8. 30 November 1760. Jacobs to Curtius.

81.Jacobs Estate Papers. Vol.8. 5 December 1761. Curtius to Jacobs.

82.Jacobs Estate Papers. Vol. 8. 13 May 1762. Jacobs to Colonel Blist.

83.Jacobs Estate Papers. Vol. 8. September 1763. William Webb to Jacobs.

84.Jacobs Estate Papers. Vol. 8. 16 October 1763. Webb to Jacobs.

85.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/59. 18 March 1761. Amherst to Bradstreet.

CHAPTER SIX - THE IMPACT OF THE ARMY ON THE TOWN OF QUEBEC

Historians have rarely commented on the impact of the military presence on the colony in the immediate post-conquest period. This oversight is odd because the military ethos of the colony during the French regime still ran deep, after the conquest when the economy was still geared to military rather than consumer needs. The traditional and central importance of the military presence in the colony did not change in the early period of British rule. It was only natural therefore, that after 1763, the town of Quebec continue to fulfil its role as military, administrative and economic nerve centre of the colony. Although the first difficulties of provisioning occurred at Quebec, which was the central depot for all army provisioning, it was not the only area affected by the army's presence. The troubles in Montreal which led at times to a breakdown in order stemmed from the deteriorating relationship between the military and civilian population and were related specifically to the need for billets, provisions and to the use of the impress. Through a systematic study of the needs of the army it is possible to gain some insights into the workings of the local economy and its relationship with the civil administration.

In the French regime military fortifications and military needs took precedence over civilian needs. In the 1740s a new fortification wall was built that enlarged the upper town by 1200 feet in a westerly direction.[1] This area was mapped out street by street and in return the houses already built in the St. John's area were demolished to create a military zone. In 1763 approximately 535 acres of land at Cape Diamond was taken by right of conquest for the site of a future citadel, and this seizure ended the expansion plans of the upper town as laid out by French planners.[2] This British acquisition meant that no civilian building would be allowed in that area and therefore decreased the housing space in the upper town by 30%.[3]

Quebec escaped most of the destruction of war until 1759 when it was bombarded for two months. The French authorities were aware that there could be large scale-destruction: the evacuation of lower town was ordered, all windows were to be bricked up and the local population was notified that no fires would be put out. This plan was a compromise, because the original order had been for lower town to be levelled before the fighting began.[4] By July the town was empty and when the summer turned into autumn and the smoke cleared, only 6 of the 200 homes in lower town were still standing. The situation was not much better in upper town, where 535 houses were totally destroyed and 150 badly damaged. Besides this residential destruction, all the churches, monasteries and administrative buildings, including the Chateau St. Louis, had been partly destroyed.

In the winter of 1759-60 an estimated 5000 inhabitants and 7000 British soldiers huddled together in the partly destroyed town. After 1759 the troops were kept in the New Barracks, the Dauphine Barracks and the Intendant's Palace; the rest were billeted until the Jesuits' College could be used as a barracks and storehouse. By 1764 there was a semblance of the old order, and an officer travelling through the area remarked that many of the houses in the upper town and most in the lower town had already been repaired.[5] In the main, the army repaired public buildings in Quebec because it needed them as barracks and provisioning storehouses, since the lower town warehouses were now just piles of rubble. Murray assured Amherst in 1762 that not only would the Canadians help him rebuild and repair the fortifications at their old rate of a penny a day but they would also buy the old planks and boards to rebuild their own homes.[6] This plan would have been difficult in light of the cash shortages in the colony but it was possible.

Most thoughts on the defence of the town were put forward by the military administration. The first plan for a citadel was drawn up in 1762 by Samuel Holland, Surveyor General, and similar plans were sent to the Board of Ordnance in 1767 and 1769, but none had much effect.[7] The major difficulties facing the British engineers were the lack of budget and the shortage of labour. Because of the uncertain outcome of the peace negotiations before 1763, it was not thought wise to use corvees for labour in case it caused bad feeling. Soldiers themselves were put to work whenever possible. During the French regime building contractors were used for the fortifications of 1745. This building boom had brought employment for a number of master masons and tradesmen. The change to British rule brought a sharp downturn in business for the masons and skilled tradesmen in the colony and was one area where the presence of a garrison did not bring any of the old economic advantages. There was now no major contractor who had the wherewithal to do all the repairs, and, on the British side, there was neither the money nor the inclination to engage in any large-scale projects. In fact only ten men were involved in any way until 1768 in repairs to public buildings, whether for military or administrative use.[8] Only four of these craftsmen were British and the rest were Canadian.[9] The bulk of the work in 1763-65 was done on the Seminary and then, in 1765, on the Court and prison. The remainder of the work was in 1768-69 on the Provincial secretary's office, the Executive Council rooms and the Chateau St. Louis. All of the men involved were either master masons or timber framers and carpenters. There was extensive work left but it was done by soldiers. The British army had a far higher percentage of unskilled men than the French army in Quebec in the 1750s which counted 635 craftsmen from 35 trades among its numbers.[10]

Under normal circumstances the presence of a garrison brought work for local artisans and tradesmen. When the British army settled down in the colony any hope of profiting from the garrison was lost to the citizens because the British authorities decided to use their own soldiers, as much as possible, in order to cut costs. Military building had been a great boon to master masons and artisans of Quebec before 1759 because they could nake 200% more profit from military contracts than from private building contracts.[11] There was no comparable military contracting in the British regime until the next century. There were a small number of jobs that needed to be done and if they were to be contracted out they were first advertised in the Quebec Gazette, and sealed tenders were to be handed in to the barracks master. The first such advertisement appeared on 16 May 1765 calling for tradesmen to repair the barracks and was followed on 4 July by a notice that the Jesuits' College was to become a barracks, that the barracks near the palace gate needed repairs and that the palace itself was to be repaired to hold 8000 barrels of provisions. There was another type of contract in the Gazette and it was aimed at a different group of specialists. It called for axes, pots and candlesticks for the use of the soldiers.[12] The prison was the main focus of repairs in 1766. Tradesmen were also asked to submit written proposals for roofing the artillery barracks and repairing the Intendant's Palace and Gate.

Although the British took over a substantial amount of land and public buildings in 1760, no local construction boom resulted. Any economic gains were strictly limited to a very small number of tradesmen and labour was supplied by demands on the locals at first, and later by paying small bonuses to the soldiers. British engineers responsible for military building in Quebec belonged to the Royal Regiment of Artillery which maintained a small but constant presence in the town throughout the decade. The officers of this regiment reported to the Master General of Ordnance, Lord Ligonier, until 1763; they then reported to the Marquis of Granby.[13] The Ordnance Department supplied much of the materials used by the army and was responsible for designing and building barracks and fortifications for the army overseas.[14] It was through this department that contracts were made for repairs. Local boards of ordnance comprising senior engineers and artillery officers made decisions, took appropriate action, and then submitted their accounts to the Board in London. In the French period the presence of a garrison in the town ensured a great deal of work for masons and tradesmen; this situation changed after 1759. Although there was a lot of work, there was no money; military building was not one of the priorities of the Ordnance department in London. Massive amounts of work had to be done before 1763 but none of this brought much in the way of financial benefit to the masons because it was accomplished through cheap day labour, involving the locals and the garrison.

A recent study of military property in the town of Quebec examined the public buildings taken by the British.[15] In 1760 the British took 14 1/2 acres by right of conquest including the Intendant's Palace, King's Wharf, Jesuit College and the Barracks.[16] In 1763 the Ursuline land was appropriated.[17] Nothing else was appropriated, purchased or leased until the American Revolution. There were 141 acres of fortification of which only 14 were in lower town. This property was the best in town and represented 32% of all property taken by the military from 1760 to 1871.[18] There was of course far more property when private sales and leases were taken into account. It was common practice for officers to rent homes while in Quebec. From 1760 to 1763 twelve houses were rented by the military at a cost of just over £400.[19] Murray rented a house on Rue St. Louis because the Chateau was not rebuilt until later in the decade. There were six other officers who rented houses in the town. Other sources of information for this particular activity can be found in the Quebec Gazette, although there is only the odd reference here and there in the 1760s.[20] Overall, the British authorities claimed the best land in the best locations but because of the lack of building by the military, they failed to stamp a British character on the town.

Of course the town of Quebec was not the only town to feel the impact of the British army. In Montreal the army had more effect on the local population because of a combination of local conditions and decisions taken in London; there were not the same number of public buildings that could be used to house troops, and, after the Quartering Act was enforced in Canada in 1765, soldiers could no longer be billeted in private homes.[21] The Lords of the Treasury asked for and received an estimate of the cost of quartering troops at Montreal and Trois Rivières for 30 weeks and it came to £5929 sterling.[22] All of this money would go directly into the local economy. During the military regime, billeting had been handled by the militia captains under the supervision of British army officers but as soon as civil government was established, this job passed to the justices of the peace who were, of course, newcomers. There was already some tension between the merchants and the military. The justices of the peace had to be careful not to increase this tension by acting as though they were superior to the soldiers and officers. Walker's spirited stand signalled to the army exactly how the justices intended to use their power; the army's response was swift and brutal. The quick reaction of the government to the Walker incident showed that such lack of discipline would not be tolerated in a civil society and the soldiers in question would be brought to justice.

Another area of tension was also related to billeting. The year 1765 was a difficult one for troops stationed in Montreal. In the early months of the year they had been deprived of shelter because of the pettiness of Brigadier Burton who had refused to allow them to be billeted outside the town proper. Adam Mabane, council member and close associate of the Governor, was sent to Montreal to investigate the matter and found that the real problem was that Brigadier Burton would not allow soldiers to be housed outside the town walls although there were rooms to be had there. Burton soon changed his mind when Mabane publicized the issue. It seemed an act of insanity to have soldiers sleeping out in the elements when there was shelter available. By March all the soldiers were billeted.[23] Murray wrote to Burton in the summer to inform him that troops could no longer be billeted in private homes; he was therefore sending money through for the hire of homes for officers and soldiers but he warned that there might be trouble finding this accommodation. There were also plans for a barracks in Montreal to be completed early in the New Year and Murray believed this accomodation would relieve the billeting crisis. The council was worried by the cost of furnishing the barracks and told John Carden that because it cost so much to buy furniture in Canada it should be hired for one year, until replacements could be brought from England.[24] The separation of military personnel from the civilian population had worked well in Quebec and the Governor hoped that it would settle things down in Montreal because no one expected that the troops would be thrown out into the streets. The period of transition should have been trouble free. The fact that trouble increased brought more tension to a town where the opposition to the billeting of troops continued to grow until it seemed to the Governor that he was facing some form of organized resistance. Murray sent councillor Thomas Dunn to see if it were true that the justices of the peace could not find billets; he found it was impossible to hire any houses for army use. Murray, in desperation, told the justices to secure houses no matter what the cost.[25] The cost of this measure was to be met from the Treasury.[26] The following month he warned John Carden, Barracks Master at Montreal, that the soldiers would have to go into the old barracks because it was too late to fix up the King's storehouse for them and too early to move to the unfinished new barracks.[27] The real crisis struck in January of 1766 when Carden had to tell Murray that on the day the troops were to move, there was a fire in the barracks. Arson was suspected as the cause of the fire, which destroyed the new barracks and all the provisions.[28] This loss meant that not only was there a severe shortage of shelter in the middle of the winter but there was now a shortage of bedding and utensils. Murray immediately told Carden to act on his idea of offering one cord of wood per month to anyone who would billet a soldier and asked him to work through Hertel de Rouville, one of the most highly regarded Canadians rather than the British justices. The rest of the correspondence between the two men dealt with the high cost of replacements and the cost of lodgings (expensive, at one dollar per month). It was only after Murray's departure that the billeting issue was resolved by Colonel Robertson, the

Barracks Master of North America, when he decided to use the king's storehouse as a barracks. In a letter to Murray in London, Adam Mabane pointed out that if Robertson had ordered this arrangement in the first place when the terms of the billeting act had become known or when the barracks had been destroyed, there would have been no civil unrest.[29]

There seemed to be habitual trouble between the Governor at Quebec and the merchants at Montreal in matters concerning the economy, and the billeting troubles simply exacerbated this unsettled mood. The Walker incident showed that the British merchants felt that the end of military rule had in fact increased the impact of the military on their lives and not the reverse. The military presence had been an annoyance; now it had become unbearable in the merchants' view. Many merchants were magistrates and as such were exempted from the onerous duty of billeting, but by the early months of 1765, even this exemption was in doubt. The need for billets was so great that, after the fire of 1765, local property owners were more or less pushed into providing this service. Murray and the council circumvented the magistrates and appealed directly to the Canadian elite to convince the local population to assist the army.

Not only were Canadians cajoled into offering their homes for hire by the promise of cash and wood but they were affected in other ways by the military through various unavoidable interactions. The best examples of this interaction are in the supply of wood to the garrison at Quebec and the barracks at Montreal, and in the thorny issue of impress warrants issued by the Governor to the Deputy Quartermaster General. In the first winter of occupation the soldiers had to go out and bring wood back themselves.[30] Letters that passed between Murray and Amherst in 1762 suggest that by then the Crown was paying Canadians to bring wood to the garrison.[31] Wood played a central role in the well-being of the garrison and was also instrumental in making the billeting issue less rancorous. Canadians were more interested in receiving firewood than cash and Murray asked Thomas Gage to order such a payment for people who had billeted officers since August of 1764.[32]

In 1762 Murray had lowered the cost of wood to one quarter of its old price and sold it at four shillings per cord.[33] There was, no doubt, a degree of self interest on the part of the British in this price reduction since the army was now paying for its wood. The wood was vital to the well-being of the garrison. Each parish was required to bring in its quota or face a penalty. The local population was paid the current market price. In the council instructions of September 1765, Carden was told that if he could not get enough wood, he could have John Fraser, magistrate, issue an impress warrant for this purpose.[34] Wood was such a precious commodity that once it was collected, a guard was stationed at the woodpile around the clock. At the end of the year Murray sent Carden an ordinance that forced the Canadians to provide firewood at a reasonable rate, and because of his knowledge of local conditions, gave him leave to choose the parishes that would be asked to contribute.[35] While wood was supplied to the garrisons under the impress warrant, the task was evenly distributed parish by parish and a record was kept of which parish had contributed. Forced or not, supplying wood was one way for the Canadians to make a steady income from the army.

Each soldier was issued with wood by the cord for a six month period. This allotment was no trifling amount. The estimate for the Quebec garrison from August 1765 to July 1766 came to 4500 cords, or approximately £1035 plus £225 for transporting and piling it in the wood store. If the £73 paid to the Barracks Master for overseeing the project and the small amount for labourers to brush the snow off the piles in the winter is added in, the total comes to £1390.13.4d Halifax currency.[36] The garrison was, however, not the only market for wood. As early as September 1765, a Canadian, advertising in the Quebec Gazette, was offering 20,000 square feet of oak logs and more of pine logs for sale.[37] This advertisement must have struck a receptive chord and shows that there was a market for lumber. In the same month the Quebec Gazette published notice of a British government bounty for nine years, beginning in January 1766, for deals, planks and boards.[38]

In the 1730s the export market for lumber had been one area where Canadian merchants had turned a profit, but now, although there was a bounty, there was still the problem of supplying the garrison. Since the garrison came first, under penalty of fine, the need to supply the garrison was a disadvantage to anyone hoping to take advantage of this new market for lumber. This type of structured economic activity was anathema to those involved in entrepreneurial enterprises. It was ironic that while the imperial government offered assistance to market a perfect export item under ideal conditions, the needs of the local government decreased the chance of merchants benefitting from this offer. There were no more public sales of wood until the summer of 1766 when there was a public auction of pine planks from a local seigneury. British officers had made some seigneurial purchases and would later use this local supply to their advantage but for the moment the timber trade was not an area of economic growth. The garrison's need for wood was beneficial to the community as a whole, that is, to the canadian rural community in the parishes. The wood contract was one of the largest expenditures of the British army in Quebec and brought a much needed infusion of cash into the area, but it is debateable whether much of this money found its way directly into the hands of British merchants. Of course the cash increased the overall amount of hard currency in circulation, presumably having been handed over in payment for goods sold by British merchants.

It was necessary to order wood for the garrison almost a year in advance when it was done by contract, a fact that Murray had to remind his own barracks master of in February 1765.[39] In a letter, Murray said that he was aware that it was no longer possible to obtain wood at the easy terms he had insisted upon in the early years when he had simply followed the French model and required the locals to provide it at a reasonable cost. In 1766 Kenelm Chandler became the new barracks master and he placed advertisements in the Quebec Gazette, asking for contractors to supply wood to the garrison from June to October 1767.[40] The barracks master at Montreal followed suit placing an advertisement for 3100 cords of wood for his barracks and 1500 cords for that of Trois Rivières with one half to be delivered in November 1767 and the rest in February 1768.[41] In fact, by the end of 1765, the garrison at Quebec had contracted with one man, Monsieur Philibot, to find, cut, transport and pile their wood. He included in his estimate of over £1000, his expenses for going into the countryside to find a suitable supply of wood (the princely sum of £2.10.0). The barracks master was able to supplement his own income by collecting £73 for receiving and issuing the wood to the men. Chandler passed on all his costs to the government, the fee for his assistant, the cost of repairs to the woodyard and the extra wages on issuing days for helpers.[42] By 1765 the contract for the garrison's wood was in the hands of one man and there was no guarantee that he would use suppliers in each of the parishes; instead he would purchase it at the best rate possible from whomever he could.

The system of impress was thus ended, but so was the benefit of having the order for the garrison spread evenly throughout the parishes. Not everyone would make money selling wood to the soldiers; at the most there was now one contractor per town. In 1768 the Navy asked merchants to step forward who would sell and import American white pine masts and deliver them to H.M.Woodyards in England.[43] There is, however, no indication that the offer was acted upon by any merchants in Quebec and it followed a published warning to stop cutting timber without a licence, especially in the King's desmense.[44] The market in wood was well enough developed by late 1766 to allow for such services as home delivery of cords of wood, and by midsummer of 1767 there was a stall near the courthouse where pickets and faggots could be bought all day long.[45] The consolidation of the army contract into the hands of Monsieur Philibot had, it seems, freed up other sources of wood for public use. The need to provide H.M. troops with their half cord of wood per man per week, coupled with the power of the impress warrant, hindered the early development of a profitable timber industry but benefitted the local economy in general.[46]

The impress warrant was another bone of contention between the military hierarchy at Montreal and the administration at Quebec, although it should not have been an issue at all. English law allowed magistrates to impress carriages and men on warrants specifically for that purpose. In 1764 Murray sent Lieutenant Colonel Christie, Deputy Quartermaster General at Montreal, a general impress warrant for his use, but was informed shortly after by the Attorney General that this action was illegal and that whenever warrants were necessary, each one had to be for a specific case.[47] The Governor's attitude towards Christie shines through in one of his letters on the issue of the powers of an impress warrant: "I am a stranger to such powers; I think they cannot exist in a free Country, and shall never consent to give the warrants you seem to expect from me".[48] Later the same month he chastised Christie for believing that he could take what services he needed locally and pay what he wished. He was told once again that he had to pay market price and if there was any dispute about the price, the conflict had to go to a civil magistrate or jury to be settled in a legal manner.[49] It was well known that Christie operated on his own account and Murray's fear seems to have been that Christie was using his position to take advantage of Montrealers by using their services for his own good. There was no proof that this activity was happening. John Fraser, a trusted friend of the Governor's, was given the power in Montreal to issue specific warrants to Christie and Burton when necessary, although no one actually ever applied to him for such warrants.[50] At the same time, the Quartering Act which reached Quebec in 1765 confused the issue even more because it stated that magistrates were still to provide men and transportation when required. The upshot was that there was a conflict over the issuing of the warrants and this issue became harder to settle as relations between Christie and Murray rapidly deteriorated. Christie wished to continue to impress Canadians for a variety of services and Murray had Fraser disallow this practice. He was worried that the warrants would interfere with the normal functioning of the colony and remarked to Burton that "the subsistence of the Canadians depends upon a punctual attention to and strenuous industry during these seasons" and that "these seasons are too short here to admit of any interruption in the Business of Agriculture".[51]

In the autumn of 1765 Christie could not launch his supply boats in time and asked for an impress warrant. He was refused, and the supply line to the upper country was in danger of being broken. Christie eventually received the warrant, but was warned that he would not receive another. Part of his job as quartermaster was to supply the Great Lakes posts and Christie had used Canadian batteaumen until 1764. He was not willing to relinquish this service because it was still difficult to find adequate transport within the colony.

The impress issue is clear evidence of a breakdown in communications between the authorities in Quebec and Montreal. Murray never seemed to understand what was going on in Montreal and he never considered its garrison well disciplined, a condition he blamed on Burton. There were frequent complaints of the lack of control there over everything from the soldiers' bowels, to their romantic dalliances with Catholic girls. On hearing of the high level of ill health in Montreal and the possibility that his troops would be sent to reinforce the Montreal garrison, Murray, who was plagued by the same health problem, wrote that "The Disease is in our Bowells, and as you think it will be imprudent to secure every Apothecary in white who can propogate the poison I shall be as attentive as I was in 1759 and 1760". He was not unaware of the social side of the soldier's life, but after receiving an enquiry from Burton on the sensitive issue of marriage and religion, explained that "I cannot suppose the Laws of Ireland can be of any force out of that kingdom where you know an officer who marries a Roman Catholic is ipso facto dismissed from the service". He expressed his hope that the marriage distemper would not reach Quebec.[52] On the impress issue, Burton had been informed in no uncertain terms that the justices had no legal power to impress men because batteau service had not been specifically mentioned in the Mutiny Act.[53] Although Murray explained his side of the story to both Christie and Burton he never seemed to realize the problems that they faced. This lack of understanding is unusual, considering what he had been through himself only a few years before with the provisioners in London. Murray's hesitation came because he did not fully trust either Christie or Burton. When he found out that the soldiers in the upper posts really were in danger of being undersupplied, he did allow the warrants to be issued.

From 1766 onwards the army had to hire boats for transporting provisions, and this time they were not just allowed to seize the vessels of British merchants as they had in the past. In 1762 Anderson and Lee wrote to Amherst asking for compensation for a ship of theirs ordered into service in 1759 and not yet paid for by Murray; likewise Samuel Jacobs claimed the government owed him over £500.[54] In both cases the ships were wrecked after wintering in the St. Lawrence.[55] The ships in Canada were all fully utilized in either the transatlantic, colonial or river trade and while helping with troop provisioning, provided a seasonal source of income.It was however, not the most lucrative of jobs. In 1763 Murray complained to Gage that the vessels carrying government stores from Quebec to Montreal were taking their own sweet time and adding about three weeks to the voyage time and thus to their wages - in the process they were also increasing the chance of water damage to the provisions. He suggested that Gage might like to send officers up the shores to catch the most recalcitrant masters and in the process save the Crown some money.[56] Gage did not appreciate this kind of interference and there were some things that Murray did not take into account such as the fact that there were so few vessels and so many goods and provisions to move for the army and for merchants that ships' masters could afford to write their own terms, especially in the river trade. The army tried to spend as little money as possible in the town of Quebec and in the country as a whole.

The cost of running the garrison at Quebec had been estimated in the French period at approximately £460 sterling, but, as Murray pointed out, there had been no garrison. The money went right into the Governor's pocket.[57] By October 1763 the estimated cost or general account of the Quebec garrison was £13,102 and, assuming that the accounts were paid, all of this money was spent in Quebec.[58]

In 1765 there were repeated calls by the Ordnance department in London for repair estimates and inventory counts and the responses seemed to indicate that when the costs of repairs to public buildings for government use was tallied, Quebec was going to be a drain on army finances.[59] The estimates of barracks expenses for the Quebec garrison alone for the period August 1765 to July 1766 came close to £1500, plus £700 for repairs; and the commissary office expenses were nearly £600. When the cost of wood was added, £1390 for Quebec and £395 for Montreal, the overall costs seemed prohibitive. In effect, for the 1765-66 period, an actual £3490 would be paid out in Quebec. This expence was a far cry from the 1763 expenditure but it was a steady source of hard currency and one which merchants hoped would soon find its way into the local economy.

The approach of the army hierarchy in London was to economize whenever possible. The army in America also felt the budget squeeze which was being passed on from London, but in Quebec there were some very specific cost cutting measures dreamed up though not always implemented. To the modern eye some of the army's cost-cutting measures seem hardly worth the bother. For instance, the Marquis of Granby, Master General of Ordnance, was told that when the 78th Regiment returned to Glasgow to be disbanded, all the weapons were to be collected but soldiers would be paid three shillings for handing over their swords.[60] It seems they were more expensive to replace and it was thought that the Scots would either use them to cut peat or hide them until the next rebellion. As early as 1763, Amherst informed Murray that since there was no longer a war on, the soldiers would be expected to pick up some of the costs of their own provisioning. He also suggested that in their spare time the soldiers hunt, fish or grow a little garden so that they could make up for the pay cut. Word of this measure caused a mutiny at the Quebec garrison, but Murray was commended for extinguishing the fires of this insurrectionary passion and bringing the men under control within one day. The men lost four pence per day and this deduction saved the army a lot of money. This measure was followed in 1765 with an anonymous publication which contained some hints for the social control of soldiers by having them build a road to Massachusetts Bay to keep them healthy and out of trouble. It would involve them in public service and they could be paid six pence per day (less than local labourers received).[61] The most practical cost cutting suggestion came from Colonel Robertson, the Barracks master general for North America, who in a letter to Secretary at War, Barrington, suggested that the troops again take over the wood contracts and its labour obligations. He thought they could be paid 3/8ths of a dollar for every cord cut and piled. The normal cost in 1766 was between four and five shillings per cord, plus one shilling for haulage. To reduce costs further Robertson also planned to reduce the rates for haulage. He also wanted the soldiers to perform all the repairs on the barracks for a little extra on their pay packet.[62] A cursory examination of the estimates sent to New York and London in 1765 shows that the main item of army expense was wood, followed closely by the need for local repairs.

Money had always been scarce in Quebec for the military and the civil government. While garrison towns certainly had the potential to bring great economic benefits to merchants this potential was not realized in the 1760s. The merchants however never lost hope, and an anonymous report of 1765, called for more regiments, as many as ten, to be distributed evenly about the province to stimulate local trade.[63] Millions of pounds sterling poured into North America each year in provisioning contracts and troop pay, but in Canada neither happened. If the American colonies were the feast, Canada was the famine. In 1773, the cost of repairs and upkeep of the army in Canada was still a headache for the government and Gage was told to undertake nothing without first submitting plans to the Treasury.[64]

The garrison had a significant impact on the town. Through the acquisition of property and its need for fuel it forced the inhabitants to deal with it on a regular basis. There was no great economic benefit to be derived by any individual merchant in their interactions with the garrison until the use of impress warrants ended and the contract for wood was given out to tenders. Major repairs and small jobs were given to a very tiny group of masons and carpenters in the mid 1760s; the bulk of the work was done by unskilled army labour rather than local labourers. Transportation, which was crucial to provisioning Montreal and the upper posts, was accomplished by forcing the locals to give their service at what was considered to be fair market price. When military rule ended and civil government was established, the use of impress warrants was also supposed to end but in reality could still be found in use at the end of 1765. Even in 1766 when the transportation of army goods was in essence thrown open to one and all there were still so few vessels in operation that it was not the great economic breakthrough that the merchants looked for. Timber bounties were offered in 1765 for nine years but the need to secure a supply for the garrison and the problems of transporting such a cargo lessened the advantages that the bounty seemed to promise. Billeting proved to be more of an imposition than a healthy economic prospect, as the Montrealers showed when they practically had to be forced to open their homes to officers and soldiers after the barracks fire of 1766.

By 1765 economies had already been made by the army - pay cuts, troop utilization for repairs and suggestions for troop use for road building and timber cutting. All these cutbacks lessened the chance that the garrisons would be a great boost to the local economy. The soldiers were not only doing more in the way of labour for their own garrison but they also had less money to spend and there were, by 1766, fewer of them.

There was another side, of course, to the presence of British soldiers in the towns of the colony. The relationships between the army and the merchants, and the army and the local population at large, were not always formal. In Quebec and Montreal the army's activities and needs permeated every level of society. The garrison enjoyed a more active social life in the decades after the American Revolution, but in the 1760s, it confined itself to sports, freemasonry and a ball on special occasions. Freemasonry came to Canada with the army and entered Quebec with Colonel John Young of the 60th regiment in 1759. By 1760 there were seven lodges attached to the regiments at Quebec and they were to be found celebrating St. John's day with the traditional procession and celebratory meal afterwards.[65] The local headquarters of the freemasons was the public house kept by Miles Prentice, the Freemasons Hall Tavern. Prentice advertised in the Quebec Gazette, indicating that members had to pay five shillings per ticket for the freemasons festival in June 1764.[66] These festivals were annual events that brought the merchants and the soldiers together. By 1767 they had a musical band leading the procession, but with the exception of advertisements for festival tickets, their activities remain unrecorded. One of the other activities that seems to have occupied the attention of the garrison was horse racing on the plains of Abraham, and although this sport is mentioned in the newspaper, no other sport is discussed.[67]

It was not until Governor Murray left Quebec that there is any mention of other social activities such as the celebration of St. Andrew's day. This celebration took place in the splendour of the British Coffee House in lower town and brought together the notables of the civil and military establishments.[68] This socializing is not surprising, considering the high number of Scottish officers in the regiments stationed in North

America and the number of Scots names in the 1764 census.[69] Shortly after his arrival in 1766, Lieutenant-Governor Carleton held a public ball for everyone.[70] In response, he was to be treated to a ball by the merchants but there was some trouble over this event because most of the officers claimed that they would not go. All the commanding officers were called together to discuss the matter of the merchants' ball and they were told to judge for themselves what should be done. Each officer was then told of the ball through a circulating letter. Some thought it might be a good way to settle the differences between the merchants and the officers to which Colonel Jones replied that "he knew of no differences between the officers and the merchants of Quebec and that the best way to show them was not to associate with them indiscriminately".[71] It was not just the officers who were of two minds about attending, some of the merchant community itself refused to go to the ball which in the end had to be postponed for lack of participants. There was still clearly some tension between the military and the British merchants, even in Quebec, in the autumn of 1766. Other overtures were made by the military to the population in general, though some were not appreciated. There was the celebrated case of Mr. Latham, surgeon of the 8th regiment, who advertised that he wished to inoculate the population against an undisclosed illness and that he had just performed that same service for the soldiers. When no one stepped forward to accept his generous offer of free inoculation for the poor, he decided to perform this medical miracle on his two year old daughter to show how it worked; there is no record of the results of this act of faith on the part of his family.[72]

The main arena of social interactions between the military and everyone else must have been in the eighty three public houses which were peppered throughout upper and lower town not to mention the many more in the surrounding parishes. It was also here where most of the cash changed hands. Soldiers and officers usually had some kind of credit arrangement in the towns in which they were billeted but they had to pay up before being moved on. As late as 1773 the tendency of officers at Quebec to obtain credit beyond their means and to do odd jobs to cover their debts was common; as one soldier said: "all the extra money went for drink".[73]

According to official sources and documents, neither the Canadian nor the British merchants had been able to cash in on the benefits of having an army in their midst. This failure is not to say that there was not a thriving unofficial economy in operation, but of course, such activity this cannot be traced through public records. The wood contracts alone were a steady source of income. Before 1763 this income was distributed evenly among parishes but after 1766 was in the hands of one or two men. Soldiers were paid on a regular basis and were forced to settle up with merchants before they were moved to their next post. As we have seen, they were switched regularly between Quebec and Montreal and also on occasion sent to the upper posts. An examination of the few remaining merchant books from the period show that officers were regular customers of, and kept a running tab with, local merchants. If merchants had expected to make their fortune from provisioning contracts they would have been disappointed, but it seems unlikely that this was ever their aim. Their limited knowledge of local conditions and their lack of contact with the parishes would have made it exceedingly difficult for them to have handled the demands of feeding the army. However, it was a possibilty for the future. In the 1760s merchants were able to benefit indirectly from the presence of the army in the towns and at the upper posts. Soldiers had cash and they also had a terrible thirst. Merchants such as Samuel Jacobs were able to quench their thirst and provide them with other goods as well.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER SIX

1.LaFrance and Ruddell, p. 156.

2.Ibid., p. 156.

3.Charbonneau, Desloges and LaFrance, p.426.

4.This short discussion of the condition of the state of the town in 1759 is based on the work of Allana Reid, " The Development and Importance of the Town of Quebec", pp. 417-419.

5.Kings Mss. 213 folio 57. Journal of an officer who travelled over North America and the West Indies in 1764 and 1765.

6.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/1. 10 March 1762. Murray to Amherst.

7.Charbonneau, Desloges and LaFrance, p.154.

8.A.H.J.Richardson, G. Bastien, D. Dube and Marthe Lacombe, Quebec City: Architects, Artisans, and Builders (Ottawa : National Museum of Man, National Museums of Canada, 1984), Bell p.98 : Charlery p.175 : Deguise p.199 : Delestre p.206 : Clark and Dunn p.229 : Emond p.252 : Jouineau p.328 : O'Neill p. 429 : Parant p.445.

9.Ibid., John Bell p.98., Henry Dunn and John Clark p. 229., Henry O'Neill p. 429. The last three were in partnership for the first part of the decade.

10.Charbonneau, Desloges and LaFrance, p. 254.

11.Ibid., p. 310.

12.Quebec Gazette, 3 October 1765.

13.Carol M. Whitfield, Tommy Atkins : The British Soldier in Canada, 1759-1870 (Ottawa : National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, 1981), p.124.

14.Ibid., p.19.

15.Claudette Lacelle,Military Property in Quebec City, 1760-1871 (Ottawa : National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, 1987), passim.

16.Ibid., p. 150.

17.Charbonneau, Desloges and LaFrance, p.422.

18.Lacelle, p. 159.

19.Christian Rioux, Quelques aspects des effets sociaux et urbains de la presence d'une garnison Britannique a Quebec entre 1759-1871 (Quebec : Parcs Canada, 1983), Appendix L. p. 164.

20.Quebec Gazette, 23 April 1767.

21.S.M. Scott, "Civil and Military Authorities in Canada 1764-1766", Canadian Historical Review, IX (1928) : 130.

22.C.O. 42. Vol 5., 5 October 1765. Barracks Master to Lords of the Treasury.

23.S.M. Scott, p. 131.

24.MG11 Q Series Vol 3., 30 September 1765. Council of Quebec to John Carden.

25.MG23 GII Series I Vol(1)2. 16 September 1765. Murray to the Justices of the Peace at Montreal.

26.MG11 Q Series Vol.3., 19 September 1765. Council of Quebec on billeting.

27.MG23 GII Series I Vol(1)2. 18 October 1765. Murray to Carden.

28.MG11 Q Series Vol.3., 2 January 1766. Carden to Murray.

29.Shelburne Mss. 64 : 309-313. 26 August 1766. Mabane to Murray.

30.Northcliffe Collection. "Account of Life in Quebec during the winter of 1759-60" by J. Desbruyeres to General Townshend. p. 408.

31.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/1. 12 January 1762. Murray to Amherst.

32.MG23 GII Series I, Vol(1)2., 29 July 1765. Murray to Gage.

33.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/1. 12 January 1762.

34.MG11 Q Series Vol.3., 30 September 1765. Council to Carden.

35.MG23 GII Series I, Vol(1)2., 2 December 1765. Murray to Carden.

36.W.O. 1/6. Letters- North America. General Gage. "Estimate of the Barracks Expenses, 1 August 1765 - 31 July 1766".

37.Quebec Gazette, 5 September 1765.

38.Quebec Gazette, 12 September 1765.

39.MG23 GII Series 1, Vol.(1)2., February 1765 Murray to the Barracks Master of Quebec.

40.Quebec Gazette, 24 November 1766.

41.Quebec Gazette, 23 February 1767.

42.W.O. 1/6. Chandler's Account - Repair Report 1 July 1765- 31 July 1765.

43.Quebec Gazette, 12 May 1768.

44.Quebec Gazette, 12 May 1768.

45.Quebec Gazette, 22 December 1766 (cords of wood) and 18 June 1767 (pickets).

46.W.O. 1/6. 17 August 1765 "Instructions for the Barracks Masters of Quebec and Montreal". One half cord per week from November to April and one half of this for the rest of the year.

47.S.M. Scott, p.123.

48.MG23 GII Series 1, Vol(1)2., 11 March 1764. Murray to Christie.

49.MG23 GII Series 1, Vol(1)2., 26 March 1764. Murray to Christie.

50.MG11 Q Series Vol.3., 30 September 1765. Council to Carden.

51.MG23 GII Series 1, Vol(1)2., 9 October 1765. Murray to Burton.

52.MG23 GII I, Vol(1)2. 23 December 1763 Murray to Burton (Bowel problems) and 22 March 1764. Murray to Burton (Marriage and Religion).

53.MG23 GII Series 1, Vol(1)2., 9 October 1765. Murray to Burton.

54.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/60. 28 July 1762. Anderson and Lee to Amherst.

55.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/2. 26 September 1762. Murray to Amherst: W.O. 34/3. 25 August 1762. Amherst to Murray.

56.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/2. 10 July 1763. Murray to Gage.

57.MG8 E1. Murray Report 1762.

58.W.O. 34/59. October 1763. Irving to Quartermaster General North America.

59.W.O. 1/6. August 1765. Letters - North America. General Gage.

60.W.O. 4/74. Selections- Out Letters, Secretary at War. 1 December 1763. Welbore Ellis to Marquis of Granby.

61.MG23 GII Series 1, Vol.3., No Collection." Hints on Regulations that might be useful in the Province of Quebec".

62.W.O. 1/7. March 1766. Robertson to Barrington.

63.MG23 GII Series 1, Vol.3., "Hints on the Regulation..." Clause 27.

64.John Shy, Towards Lexington The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution, 1763-1775 (New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1965), p.329.

65.J.H. Graham, Outlines of the History of Freemasonry in the Province of Quebec (Montreal : n.p., 1892), p.36.

66.Quebec Gazette, 21 June 1764.

67.Quebec Gazette, 9 July 1767.

68. *Quebec Gazette*, 3 December 1767.

69. Shy, p.352.

70. Shelburne Mss. 64 : 439-449.

71. Shelburne Mss. 64 : 439-449.

72. *Quebec Gazette*, 15 September 1768 and 3 November 1768.

73. As cited in Shy, p.372.

INTRODUCTION - SECTION THREE

This section constitutes a five chapter study of the economy and of the merchant community at Quebec. It seeks to place the economic activity of Quebec within a wider imperial and international context by examining the nature of its overseas trade. To accomplish this task, the section is divided into a study of shipping and shipping patterns from Quebec to the colonies, Quebec to Britain and Southern Europe and finally from Quebec to all points on the river trade. The next step consists of an analysis of the levels of involvement of the British merchant community in London and the outports in the trade to Quebec which includes a synopsis of the types of coverages and outlays involved. The ninth chapter returns to a study of shipping. This time the focus is on cargoes and tries to address the issue of consumerism in the eighteenth century. Chapter ten is divided into two parts. First, the discussion centres on how the London merchants traded within the empire and outside it, noting in the process that the establishment of factories, factors and resident agents brought the greatest chance of success. The second part of the chapter looks at those British merchants in the colony who were successful in Quebec. In each case they had come to the colony as junior partners or agents of London merchant houses. They came to Quebec already armed with the necessary capital, credit and suppliers. The evidence, therefore, suggests that the reason for their success was because they were part of the tried and true British commercial network. That this system was not extended more fully to the colony appears to have been the function of the credit crisis in Britain in the 1760s. Chapter eleven examines the merchants in the town of Quebec and looks at how well they fared in the 1760s. The conclusions drawn from the admittedly fragmented evidence is that the merchants did not do well at all. They did not have the dynamic characteristics ascribed to them by writers like Ouellet. They tended to form partnerships with one other person, and if this relationship ended for any reason, no new business relationship was formed. After 1766, more and more merchants saw their businesses go under. There was a dramatic rise in public sales and auctions. Most of the recorded partnerships ended within the next shipping season. Payments in cash were no longer necessary because the merchants would take whatever they could from furs to oil. Writs were served with increasing frequency and the real estate market was sluggish. This chapter ends by looking at the interventions of the Attorney General, Francis Maseres, into the financial affairs of the merchants, no doubt due to the high incidence of failures and the mounting debts in the colony. By 1768 the small British merchant community was floundering. Only those merchants with good London connections did well.

CHAPTER SEVEN - THE STRUCTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AFTER THE CONQUEST.

There was more to Canada after 1760 than just a small number of administrators and a few garrisons. Contemporary estimates of the local population range from 60,000 to 80,000 all of whom were used to having a European country provide them with goods in return for their raw materials. This expectation did not end in 1759. Discussion so far has been confined to an examination of the provisioning of troops in the new colony, the problems which arose and which were eventually conquered. But what of the normal trade which had existed between the merchant houses of France and the little community at Quebec? Trade relations had not been normal since the middle of the 1750s when the emphasis had switched from La Rochelle, catering to consumer needs, to Bordeaux which was primarily concerned with filling huge government contracts. After the fall of Quebec British ships began arriving regularly at the port of Quebec with cargoes as varied as those found in the old colony in the golden years from the 1720s to the 1740s.

European merchants engaged in overseas trade were experienced in shipping to North America, India and the Far East. In many cases the merchants of both Britain and France competed for the same markets and in doing so developed similar approaches to maritime trade. The Huguenot merchants of France and the Netherlands worked within an international community of Protestant traders which included London. France and England were, in the eighteenth century, major European powers who had sent their merchant marine around the world in search of new markets. They plied the same routes in ships of similar size and tonnage and took the same types of goods to their overseas markets. There were, however, some very specific differences in the way the British operated which were a function of their financial and legal systems and of their position as victors in the first truly global war. It is only when the structure of the British shipping industry in the eighteenth century is examined that we can fully understand why Canada was able to shift smoothly to receiving consumer goods from England instead of France.

There are no direct comparisons for British shipping to Quebec before 1760. There are, however, a few general comments that can be gleaned from the work of historians working in the American colonial sphere which are useful. There were some changes in the efficiency of British overseas shipping in the eighteenth century, and, although the cause of this had in the past been a matter of debate, historians have now agreed that this increased efficiency did not come from technological changes.[1] This accepted orthodoxy does not exclude any technical improvements. In fact there was a significant change in the hull design, but this adjustment seems to have had little effect on ship speed.[2] Technological advances were important but more important was the attitude of the House of Commons which passed legislation throughout the century to foster such advances. Parliament also intervened in a number of other ways to help the shipping industry, for instance handing down the death penalty for any master who burned his owner's ship or cast away with it.[3]

Throughout the century there was no decrease in ship size or any increase in ship speed but there was a decrease in manning requirements because of a steady drop in piracy and privateering, and because of the resultant decline in the need for heavily armed ships.[4] The seas were becoming a safer place to do business. Another change that brought good results and a decrease in the time of the round trip to North America was the switch to the shorter route to the Americas round the north of Ireland.[5] This route had been in use as early as 1660 by the Scots merchants who traded to St. Kitts and the other islands, as well as to Virginia. It took the English a lot longer to adopt this route, but it worked as well for them as it had for the Scots. Perhaps the change which brought the maritime trade to a pinnacle of efficiency was the ability of merchants in the colonial ports to organize return cargoes, and also to ensure that port time was kept to a minimum in order to save wages and reduce the total round trip time. Maritime trips to the New World were slowly becoming standardized and regularized and the proliferation of printed guides helped masters of vessels on everything from routes and shipboard discipline, to duties once at the port of call.[6] Printed guides for mariners certainly helped to make loss at sea less likely, but the treacherous passage up the St. Lawrence meant that vigilance was neccesary. River pilots had to be used on this last stretch of water to increase the chance of a safe arrival at the port of Quebec.

The choice of a master for the ship was perhaps the most critical decision of all, for not only was there the fear that the master might never bring the ship back, but also, if he was merely incompetent, the ship could be lost through his negligence. Many shipowners worked their way around this problem through the practice of nepotism - not a perjorative term in the eighteenth century. The French practice mentioned earlier of keeping it all in the family can also be seen at work in Britain. Money was not enough to ensure that a master of good skills and equal moral fibre could be hired. Family ties and the offer of part ownership of the vessel seemed to work better. Most of the master's career was spent away from the eagle eye of the owners, so his loyalty and skills were crucial to the success of the venture. The master's duties went far beyond navigating the vessel. They often had to negotiate for cargoes and passengers, repair the ship, manage the crew and be literate enough to read the printed manuals and handle customs' formalities.[7] Masters were not only responsible for their owner's cargo but when the ship was chartered out they had to look out for the interests of the charterers and the owners.[8]

In the Atlantic colonies there was great improvement in harbour facilities in the eighteenth century and systems such as the Scottish factor in residence programme made a significant improvement to turn around times. In the case of Quebec the reverse was true. Turn around time in the Quebec port was lengthened because there were few storage facilities and until 1764, the merchants had to compete with the army victualling ships which needed to unload and be checked by the harbour master and commissary of stores. Until 1763 most of the vessels arriving at Quebec came in convoy and, besides increasing the overall time of the voyage, it meant that the ships all arrived within days of each other and caused a bottleneck at the port. Murray's letters tell of the difficulty in unloading and checking cargoes when there was only one man to do this. Neither port facilities nor customs officials were well provided for at Quebec and the lack of adequate facilities and officials slowed formalities down considerably. The other factor that distinguishes Quebec from the American colonial examples is that Quebec merchants always had trouble gathering return cargoes. In the New York Gazette in the 1760s, there are few advertisements calling for return freight or passengers, whereas in the Quebec Gazette, it is a standard feature.

In one instance the problems of Quebec and the Atlantic colonies are similar. Economies of scale in colonial shipping just did not work - given the scattered markets, longer unloading time in port and under utilization on the return trip, it made more sense to use smaller vessels.[9] This situation was also true for Quebec until after 1764. Quebec was just one market, so it did not fit that part of the American colonial experience. Under utilization on the return trip meant that until the end of military rule and the end of competition with army provisioners, ship size remained on the lower end of the scale. Some ships arriving from England did not return direct but sailed on to the American colonies to load up there. This pattern was not the most common however: as recent studies have shown, most of the traffic between London and the American colonies was direct.[10] This pattern is true also of the trade between Britain and Quebec in the 1760s. Whether or not there was any trouble collecting cargoes for the return journey, only a few vessels sailed from Quebec for anything but British ports. The reason that some went on to other colonial ports was the result of less than full ladings. One of the ships from a Scottish port had its regular route between Greenock and Virginia, and when it switched to Quebec, it continued on to Virginia before returning home. There was such a small number of vessels from Britain each year that it is doubtful that they would fit the profile of the multi-port voyages commonly found in the eighteenth century. Ships on the latter were usually slavers and Canada escaped this type of traffic.

Direct voyages were more likely when the port of call had goods that were in demand in the home country - for Quebec this meant furs, fish, wheat and lumber. The great benefit of direct routes, and this factor is borne out for Quebec, was that the same master or captain sailed there regularly (although not always on the same ship) so there was less uncertainty about the actual route and its hazards. The Harbour book for Quebec and the Lloyd's lists for the period give the names of the masters; it is easy enough to trace them from one ship and one voyage to another. The masters also had a better chance to make contacts among the merchants of the other port and became known to the port officials. All of this knowledge made for a safer, more efficient voyage and led to the creation of better information networks. The trend in the eighteenth century was towards these direct voyages with all these noted benefits.[11] This concentration on direct voyages meant that the London merchants dealing with Quebec were at the forefront of maritime change. An examination of the Quebec port records shows that after 1764 the range in the size of ships entering the port of Quebec was increasing. From 1764 to 1768 a larger number of ships over 250 tons entered the trade despite under-utilization on the return voyage. Ships on most routes, with the exception of the trips to the tobacco colonies and India, often did not obtain full ladings and owners offered special deals to try and overcome this difficulty.

The combination of improved expertise at gathering return cargoes, the end of competition with the army for scarce resources, such as internal transportation, and the growing need for Canadian lumber in Britain, all contributed to the trend towards larger ships in the transatlantic trade. Other factors had worked against this trend at Quebec. The shipping season on the St. Lawrence was already short for reasons of weather and geography, and the larger the ship, the longer the turn around time. Until 1763 the only time ships of over 300 tons visited the port was when they had government stores on board for the army. It is also more likely that the French were more efficient in their transatlantic shipping to Quebec because they had factors in place to gather cargoes ahead of time, yet, even so, French merchants still made only one trip per year.

The brigantine and the snow were the types of vessels most commonly used for overseas voyages in 18th century; the 250-300 ton ship was the typical size on the transatlantic route.[12] The tonnages for Quebec were far lower until after the peace of 1763. The crews sailing to North America were paid for their port time - the same practice as in the French period. Colonial historians have pointed to a decrease in round trip voyage times by the mid 18th century and while this decrease may have been true for the American colonies, it does not hold true for Quebec.[13] From a very small sample which is valid only for the period up until 1764, the voyage times are twice as long as the averages from the French period. This was partly a result of operating in wartime and having to wait for convoys, but it is not possible to check average times after 1764 because the customs records for Quebec go only as far as June 1764; the colonial customs records, including those for Quebec, were destroyed in a fire at Customs House in London in 1814.

A general record of all shipping was kept in London by the Commissioners of Customs but it has long since disappeared. All that remains now is Customs 3 which is the Inspector General's ledger of annual cargoes imported into, and exported from, London and the outports to Quebec and the colonies. This document does not keep records of individual ships and has come under fire as a reliable source because it does not include estimates of the volume of smuggled goods, which in some commodities like tobacco, was substantial. The commodities listed are recorded at a standard value set in the 17th century, so it cannot be assumed that this record gives any indication of real current values. This said, the reliability of Customs 3 depends very much on what analytical purpose the historian intends. If it is used to examine types and volumes of goods over a short period of time, then it is an excellent source, especially when it is remembered that the Canadian records from 1764 to 1768 have disappeared. In the most recent work on the Customs 3, C.M. Foust looked at just one commodity in order to show that in individual items, the Customs 3 records are virtually identical to the port books.[14] The commodity used for the study was Russian rhubarb. The St. Petersburg port books for the period 1753 to 1801 show a difference of only 1% from other external records.[15] In the end he decided that Customs 3 was a better source than port books. There was no tradition of bribery or bad bookkeeping at Customs House in London, but because of the small amount of difference in the case of rhubarb, he concluded that there was no bribery or bad bookkeeping at the port of St. Petersburg either. The only conclusion that can really be drawn from this study is that Customs 3 is reliable when used for very short periods and commodity by commodity, but perhaps loses something when used over a long time. It is an excellent source for any study of Quebec consumerism because it tallies well with the Quebec harbour book and is helpful if the current value of the goods is not an issue. A comparison of the Greenock Collectors Quarterly Accounts and the Quebec port book shows that the records were well kept in both ports even though the customs records were far less complicated at Quebec. One of the problems often noted with Customs 3 is that it does not take into account smuggled goods. This omission is important in ports such as Glasgow where the amounts of smuggled tobacco in the early eighteenth century were sometimes higher than the recorded amounts, but Quebec was not a high risk smuggling area for this commodity.[16]

The only way to trace ship arrivals and clearances after 1764 is through the Greenock Collectors Quarterly Accounts now housed in the Scottish Record Office in Edinburgh, in combination with the Customs House reports in the Quebec Gazette. The reason that the customs records are such good sources of information is because every single ship had to be registered with details of its size, age, place of construction and cargo list. These data were used for the purpose of collecting duties. The customs system was so complex that London merchants commonly employed officers of the customs to do their entries for them.[17] By 1750, London still sent out 66% of all British exports and took in 71% of imports, but the outports always followed standard procedures set in London. When an inward bound ship was sighted off the coast, it was boarded by tide surveyors who then stayed on board until it docked in the Thames, counting the cargo all the way. This was tallied with the reports of the land waiters who counted the cargo once it was unloaded. It took a few days to unload and have the goods cleared through the customs house, and merchants had to provide certificates from their outward bound port and swear oaths on the amount and value of their cargo. They then immediately had to pay the 'Old Subsidy', one shilling per £1 value, with the rest of the duties due in 18 months.

In Quebec, Zachary Thompson, Harbour Master, kept a record of the incoming and outgoing ships and their cargoes. He was helped by Thomas Ainslie, the Collector of Customs. They did not possess the manpower to send land and tide waiters out to every vessel, but a check on the cargoes from the Scottish port of Greenock bound for Canada show that the Quebec books were in good order. Ships leaving Britain for Quebec were subject to all the rules of the British customs system; they were checked as far as Gravesend by tide surveyors to prevent landings to take on smuggled goods. Individual victualling bills had to be signed to keep the provisions needed for the voyage apart from regular dutiable goods. Once in Quebec all proper records were kept. Since there was no duty on dry goods and prize goods, a raging dispute continually occurred about the payment of duties on liquor and about the lack of money to pay the salaries of extra customs officials. In trade, the system was not as efficient as it could have been. The customs system in Quebec suffered badly from comparison with the French regime where the customs system had been enforced by a Court of Admiralty and where captains needed trade permits before being allowed to unload their cargoes. There had been no port duties or export duties until 1748 and vessels paid licencing fees at Quebec based on ship tonnages. Before 1759 all cargoes arriving at Quebec had to be declared within 24 hours and unless the duty was paid immediately they were not, in theory, supposed to be unloaded. In practice some of the cargo had to be sold first to raise the money to pay the duties. The first decade of British control brought a much looser system of customs to the port of Quebec than had been the norm, but it was not long until the full power of the system was felt operating with a full complement of officials. In the 1760s the reality was that there were delays in unloading and loading cargoes because the incoming vessels from England and Scotland usually arrived at approximately the same time - and along with the colonial vessels, because all shipping was subject to the same natural constraints of weather and season. On the other hand, because of the lack of officials and dutiable goods it took a shorter time to clear customs.

In a letter to Amherst in 1763 Murray said that there was a Harbour book kept by the Port Captain, a register kept by the Deputy Quartermaster General, and a book kept by the Commissary of stores.[18] Of these sources, only the Harbour book has been recovered and it goes only as far as the middle of the 1764 shipping season. The Harbour book can be supplemented by a variety of other official Quebec sources and by synthesizing these records, the ship types, tonnage, crew numbers, master's name, port of origin and cargo are revealed. This collection of sources provides a wealth of information for the years up to 1764. From 1764 to 1768 this information has to be gleaned from a different group of records, such as the register of the Greenock Collectors Quarterly Account which gives the entries and clearances from the main Scottish ports for North America. This source does not give ownership of vessels but does give the cargoes and their owners, as well as all the usual information that would normally be found in a port book. Ship movements can also be traced through the pages of the New York Gazette, the Quebec Gazette, and the London papers and other published if fragmentary sources.

In Quebec the port facilities were abysmal, and for the first half of the decade the needs of the army severely impacted on the merchant's ability to store and transport exported commodities to the port of Quebec. Warehouse facilities and the lack of a sufficient number of harbour officials made loading and unloading times slower than they should have been. The short navigation season due to ice in the St. Lawrence and the necessity of leaving Britain in the early spring to catch the proper winds (the north east trade winds at the latitude of Madeira) meant that vessels only had from June to October to sail to and from Quebec. This factor more than anything else dictated their turn around time. Quebec was not like the American colonial ports - there were no scattered markets here - there was just one port which gathered in all the products from its huge hinterland for export.

It is possible to gauge the approximate sailing and turn around time for vessels sailing between New York and Quebec by tracking their arrival and departure times through a combination of sources which extend past official records to include newspaper reports of clearances from the New York Customs House. There are only a very few examples which can be tracked in the 1761 shipping season. All of the vessels cleared Quebec between 28 July and 7 August and arrived in New York between 24 August and 14 September, taking an average of 34 days for the total voyage including customs clearance, the last task before departure and the first task on arrival. In 1762 the average time had increased slightly to 38 days. There are few occasions when turn around times can be established, for example, in the 1762 season the William and Sarah, a 40 ton vessel with goods already consigned to Quebec merchant and postmaster, Hugh Finlay, and to General Gage at Montreal, sailed from New York. To establish turn around time, both the entry and exit times have to be clearly established. When this period of time is very long there is no way of knowing if it was because the captain was having trouble finding a return cargo or if there was some personal reason for the long stay. Because the William and Sarah remained at Quebec until returning to New York in seastores and ballast in September, the vessel falls into the grey zone, and it is difficult to say why it remained in the port for so long.[19] The Betsy and Peggy arrived in Quebec in late October with linens and woolens for the army, but because of the lateness of the season, cleared out almost immediately with merchandise and furs on 10 November.[20] Again, it is hard to say whether this voyage was just an emergency trip planned late in the season or just a very efficient voyage. Colonial voyages even from New York were not likely to be repeated more than once a year and colonial sailings followed roughly the same timetable as the transatlantic voyages. The trip from New York took approximately five weeks and since the vessels usually returned in ballast, the captain and crew were in no hurry to get back to colonial ports unless they had reached Quebec late in the season and were worried about being stuck there for the winter.[21]

It is just as difficult to establish voyage times from Quebec to Britain because the customs records have been destroyed. However, voyage times can be worked out for a very small number of ships by using the Collectors Quarterly Account from the port of Greenock in Scotland. The Catherine, a 140 ton vessel with a crew of 16 men left Greenock for Quebec on 25 March and arrived at the port of Quebec on 22 July 1761,[22] a total voyage time of 120 days. The reason for the length of this voyage was probably a combination of the convoy system and a lack of knowledge about conditions in the St. Lawrence. Even so, it is much slower than in the French period when a 40 day trip across the Atlantic and two or three weeks in the river itself was the norm. The Catherine was also one of the few ships which did not return directly to Scotland. This failure to return directly is understandable since the main focus of Scottish shipping was to the colonies and the West Indies for tobacco and sugar. The Catherine arrived back in Scotland from Virginia on 10 January 1762 after clearing Quebec loaded with merchandise in August 1761. The merchants with interests in this ship were part of the small core of Glasgow merchants involved in the transatlantic trade, and their normal business was with the American colonies; no one merchant redirected his business exclusively towards Quebec.

One of the vessels which sailed regularly to Quebec was the Bonny Lass of Livingston, a 40 ton schooner, owned by Hugh Finlay and Stephen Moore, late of Scotland and now merchants in Quebec. She first left Greenock on 3 March 1763 and arrived at Quebec on the 27 May.[23] She left Quebec again on 11 June laden with wheat, skins and oils and reached Greenock 16 August.[24] The Bonny Lass sailed for Quebec once more arriving there on 8 November with a small cargo, leaving the port on 17 November, just before the first ice, loaded with planks, oil, feathers and skins.[25] This voyage made her the only vessel from Britain to make the trip to Quebec more than once in the same season. She arrived back in Scotland on 19 January 1764 and sailed for Quebec less than two months later.[26] The Bonny Lass of Livingston was the only ship to work her market at full tilt; in the 1763-64 season she went almost non stop between the two ports. This sailing time means that her outward bound voyage in the spring took about 85 days and the return voyages were 66 and 63 days respectively, with port times kept to under two weeks. This level of activity was possible because the owners of the ship were merchants in Quebec and were able to gather cargo for the return voyages; they were also the consignees of some of the incoming cargo as well as being the owners of the ship, a very unusual situation on the Quebec run.

Another Scottish ship, the Charming Annie, left Scotland on 22 April and reached Quebec on 23 June but was sold within a week of her arrival to group of Scots merchants in Quebec and never made any more transatlantic voyages.[27] The only other verifiable time is from the Apthorp which took 83 days on the outward leg and 76 days on her return trip to Scotland in 1764.[28] None of these crossing times compare favourably to the crossings during the French period but the long experience of the French masters, map makers and navigators must count for a great deal. In the initial years of British control the provisioning ships left England for Cork in March, but never arrived in Quebec by June as per their contract. The larger the ship the longer it took, as the Catherine at 140 tons took 120 days to complete her voyage compared to the Bonny Lass of Livingston at 40 tons which made it in 85 days. One interesting aspect of shipping patterns was a trend among English shipowners for the shorter route, mentioned earlier, traditionally used by Scots merchants north around Ireland. Not all ships used this route by the 1760s, so English voyages were up to seven days longer than the Scottish records show for Glasgow sailings. Although ship voyage times were decreasing overall in the eighteenth century, it was not because of any increase in speed or because of design changes, rather it was because the seas were safer and the port times had decreased.

This study of Quebec takes place in part during a major war and therefore at a time when the seas were not a safe place. It cannot be established that port times were better in the 1760s, indeed the reverse is true if the operation of the port is compared with the French period. It should not then be expected that there would have been any overall decrease in the amount of time necessary for the round trip. The only comparisons that can be made for Quebec are with the French regime and as expected, French sailing times were much faster, a combination of experience, excellent port organization and a system of resident agents in New France.

It was unusual to see a ship larger than 350 tons in the Quebec trade because the manning requirements and freight costs drove the cost of the voyage sky high. The snow and the brigantine were the vessels most favoured because they had the lowest tonnage to man requirements. There was a wide variety of ships in use in the trade between Canada, the colonies and Britain but it does not help to break them into the classifications under which they appear in the customs books. They are entered as schooners, sloops, brigantines, snows and ships, all classifications according to rig, but their size varied greatly within each category.

A schooner could range from 40 to 100 tons or a sloop from 25 to 100. The only vessel that could be relied on to be within a narrow tonnage range was the one used by Canadians in the river trade, called the chaloupe. It was seldom more than 12 tons and rarely less than 4 tons. In 1761 the average size of ships travelling between Quebec and London was 90 tons, but this type of figure can be misleading when the sample is so small; therefore, it is more meaningful to say that the range was between 20 and 180 tons.[29]

There were 15 vessels that cleared the port for Britain in 1761 and of these, eleven were under 100 tons and the other four were 100 to 180 tons. By 1764 the reverse was true with only four at under 100 tons and the others ranging between 100 and 600 tons. From 1765 to 1768 there are three size groupings: a very small number at 100 tons or less, the bulk at 100-200 tons, and a small number again at 250 tons or more. In 1766 and 1767 the number of vessels clearing for England and Scotland were 24 and 25 respectively. The numbers in each tonnage category range from 6 in the under 100 range, 4 and 11 (1766 and 1767) in the 100-200 range, and 7 and 5 (1766 and 1767) at over 200 tons. The sizes of the ships engaged in the intercolonial route ranged from 25 to 80 tons and show no tendency towards higher tonnages throughout the period. As the decade progressed, a steady number of very large ships became involved in the transatlantic trade with Quebec. The bulk of shipping was, however, still under 200 tons, and since most were plantation built, it makes perfect sense these vessels tended to be smaller than British built vessels. This information adds to our knowledge of shipping in this period because until now our only comparisons have been with American colonial shipping which shows no increase in size for this period. Shipping to Quebec changed in response to changing local conditions.

Studies of both the American colonial trade and general studies of British shipping in the eighteenth century show that there was no increase in the size of the vessels on the transatlantic route, but for Quebec, the 1760s show a remarkable change from the years of military rule to the period of civil government. In the first period the bulk of shipping was under 100 tons and after 1763 the tonnages increased sharply. This change had nothing to do with new ships being built especially for this trade, but had more to do with the economies of scale discussed above. From 1760 to 1763 the British merchants involved in the trade with Quebec had to compete with the army victuallers for shipping, cargo, convoys and port time in a place with a very underdeveloped customs and port system, and where little was known of market conditions. There had also been another problem: the lack of money among the merchants at Quebec and the confused state of the Canada bills. It is no wonder that when the bulk of the army moved on after 1763 and the establishment of civil government with all its attendant bureaucracy was ensured, that not only would more ships visit Quebec but they would be larger so that they could maximize their returns, although this change probably had more to do with the end of military rule than with any sudden surge in availability of return cargoes.

By the middle of the century the American colonies had become a major shipbuilding area because of the strength of the New England lumber industry and the accessibility of pitch and tar. The high cost of shipping lumber to England had also made it more profitable to have ships built in the colonies. As early as 1686, half the vessels sailing between England and the colonies were colonial built and owned.[30] It has been estimated that by 1760, one in every four British registered ships was colonial built.[31] The Quebec port books in 1761 show that 105 of the 127 vessels entering Quebec and then returning to the colonies, and eight of the fifteen vessels sailing for Britain, were plantation built. Consequently, most of the ships sailing for Quebec in 1761 were built in the colonies and since most were built after 1758, they had been at sea for only a few years. The British built ships at Quebec were also fairly new: most were built in the 1750s though one dated back to 1718 and there was the odd one here or there from the 1720s and 1740s. By 1763 approximately 49 of the 62 vessels clearing out of Quebec for the colonies, Europe and Britain were plantation built, and in fact, only one of the fourteen ships clearing for London in that year was British built. This British construction of ships did not extend to the river trade. The chaloupe which ranged in size from four to twelve tons and which worked the river from Gaspe to Montreal were all built in Canada and the majority were owned by Canadians. In examining the bulk of clearances in 1763 for the river traffic, of the nearly 300 vessels bound for Montreal, Sorel, Trois Rivières and Louisbourg, only 25 were built outside Canada.

The colonial and overseas shipping business was dominated by plantation built ships that were generally only a few years old, in the early years of their service. These vessels were also smaller than British or foreign built ships. In Quebec itself the river trade was dominated by Canadian built ships ranging in size from 12 to 100 tons. Seasonal fishing "down the river" was carried out by small chaloupes operated by two to four men and owned by Canadians.

It is possible to follow the changes in shipping patterns after 1764 by using the Lloyd's Register of Shipping and the records of the Seamens' sixpences. By an act of 1696 all sailors working on British ships paid sixpence per month to put towards the upkeep of the Royal Greenwich Hospital for disabled seamen.[32] These lists have survived in the Admiralty records for the period 1760-1768 and provide us with the most valuable information on Quebec because the only other document that has survived is the customs house list of arrivals and departures as printed in the Quebec Gazette.[33] The Admiralty records not only confirm that tonnages were increasing but allow for an examination of the turnover in vessels sailing to Quebec from Britain. It must be kept in mind that some of the non-army vessels sailing to Quebec from the colonies did so at the request of Amherst and brought baggage and emergency rations for the army. The initial burst of incoming traffic in 1761 can also be attributed to the profits to be made from importing alcohol into Quebec. Ninety-seven vessels entered the port of Quebec in 1761 laden with alcohol and of these, sixty-seven were from the colonies.[34] Alcohol, especially New England rum, remained lucrative throughout the decade, so much so that many of the American ships sailed back home in ballast.

There were forty one ships registered at Lloyd's for the London - Quebec route in either or all of the years 1764, 1765 and 1766. Thirty three of these ships were plantation built and of the remaining eight, only four were British built. These ships, built in various east coast colonial ports, ranged in size from 50 to 600 tons, but the majority were between 110 and 200 tons with only six under 100 tons, and eight at 250 tons or more.[35] These figures compare well with French shipping statistics previously mentioned which show that in the period 1727 to 1760 the average tonnage sailing from LaRochelle (which in those days was the leading port in the France - New France trade) was in the 174-179 ton range. Bordeaux became heavily involved in this trade in the 1750s but, before that, the tonnages sailing from that port averaged just over 100 tons. The real change came in the last years of the French period, (1755-60), when 207 ships sailed to New France and they averaged 222 tons.[36]

Previous studies have noted the high number of plantation built vessels in the transatlantic trade but none to the degree seen in the Quebec to London trade.[37] Within the colony the preference was for Canadian built vessels. British and foreign built ships did not figure highly in the trade to Quebec and even when the size of vessels increased, they were still plantation built. Merchants in Britain were very conscious of money saving devices and this use of colonial shipping provided the ways and means of achieving this end. Merchants in Quebec could not afford to buy into this part of the market and contented themselves with buying boats for the river trade.

Shipping statistics for the period 1761 to 1768 show a steady increase in the numbers of vessels sailing from Quebec to Britain with the exception of 1762 and 1768, and work out to between 14 and 25 voyages per year. At the same time the tonnage per voyage was also on the rise. One of the most interesting aspects of the inward and outward bound figures is that they show a marked increase in sailings between Quebec and Southern Europe, an increase from six in 1763, to a peak of 20 in 1766, and a drop in line with the overall drop in overseas voyages in 1768. These ships carried wheat, fish and boards.[38] There was also a constant yet small number of vessels sailing to the Caribbean throughout the period.

The statistics for incoming vessels are substantially higher for the period 1762 and 1763 because of the number of ships carrying provisions for government use: twelve in 1762 and nine in the following year. Before the end of military rule and before merchants could be sure that Britain was to keep Quebec, the total number of incoming vessels fluctuated wildly from 181 in 1761, down to 53 in the next year, and peaked at 341 in 1763.[39] Shipping records for this period are complete and can be checked against newspaper reports and insurance registers. In each of these years the total number of overseas voyages is small compared to the colonial and river traffic that passed through the port. In 1763 when the total clearances numbered 341, only 21 of these clearances were for Britain, Europe and the West Indies, and another 40 for the colonies. Statistics gathered for the years 1765 to 1768 do not include river traffic, which in the earlier period made up the bulk of the entries and clearances. This lack of information is because the harbour book no longer exists, but it does not mean that this traffic stopped. It must certainly have been affected by the actions of Palliser on the east coast. While the number of vessels sailing to Britain, southern Europe and the Caribbean was 27 in 1765 and 36 in 1767, this information was from a recorded total (including colonial sailings) of 61 and 71 respectively. These figures show that the proportion of transatlantic to colonial traffic did not vary much during the period. The year of the most dramatic change was in 1766 when 51 of the 69 voyages were overseas and to the Caribbean. This re-routing of outward bound vessels was partly in response to a crisis in overseas grain markets. The Navigation acts did not allow European vessels to sail directly to the colonies without first passing through London, but in most years throughout the period there were at least two vessels which sailed direct from Spain or Portugal to Quebec.

Studies on colonial shipping to Britain have pointed out that there was a trend towards the same captains returning time and again to the same colonial ports, and from the pages of the Harbour book this repetition appears to be true for Quebec. By making the same trip over and over again, the odds for a safe passage improved and the port turn around times decreased because the master would have established contacts in the port and a working relationship with the port officials. An analysis of port clearances for Britain from 1761 to 1768 shows that almost half of the ships involved made at least two voyages and of these, eighteen had been to Quebec at least three times. The Providence of London made the trip in five separate years and the Bonny Lass of Livingston from Glasgow came five times in four years. An examination of the port books for 1761 alone, shows that of the fifteen vessels that cleared for Britain, seven returned at least once. In 1762 only seven vessels cleared for Britain and, of these, two had been before and only one of the ships visiting for the first time returned. There were fifteen overseas departures in 1763. Six of the ships had not been to Quebec before and would not return, but three were on repeat trips. By 1764 six of the departures had never been to Quebec before, but would return, and six were regulars by now. From then on the number of ships that would make return trips remained steady and the number of regulars (making more than two voyages) from 1764 increased. There was a turnover even in the regulars when, in 1766 for the first time, the Little William, Eltham, Bonny Lass of Livingston, Royal George and Beaver stopped coming to Quebec. The following year, 24 vessels sailed for England, and of those who had made the trip for the first time (16), only two returned, but eight of the regulars also came back. There was therefore a remarkably high number of return trips by the same ships and since the masters moved around considerably, they came back often but in charge of different ships; consequently, the incidence of return is actually higher than it seems at first glance. In the early period British merchants sent their wares on ships that came to the colony once but seldom again, perhaps because of the military presence, the lack of contacts in the colony and the unsettled nature of the occupation. Make a profit if possible and move on to another market seems to have been their chosen method. After 1763 it was obvious which merchants were going to stay on in Quebec and this certainty made it easier for traders on both sides of the Atlantic to carry on normal business. It also heralded the beginning of an era of larger ships sailing to the colony, as well as the repeat visits by captains. Such stability helped settle the import-export trade of the colony into a routine by building up personal and business contacts. It was critical to the success of their trade that British merchants were aware of any potential problems in the colony and the increased frequency of reliable contact through the most trustworthy person in the venture, the master of the ship, gave merchants a measure of security. Many ships came to Quebec only once even after 1764, but there was at least a nucleus of shipping activity that connected the merchants of the colony to the British merchants in London and the outports, and created the foundation upon which to regularize trade and build contacts.

The river trade was a different story. Vessels which sailed just on the St. Lawrence were almost always operated by Canadians, but in a record of ownership taken in 1763, of sixty-one vessels there were twenty-nine owned by British merchants in Quebec. When the clearances for 1763, with fifty-six entries giving ownership are counted, seven vessels were owned by British merchants. In the internal river traffic these merchants newly settled in Quebec owned just under one third of the vessels in use but hardly ever owned the smallest vessels. The ownership of the vessels in the overseas and colonial trade have to be gleaned from the harbour records and insurance registries and they tell a far different story. There were fourteen clearances for Britain in 1763, eleven of which were owned by London merchants. As mentioned earlier, one of the most effective ways to ensure that the master did not sail off with the ship was either to give the job to a competent family member or to give the master a part share in the ownership of the vessel. It should not be surprising, therefore, to find that four of the eleven owners were also masters of their vessels. In the French period captains were offered free cargo space and financial incentives which included part ownership. In Quebec there was only one mariner, Thomas Church, who was master and co-owner for overseas voyages, but in the British case the proportion of the master to owner pattern was higher. The three other ships, the Swanton, Martha, and the Bonny Lass, were owned by British merchants in Quebec in partnerships of two or more.

There was a lot of interest in ship owning in Britain during the eighteenth-century and so it is not surprising that most of the vessels engaged in the transatlantic trade were owned by its nationals. Ship owning was not something men practised as a career and it is not even a category in the trade directories of the 1760s but, as can be seen in the case of Quebec, it was a sideline for merchants. The records show only a small number of ships were owned by more than two men and this downward trend in the number of owners from five or more earlier in the century is confirmed by the Quebec trade. In an age when limited liability had not yet appeared in England, owners were willing to take the risk of low returns for the sake of having a tangible and freely transferable piece of property.[40] It is clear from this information that while there were some vessels owned by British merchants in Quebec, they were not heavily involved in the overseas trade. These merchants owned their vessels in partnerships of two, and a small number were owned by less than or more than two.

Ships which sailed on overseas routes were generally larger than those used domestically and involvement in this trade was an expensive business. It has been estimated that it cost about £5000 for a 300 ton ship.[41] Merchants spread the risk by investing their money in a couple of ships and would send their own merchandise on someone else's ship in order to obtain the best possible price while charging other merchants whatever the market could bear. Not only did merchants have to think of the cost of the ship but they had to work out the cost of victualling, repairs and wages which could run as high as £4 sterling per ton on trips of over six months.[42] There was so little in the way of currency in Quebec in the first decade that this lack of capital accumulation helps explain why it was unlikely that merchants would be involved in the overseas trade. Setting aside the costs, there was also the problem of having enough business contacts at the home port to gather in a full cargo - Finlay and Moore were one of the few partnerships who were able to do this work and their Bonny Lass made many successful runs between Quebec and Scotland; but it was only a 40 ton schooner and not typical of either the tonnage or frequency of ships trading to Quebec.

The transatlantic trade to Quebec was controlled by English and Scottish merchants living in Britain. The trade between the colonies and Quebec followed a similar pattern. In the clearances for the American colonies for 1763, only two of the forty voyages were on vessels owned by British merchants at Quebec.[43] Colonial vessels were owned by colonial merchants. The British merchants at Quebec used their ships mainly for trips back and forth from Montreal, Sorel and Trois Rivières and for fishing trips down the river. There was no typical size and if the few involved in the overseas trade are put aside, then the range was eight to sixty-five tons with almost two-thirds at 30 tons or less. Such sizes were of course still far larger than the chaloupes which made up the bulk of the Canadian owned ships. There were few cases of masters also being owners of ships, but as expected, the incidence of this ownership rises in the transatlantic trade. None of the ships owned by the British merchants living in Quebec were particularly old. There are thirty-three entries with ownership information: of these, five do not have construction details and over half were Canadian built, the bulk of which were built in the 1760s.[44] The rest were plantation built dating from the 1750s. The rest of the river traffic was owned by Canadians and only one of their thirty-four registered vessels was plantation built, perfectly normal, considering that the Canadians were not particularly friendly with the English colonists to the south, particularly in war time. Over half of the Canadian owned vessels were under thirty tons and twenty-five of the thirty-four were built in 1760 or later. The shipbuilding industry in Quebec was alive and well within a few years of the conquest.

Voyage times during the French regime averaged 30 to 40 days and much less on the return - the sample for the British case is so small that it is virtually useless for statistical purposes, yet it is still interesting because it shows the colonial run was approximately 35 days and the overseas trip upwards of 85 days. The few voyage times that we do have seem very high and do not fit the profile of a downward trend in round trip sailing times. Nevertheless it must be remembered that Quebec was a new route for the British merchants and it took them a while to adjust to it. There is no way of knowing if inclement weather played any part in the recorded voyages, or if there was an abnormal amount of trouble experienced navigating the St. Lawrence. It is known that the decreased round trip times found in studies of the period can be applied only to the American colonies because the key element was better economic organization in the ports which brought a resultant faster turn around time. None of these facts can be held to be true for Quebec. Merchant ships were in direct competition for port space, storage and harbour facilities with the army until 1764. The French statistics do not take into account the extra two to three weeks that it could take to travel from Bic to Quebec.

It is important to be aware that the American and Canadian shipping experience in the eighteenth century was very different. Studies on shipping between the American colonies and Britain do not really help us understand transatlantic shipping to Quebec because their local conditions are entirely different. Their findings show increased efficiency because of faster turn around time in port, rather than because of economies of scale or technological change. At Quebec the harbour facilities were very poor and there were not enough harbour officials to process arrivals and departures in an efficient manner. Ship size did not seem to increase in the colonial example throughout the eighteenth century, yet for Quebec the increase was dramatic after 1764. Perhaps size increased because the army was reduced in size and there were no large numbers of huge provisioning ships plus emergency supply ships from the colonies saturating the small market. It was after 1764 that the currency was regulated, and at the same time, the American colonies plunged into an economic depression, thereby creating a desperate need in England and Europe for corn. Thanks to the efforts of British merchants in Quebec, such as Samuel Jacobs, this commodity was being gathered for export.

Direct trade between Quebec and Britain followed traditional practices and procedures but Quebec was not involved in slaving voyages and it did not take part in many multi-port trips either. The increased size of ships on the Quebec run now made economies of scale possible and hence fostered direct voyages. In the broader context of colonial shipping within the Empire, however, for a full lading, the ship would pick up a number of commodities from different colonies, rice from the Carolinas, tobacco from Virginia, and so on, until loaded. In contrast, Quebec was the only place of entry and exit for the overseas trade and therefore all commodities had to be brought there for export. Once merchants had established themselves over a number of shipping seasons, the likelihood of them making contact with a London merchant increased, although throughout this period Samuel Jacobs appears to have been the only merchant to sign a deal with London merchants. He did so with the firm Watson, Olive and Rashleigh who made it clear that they were making an exception.

Information for this analysis on the shipping business has had to be gathered from a variety of sources including the Admiralty records, Insurance records and Scottish Collectors Quarterly Accounts because in 1764, with the end of military rule, the Harbour book was handed into the care of a new official, but has since been lost. Harbour books were kept because customs officials deemed it necessary due to lack of manpower.

Studies by British and colonial historians have shown that by 1774 over 30% of British owned ships were plantation built, but the numbers for the Quebec run are far higher. The majority of vessels clearing from Britain to Quebec and vice versa were plantation built and so were almost all of those sailing from the colonies to Quebec. Approximately half of the British owned vessels in Quebec were plantation built, whereas Canadians owned ships built in Canada. Within the colony the preference was for locally built ships; due to lack of money and opportunity, only a small number of merchants bought colonial vessels.

There was a steady if small increase in the number of ships sailing to Quebec throughout the period but there was also an increase in the number of outward bound voyages to Southern Europe with cargoes of wheat and lumber. This change shows that British merchants were able to broaden their horizons to include the European market but one or two British merchants at Quebec were also involved. Demands for certain raw materials, such as wheat, had increased in Europe in the 1760s, but it was not within the ability of most merchants at Quebec to take advantage of this situation by sending the necessary commodity on their own ships.

Throughout the 1760s there were a small number of ships that returned time and again and with the same masters at the helm. In this respect trade with Quebec follows the general trend for transatlantic voyages in the eighteenth century. Colonial and British merchants owned the ships and cargoes which they sent to Quebec in the 1760s and they did so in plantation built ships. Canadians owned and controlled much of the river trade but British merchants managed to buy enough Canadian and plantation built ships to have a stake in the river trade between the towns and parishes. During the military regime, some of the merchants had their vessels requisitioned by the army, an act which brought hardship to them but for which they were later repaid by Jeffrey Amherst, Commander in Chief for North America.

There may have been social and economic tensions within the colony and trouble over requisitioning in the early years of army rule. Nevertheless, the transatlantic trade which was the lifeline between the colony and Britain, sailed on oblivious. It was not so much changes within the colony after 1764 which altered shipping patterns, but changes and fluctuations within the European economy that brought a redirection of vessels to Europe and an increase in the size and number of vessels sailing from England. The only time that Murray interfered with shipping was to insist that all vessels hire river pilots to bring them safely to port. The organic nature of the transatlantic shipping trade makes it difficult to see how the Governor could have hurt the industry with his economic policies. It was the government in London that upset the export trade by its policies on the fur trade in the west and the fisheries in the east. The merchants had to work within the larger economic context of shipping, credit and the ever changing whims and needs of the consumer. Nevertheless, this system was a network that had a greater degree of responsiveness to changing conditions in spite of the normal restraints of nature and, in this case, the mighty St. Lawrence. Both the merchants and the administration operated within an unyielding framework where power and control did not rest with them, but in London. We have already seen how the administration worked within the constraints of such a system and now we shall turn to the business relationships of merchants in London and Quebec.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER SEVEN

1.For a good summary of this debate see; G.M. Walton, "Sources of Productivity Change in American Colonial Shipping, 1675-1775", Economic History Review XX (1967) and Robin Craig, "Printed Guides for master mariners as a source of productivity change in shipping, 1750-1914", Journal of Transport History 3 (1982).

2.G. M. Walton, " Sources of Productivity Change in American Colonial Shipping, 1675-1775", Economic History Review XX (1967) : 71.

3.Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Newton Abbott : David and Charles Publishers, 1972), p.313.

4.Walton, p. 71.

5.Ibid., p. 67.

6.Robin Craig, "Printed Guides for master mariners as a sources of productivity change in Shipping, 1750-1914." Journal of Transport History 3 (1982) : 24.

7.Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry, p.159.

8.Ibid., p. 166.

9.Walton, p. 69.

10.Kenneth Morgan, "Shipping Patterns and the Atlantic Trade of Bristol, 1748-1770". William and Mary Quarterly XLVI (1989) : 506.

11.Ibid., p. 526.

12.Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry, pp. 77-79.

13.For a fuller discussion of commerce and communication between England and the North American colonies see I.K. Steele, The English Atlantic 1675-1740 An Exploration of Communication and Community (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1986), chapters 5 and 11.

14.C.M. Foust, "Customs 3 and Russian Rhubarb. A Note on reliability", Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 15 (1986) : 551.

15.Ibid., p. 560.

16.R.C. Nash, "The English and Scottish Tobacco Trades in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries : Legal and Illegal Trade" Economic History Review 35 (1982) : 354-374.

17.The discussion of the English customs system which follows is indebted to the work of E.E. Hoon, The Organization of the English Customs System 1696-1786 (New York : Kelley Publishers, 1968), pp.122-157 and pp. 249-259.

18.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/2. March 1763. Murray to Amherst.

19.RG68 Vol. 294. Ships Arrivals and Clearances, 1761-62.

20.RG68 Vol. 294. 1761-62.

21.RG68 Vol. 195. Clearances from Quebec 1763-64., RG4 A3 Vol. 1. Entries into Quebec 1763-1764., RG68 Vol. 213. Clearances and Entries 1763.

22.SRO E504/15/10. Greenock Collectors Quarterly Account and RG68 V. 294. Ship Arrivals and Clearances at Quebec 1761-62.

23.SRO E504/15/11. Greenock Collectors Quarterly Account. and RG4 A3 Vol.1. Entries at Quebec 1763.

24.RG68 V. 195. Clearances from Quebec and SRO E504/15/11. Greenock Collectors Quarterly Account.

25.RG4 A3 Vol.1. Entries to Quebec and RG68 V. 195.Ship Clearances from Quebec 1763-1764.

26.SRO E504/15/12. Greenock Collectors Quarterly Account.

27.SRO E504/15/11. and RG4 A3 Vol.1. Entries.

28.SRO E504/15/12. Left Scotland 20 February 1764. RG4 A3 V.1. Entered Quebec 14 May 1764 and RG4 B58 V.15. Left Quebec for Scotland 18 October 1764. SRO E504/15/12. Entered Greenock on 2 January 1765.

29.RG68 V. 294. Arrivals and Clearances 1761-1762.

30.Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry, p.66.

31.Ibid., p. 68.

32.Ralph Davis, "Seamens Sixpences : An Index of Commercial Activity, 1697-1828" Economica XXIII (1956) : 328.

33.ADM68/ 200-201. Ships paying Chelsea sixpences, 1696-1865.

34.C.O.42, No.1., Part 2., Vol.4.

35.Lloyd's Register 1764-66 (Republished in 1965, Gregg Press Inc., Farnborough, England).

36.James Stewart Pritchard, "Ships, Men and Commerce : A Study of Maritime Activity in New France", Tables III, IV and XVII pp. 490, 492 and 502 respectively.

37.For a good discussion of this issue see; Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry, p. 68 and James F. Shepherd and Gary M. Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of Colonial North America (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 242-244.

38.RG4 B58 V.15. General Passes to Leave the Province, 1766-1768 and Ships Clearances to leave the Province 1764-1774. RG68 V. 195. Ship Clearances from Quebec, May 1763 - June 1764.

39.RG4 A3 V.1., RG4 B58 V.15., RG68 V.195., RG68 V.202., RG68 V.213., RG68 V.294. Ships Arrivals and Clearances 1761-1768.

40.Davis, The Rise of the Shipping Industry, p. 81.

41.Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry, p.86.

42.Ralph Davis, "Earnings and Capital in the English Shipping Industry, 1670-1730" The Journal of Economic History XVII (1957) : 410.

43.RG68 V.195. Arrivals and Clearances 1763-64.

44.RG68 V.195 and RG68 V.202.

CHAPTER EIGHT-QUEBEC AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY IN THE 1760s.

Quebec and its inhabitants had always been dependent on European suppliers for imports. After the conquest the agents of major French mercantile houses returned home and it took British merchants in Quebec more than a decade to establish themselves and to rival the efficiency of the French import-export business. Throughout the 1760s British merchants were unable to convince most major import-export houses of London to deal with them. One attempt made by the firm Watson, Olive and Rashleigh ended abruptly in failure after only one season. Nonetheless, London and Glasgow merchants participated in the trade to Quebec after 1760. As we have already seen, ships were insured, freight rates were set, goods were exported, and contacts were maintained through correspondence with London merchants. English and Scots merchants set themselves up at Quebec and many difficulties including the virtual absence of long term credit, a shortage of specie and often strained relations with the civil administration. For its part, the London merchant community did not jump in and establish themselves in the Quebec trade with as much zest as they had done in other parts of the empire. This reluctance had little to do with the potential of the area but had everything to do with the series of financial crises which shook the foundations of European credit in the 1760s.

British merchants at Quebec cannot be accused of failing to make sound political and social contacts in England which laid the foundation for future political action. Merchant groups came together with common interest and formed into committees. One such group was the Canada Committee, originally set up to raise subscriptions for the victims of the Montreal fire of 1765. British interest groups acted as channels for American colonial merchants to voice their concerns, and British merchants in Quebec were initially able to gain access to this network. The peak of lobbying activity had come and gone by 1766 and other more formal structures replaced these informal interest groups.[1] These groups also exchanged commodity information in the coffee houses and clubs of London. They were courted by the Board of Trade and Privy Council because of their access to a flow of information which was a necessary input for government decisions on North American policies. Olson has suggested that as the power to make policy for North America shifted from the Board of Trade to Parliament itself, this informal channel of lobbying dried up and merchants formalized their protests into petitions which they presented directly to Parliament. At the core of these new interest groups was a group of merchants which included David Barclay, William Baker, John Nutt, William Molleson, William Neale and Fred Pigou, all of whom were American colonial traders but who also sent goods to Quebec after 1760.[2]

The idea of merchant committees had been in existence since the early eighteenth century and was popularized by the example set by the very influential West Indian lobby. There has also been the suggestion that by the 1760s it was the politicians themselves, especially the Rockinghams, who in their need for information and support from the City helped mobilize the merchants to take part in the political process.[3] As the merchant committees gained ground, their tactics evolved from fighting issue by issue, to a more general concern with the running of the colonies. This strategy did not help Quebec which had some very specific needs which were easily subsumed by larger colonial issues.

There were, however, forces at work which led London exporters to avoid becoming too deeply involved in trade with the new colony. The uncertainty in commercial circles over whether or not Quebec would remain British was not resolved until early in 1763, and by that time, the English economy was in a state of crisis. Economic conditions in England were very poor in the 1760s, and this economic downturn not only hampered any efforts to extend credit but affected the import-export trade and, in turn, put additional pressure on British merchants already operating in Quebec. At the same time the neighbouring colonies to the south were going through a period of economic stagnation which by the end of the decade had turned into a depression affecting markets in the American colonies as well as Britain. An earlier discussion of the state of Quebec showed that it had suffered much economic dislocation during the war, and, while there had been a strong military presence in the colony until 1763, it had not brought the expected benefits to the local merchant class. In fact, the military had been a strong competitor for shipping, harbour space and storage facilities. There was also a chronic shortage of coin in circulation in Quebec and the Canada bills settlement was unresolved for a good part of the decade. All of this uncertainty meant that it was harder to get people to buy goods and pay for them and this difficulty, in turn, caused problems for merchants who did not have established lines of credit in London. The last and perhaps most serious issue that had to be faced by merchants in the colony was the disruption of the natural economy of the western and eastern borders of the colony by the Proclamation of 1763. These conditions then, were the parameters within which British merchants in Quebec and British exporters in London and the outports operated. But what was the structure of the transatlantic trade? While it is perfectly acceptable to discuss in very broad terms what goods were traded and in what quantity, it is more important to understand the intricacies of overseas trade. An explanation of this trade gives us a better sense of how much planning and coordination of effort was involved in sending a cargo to an overseas destination and, in turn, shows us how complicated and delicate a trading network is; and, furthermore, how difficult it is to operate in a colonial setting without being part of one.

It was established in an earlier chapter that the transatlantic trade, whether practised by the French, English, Scots or colonials, took much the same form. Merchants could not afford to buy a ship and send it willy-nilly to who knows where with a cargo picked on a whim. Information was all important and could be found in a variety of sources. One of the main sources was the daily press which was an eclectic blend of serialized national histories, elixirs for curing nasty diseases and commodity information and prices. Since businessmen did not act alone it would have been foolish for them to withhold information from each other. A ship would, typically, have five or six owners and carry the cargoes of more than half a dozen others. Shipowners could, and likely did, own a number of other ships and sent their variety of cargoes on the ships of others as a way to spread risk. Ship and market information was common knowledge and at the port of call the resident agents also pooled their market knowledge. There were obvious advantages to being the first ship of the season but, beyond that, merchants sent the same commodities to the same places. When new markets were gained through conquest or other means, British merchants serviced and exploited the resources of the area as best they could.

Shipping to Quebec altered after 1764 and provides a good example of how local and international circumstances combined to create a new pattern of exchange. The end of the Seven Years War meant a decrease in freight rates and insurance, and, a simultaneous drop in seamen's wages; it also meant the end of the convoy system which had tended to increase the voyage time and hence the wages and provisioning costs of voyages. The British government now no longer needed to continue its massive borrowing spree, and this relief, in turn, freed up a large amount of merchant capital. Many British merchants in Quebec had been in the colony at least two years by 1764 and knew exactly what they could and could not afford to do. There were high expectations that the benefits of civil government would mean the end of official interference in the daily running of the colony. In addition, the increase in the size and number of vessels sailing to the colony as the overall cost of ventures to Quebec dropped seemed a fulfillment of their wishes. It was not long, however, until economic problems in England dampened their high expectations.

There were a number of elements which had to be factored in to the cost of shipping. These were insurance of ships and of cargoes, port fees calcualted by tonnage and customs and duties on freighted goods. Factors which affected the buoyancy of the import-export trade with overseas markets were the availability of credit (usually affected by the need of the government to borrow in time of war) and bankruptcies in the import-export trade. Each of these factors will be considered in turn and will address the impact of conditions at Quebec on the overall economic success of shipping ventures in the period.

One change in shipping practices which seemed destined to benefit merchants in Britain was in the area of marine insurance. One of the most basic elements of the import-export business was the need to cover potential losses. By 1750 there were at least forty insurance brokers in London, most of them to be found in Lloyd's coffee house, and their business resulted in the creation of the Lloyd's Register of Shipping. The marine insurance business was centered in coffee houses because these were the places where merchants congregated and were usually the first stop of ships' masters on their return home. Information on voyages and routes were pinned on the walls. It made sense, then, for the underwriters to gather in the same place as the information. Lloyd's list was established in 1734 and the Register of Vessels in 1764.[4]

One important change in the rules of the insurance business came in 1764; policies could now be made out to one person or insurer.[5] Policies themselves were still very rudimentary legal documents but merchants could, for an additional fee, add specifications for individual voyages or ships; this practice led to the development of cross risk voyage insurance and time risk insurance. The insurance companies followed a practice known as the "average system" which meant loss by damage.[6] In practical terms, if a ship's cargo was lost because of damage to one part of the ship, then what was left of the vessel would be used to offset the damage payment. There was only one instance of this occurrence in the Quebec run and of course, the imperative was to prove that the poor condition of the ship's hull was the cause of cargo losses in order to cash in on the insurance policy. Some commodities were non-insurable, or, in other words, were free of the average because they were most likely to be damaged - these goods included corn, fish, salt, fruit and flour.[7] There were two types of insurances offered for British shipping from 1720 until the late 1750s. The first type of insurance paid 84% in case of loss, and the other paid 98%. As business began to drop off in the 1760s, there was a readjustment of insurance coverage - one hundred percent coverage for loss. The London Assurance Company books from 1769 show that all policies were for 100% coverage with a 10% abatement.[8] The cost was the same as previous policies which had only covered 84% of losses.

Premiums were not restricted to London and could, by 1750, be bought in the colonies. However, London insurers would only insure after an inspection and it was as part of this process that the Lloyd's register became critical. By mid century the risks associated with transatlantic voyages had decreased because the captains who made the trip regularly had better knowledge of the route and because of the sheer increase in numbers crossing the Atlantic which, in turn, added to the pool of reliable information. With the end of the war, the need for convoys disappeared and interest rates fell as government borrowing eased and the state began to repay some of its debts. All of these military and economic factors had an impact on the insurance business, and it moved from an informal bond of merchants to a standardized, regulated body which could count on the support of the legal system.

It is worth looking closely at the Coffee House ritual to see how merchants did business. Lloyd's was perhaps the most important of them all and was first mentioned in 1668. By the end of the seventeenth century its manager, Edward Lloyd, was producing an information sheet, Lloyd's News, three times a week. It did not last long and was resurrected in 1726 as Lloyd's List, a weekly which gave rates of exchange, foreign markets, stock prices and a page devoted to ship news. Each underwriter had his own box to sit in at Lloyd's so that the brokers could find them easily.[9] The brokers did more than organize the insurance, they also took the money from the merchants and passed it on to the underwriters. At first this money was passed on at the time of the deal, but later, the broker held onto all the money he took in and settled accounts with the underwriters annually so they were able to extend credit to merchants and act as an alternative source of credit.[10] Lloyd's underwent some changes in ownership and the management ran it down so badly that merchants who had been involved with it for years broke away in 1769 in order to set up a new Lloyd's which brought out a new Lloyd's List in 1771. One of the young underwriter-merchants who had been involved in the Canada trade and would become a committee member in the new Lloyd's was Brook Watson, of the firm Watson, Olive and Rashleigh.

The importance of the Lloyd's register cannot be underestimated. It is the only surviving document which gives exact and unchallengeable information on the type, size, equipment and condition of the vessels engaged in the transatlantic trade. The Register rated the hulls of vessels by vowel and the state of its equipment by the letters G, M, B. This designation meant a top class vessel was rated AG and the worst was UB.[11] From 1764 to 1766 forty-two of the ships in the Register were rated and insured for the London-Quebec trip. In the 1768-71 register only the M-Z section remains and it listed three ships insured and bound for Quebec. There were also underwriters in Glasgow because of its extensive trade with the tobacco colonies. The Glasgow firm of Buchanan and Simpson bought insurance for its own string of ships trading to the Chesapeake; it also tried to insure every vessel outward bound from Glasgow.

War meant radical increases in the price of insurance. In France, insurance rates to New France in the 1740s rose to as much as 35% on the ship, and although peace would bring a return to regular rates, the high losses sustained by the French in 1755 drove their insurance rates higher than 40%.[12] In 1759-60, the rate for unconvoyed ships sailing to the West

Indies from Britain was 15-20%.[13] In 1761 the rates from the Clyde to the colonies ranged between 5-7% in convoy, and 7-8% without. Meanwhile, the London rates were 4-5% in convoy and 7-12% with no convoy. Once the peace was signed, the premiums to North America were settled at 42/- each way. There are no traceable insurance policies for Quebec in the 1760s. The best that can be surmised is that the route to Quebec was longer and more hazardous at the outset because of the initial lack of knowledge about the St. Lawrence; consequently, the rates for North America should be taken as the lowest possible for voyages to Quebec. American historians have come to the conclusion that the decline in the cost of insurance was based on an increased knowledge of routes, an increase in the volume of shipping across the Atlantic, advances in packaging and increased efficiency in harbour facilities.[14] This series of coincidences cannot be held to be true with the same degree of certainty for Quebec; therefore it is unlikely that the cost of insurance would be as low as it was for the American colonies which in peacetime was 2% each way.[15] There were two New York companies operating after 1759 and they were close to the London rates offering 2-3% one way and 5% round trip, but Quebec was lumped in with the Canaries and it cost 7% round trip.[16] This percentage did not necessarily mean that the rates to Quebec were so far out of line with the colonies as to be uncompetitive. In fact from the lack of comment on rates to Quebec it is fair to assume that little difference existed. Ships trading to Quebec were insured in London and Glasgow and were able to take advantage of the changes in insurance practices that now brought 100% coverage.

Ships were insured and laded according to their tonnages. This measurement sounds clear cut enough, but there were some very fundamental problems in working it out. Shipowners and masters tended to register their tonnage lower than the actual tonnage to avoid paying higher lighthouse and harbour fees. Tonnage figures were recorded annually at each port, but this figure was lower than the actual port traffic figures, since ships arriving or leaving in ballast were not counted.[17] There were some problems at Quebec with the proper measurement of ship tonnage. The formula, set in 1695, was used not only in Britain but throughout the Empire, and the Inspector General from 1769-1774 estimated that North American ships were consistently registered at 2/3rds of their real tonnage.[18] The problem of proper measurement was brought to the attention of Murray by Amherst when he expressed alarm at the differences in measurements of the same ships at Quebec and Philadelphia and told Murray to remeasure all the ships at Quebec. The blame lay with Zachary Thompson, the Harbour Master, who appeared to be using the wrong measurement. Murray believed that it had been an honest mistake.[19] Thompson was given a dressing down and provided with a list of all the vessels that had been to Quebec the previous year and told to remeasure them all.[20] The response of Thompson underlined the difficulties under which he laboured. He had been so overworked that he had not even looked at the rules of measurement repeatedly sent to him by the council and he swore he would now use the standard formula.[21] Single deck ships paid 10s. per ton and doubledeckers 13s. per ton in harbour rates at Quebec.[22]

In 1765 when Isaac Werden was made Deputy Naval Officer, it was agreed by the Council that the port fees at Quebec should mirror those of New York. The New York rates ranged from 2s. for vessels under 30 tons to 12s. for vessels over 150.[23] This rate was not good enough for Werden who thought that harbour fees at Quebec should be increased because of the short shipping season and the small number of vessels using the port. What he really meant was that by the time he split the fees with Bishopp, the Naval Officer, he was not making a satisfactory amount of money from port fees. He pointed out that while the colonial ports had produced approximately £500 in fees in 1764, Quebec had brought in only £57.9.3.[24] To supplement his income he insisted that the chaloupes and coasters which handled the river trade should no longer do so free of port charge. Murray strongly disagreed: "I cannot think it necessary in time of profound peace for the small craft, plying from this place to Montreal to take out passes. The expense is great to the poor people."[25] Most of the small vessels were owned and operated by Canadians and while they had paid a small fee under the French customs system, it appears vessels under 10 tons paid no fees.[26] In contrast, 10 to 30 ton ships, the most common size in the river trade and commonly used for fishing voyages, paid a 2s. harbour fee.

After much discussion, the charges for clearing the port of Quebec were settled into a variety of groupings which ranged from 6s. for under 20 tons, up to 27s. for up to 250 tons.[27] Fishermen and provisioning chaloupes were exempted. Tonnage measurements also decided wharfage charges which were divided into two categories based upon the Halifax harbour model. Vessels registered at Quebec paid one half the daily fee charged to foreign vessels; for instance, vessels of up to 50 tons registered at Quebec paid 6d. per day, and foreign vessels paid 1s.[28] Werden still complained at the end of the shipping season that while he had been told to stick to the New York harbour fee guide, the Governor and council had decided to reduce the fees, and thus, had reduced his income. In fact the mistake the council had made was to use an outdated New York fee guide. Werden had been a master on ships sailing between Scotland and the colonies from 1748 until taking up his post in 1765. He claimed that he had never cleared a port for less than £3 and not more than £9, whereas 12 ships bound out from Quebec in July of 1765 had paid just over £1 in total for their clearances.[29]

Tonnage measurement was not only important for the payment of duties but was a precise gauge for merchants of exactly what a ship could hold. Deadweight tonnage or tons burden was the number of tons weight to lade an empty ship to her load line. Most goods had the same specific gravity as water, so the rule was, that, depending on the weight of the commodity, a 100 ton ship could hold 100 tons of goods. This calculation was easy enough to work out if all goods weighed the same and took up the same amount of space, but such uniformity was not usually the case - timber took up more space than wine, and cotton weighed less than most other commodities. In order to measure cargoes properly it had to be done by volume, a figure termed freight tonnage.[30] There were two basic measurements used in England, the first was the hundred subtle which was used for spices and drugs and was 100 lbs. or 45 kilos. The other measure was the long hundredweight of 112 lbs. used for coarse goods, groceries and salt. All commodities including spices were weighed by the long hundredweight, then spices were reduced to the subtle hundred before going to market. The long hundredweight was the standard measure used to lade ships and was used by customs officials. There were also problems in gauging the amount of other commodities, especially liquids, so other standards had to be set for these goods. The English wine cask was called a tun and weighed 2240 lbs., so a 100 ton ship could hold 100 of these casks since wine had almost the same specific gravity as water.[31]

Conversion charts had to be made up for the use of merchants. All commodities recorded by weight were converted to the long ton which equalled one ton burden, or 60 cubic feet. Naval stores were, for instance, gauged at 8 barrels per ton. Two hogsheads of tobacco, 22 quintals of dried fish or 3000 shingles all equalled one ton burden.[32] A wine cask took up 40 cubic feet but the space between it and the hull had to be accounted for, and this additional area brought the total space used to 60 cubic feet which then became the standard conversion for one ton.[33] This method of calculation ended the problem of weight differences of various commodities. One of the most popular export items from Quebec was whale oil which took 252 gallons to equal one liquid ton which, in turn, equalled one ton burden. Dried cod was another item for export. It was packed by the quintal (100lbs), therefore, 22.4 of these equalled one ton burden. Some commodities were packaged in specific volumes to prevent smuggling by sailors. Thus tobacco had to be shipped in chests of no less than two hundredweight and spirits had to be in casks of at least 60 gallons. Most commodities entering the Quebec harbour ran the gamut from the keg - puncheon or firkin down to the pipe. Customs officials and merchants both used standard tonnage measurements and conversion lists to keep the system up and running.

The types and volumes of goods traded to, and exported, from Quebec depended on internal and external factors. The change from military to civil government should have brought greater freedom to merchants at Quebec but, as seen above, this was not the case. While it is true that some British merchants had managed to make contacts with some of the most prominent London merchants and receive moral support from the Canada Committee, political and economic instability in post-war England had a negative effect on the colony's economy. The financial crises in England and the negative reaction to the imposition of additional duties in the colonies created unfavourable conditions for the merchant elite who were unwilling to dig themselves in any deeper in the Quebec trade in the 1760s by extending long term credit to merchants there. This reluctance, in part, explains why only one major London house became involved in sending cargoes on contract without a cash advance.

The English crisis had to do with its credit structure. In time of war, governments borrowed heavily and this borrowing placed an intolerable strain on informal credit networks and on banks. At the beginning of the Seven Years War the national debt hovered around £74 million, and by the end of the war, had climbed to £132 million. Throughout the war Naval costs had been high, not just in building ships of the line, but in repairs, maintenance and wages. The cost of manning the Navy rose from 2s. per man in 1754 to £11 before the end of the war.[34] The cost of maintenance ran close to £200,000 a year and because of the demand for naval stores and timber, prices were kept higher than normal even after the war ended. To pay these costs, money had to be raised from somewhere and as John Brewer has discovered in his recent study of the subject, this money came from an efficiently taxed public.[35] Taxes ran at around 20% of total income in 1760.[36] Until recently it was thought that the English were lightly taxed and the French overtaxed. Comparative studies of French and English taxation show that both governments used their tax revenues primarily to support their military establishment, that taxes rose continuously from the 1740s until the end of the century but that they did so at a faster rate in England than in France.[37] On a per capita basis British taxes were twice as high as French taxes, but the difference was that in Scotland and England indirect taxation was more prevalent than direct taxation. During the war years, almost 57% of government receipts were raised by taxation and the rest by borrowing.[38]

The government was able to raise the extra money needed to wage a successful war overseas because of the population boom which gave a larger than normal pool of consumers which, in turn, made indirect taxation possible. One of the first targets for increased taxation was alcohol. Changes in beer and malt duties brought a 26% increase in the wholesale price of these commodities by the end of the war. All goods considered fundamentals, significantly a small list of clothing and foodstuffs, were not taxed, and soap and candles paid very low duties; everything else was fair game for the exciseman.[39] The high cost of war rendered even this level of taxation inadequate; therefore, the government turned to loans which were provided by the giants of the London mercantile circle and by Dutch bankers who already held 15% of the national debt.[40] Britain was soon to experience two financial crises and its only peacetime recession. The recession of 1761 followed a financial crises of late 1760 and extended past the next year because of the declaration of war on Spain in 1762. This conflict cut England off from her lucrative southern European markets. These markets had already suffered from the disruption of the national market because of the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, and it took nearly eight years to recover from these losses. It was common during war to see a financial crisis and trade slump because war decreased the ability of merchants to ship goods safely to their overseas markets. The

Seven Years War was different from others in that the volume of imports and exports from France and England to their colonies sharply increased because of the huge expenditures in provisioning and clothing to the army and for the maintenance of the Navy. When government spending on the war effort ended in 1763, the volume of trade contracted and remained stagnant until 1770. The French economy had also suffered, but there is some controversy over the impact of the war on the French economy. One conclusion is that war had a catastrophic effect with unparalleled losses, but the more popular view is that because merchants saw the war coming, they were able to offset their losses by stockpiling, and then took advantage of the post war boom in trade which offset overall losses to such an extent that over the long haul the war could be said to have had little effect.[41] A study of Marseilles in this post war period showed that there was no more than the normal number of bankruptcies there and prices remained within a normal range.[42]

To return to the English economy, one standard economic indicator was the rate of exchange which went into a downward spiral when credit was overextended. Another indicator was any increase in bankruptcies. In 1760 the rate of exchange moved against English interests.[43] With the declaration of war on Spain, bank stocks fell sharply and although there were signs of recovery with the signing of the preliminary peace in November 1762, the combination of the stoppage of the annual grants to Prussia in 1761 and Frederick the Great's decision to recoin the specie of his kingdom caused a continental crisis as he sought loans to finance his schemes. All of northern Europe was involved, and a number of Amsterdam banking houses closed their doors. The Prussian search for loans brought down twenty Amsterdam money houses and saw the number of London bankruptcies rise steadily from 191 in 1760 to as high as 330 to 360 annually.[44] The Dutch were forced to throw their British securities on the market and prices plummeted; bank reserves were drained. As a depression of trade became noticeable, the industries dependent on navy and army contracts severely contracted. The first crisis in 1761 was one of public finance which saw a slump in stocks at a time when export levels were still high, so the effect was limited. The second, in 1763, was more widespread. The critical factor in whether a business prospered or failed was whether or not it could mobilize the key ingredients of money, skills and connections. Furthermore, it was also important to have some control over all aspects of their business, a difficult condition for merchants involved in overseas trade. Bankruptcy was just one way to deal with indebtedness but was used when all other methods of collection had failed. Until 1750 the number of English bankruptcies was fairly steady, but rose sharply thereafter. The English business community increased by 58% in the 18th century while the number of bankruptcies increased by 168%, and the number of failures was also high.[45] Failure rates have been broken down by geographic region and show that almost 45% occurred in London in the period 1761-1780.[46]

Credit in London was in a stranglehold from 1759-1762, but the private banks in the City were able to maintain their positions by calling in a number of loans in 1759 and selling off stocks to keep high liquidity levels. This crisis meant that private banks kept their lending to a minimum until 1764. The 1760s was the only decade when the fortunes of private banks were not on the rise. There were fifty-two bankers in the business by 1785 but only three of these entered the business in the early 1760s and twenty-five after 1769. Banks came in two distinct types: the West End bankers of Fleet Street and the Strand who handled gentlemen's accounts and were involved in mortgages and bonds; the rest of the bankers on Lombard Street made loans to merchants. Most of the latter were merchants themselves or from merchant stock and were involved in financing the commodities trade.

Credit in Scotland was not much different. The Bank of Scotland was not in the habit of lending to merchants, whereas the Royal Bank of Scotland not only extended credit but invented the overdraft on current accounts.[47] There was also a radical change in the period 1750-75 when wholesalers and merchants joined together and formed their own banks, the Ship Bank, the Glasgow Arms Bank, the Thistle Bank and the New Merchant Banking Company of Glasgow.[48] All of these banks did well until the general depression that began in 1766 and which was extended by the non-importation agreements of the American colonies against Britain.

Business was affected by a number of other circumstances including natural disasters within Europe, such as the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in 1767.[49] The drought of 1762 in the British isles had a severe effect on a number of industries, including the leather and tannery works because a huge number of cattle had to be slaughtered due to a shortage of feed. This killing brought a long term shortage of dairy products and meat and the problem was compounded by a bad frost that winter which hurt the crops and stopped the transportation of perishable goods.[50] The English harvest returned to normal for the next two seasons but the cost of goods remained high. In 1766 the drought increased the price of hides and the price of grain rose sharply and caused a constitutional crisis over the export of grain, and, as a result, an order-in-council prohibited the use of wheat in distilling wine or spirits.[51] An embargo was eventually placed on the export of wheat and imports were allowed into England duty free. The reason that the grain embargo caused so much trouble was because the Privy Council had never ordered one in peacetime before.[52] The government usually reacted by temporarily rescinding the bounties for the export of grain in an effort to stop food riots. In 1765 an enabling act allowed for the prohibition of exporting corn when Parliament was not sitting.[53] This measure was a step forward, but when the act expired in August 1766 during the summer recess, trouble followed. The government found that it could not stop grain exports and there was parliamentary resistance to the King acting without the House even in times of crisis. The constitutional crisis was eventually settled when Parliament resumed in November, but for consumers prices remained high.

Large scale civil disruption attended the high prices and the depressed labour markets which continued until 1768. In the last years of the war a number of industries had been stimulated by government demand, especially for metals and clothing. There had also been the rise of secondary industries - offshoots of shipbuilding and provisioning which had increased the overall cost of living because of the rise in price of any commodity likely to be bought by the government. English prices rose 35% in the years 1730-1770 and colonial price rises were not far behind.[54] In general, prices were higher when the government borrowed heavily or when it carried a high amount of unfunded debt. The government was in this delicate position for much of the decade.

Problems with grain or cattle do not at first sight appear related to the economic depression and trade squeeze, but they extended the recovery time needed to pull out of the depression. At the same time the government had been borrowing heavily and raising indirect taxes. There were also noticeable increases in the price of beer, tea and an increase of 3s. per hundredweight on sugar. Sugar was always in great demand but never more so than when distillers were prohibited from using corn to distil spirits and instead used molasses, a by-product of sugar.[55] Lending by the major private banks in London and the outports was severely curtailed and credit was scarce. Only the richest overseas merchants were able to remain in business and many financed ventures through the formal credit networks of commodity brokers.

Exports to the North American colonies formed only a small part of the English export trade, yet even these markets decreased in value from £2.4 million in 1764, to £1.3 million in 1769.[56] One reason for the extremely low levels in 1769 was because colonial merchants fought the Townshend Acts through a non-importation agreement that took effect during the 1769 shipping season. The colonies also had troubles of their own; their economies had expanded through the massive spending of the British army on location there throughout the war. New York went into an economic slump when the army shipped out in 1761.[57] The loss of soldiers meant a loss of circulating coin, still an issue on the Governor's agenda in 1769. Prices in the colonies shot up after the army began to move around with the cost of tea doubling to 11s. per pound by the end of 1762.[58] The desperate economic condition of the colonies was exacerbated by the imposition of the Stamp Act in 1765 and did not recover after the repeal in 1766. There were some colonial merchants who exported goods to Quebec, but they did so for hard cash only which meant that there was little chance of British merchants at Quebec building a solid export market to the American colonies. The imports from the colonies only added to the specie shortages in Quebec.

Europe was the main export market for Britain and it was the decline in this sector that hurt the British economy the most. English exports to Portugal averaged well over £1 million in the years up to 1760, but by 1766, had fallen to around £600,000.[59] Although the woollen trade dropped off, the slack was taken up in part by the increased need for grain. The Iberian crop failed frequently from lack of rain and if this information was received in time by major grain exporters such as Samuel Storke, colonial grain could be shipped to the area. It was only sent if the profit margin was healthy and the crucial factor here was transportation costs. In New York grain sold at around 5s. a bushel but transportation costs added on another 12 shillings. Even with this additional cost, profits of up to 100% were possible.[60] Cargoes sent by English merchants via the colonies ranged from five to ten thousand bushels - an investment of £1000. Colonial merchants exporting directly to southern Europe did so in the same volumes as the London exporters. Quebec merchants also sent shipments to southern Europe, though substantially less than their neighbours who, by 1772, were exporting 28,500 quarters of wheat plus a steady amount of corn, flour and rice.

The grain and wine trade between Britain and Portugal was handled through factories set up in Portugal. The grain trade was in the hands of thirty nine merchants, three of whom controlled over two thirds of the trade. One of the top firms, Holdsworth, Olive and Newman bought grain from Halifax and the American colonies to fulfil their orders.[61] Gregory Olive was the same person who was in Watson, Olive and Rashleigh, a firm prominent in the Quebec trade.

Portuguese merchants were not involved in the wine trade as exporters because they had neither the monetary base to break into the export market nor did they have an extensive enough knowledge of English markets. Wine was an expensive and heavy commodity costing 30/- per ton to ship in peacetime, and the cost in duty and loading fees could double the shipping price. In the 1760s shipping patterns changed and, while fewer ships sailed between England and Portugal, the total tonnage was higher. This increase occured because of the switch away from the import of manufactured goods towards the import of grain and lumber. It made better sense to send larger ships there to be fully laded. Lisbon was important to English trade for another reason - it was the centre of bullion shipments and although this was technically illegal the Portuguese government turned a blind eye. Brazilian gold was brought over regularly to Portugal but the Portuguese merchants were chronically in debt to other European centres and especially to the British. Therefore, the bullion seldom remained in the country despite government legislation against its export. This inflow of bullion helped England ride out the credit squeeze in the 1760s and added gold moedas and silver crusados to the purses of Englishmen. In turn, the bullion ended up in all parts of the empire. The value of the bullion entering Falmouth between 1764-69 was close to £900,000. Changes in the English economy, the impact of the decline in the output of the Brazilian mines and a series of poor harvests in Portugal, opened a window of opportunity for other grain producing regions within the empire to trade with Portugal taking wine and fruit as well as remittances to England in return for cargoes. Quebec was only able to take modest advantage of this opportunity while the American colonies seized

R

the moment. The Portuguese example offered some ideas for the future direction of the Quebec trade but for the moment it was beyond the grasp of British merchants at Quebec.

British merchants faced a credit squeeze after the war and by 1766, were also faced with an agricultural crisis which resulted in a sharp decline in export trade with their traditional partners. The risk of bankruptcies and business failures steadily increased - not just because of a lack of reliable information but because of all the short term factors already mentioned. Overseas merchants were not more prone to failure than any other merchant group because there were fewer of them and the entrance threshold was higher. They were the elite of their craft and needed a combination of money, credit and political and social connections to even breach the walls of the merchant adventurers guild. London recorded the largest percentage of bankruptcies. This number was not just a function of the pre-eminence of London merchants in the overseas trade but because bankruptcy proceedings could only be started by means of a petition to the Lord Chancellor and this was most easily done by residents of the City.[62] The majority of bankrupts were in textiles, and when failures among food and drink merchants and retailers are included, these groups together account for two thirds of all bankruptcies.[63] The wholesalers, victuallers and wine merchants involved in the food and drink sectors were usually involved in overseas trade. The risk of failure in the overseas trade was high because of time, distance and the uncertainty of market information, but it was offset by the widespread use of insurance on ships and cargoes. Overseas trade was controlled by a very small number of men all tied to each other through business, experience, skill and marriage. There were few novices.

All of these circumstances mentioned above affected the way Britain traded with her new colony in North America. It was not that there was no wish to expand the overseas network to include Quebec, it was just that circumstances at home had left less than normal amounts of credit and goods available to trade. There was one other important difference: few resident agents were sent to the colony. It was, by mid-century, customary for English and Scots merchants to have resident factors in the American colonies, West Indies, India and Europe. This practice was a function of the need or desire to maximize profits by placing hand picked employees with extensive knowledge of specific commodities on hand to buy and sell goods; as well as to pass on information and remittances to their respective correspondents in Britain. As stated earlier, at the time when Quebec joined this well organized family of merchants, the overseas trading community in Britain was suffering from a series of financial problems, and there was no wish to add to these difficulties by starting a new series of ventures. Charles Crokatt was one London merchant to send a representative to work in the colony on his behalf, and this venture only came about because of his legal trouble with two British merchants in the colony. Colonial merchants did not block the overland route or clog the sea route in their attempts to reach Quebec and settle there. Colonials seem to have considered living and working in Quebec as a type of punishment for bad behaviour or as a form of exile.

The British merchants at Quebec had few social and business connections in London and it took them a considerable time to establish these. There were, to be sure, a few, including Samuel Jacobs, who were able to use their army connections to build up a rapport strong enough to obtain credit from a London merchant. But Jacobs was the exception to the rule. Jacobs had been involved in army provisioning with Brook Watson of Watson, Olive and Rashleigh in the late 1750s. The two men became involved again in a pearl and potash venture in 1768 and Jacobs talked Brook Watson into sending him goods on consignment on nine months credit with no cash advance. This involved the London company "deviate[ing] from our general rule not to ship goods without having some money in hand."[64] The company also asked that Jacobs remit as much as possible of the £794 worth of goods sent, in furs. Because of the bad harvest in 1769, Jacobs was incapable of paying his London creditors, but they had already pulled the plug on him by refusing to send out more than one third of his 1769 order, having received information on the bad harvest before shipping goods there.

British merchants were having trouble with their shrinking export markets in Europe and elsewhere, illustrated in their inability to sell their manufactured goods in India and remit money and jewels back to England. They were also faced with a stagnant colonial economy. Quebec did not have a large enough population base to warrant more attention from London and its ability to export furs and fish had been hampered by the Proclamation of 1763. Quebec did not produce good masts or sufficient lumber to make it a primary target of the Navy Board; its poor harbour facilities and difficult approach did not add to its appeal. Quebec did not have the attraction of a jewel of the east and, as of yet, it was not the prize of the west. Still, there were some merchants and some politicians who felt that it had great wealth that could be tapped. In the 1760s, tentative but steady inroads were made in the import-export trade and merchants living in Quebec had to be content to buy from captains. These merchants involved themselves only marginally in the overseas trade because they did not have the capital accumulation to fund their own ventures. Quebec reverted to its natural colonial state in a world of empires. Control of its economy was dictated by a European centre and the condition of its economy was affected by every twist and turn of the international economy. In stringent economic times London merchants preferred to fall back on a system which had shown itself to be tried and true. This system made use of ships' masters to transport goods, sell them and freight the vessel for the return voyage, and these patterns of exchange had to suffice until the leaner years had passed. Until sufficient interaction between the two merchant communities had occurred, there would be few goods consigned to British merchants in Quebec. The attitude of London merchants to Quebec's future must have seemed gloomy to

British merchants in the colony, but in fact, it was a sensible response to the tightness of credit in England and the lack of specie in Quebec. Naturally, London merchants sent what they believed would sell; in fact, the cargoes sent to Quebec differed little from those sent to New England, Philadelphia or other colonial ports.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER EIGHT

1. Alison Olson, "The London Mercantile Lobby and the Coming of the American Revolution," *Journal of American History* 69 (1982-1983) : 22.

2. Ibid., p. 27.

3.Ibid.

4.A.H. John, "The London Assurance Company and the Marine Insurance Market of the Eighteenth Century",*Economica* XXV (1958):129.

5.Ibid., p. 138.

6.Adam W. Kirkaldy, *British Shipping. Its History, Organization and Importance* (New York : Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1970), p. 240.

7.Ibid., p. 245.

8.John, "The London Assurance Company", p. 140.

9.Sutherland, p.54.

10.Ibid., pp. 55-56.

11.Kirkaldy, p.219.

12.Chapter One, pp. 26-29.

13.Jacob M. Price, "Buchanan and Simson, 1759-1763 : A Different Kind of Glasgow Firm Trading to the Chesapeake" *William and Mary Quarterly* XL 1983) : 33.

14.James F. Shepherd and Gary M. Walton, *Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of Colonial North America* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1972), p.88.

15.G.M. Walton, "Sources ,of Productivity Change in American Colonial Shipping, 1675-1775", *Economic History Review* XX (1967) :71.

16.Virginia Harrington, *The New York Merchant on the Eve of the Revolution* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1935), p.154.

17.T.S. Ashton, *An Economic History of England ; The 18th Century* (London : Methuen and Co., 1955), p.143.

18.John J. McCusker, "Colonial Tonnage Measurement : Five Philadelphia Merchant Ships as a Sample", *The Journal of Economic History* XXVII (1967) : 82.

19.Amherst Papers, W.O.34/2 18 March 1763. Murray to Amherst.

20.Amherst Papers. W.O. 34/2. 11 March 1763. P.E. Irving to Thompson.

21.Amherst Papers W.O. 34/2. 14 March 1763. Thompson to Irving. The formula was : $T= \frac{L - 3/5B \times B\ 1/2B}{94}$
L = length of Keel and B = breadth (breadth from the outside to inside not the walls).

22.Amherst Papers W.O. 34/2. 18 March 1763. Murray to Amherst.

23.S Series Volume 12. Ff. 4679-4680. 12 April 1765. Report of Dunn and Price on the petition of the Deputy Naval Officer.

24.S Series Volume 12. F.4685. 9 March 1765. Petition of Isaac Werden to the Council.

25.S Series Volume 12. F. 4697. 17 April 1765. Murray to Goldfrap.

26.S Series Volume 12. F. 4685. 9 March 1765. Werden to Council.

27.S Series Volume 12. F. 4685.

28.S Series Volume 12 F. 4710. 1 May 1765.

29.S Series Volume 14. F.5335-5336. 18 August 1765. Werden to Murray and Council.

30.Frederic C. Lane, "Tonnages, Medieval and Modern" Economic History Review 17 (1964) : 216.

31.Lane, p. 218.

32.Shepherd and Walton, pp. 239-240.

33.Lane, p. 219.

34.Larry D. Neal, "Interpreting Power and Profit in Economic History : A Case Study of the Seven Years War" The Journal of Economic History XXXVII (1977) : 27.

35.For a fuller discussion of war and the economy see John Brewer, The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (London : Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1989),chapters 6 and 7 (pp. 167-190 and pp. 191-217.)

36.John Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 88.

37.Peter Mathias and Patrick O' Brien,"Taxation in Britain and France, 1715-1800. A Comparison of the Social and Economic Incidence of Taxes Collected for the Central Governments" Journal of European Economic History 5 (1976) : 605-606.

38.Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter, "English Prices and Public Finances, 1660-1822" The Review of Economic Statistics XX (1938) : 27.

39.Brewer, p.211.

40.Neal, p.35.

41.The background and detail of this debate is explained more fully in, James C. Riley, The Seven Years War and the Old Regime in France, The Economic and Financial Toll (Princeton : Princeton University Press,1986), pp. 113-114.

42.Ibid., p.130.

43.T.S. Ashton, Economic Fluctuations in England 1700-1800, (Oxford : Clarendon Press,1959), p. 125.

44.Julian Hoppit, "Financial Crises in Eighteenth-Century England" The Economic History Review XXXIX (1986) : 49-50 and Appendix One.

45.Ibid., p. 51.

46.Hoppit, Appendix 2.

47.Jacob M. Price, Capital and Credit in British Overseas Trade : The View from the Chesapeake, 1700-1776 (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 64.

48.Ibid., p.70.

49.Gentlemans Magazine, 27 October 1767.

50.Ashton, Economic Fluctuations, p.51.

51.Gentlemans Magazine, 27 October 1767.

52.Philip Lawson, "Parliament, The Constitution and Corn : The Embargo Crisis of 1766" Parliamentary History 5 (1986) : 17.

53.Ibid., p. 19.

54.John J.McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of British America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1985), p.67.

55.Richard Pares, "The London Sugar Market 1740-69" Economic History Review IX (1956) : 269.

56.T.S. Ashton, Economic Fluctuations in England 1700-1800 (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1959), p.154.

57.Harrington, The New York Merchant, p.313.

58.Ibid., p. 315.

59.H.E.S. Fisher, The Portugal Trade. A Study of Anglo-Portuguese Commerce 1700-1770 (London : Methuen, 1971), p.41.

60.William I. Roberts, "Samuel Storke : An Eighteenth Century London Merchant Trading to the American Colonies'" Business History Review XXXIX (1965) : 160.

61.The discussion of the Portugal trade which follows is examined in detail in the work of H.E.S.Fisher, p.70.

62.Hoppitt, Risk and Failure, p.63.

63.Ibid., p.57.

64.Jacobs Estate Papers. Volume 10. Number 467. 6 March 1769 Watson, Olive and Rashleigh to Jacobs.

CHAPTER NINE - AN ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER GOODS ENTERING THE COLONY IN THE 1760S AND AN ANALYSIS OF CHANGING EXPORT PATTERNS FROM THE PORT OF QUEBEC

Little has been written on the types and varieties of goods which entered the port of Quebec after the conquest. An examination of cargo lists provides information not only on the sorts of goods commonly traded but also on consumer patterns and raises questions about methods of payment and markets within the colony. British merchants involved in transatlantic trade sent merchants at Quebec cargoes similar to those which they shipped to their American correspondents. The cargoes for the year 1761 will be used as a benchmark in this chapter against which to judge changes and variations in the cargoes for the remainder of the decade because the documentation for this year is complete and voluminous. It was the first year of recorded shipping activity in the military period for which the customs records are complete. From the beginning, cargoes contained dry goods, groceries and metals in large amounts, but within each category, there was also a wide range of goods.[1] They sent not only British linen and wrought iron but toys, musical instruments, printed books and looking glasses. British and Irish linen, to be sure, made up the bulk of cloths sent but there was also a dazzling array of more exotic cloths from India which would soon grace other parts of the Empire. Soosays, mulmuls, gurats, tanjeebs, cossacks, damasks and persian taffetas were all sent with the more traditional chintz, flannel, germany and cottons. Some of these types of cloths were so named to avoid paying top duty. For instance, Flanders cloth entered England and was re-exported under the name broad germany and paid 3d per ell instead of the real duty of 8d.[2] Dutch lawns were exported as narrow germany to escape higher duties, and French cambrics which can be found in Quebec cargoes were allowed to enter British ports only if immediately re-exported.

The shipping year 1761 saw huge numbers of goods flooding into the concentrated Quebec market. Nearly 300,000 lbs. of wrought iron and over 70,000 pieces of green glass were unloaded at Quebec but other metals, such as sheet lead and cast iron, came in smaller amounts. There was also a large shipment of nails estimated at approximately 100,000 lbs. Wrought copper and brass totalled 88,000 lbs. and pewter just over 40,000 lbs., British iron exports had increased from 8% earlier in the century to 20% of total exports by 1770 and the weight of iron exported rose to 21,000 tons annually by 1750.[3] There were other heavy items such as grindstones, great and small bugles, silverplate and lead shot. The weight and bulk of these items meant that they took up a large amount of the available shipping space but the large amounts of linen, sailcloth, hessian canvas, cordage, and fishing nets made the cloth element of the cargo also substantial. Carpets and rugs were imported although not in great number. Most goods entered Quebec in a semi-worked state, the metals were wrought or worked and the cloth was manufactured, but it was unusual for ready made clothing to be exported, and in fact, only 36 ready made garments entered Quebec from Britain in 1761. There were certain items which did come in ready made and these included stockings, hats and shoes.

The first British ships to reach Quebec in 1761 carried on them 6291 dozen worsted hose and a small amount of woollen stockings and almost 10,000 hats, either castor or felt. There were also special items sent, such as 150 dozen mens night caps, 33 dozen cotton caps and 46 dozen plain hats. Large amounts of woollen goods were sent to the colony and some of the largest woollen houses of London - Mauduit, Wright and Co. - were involved in this export. The most interesting aspect of the woollen trade was the change it had undergone by mid century. The Woollen Act of 1699 had prohibited Irish exports of woollens to the colonies but this barrier had given a boost to the Irish linen trade. The woollen industry provides an excellent example of how London industries operated and explains why shipments were in the hands of only a few merchant houses. Increased sales to the colonies had brought more firms into the business and instead of manufacturers sending wool to London to be sold in markets, it was now sent directly to the Blackwell Hall factors who would sell it on commission for the manufacturers. From this practice developed a standard system of credit which gave twelve months credit to exporters. The Blackwell Hall factors became the brokers for merchants and acted as their bankers. The export of wool and other commodities rested on a foundation of long term credit.

The linen industry was also overhauled in the 18th century. Irish linen was allowed to enter England duty free after 1696, and after 1719 was allowed to be exported free of duty to the American colonies.[4] To further encourage linen production export bounties were paid in 1743, and this bounty was renewed after 1753. The bounties ranged from a halfpenny to one pence halfpenny per yard. Quebec imported small amounts of Silesian lawns. The overall exports from Silesia had dropped by 75% during the Seven Years War, and overall imports to Britain from Europe dropped in the same period and were made up by an increase in Scots and Irish linen production.[5] In Scotland, linen output rose by four million yards per year between 1756 and 1763 and this increase was mirrored by a similar rise in Irish production.[6] Linen exports from London were controlled by the Barclay house and their name is found as a cargo owner on ventures to Quebec along with Payne and Swayne, one of the largest wholesale linendrapers in London.

European linens were handled by large London merchant houses and were sold only as they came - in bales. This method caused some practical problems for exporters and it was men like David Barclay who became popular with exporters because he would break open bales and sell the commodity in a variety of volumes. Scottish linen did make up a large part of the total export cargoes for the colonies and for Quebec, but until the 1760s, the Scots merchants were held back by their lack of proper storage facilities. This problem was remedied when powerful tobacco merchants, the Tobacco Lords, set up a universal warehouse in Glasgow and linen exports increased.[7] Large amounts of linens were exported from Scotland, though only 16-19% left from Scottish ports in the period 1758-67.[8] The rest, approximately 2 million yards per year, was exported to England. Scottish exports to Quebec, however small in comparison to the volume of English exports, were in linens, handkerchiefs and cloth in exchange for train oil, wood and some furs. To break into the overseas market Glasgow linen wholesalers gave twelve month's credit to exporters while giving only six months for domestic sales; and, just as in the London woollen trade, became lenders to merchants. This credit relationship was formalized with the emergence of the British Linen Company, founded in 1746 and which, by the 1760s, had switched the focus of its operations to banking. A cursory examination of the names of owners of the cargoes from the ports of Greenock and Glasgow for Quebec show that the leading American and West Indies import-exporters of Glasgow were the men known as the Tobacco Lords. The Glasgow firm Buchanan and Simson who were heavily involved in the Chesapeake trade, dealt with John, Edward and Rene Payne linendrapers of London and the firm Nash, Eddowes and Martin of London. The names of these merchants can be found either on customs records for Quebec or on petitions by London merchants in the Quebec trade. Scots merchants were well integrated into the British colonial trade and did not operate on shoestring budgets. They made considerable fortunes in the colonial trade and had strong business connections in London and the outports. In Quebec cloth imports were as important as they had been during the French colonial period.

Peter Kalm had in the course of his North American travels made a few comments about fashion in New France. He noted that women wore petticoats and caps and that their dress style was laborious and fancy, especially on Sundays. He also commented on the fact that while the locals had access to wool for clothing all the "better sorts of clothes came from France".[9] There was a great demand for ribbon in Quebec as well as throughout Europe, in the eighteenth century which was an era that saw the first appearance of many national costumes. In fact the varieties of fabrics and haberdashery were such that by the 18th century tradespeople needed encyclopedias and technical journals to keep up with the changes.[10] The trend in the mid eighteenth century was generally away from heavy cloths and towards mixed cloths which either made the fabric lighter or, as in the case of silk and cotton, made it warmer. Fustians, for instance, were half woollen materials made on cotton warps. There was also a general movement towards the production of non essential cloths, such as felts for hats, stockings, gloves and ribbons - all of which was aided by the technical improvements in machinery. Lace which had always been handmade, was being produced in England by machines as early as the 1760s. The increased exports of furs from North America in the second half of the century meant an increase in the use of furs in a wider range of clothing - in skirts and as liners in coats. This general trend towards a wider range of cloths in fashion can be seen in the variety of cloth sent to Quebec in the 1760s.

Kalm had noted a similar trend towards a wide range of fashion among the Canadian elite. Men's clothing was typically a coat, waistcoat and knee breeches, embroidered with gold thread and silks. Women's clothing was festooned with lace, ribbons and ruching. Ordinary lace came from Antwerp and Ghent but the gold and silver variety came from Paris and Lyon.[11] Lace edged handkerchiefs were an important accessory, as were snuff boxes (which in New France could be made from sealskin) but watches belonged only to the rich.[12] Handkerchiefs were sent in large numbers to the colony in 1761 (over 2000) and garters, cloaks and waistcoats arrived in smaller numbers. The majority of cloth was sent in pieces or yards along with a miscellaneous amount of sewing thread, sewing silk, gold and silver thread, lace and silk ribbons. Over 800 pin cushions and 61,000 lbs. of haberdashery were also counted. The utilization of shipping space was so important that cabinet ware and desks sent over were often packed with such goods. Women wore corsets and hoop skirts with whalebone seams and high heels with worsted hose. The man about town would be draped in a combination of cloth, velvet and silk, while the woman would be in silk, satin and chintz.

Leather was shipped to Quebec in a number of different states, as wrought tanned leather (4693 lbs), tanned hides (236), tanned calf skins (606), gloves (470 dozen), boots (63 pairs), galoshes (128 pairs), holsters (4), saddles (over 100), bridles and stirrups (over 100), and shoes. The shoes were further broken into children's, mens and women's fashion shoes. Shoes were measured both by poundage and by amount so there were 9537 dozen pairs of leather shoes and 10,000 lbs. worth of the same.

Leather was one of the key growth industries in England in the 18th century and formed 23% of the total value of industrial output.[13] In England the trade was localized in London on Budge row and was surrounded by all the trades associated with leather.[14] Leather was the top export item behind cloth in Scottish and English exports throughout the decade. There were a number of reasons for this development. There was a massive rise in the number of hides tanned in 1764 - 3 million more than in the previous year - because the drought of 1762 had resulted in widespread slaughter and this brought millions more than the normal numbers of hides onto the market. In the short term, this trend flooded the tanneries and markets. Over the long term, however, it depleted stocks. This change was compounded by an outbreak of distemper in Europe which brought a prohibition of European imports in 1768.[15] Taken together these circumstances raised the price of tanned hides from 9/6d to 14/6d by 1768.[16] Tied to these dramatic changes were the fluctuations in the production of tallow candles and soap. When the short term boom in hide production tailed off in 1766-67 so did the output of candles and soap. For exporters, these changes meant that there was a large volume of leather as hides and as manufactured products on hand; one potential market was Quebec. Tied directly to this, there was an increase in the export of train oil from Quebec to London. This type of oil was in great demand because it was not only used in the colony for burning candles, but was a necessary component of turning hides into tanned leather.[17] Hides were tanned in two ways, by oakbark and by train oil or alum. To give some idea of the time involved in the manufacture of leather goods, it is worth noting that it took six months to two years before a hide was tanned; the outer soles of shoes required one year's work. Train oil was preferred by tanners because it made the tanning process easier. Unlike the woollen or linen industry, the leather business took very little in start up capital - close to £6 - but it cost a lot to buy the hides and to keep a large stock on hand. A large number of hides had to go under the tanning process each year to ensure a steady income.

Once past the metal and cloth component of a cargo, one was likely to find other basic necessities which included soap and candles. Soap came in a variety of different styles and types, ranging from hard soap to castile and prize soap. Ordinary soap was in greatest demand and over 28,000 lbs. came over in 1761. But there was also 13,000 lbs. of hard and 2000 lbs. of castile and prize soap imported. Taken together the overall sum totalled over 40,000 lbs., but, since it was one item not on the standard issue list of soldiers, there was a ready market for it. Candles came in a variety of types from the most popular tallow to molded and waxed candles, and the smaller amounts of spermaceti candles which came in from the colonies. There was an apothecary who set shop in the town of Quebec after 1760, and to him, and other merchants, was shipped nineteen hundredweight of apothecary goods. The presence of craftsmen still active in the town can be seen in the twenty two hundredweight of clockworks and one clock dial sent out that year.

Textiles, leathers and soaps were just a few of the varied goods which were exported to Quebec. There may not have been an active printing press in the colony, but this lack had not prevented Canadians from building private libraries. The British inhabitants had their reading needs met as well and, although there was no listing of the individual titles, it is known that 500 books and 6000 lbs. of books were exported to the colony. These books found their way not only into private homes but into the weekly circulating library in the market place at upper town Quebec. Germain Langlois advertised his circulating library in the Quebec Gazette in 1764. It offered several hundred volumes in French and English for the fee of 6d. Halifax currency per week.[18] The gambling spirit of both the Canadians and the British was catered to by the more than 500 lbs. of playing cards being imported, and they relaxed around their fires puffing on one of the five hundred and fifty gross of glazed tobacco pipes that were sold in the market and shops of the town in 1761. The tobacco trade in the colony looked brisk and at least one Glasgow tobacconists arrived to set up shop that year. The tobacco import business involved suttee, cut, rolled, manufactured, locally grown and British plantation tobacco which totalled somewhere in the vicinity of 12,000 lbs. and there was also a substantial amount of Holland, Rapee and English snuff. Snuff boxes were popular as seen by the three hundred and thirty five paper snuff boxes for sale which had been taken as prize goods.

Since fashion was an important part of daily life it should come as no surprise that a whole body of goods intended to beautify the body were imported. Horn combs, brushes, hair shags and powder arrived in a steady flow throughout the season, along with forty-four dozen looking glasses. Not all of the looking glasses were destined for the local market. Instead, they were bound for the Indian trade where, Peter Kalm had noted in his travel diary, they were popular among the men.[19]

The needs of the household had to be met and, although not everyone could afford the pleasure of a complete dinner set, many made do with whatever crockery could be had. Blue and white patterned cups, saucers and plates were the most popular, even though they arrived only in very small amounts. Not only were painted blue and white cups and saucers sent, but also chocolate cups and enamel cups, as well as a few cases of Delph and China ware. Peter Kalm pointed out that all the Canadians he dined with had their own knives, and that spoons and forks were silver and their plates were Delphware.[20] Pint basins, gold teapots, coffee cans and iron pots all arrived in small numbers, accompanied by huge amounts of earthenware. It was unconscionable to own tea sets and dinner sets without having somewhere to display them, therefore, desks, cabinets, Sheffield ware, household furniture, Silesia tablecloths, napkins and curtain material were imported in miscellaneous amounts. The point should be reiterated that within each general category of goods exported from Britain there was great variety. It was not just a case of sending hats, plates or cloth - the owners of the cargo seemed alive to the fact that the buyers were consumers and, as such, would have preferences. Sending just one of the variety of goods within the range available for export therefore, might not guarantee a market. Cargoes sent to Quebec were the same as typical cargoes sent to the colonies because merchants were used to catering to the more demanding consumer. London merchants also had business contacts with French merchants and were aware of the types of goods people were used to receiving before 1760.

Samuel Jacobs set up his employee, Charles Curtius, in his store at St. Denis to sell manufactured goods in return for grain. While the types of goods which reached the port of Quebec can be seen from the customs records, it is more difficult to see which goods found their way into the countryside. The correspondence of Jacobs and his employee, however, makes this task a little easier. The St. Denis store took inventory in February 1762 and this record was sent on to Samuel Jacobs and can be consulted through his extant papers. There are many exotic items in the inventory: cambric, satin, gauze and ribbon, as well as shoes, gloves, stockings and some household standards such as cutlery, tumblers and table cloths.[21] The Curtius store appears to have been the only store operating in the area but it did do well and shows that more than New England rum and British corn spirits forced their way into the rural economy. The extant inventory is obviously a catalogue of unsold items and may therefore reflect goods of limited marketability. Had this been so, one would expect that either the order for the following season would not have asked for those goods, or the overall variety of stocks on hand would have been limited even more. The order that Curtius sent to Jacobs in the autumn of 1763 can be broken into five categories: cloth, sewing needs, household goods, ready made clothing and a miscellaneous mixture of tools and hardware. In the cloth category there were approximately fifteen different types of cloth, ranging from mohair to taffeta. He also requested red cloth for caps, yellow buttons, silk embroidery and pins. The ready made clothing he requested consisted of knee breeches, caps, shoes, stockings and blankets. The household goods he sold were a mix of frying pans, kettles, dishes and plates as well as lamp oil. In the miscellaneous category he asked for tools, iron bars for the smithy, as well as gunpowder and shot.[22] There was no mention of food in the inventory with the exception of salt and brown sugar, nor was there any mention of more specialized goods such as toys or books. From the Jacobs records it is clear that a merchant with sufficient credit and connections had no trouble at all breaking into the rural market and that rum was not the only product which could make the self sufficient habitant produce a surplus. Goods imported into the colony of Quebec were destined not only for the Indian trade but for very brisk urban and rural markets.

Food was an important export item from Britain too. At first there were large amounts of beef, pork and butter sent to feed the troops, and much of this produce came from Ireland. This supply pattern was due,in part, to an Act of Parliament which did not allow direct shipping of goods between Ireland and the colonies, except in the case of provisions. This directive was sanctioned by the Cattle Act of 1667 which redirected Irish exporters into beef, pork and butter production.[23] These exports had tripled in volume by the 1770s and pumped £350,000 per year into the Irish economy in the 1760s.

One other major import throughout the period was tea. Four thousand pounds of tea from China, in three varieties, Singlo, Bohea and Hyson reached Quebec. Kalm had mentioned that the ladies of New France all drank coffee probably because it was easily obtained from South America, while tea could only be brought from China. The arrival of the British changed this situation, but while coffee was generally not to be found on the London-Quebec run, it did come to the colony from Boston, Philadelphia and New York. Coffee drinking did not die out altogether; in fact the 1760s saw the rise of coffee houses in the traditional European style, where merchants could meet to do business and discuss politics. In Quebec the coffee houses also doubled as auction rooms. By 1765 these establishments expanded to offer dinner and overnight lodgings. The rise of tea and coffee drinking as a social event was important for merchants because it opened homes to a wider social function and thereby almost as an afterthought, increased the amount and quality of furniture purchased for the home. The general acceptance of tea over coffee meant that tea services had to be bought and new types of ceramics used that could bear heat. By mid century, there was a move away from real China and towards Staffordshire ceramics and Wedgewood cups, as English brown and enamel stone teapots began to replace teapots from China. As tea became more popular in England, its price fell and by 1750 it had dropped from £1 to 5s. per pound. Bohea tea from the Fukien valley in China was in the greatest demand. It was a black fermented tea gathered in the early summer. If it was harvested later in the season it was called Congo tea and fetched a higher price. Tea gathered in April was called Pekoe but no mention of it is found in the Quebec customs records. The other type was Singlo or green tea; it was steamed not fermented and was popular in England. At the top of the tea market was the very expensive Hyson, the brew of the aristocracy. All three types were exported to Quebec. One pound of tea lasted a long time, and while it seems unlikely, it has been estimated by one historian that in 1700 it was possible to get 196 cups from one pound of tea![24]

Few references have been made to table glass in the cargo lists, yet excavations at sites throughout Quebec have found almost exclusively

British glass rather than colonial glassware. This finding tallies well with the Customs records. Duties on exports of glass from Britain were levied according to weight, and in the period 1740-80, there was a move towards lighter, smaller, daintier glass.[25] One of the heavier types of glasses advertised in the Quebec Gazette was the mason's glass which had a strong handle that could be banged on the table without breaking.[26] Most glass was lime glass in which potash was a necessary ingredient and this was one reason why the establishment of a potash works in Quebec by Samuel Jacobs was encouraged.

An examination of the types of foodstuffs sent to Quebec shows a dizzying variety. Cheese was popular and came from many different English counties. Almost three thousand pounds of pepper were imported along with salad oil, pickles and olives as well as exotic capers, anchovies and rhubarb in small amounts. Canadian palates must have welcomed the return of imports common to the colony before 1760 with the arrival of fresh fruit, nuts, raisins and figs along with a wide range of spices which always included cloves, cinnamon, nutmeg, mace and vermilion. Many of these spices were also much sought after for the Indian trade. The gardeners, one of whom was Governor Murray, asked for and received garden seed, grass and flower of mustard seeds. Kalm had commented on his travels that colonists had to send to France for seeds every year because plants lost their strength within three generations.[27]

One category of goods which loomed large in every shipment was spirits, beer and wine. There were two types of beer, ordinary and strong, and each paid a corresponding duty. The British brewing industry underwent many formative changes in structure in the eighteenth century, as the business slowly moved into the hands of a few brewers. Beer was increasingly subject to government regulation and its price was fixed by the assize of ale. In 1761 it retailed at 3d per pot (quart), but this price was raised by a halfpenny the following year and stayed there until 1800. Beer was one of the commodities sent to Quebec in notable quantities. It was exported by well established merchants who counted the Whitbreads among their number.[28] The problem that beer posed for exporters was that it was unstable when transported, especially by sea.

The overseas market for beer was not for the type sold in British public houses, but for a much stronger version called strong, or double strong beer. There was an extra duty levied on this strong beer in 1761.[29] It was common knowledge that strong beer kept better, and, since all beer valued at 6s. per barrel paid a flat duty, it became profitable for brewers to brew and export double strength beer, and this practice is exactly what they followed in the case of Quebec.[30] Once it had reached its destination the volume was doubled by adding water and selling it at regular strength. Brewers in Scotland grew in number from fifty in mid century to one hundred and fifty by the 1790s. The largest breweries were owned by some of the Tobacco Lords of Glasgow and in the 1760s they too turned to brewing strong beer and strong ale as well as small beer, all of which can be seen in the Greenock cargo lists. One of the brew houses had belonged to Robert Finlay who had also exported leather from his shoe works factory and is thought to have been related to Hugh Finlay (postmaster and merchant in Quebec) with whom he did business. Scots ales show up in the cargo lists but until the 1760s were not recorded as they were put in primarily to fill up empty space on ships. By 1765, 40,000 gallons of ales were exported annually from Scotland, and of this amount, 31% was destined for Canada.[31]

To save space many glass bottles were sent over filled with beer so there are two types of bottle exports; empty (29,000) and those filled. In the latter category it is difficult to know how many there were because they are listed in the records as tons of beer in bottles (12 tons) and bottles with beer in them (51 barrels, 30 tierces and 5462 bottles). When shipments of strong beer are added in, the total rises to a minimum of forty nine tons of beer exported to Quebec during the 1761 shipping season from Britain.

British merchants at Quebec often commented, especially during their struggle with the courts over paying liquor duties, that no one liked the British equivalent of brandy, more commonly called British corn spirits. This dislike did not stop over 120,000 gallons of this spirit from clearing into Quebec in 1761 with only very small amounts returned to England. For the more discerning palate there was far more than British beer and British corn spirits available. French brandies and clarets were available in middling numbers. These were usually prize goods. But a selection of Rhenish, Oporto, Spanish, Madeira, Curacao and Mountain wines were imported along with a variety of foreign waters. There was virtually no rum exported from Britain. This product was provided by colonial merchants.

The 1761 shipping season re-established that very necessary link between Quebec and the rest of the European world. Merchants sent hardware, housewares, cloth, exotic foods and spices as well as riding togs, tobacco, alcohol and playing cards. All the necessaries to make garments and to cook and serve food found their way off British boats into the colony along with books, musical instruments and toys. It must not be forgotten, however, that a substantial amount of the incoming goods were destined directly for the Montreal outfitters supplying the fur trade. Statistics on goods sold to fur trade merchants were not consulted but Robert Rogers of Michilimackinac estimated in 1767 that the fort and its surrounding hinterland was supplied by 100 large canoes with £450 worth of goods per canoe. He listed the types of goods necessary for the successful prosecution of this trade, and while he was specifically concerned with a variety of cloth and haberdashery, there were also looking glasses, combs, cutlery and ironworks, including kettles. Guns and gunpowder were also on the list. The total estimate for the 1767 season was £45,000 worth of imports shipped out to the Michilimackinac area. Total imports to Quebec in that particular year had dropped dramatically from the peak reached in the previous year, yet still reached around £194,000.[32] An examination of the amounts estimated for the major fur trading post shows that even in 1767 the fur trade involved less than one quarter of the total imports from Britain. The rest was destined for the local rural and urban markets of the colony.

There was enough variety within each category of goods to meet the needs of large numbers of buyers, as well as to cater to merchants in Quebec buying for their shops. There was also specialist merchandise, such as optical instruments, spectacles, mathematical instruments and clockworks. But the bulk of imported goods were obviously meant to appeal to a wide range of consumers. Depending on its size, each ship carried varying amounts of all of the goods mentioned. The only way to get ahead was to be the first ship of the season to clear customs or to make the trip twice in one season. The Bonny Lass of Livingston was able to make more than one voyage per season, but, interestingly enough, this knowledge of the Quebec market did not bring about any changes in the types of goods brought over in the second voyage. This lack of change in the cargoes purchased in Scotland for the Quebec market implies that there were no obvious consumer goods that had not already been sent and that there was no overwhelming need for any one good or else the merchants involved would undoubtedly have taken advantage of this opportunity.

The Scottish ventures to Quebec throughout the decade brought much the same goods as English ships, although there tended to be a concentration on linen, handkerchiefs, woollens, leather, beer and tobacco.[33] The contractors' vessels were almost exclusively with barrels of pork, beef, pease, flour and butter, but some also carried small amounts of goods sent out on private accounts.

The overseas trade from Britain was not the only source of imports. In 1761 three ships from the Caribbean carrying wine and rum cleared inward along with five from Portugal and Gibraltar which were laded with wine, fresh citrus fruit and salt. One of these, the Broderick, carried a typical British style cargo which, although it had a larger than normal share of nuts and raisins, also carried more unusual items such as medicines by the case, building bricks, barber tools and church candles. Quebec merchants were not involved in trading to Southern Europe at first but British merchants were; they bartered fish for wine from the mainland and salt from the Isle of May.[34] Iberia alone ate 300,000 quintals of cod every year and even the American colonial merchants helped meet this demand. Most return cargoes were in salt for the fisheries, but salt was cheaper than fish (half the price) whereas wine could fetch one and a half times the value of cod.[35]

The other main source of imported goods was the American colonies which sent a total of 87 ships to Quebec in 1761 in almost equal numbers from the ports of Boston (27), New York (26), and Philadelphia (24). It should also be noted that Colonial Office records show that 67 of these vessels brought alcohol as part of their cargo; that explains why they were profitable voyages. One thing that must be kept in mind in any discussion of colonial shipping until 1763 was that from time to time Amherst, as Commander in Chief of the North American forces, requested that ships be sent to Quebec to help provision the troops. After 1764 the stagnation of the colonial economy because of the loss of the soldier's spending power meant that substantially fewer ships would make this five week journey to Quebec since most of them would return in ballast. There was very little difference in the types of goods sent from any of the three colonial ports. The standard exports were flour, beef, pork, cheese, bread, biscuits, molasses, sugar and rum - both West Indies and New England types. Each centre sent small amounts of European goods, but while Philadelphia exported lime juice and tobacco (21,973 lbs), Boston sent oysters, potatoes, Guadaloupe coffee and board feet of lumber. Both sent pitch, tar and turpentine. Boston, New York and Philadelphia each sent a wide selection of tea, rice, coffee, chocolate, and candles, but Philadelphia was responsible for the bulk of the salt exports (over 6500 bushels) and only New York and Philadelphia sent hams and gammons by the barrel.

The colonial cargoes were much like the European cargoes in as much as each venture carried a number of different types of goods. There was virtually no exports of metals, except for one ship which brought six tons of bar iron from Philadelphia. The point of mentioning the limited nature of the iron exports is to show that they existed at a time when the colonies were not supposed to be involved in iron production at all. There is no conclusive evidence to show that it was colonial made, yet it seems an odd commodity to re-export. There were far more perishables sent from the colonies; these included bread, gammon, juice and hams. The items sent most often were rum, whether New England, Jamaican or cherry, followed by molasses and sugars of every type - loaf, powdered, British refined and muscovado. Indian corn was a popular export item, as were the tar and pitch needed in potash works, and fishing equipment for fishing voyages. Some household items were also sent: earthenware, china, tin plates, kettles and frying pans. The many boxes of chocolates seem to have been especially popular and were quite expensive. The colonial cargoes did not have the same exotica as the British cargoes but were able to add a few more varieties of wine to the already bulging list. Tenerife, Vidonia, Madeira and Fyall wines and small amounts of Bristol and other bottled beers were unloaded from colonial ships. With such large imports of alcohol entering the port of Quebec it is clear why the Government at Quebec was so eager to collect the old duties. Colonial cargoes were clearly able to fill a gap in consumer goods in Quebec and one which could not be filled by merchants operating from British ports.

There were eighty-seven ships which sailed for Quebec from colonial ports in 1761 and a total of twelve were for the government. Not all ships unloaded at Quebec, in fact five were destined for Montreal and passed right through Quebec. These vessels were laden primarily with food and drink, although one large vessel from New York carried over three hundred crates of earthenware, a large amount of hosiery and some china. Only ten of the ships carried goods on private account for British merchants at Quebec and all of these ships came late in the season. It is, therefore, more than likely that these merchants took advantage of their knowledge of the Quebec market to order goods that would find both a ready made consumer and a quick sale. In September there were sixteen inward voyages of which four vessels brought in goods that were not already consigned, eight were filled with provisions for the government and four were specifically consigned to British merchants at Quebec. Two of the ships for the government also had some goods on board already consigned. The cargoes brought in on private account differ from the rest of the cargoes in one way, they brought in large amounts of Indian corn as well as spirits, bread, candles and flour.

After 1761 there was a steady river trade from all points on the St. Lawrence between Montreal and the port of Quebec, but in 1761 this trade was limited to only a few ships. However, there was a steady trade from Quebec out to Halifax and Louisbourg. This part of the river trade involved the movement of troops (until 1763) and the movement of provisions. It also provided Quebec with fresh fish and salt and acted as a catchment area for a variety of wines, rum, prize goods, salt, lumber; emergency rations were able to be moved from one port to another in times of need. Halifax and Louisbourg merchants had a finely honed network of colonial correspondents but they sent almost no cargoes to British merchants at Quebec.

In 1761, therefore, it can be seen that Quebec received a great variety of goods from a number of places with minimal overlapping. The bulk of goods came from Britain and involved huge volumes of metals, cloth, food and alcohol. Colonial shipments involved different types of food, more of it perishable and home grown harvests and they made their money from the colonial made spirits and the produce of the West Indies in rum sugar and its by-product, molasses. There was an overspill at Halifax and Louisbourg that was utilized by Quebec to top up food and alcohol supplies. Imports from Southern Europe were largely confined to wines and salt. Although it was possible to make only one trip across the Atlantic per year, two or three could have been made from the colonies had the market existed, but it did not, and few vessels came more than once in a season.

Ships may have entered the port at Quebec groaning under the weight of their cargoes yet they left substantially higher in the water. There were fifteen vessels outward bound for England in 1761 with cargoes listed in the port books. Two were in ballast, and two were to load with train oil at Bic and Hare islands. The rest returned carrying very small amounts of furs and oil or just furs. When compared to the fur cargoes bound for London from Quebec in 1763, these ships might as well have been in ballast. Four of the ships did have a large amount of whalebone on board and this cargo increased in value as an export until Governor Palliser took restrictive actions against Quebec residents and traders on the east coast. It is difficult to find information on vessels travelling between Quebec and Britain and at times when it is available it does not provide useful information. In one instance, the first ship back from Quebec to Scotland was the Catherine which arrived in January 1762 having left in the late summer of 1761. It returned via Virginia so its cargo list is useless as it was laded mainly in tobacco and staves.[36] When it left Quebec it was loaded with seventy eight empty casks and thirteen bales and twenty boxes of merchandise.[37]

There were one hundred and twenty six vessels which cleared the port of Quebec for colonial destinations, eighty-four of which sailed in ballast and many more sailed with very small amounts of unsold rum and other miscellaneous merchandise. Eight vessels were either involved in moving troops or stores for the army. Only thirty-four vessels did not return to the colonies in ballast and of these ships only eight had substantial amounts of goods on board. Two vessels of the eight carried what could be thought of as an export of Quebec - furs. The rest of the cargoes appear to be returns from unsold goods previously imported. Only one vessel sailed to the Caribbean and it was laden with dried cod, oil, salmon and hoops. The St. Lawrence river trade included thirty-four trips to Louisbourg, Halifax and Newfoundland and while eleven were in ballast, the rest were partly loaded with an assortment of sugar, tobacco, salt and some foodstuffs.

In the 1761 shipping season goods flooded into Quebec from a number of areas, but London merchants were not as lucky on the way out as they had been on the way in. If the theoretical goal of having a colony was to exploit its natural resources this exploitation was not achieved in the first regular shipping season. London and colonial merchants were more concerned with taking what they could in the way of cash and Canada bills for their exports than they were in shipping furs and fish out of the colony. The lack of exports clearly shows that while the fur trade in the west was still open, it was still severely disrupted; there were not enough British or Canadian merchants operating in the colony who could hook back into the transatlantic economy to transport furs to Quebec for export.

It is worth comparing the years 1761 and 1763 because the record is complete for each. The year 1763 was chosen because it is more indicative of trade in the years which followed. By 1763 the import-export picture had changed considerably.[38] The first striking feature is the increase in the numbers of vessels to enter the port of Quebec - thirty-eight, including ten for the government, cleared from Cork, London, Glasgow and the outports. Two vessels arrived from Lisbon laden mostly with salt. Colonial entries had dropped off to thirty-two with equal amounts from Boston and New York but only five from Philadelphia. There was a much stronger traffic from down river which now included far more harbours than just Halifax, Louisbourg and Newfoundland. Vessels did extensive trade with the fishing centres of Cape Chat, Mount St. Louis, Gaspé, Madelaine, Chaleurs and other small places. In fact only five of vessels sailed from

Halifax, and none from Louisbourg and Newfoundland, the most frequently used point of exit of vessels headed for Quebec was Gaspé. The most dramatic change of all was in the trade of Montreal and the villages up river with the port of Quebec. It was only natural, given the state of economic and physical disruption caused by the fighting on Canadian soil, that it would be a season or two before a strong recovery would be seen. By 1763, however, it was clear that Canada was to remain in the hands of the British and the area had been promised the standard political settlement found in other North American colonial possessions. It had also by now begun to prove that its virtues, extolled in the Governor's report of 1762, were very real.

Forty two vessels entered the port of Quebec in 1763 from overseas, including two from Southern Europe and two from the West Indies. The market for goods seemed to have recovered from the sharp drop recorded in 1762 which saw only twenty-nine ships enter from overseas. In fact the shipping peak was reached in 1763 and was not exceeded until the next decade. The types of goods brought from Scotland and England did not change much. Cloth continued to be exported in great quantities and in great varieties, with Manchester cotton the only new addition. Leather maintained its popularity and was to be found in the form of shoes, gloves, breeches and laces as well as in equipment needed for horses and chaises. Manufactured items expanded to include cotton striped trousers, cotton gowns, plain apparel and one box of silk gowns. The success of the east coast fisheries could be seen in the steady amounts of Dutch twine, anchors and sailcloth sent over, but there were also goods brought in to serve the needs of trappers, including muskets, worms for muskets, gunflints and steel for tinderboxes. The types of metal sent now included rolled iron plate, wire and English manufactured steel, but there were also manufactured iron goods such as scythes, pans and ironmongery. Small shot and gunpowder increased to a total weight of 40,000 lbs. in the 1763 shipping season. Wheatmeal, peas, salt and flour continued to be imported, though not in particularly large amounts. The wide selection of spices, nuts and pickles was also further expanded to include French truffles with toothpicks, fennel and coriander as well as citrus fruits and juniper berries. Household goods was by 1763 an expanding category. Instead of a lot of Delphware, the focus had shifted to tin plates and tinware and almost 800 lbs. of pans. China was still popular and over one thousand pieces were brought in as well as large amounts of earthenware. Glass and upholstery arrived in unspecified amounts and items of personal adornment expanded to include necklaces and silver watches. Alcohol, which had always been an important commodity increased significantly. There were now three standard categories of beer, strong beer, of which there was forty five tons and over 4000 filled bottles, 10,000 bottles of ordinary beer and strong ale (most came from Scotland) which came in 15 casks of 20 dozen bottles each. There was a small amount, 8500 gallons, of British malt spirits but the predominant type of alcohol in this category, and one that contemporaries claimed few liked, was the almost 92,000 gallons of British made corn spirits. The wine list was perhaps not as extensive as it had been in 1761 because most of the prize goods had been used up, but it still contained a selection of French, Spanish, Portuguese and Rhenish wines. A quick comparison with 1761 shows that beer exports to Quebec had increased while corn spirits had dropped by about 28,000 gallons; this decrease seems to support the contemporary dislike of this particular beverage.

The 1763 shipping season saw more ships arrive fully laden. Ships clearing inwards from the West Indies came laden with alcohol and fruit, and, as could be expected, the two ships from Lisbon brought cargoes of salt with some double strong beer. The number of colonial ships sailing to Quebec dropped by almost two thirds with recorded entries of thirty-two. Ships continued to sail from the three main ports of New York which sent eleven, Boston which followed with nine and Philadelphia which dispatched only five. The decline of the Philadelphia connection was most clearly seen in the drop in tobacco exports from the colonies. Colonial cargoes remained basically unchanged, but merchants added Havannah and Guadaloupe brown sugar, apples and honey to their ships' holds. The amount of chocolate exported to Quebec increased to 400 lbs. The alcoholic component of the colonial cargoes remained high, but for the first time, large amounts of shrub and a small amount of hops were added to their roster. The most noticeable change in cargo was in the amounts and types of household furniture sent, and in metals. Murray had commented before on the high price of furniture in the colony and had been told to wait and it would be sent from England. It seems apparent from the colonial cargo lists, however, that furniture was one area where the colonial price was competitive. Desks, chairs, feather beds and miscellaneous furniture were mentioned on cargo lists more frequently than before. Virtually no metals had been sent to Quebec in 1761, but now there were shipments of sheet iron, plantation iron and ironmongery. This time there were no goods consigned to specific Quebec merchants and the last colonial ships reached Quebec in October, not November, for no one wanted to become icebound in the river. Salt and alcohol made up the bulk of most cargoes with a substantial amount of the latter in prize wine.

Thus, the amount of traffic from Britain had increased while that from the colonies had declined sharply. But the internal river trade had grown by leaps and bounds. The first area of growth was down river traffic, taking in all possible stops as far as Gaspé. The other was in the river trade in the opposite direction towards Montreal. The economic vitality of the river in both directions was seriously affected for the rest of the decade by the temporary closure of the fur trade in the west and Governor Palliser's heavy handed approach to Quebec's rights in the east coast fishery. In 1763 neither of these realities had affected shipping.

Recorded traffic down river increased from 30 to 73 trips and the number of vessels arriving from Montreal and all points in between jumped from 4 in 1761 to 115 in 1763. The importance of the east coast fisheries is no where more apparent than in the 1763 harbour entries book. The seasonal nature of the fishery breaks the entries into two types, June to September and September to November. In the first, most inward voyages were from Halifax and the King's Posts, and brought in very specific goods. Halifax sent wine, lime juice, brandy and shipments of rice for the government stores. The Posts sent combinations of skins and whalebone as well as oysters and some green cod. The second part of the down river season saw most ships entering from Gaspé, the fishery in the St. Lawrence and from other fishing areas such as Coudres and Chaleurs. The bulk of goods they brought were in cod, salmon, oil, feathers and whale products. It was not until October that the cargoes became almost exclusively cod and oil. The Gaspé shipments alone totalled 303 quintals of dried cod and almost 15,000 green cod. Sixty eight hundredweight of whale fins and seventy four hundredweight of whalebones took up most of the space on the smaller vessels which plied this route. Many of the whale products and the feathers, as well as the cod, would find its way to the European market.

The other area of great activity was the river trade between Montreal and Quebec, mostly in small vessels and chaloupes owned by Canadians. The tide had begun to turn in favour of the merchants as the needs of the troops began to cause less and less disruption to the colony's economy. Most of the traffic was directly between Montreal and Quebec but some left from Sorel and Trois Rivières. Not all of these vessels were carrying goods; in fact 28 of the 115 were in ballast. An examination of these cargoes shows that the most common items carried were wheat and pelts with household furniture, especially chairs, running a close third place. It proved most common for the vessels to carry different crops (wheat, peas, corn, oats, bran and rice), as well as flour, biscuit and bread. There were also some European goods making their way back to Quebec along with what appears to have been some unsold colonial alcohol. As with cargoes from other sources, no one product was shipped exclusively on one vessel. The coming of autumn saw the inclusion of apples and cider, as well as the movement of some livestock and a small amount of fish. Although the number of vessels in this part of the river trade was high, over 80 (even when those in ballast are not considered), they were still outnumbered by vessels clearing out from Quebec headed for Montreal, Sorel, Trois Rivières, Rimouski and Chamblé because 67 of these vessels were carrying food and alcohol for the government stores at either Sorel or Montreal.

In contrast, only three vessels from Montreal had carried government stores, two of which had damaged flour on board. Many of the cargoes outward bound from Quebec contained gunpowder, shot and spirits. Only five were in ballast. When vessels involved in government business and in ballast are subtracted, it still leaves 99 vessels sailing that route; and there was, naturally, a far greater variety of goods on this leg of the journey, as European goods were passed to the interior of the colony. Towards October there was a rise in the amount of fish passed upriver, as the east coast catch came in to Quebec. European goods kept arriving at Montreal well into November. The goods which were consistently passed up to Montreal were salt and spirits and large amounts of iron in all its guises from sheets of plate iron to pots and pans. Not many of the huge imports of cloth made their way to Montreal, except some linen and one bale of shrouds. There was little in the way of spices or coffee but there was tobacco including 400 lbs. in weight of Canadian grown tobacco. From the cargo records for trips between Quebec and Montreal it would seem that the smaller centre did not receive its fair share of the British or colonial imports. The most obvious explanation for this discrepancy is that many of the cargoes needed for the fur trade arrived in the fall after the exchange of pelts for goods had already been made and could later be transported in the winter on the ice road. Montreal was also smaller than Quebec and catered only to half as many soldiers. As in the days of New France, all of the best imports were to be found in the heart of the colony at Quebec.

The river traffic towards the east coast was no longer tied to Halifax or Louisbourg. In fact only 9 of the 98 voyages in 1763 were to these ports while the rest were exclusively with the fisheries. Fifty vessels left Quebec in ballast to fish, twenty-three took provisions for the fishery and five carried salt to cure the fish. The remainder sailed to the fishing posts with a mixture of hoops, boards and provisions, although they did not state specifically that they were going to the fishery. East coast trade had within two shipping seasons changed from being primarily directed toward Halifax and Louisbourg, to become almost exclusively concerned with the exploitation of the St. Lawrence for the purposes of fishing. The interchange between British merchants at Quebec and British merchants at Halifax and other British ports was limited, and, after Captain Palliser assumed the reins of power, even this limited contact was virtually ended.

The internal river trade from Quebec to the east and west was operating smoothly by 1763. There were substantially more vessels on the river actively engaged in the carrying trade and, while there was a drop in the number of colonial vessels arriving at and clearing from the port in 1763 when compared to 1761, this traffic was still an increase from 1762. Colonial trade continued to decline until 1767 when a short lived revival of trade brought almost the same number of colonial vessels to Quebec that had been seen in the 1763 season. In the 1763 season forty-two vessels cleared Quebec for the colonies, but just over half were in ballast and one carried troop baggage.[39] Most of the remaining vessels were almost empty; for instance one 50 ton vessel listed some snuff and merchandise as its cargo, or the 130 ton British ship listed only four tons of British corn spirits which it had imported to Quebec from London and now was re-exporting it to the colonies. There were only three ships with cargoes of any volume worth mentioning and in each case they carried the products of Quebec to the colonies - furs and lumber.

It is impossible to gauge how much smuggling went on in the colonial economy. Rum and French spirits were the most obvious contraband items, but as mentioned earlier, Governor Murray was keen to prevent smuggling in Quebec and had given David Algeo a search and seizure pass as early as 1761. In the following year Algeo was given a schooner to seek out smugglers on the St. Lawrence. The Navy was also called on in the early years to search all the inlets between Quebec and Bic. The river was so vast and there were so many places to hide that staff shortages meant not many were caught. On the other hand, the river was difficult to navigate and all legitimate trading vessels had to take on a river pilot at Bic. It would have taken collusion between local and colonial merchants to evade the pilots' station and successfully navigate the river. There were not enough furs in the 1761 season and too many naval patrols to make smuggling a threat to the economy but this scenario may have changed by 1763 when small amounts of furs were exported to the colonies for the first time. If there was money to be made it was not in smuggling furs out, but in smuggling New England rum into Quebec. By 1768 it was estimated by Samuel Jacobs that most of the available cash in the colony went to the American colonies in payment for the 250,000 gallons of New England rum that arrived in Quebec each year.[40]

The situation of the colonial shipper had deteriorated but happily this deterioration was not the case for those shipping from Quebec to the overseas markets. Six vessels cleared Quebec for Southern Europe. Three of the four headed for Madeira did so laden with wheat, and the other was carrying boards, planks and staves. One ship bound for Lisbon carried only boards but the one sailing to Granada carried a cargo of fish with some bricks and lumber. This was the first time that merchants at Quebec had been able to take advantage of the fast changing market conditions in Europe. Even if the British merchants at Quebec did not own the vessels sailing to the Iberian peninsula, they had been able to gather in an exportable crop to sell to London merchants involved in this trade. One of these merchant houses was Holdsworth, Olive and Newman of London who were already aware of conditions in Quebec through a business partnership between Gregory Olive and Brook Watson.

In 1761 the vessels returning to Britain took furs and skins, as well as small amounts of train oil and whalebone. Deerskins led the fur cargoes. A typical cargo contained bear, beaver, otter, fox, marten and deerskins. In 1761 the Bonny Lass of Livingston for example, carried small amounts of furs, but when she left the port of Quebec in June 1763, she carried 200 bushels of wheat. By the time she reached Greenock in Scotland the wheat had been replaced by over 500 pine planks. She had not been given permission to anchor anywhere in between and she had also turned over her small amounts of fox, carcason and castor. It must therefore have been possible to trade goods at Louisbourg or Newfoundland on the return trip without trouble.[41] This instance was the only case that was traceable where the cargo list differed from the point of exit to the point of entry. The twenty-three vessels which left Quebec for the British Isles and Ireland were heavily laden with furs, products of the fisheries and, to a lesser degree, agricultural products. A total of three hundred staves and nine thousand boards were exported but two thirds of these products were to sail on to Madeira. The boards took up a lot of space - six hundred equalled one ton burden, therefore, the boards sent would have taken up fifteen tons burden shipping capacity. The bulk of exports were in furs, twenty seven types. Each cargo contained many bundles of different types of furs with letters on the bales to show to whom each was consigned. There is no way of knowing to whom the marks on the bales refer but on the Ranger, a ninety ton vessel owned by Brook Watson, John Moore and Robert Hunter, there were nineteen such markers. An example of one set of consigned goods on board the ship marked for one merchant looked like this :

> 258 Pack Beaver/421 Martens/27 Minks/2 Fishers/12 Otters/
> 59 Cased Cats/146 Open Cats/20 Small Wolf/3 Wolverines/
> 121 Raccoons/120 Musquash/12 Bear Skins/6 Cub Skins/4 Red Fox/

130 Deerskin in Hair/4 Elks/369 lbs Old Coat Beaver/110 lbs of Half Dressed Deer.

Total volumes of furs exported in 1761 were negligible but this was not the case in 1763. Deer was at the top of the export list at over 70,000 skins in a variety of styles from half dressed, in hair and Indian dressed. This product was followed by Beaver (65,179), Marten (42,144), Cats (28,246), and Racoon (13,072). A variety of other furs were sent by the thousand including otter, musquash, fisher, and stags. Fox, mink and others were to be found in their hundreds. Pelts in total came to 247,511; there were over 1000 lbs. of Beaver. What space was left in the ships' holds was filled with the products of the east coast fisheries. Whale products and oil were even more popular than fish. Whale fins checked in at over 3000 lbs., whalebone at 27,000 lbs. and whale oil at 19,000 gallons. Fish oil was calculated separately and it totalled 70,000 gallons and the volume of unspecified oil was 59,000 gallons. All types of oil came to 152,000 gallons which made up 604 tons burden of shipping capacity.[42] There were small amounts of sea cow hides, salmon, cows' teeth and feathers, but by and large, the main export of the fisheries and the most profitable, was oil. In Newfoundland for instance the value of seal oil rose from £1016 in 1749 to £12,664 in 1768.

The east coast fisheries had been very profitable during the French period and became so again at the end of the war. The economic impact of the post 1763 boundaries can best be seen in the changing nature of Quebec's exports to Britain through the use of the Customs 3 records in the Public Records Office in London. The east coast fisheries had functioned as the hinterland for Quebec merchants in the period up to 1760 and were vital to the health of the Quebec economy. This trade did not immediately end and recognition of its importance can be seen in the variety of petitions passed on to Murray from the leading British merchants for land concessions on the coast. The fisheries operated smoothly until Governor Palliser decided that the potential of the area should be handed over to Bristol merchants instead. Palliser's actions against Bayne and Brymer, two British merchants operating from Quebec, effectively reduced the usefulness of the east coast fisheries to merchants at Quebec. It was not completely wiped out, however, and can be traced in the records of Customs 3. While cargoes to London and the outports could be roughly divided equally into furs and fish products in 1763, this state altered quite dramatically in the period up to and including 1768. In 1763 oil exports reached 604 tons burden with train oil making up a very small proportion of this total. From 1764 to 1768 train oil was sent from Quebec in volumes ranging from 136 tons to 349 tons (which fetched £4,195) at an average of £12 per ton in London. All other fish oils dropped out of the records. Whale fin exports brought in £1785 in 1764, but had dropped to one quarter of this by 1766, and continued to fall. In real numbers whale fins dropped from 223 quarters in 1764 to a low of nine quarters in 1767, although it rallied to 15 quarters in 1768. The export records from 1763 to 1768 show that the fruits of the east coast were very restricted in this period.

Historians are still debating whether or not Customs 3 is a reliable source for pricing since it followed official values put in place at the turn of the century; but it can be used to compare the volumes of goods for the 1760s.[43] Since the official values did not change, any change in the total value indicates a change in the quantity exported or imported. The total values of goods exported from Quebec from 1763 to 1768 never fell below £37,000 and never exceeded £45,000.[44] If the output of the east coast fisheries and the western fur trade was impaired by government policy, then what exactly was being exported? Oddly enough the answer is that the trade in furs and skins had been redirected as far as the types of skins sent to London but they still made up the bulk off all British bound cargoes.

Using the official values of the different types of furs in the Customs 3 records it is possible to calculate the approximate value of the fur shipment and compare it year by year from 1763 to 1768.[45] The fur exports of 1763 was valued at £23,000 of total goods exported worth £26,856. For the balance of the decade the variety of furs exported from Quebec decreased and some types disappeared completely. In 1763 the twenty-seven categories included everything from wood rats at the bottom, to deer at the top. By 1764 the number of different types of skins had dropped to nineteen, while in 1766, that number was nine and there were never more than seventeen types through to the 1768 season. In 1763 deerskin in all its forms had been at the top of the export list, and it suffered the most throughout the decade, never coming anywhere close to its 1763 numbers. Beaver exports peaked in 1764 and 1765 at between 98,000 and 101,000 pelts, then slowly dropped to the seventy thousand range in 1767 and 1768. In view of the wartime disruptions, this number compared favourably at first with the numbers of beaver skins exported by the Compagnie des Indes in the previous decade (approximately 125,000 per year).[46] The Quebec exports, no matter what the quantity, topped up the traditional levels imported by London from York factory which had been approximately 75,000 per year in the early 1750s and then dropped to just under 50,000 from 1755 to 1760.[47] The drop in imports of beaver to London in the middle years of the decade came at a time when the hatters' industry was in a state of depression and the number of hats produced dropped to one half of the number made earlier in the decade.[48] Beaver made up fifty percent of all fur imports into Britain in the 1760s.[49] The export of cat skins dropped dramatically from over 28,000 in 1763 to 6000 in the next few years, then disappeared completely in 1766, only to reach the 3000 mark in the last years of the period. Marten exports held steady and began to increase in the later part of the decade as did mink, wolverine and musquash (which peaked in 1766 at 49,000 skins). Otter, fisher, racoon, bear, elk and wolf exports all increased steadily throughout the period. There were occasional additions to the export list, more as novelties than anything: one buffalo was exported in 1766, two lions in 1767 and one panther in 1768.

The real losses in the fur trade in the 1760s were deer,roebuck and cats. Beaver exports increased until 1766, then held steady at about one third of this until 1768. Skins were the costliest item in the Customs 3 records. The most expensive, according to the official values index, were bear and elk followed by beaver, deer and otter. Deer exports dropped off radically but others rose just as dramatically. The losers in the fur and skin category were those trading in wood rats, boars, woodchucks, stags, caribou and weasels. The total estimated values from Customs 3 of fur imports reaching London from Quebec were surprisingly stable, considering the stream of complaints from merchants in the colony that the boundary changes and new regulations governing the trade had all but ruined it. Fur exports in 1764 were £33,758. The total values of fur and pelt exports for 1765-68 were £29,000, £27,158, £29,144 and £28,462. These figures do not indicate a radical change in the fur trade but a close scrutiny of the types of skins exported does show that there was a fundamental readjustment taking place in the colony. Fur was one of Quebec's key exports, but in England it made up less than half of one percent of the total value of English imports.

The range of exports from Quebec remained fairly limited in the 1760s, although 1767 did see the addition of potash as an export. In that year nearly 8000 lbs. was exported, and the following year, pearl ash was added, a trade which did not do as well as some had hoped. The export of small amounts of hemp and flax began in 1768, but the export item which saw the most growth throughout the period was wood. Wood exports rose from an unofficial value of £488 in 1764 to a peak of £5291 in 1766, remaining high for the rest of the decade with the exception of 1768 when all figures were low. Within the timber category there was an increase in the variety of wood used for planks, but the most profitable area of all was masts whose numbers increased from practically nothing in 1763 to over one hundred large masts by 1768 and a substantial number of middling and small masts.[50] Exports to Scotland were a small proportion of the total British bound cargoes and were still counted separately. They consisted mainly of skins (beaver still ranked top), wood, ash and train oil. The wood products were sent as planks.[51] An interesting point that can be made about Quebec exports to Britain is that the exports to the outports did show at times a strange grouping of commodities. Exports to the outports were confined mainly to train oil and lumber, but in 1765 and 1766 included wheat valued at £435 and £1488, and a substantial amount of cod. There is only one record of ships on the Quebec run to southern Europe; it is for 1768.[52] This record gives some insight into what was going on and shows that the merchants of Quebec whether on their own initiative or at the call of British merchants in London, were gathering and sending small wheat cargoes to Spain. In all five vessels that sailed for Barcelona, all but one carried 4000 bushels of wheat. Two left Spain in ballast and two others left filled with brandy and headed for the French ports of Dunkirk and Calais. There are no statistics available for imports and exports or even shipping numbers from Quebec to Montreal, or Quebec down river to Halifax. The only total of incoming and outgoing vessels for the colonies are in the pages of the Quebec Gazette and the New York Gazette which give the names and dates when vessels cleared customs. From these sources the best that can be said is that from 1764-68, the number of vessels entering Quebec from the colonies was 28 in 1764, fell as low as 10 in 1767, and rose to 33 in the following year. The numbers clearing from Quebec to the colonies are very similar.

The Customs 3 record gives a good indication of what proportion of British imports came from Quebec, as opposed to all the other colonial possessions. In 1764 total imports to Britain reached close to £7.5 million, of which the total for Quebec was only £44,000, while New York dipped to a new low of £28,000.[53] The bulk of colonial imports came not from New York but from Virginia and Maryland, the tobacco colonies, and in 1764 their exports were valued at £360,000. In 1766 sterling values of goods exported from New York and Quebec were almost identical, and in the following year, Quebec outstripped the port of New York by over £6000. These figures show not so much what great strides Quebec made in this time frame, but the scale of the economic troubles of New York. Throughout the decade all other export areas in North America were outstripped by Virginia and Maryland which continued to export just under £300,000 each year. The North American colonies were only a small part of Britain's overseas trade and to further highlight this point, and put the Quebec exports into a global perspective, Quebec can be compared to the official values of trade from Europe and India. In 1767 when Quebec exported goods worth roughly £42,000 in value, London merchants imported £1,980,000 of goods from India and over £400,000 each from Holland, Russia and Germany; total imports from all parts of the world reached £8.5 million in value. The trade of Quebec with Britain was just a small part of a larger North American and much larger European trade. When considered just as part of the British empire Quebec's contributions were small, but when compared with returns from New York it held its own as long as the colonial depression continued. The potential was there for further development, a potential recognized by contemporaries.

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER NINE

1.RG68 vol. 294. Ship Arrivals and Clearances, 1761-1762. All references to incoming cargoes their volume and type are for the 1761 shipping season and are taken from these customs records.

2.Alastair J. Durie, The Scottish Linen Industry in the Eighteenth Century (Edinburgh : John Donald Publishers, 1979), p. 149.

3.W.E. Minchinton, The Growth of British Overseas Trade in the 17th and 18th Centuries (London, 1969), p. 42.

4.Conrad Gill, The Rise of the Irish Linen Industry (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1964), p.67.

5.Ibid., p. 92.

6.Ibid.

7.Jacob M. Price, Capital and Credit in British Overseas Trade : The View From the Chesapeake, 1700-1776 (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1980), p.117.

8.Durie, p. 145. Table 8.2.

9.Peter Kalm, Travels into North America (Massachusetts : The Imprint Society, MCMLXXII), Entry for 25 August. 1749.

10.Irena Turnau, "Consumption of Clothes in Europe between the XVIth and the XVIIth centuries" The Journal of European Economic History 5 (1976), p.452.

11.Conrad Gill, Merchants and Mariners of the 18th Century (London : Edward Arnold Publishers, 1961), p.149.

12.Yarwood, p.46.

13.Maxine Berg, The Age of Manufactures - Industry, Innovation and Work in Britain 1700-1820 (Oxford : Blackwell Ltd., 1985), p.39.

14.John W. Waterer, Leather in Life, Art and Industry (London : Faber and Faber Ltd,. MCMXLVI), p.67.

15.T.S. Ashton, Economic Fluctuations in England 1700-1800 (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 39.

16.Ibid.

17.Kalm., Entry for 31 August and L. A. Clarkson, "The Organization of the English Leather Industry in the late Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries." Economic History Review 13 (1960-61) : 246.

18.Quebec Gazette, 1 November 1764.

19.Kalm, Travels, August 1749.

20.Kalm, Travels, 21 August 1749.

21.Jacobs Estate Papers, Volume 8. February 1762. Inventory of Curtius Store - St. Denis.

22.Jacobs Estate Papers, Volume 8. October 1763. Curtius to Jacobs.

23.Francis G. James, "Irish Colonial Trade in the Eighteenth Century" William and Mary Quarterly XX (1963) : 576-77.

24.W.A. Cole, "Trends in Eighteenth-Century Smuggling" Economic History Review X (1958) : 403.

25.Paul McNally, Table Glass in Canada, 1700-1850 (Ottawa : National and Historic Parks and Sites Branch, 1982), Booklet 60 : 7.

26.Ibid., p.77.

27.Kalm, Travels, August 1749.

28.Peter Mathias, The Transformation of England. Essays in the Economic and Social History of England in the 18th Century (London : Methuen, 1979), p. 223.

29.T.S. Ashton, Economic Fluctuations, p. 37.

30.SRO E504/15/11-13. and Mathias, The Brewing Industry, p. 204.

31.Ian Donnachie, A History of the Brewing Industry in Scotland (Edinburgh : John Donald Publishers, 1979), p.138.

32.PRO 36/3 Imports and Exports 1758-1784.

33.SRO E504/15/10 1761 : E504/15/11 1763

34.James G. Lyndon, "Fish and Flour for Gold : Southern Europe and the Colonial American Balance of Payments" Business History Review XXXIX (1965) : 171-172.

35.Ibid., p. 175.

36.SRO E504/15/10. Greenock Collectors Quarterly Account Jan.- April 1762.

37.RG68 vol. 294 Ship Arrivals and Clearances, 1761-1762.

38.RG4 A3 Entries of Ships in the Port of Quebec, 1763-1764. All ship movements and cargoes are taken from this document.

39.RG68 vol. 195. Ship Clearances from Quebec, May 1763-June 1764.

40.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 10. 7 October 1769. Jacobs to Allsopp and Welles.

41.RG68 vol. 195. Ship Clearances from Quebec, May 1763-June 1764 : SRO E504/15/11. Greenock Collectors Quarterly Account April 1762-October 1763.

42.Whale oil and wine were recorded in liquid tons and 252 gallons equalled 1 liquid ton. H.A. Innis, The Cod Fisheries. The History of An International Economy (Toronto : The University of Toronto Press, 1954),p. 150. It took 50 quintals of fish to produce one hogshead of oil.

43.James F. Shepherd and Gary M. Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of Colonial North America (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 204-210.

44.See Appendix One.

45.See Appendix Two.

46.Thomas Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins in North America and Europe, 1720-1760 : The Uses of Fur-Trade Imperialism" Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 1 (1990) : 309.

47.Ibid.

48.M.G. Lawson, Fur - A Study in English Mercantilism, 1700-1775 (Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1943), p. 23.

49.Ibid., p.34.

50.See Appendix Three.

51.SRO E504/15/12 : E504/15/13. Greenock Collectors Quarterly Accounts.

52.T64/312. Unclassified 1767-68.

53.Public Records Office Customs 3 1764-1768.

CHAPTER TEN - PART ONE
A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF BRITISH MERCANTILE EXPERIENCE IN QUEBEC AND THE EMPIRE

Quebec and its mercantile community did not develop in a vacuum during the 1760s. Trade practices evolved from procedures and experiences established elsewhere in the British orbit and were then adapted and modified by the new colony and its merchants. In the past it has been more popular, because of the nature of Imperial history, for historians to concentrate on one country rather than to attempt comparisons of each British possessions. In the case of socio-economic studies of the empire, a comparison which includes Quebec is not only long overdue but a necessity. Overseas merchants tended to organize their business ventures along certain lines and there were some very basic needs which did not change; the need for credit, cargoes and knowledge of local markets. An examination of British mercantile activity in Portugal, India and the American colonies can help to establish the basic pattern of British overseas trade. The differences or similarities in the activities of overseas merchants in Quebec can then be more fully understood.

London merchants were not uninterested in Canada; they wanted its furs and they did want to see it incorporated into the Empire. It was further away than New York, possessed of a small population and, in consequence, a lower consumer demand. Despite these drawbacks, however, English and Scots exports to Quebec increased throughout the period, though they were small in comparison to British overseas trade with the rest of the world. Shipping into and out of the port of Quebec was largely in the hands of British and colonial merchants rather than Canadians and it is possible by examining the structure of this activity to find out how sophisticated their operations were at Quebec. The best opportunities for such comparisons come from Portugal, India and, of course, from the American colonies.

There has been a lot of attention paid of late to the scope of merchant activities within the imperial sphere in the eighteenth century and it presents a dizzying degree of activity. It is well known that Scottish and English merchants had extensive training for their careers. In the Scottish case it was normal for the young apprentices to go to Amsterdam and other European centres to learn bookkeeping and foreign languages, as well as to gain practical experience as supercargoes on voyages to the East. English merchants were more likely to follow the French practice of doing their time as factors in Southern Europe or in the colonies. In the position of factor they were responsible for everything from keeping the books, to gathering and loading cargoes for return trips.

The term merchant can be a difficult one for historians, as the works of Scottish historian T.M. Devine have shown Merchant meant someone who bought and sold goods, and covered everything from corner shopkeeper to overseas traders. In Scotland it was necessary to join a merchant guild in order to trade overseas, and because of the time and money involved, this requirement kept the occupation of merchant within the reach of only a small number of families. Changes to this elitism were afoot and as early as the eve of the Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707, apprenticeships were reduced to just a few years and more new faces than ever were allowed into the ranks of the merchant community. By 1740 approximately two thirds of all new entries to the merchant guilds were recruited from outside merchant families.[1] Even so the distinctiveness of the overseas merchants or merchant adventurers, as they were known, remained; and in Glasgow in 1700, while the merchant community numbered 400-500 in a population of 12,000, only 20% of the merchants were involved in the overseas branch of trade.[2] There was also a legal distinction between merchants and merchant adventurers. In a study of the poll tax returns for Aberdeen in the late 17th century it was shown that the overseas traders were valued at over £500 sterling while most merchants were in the £27 to £260 range. One way the exclusivity of the group was maintained was through social restrictions. Turnover was high because of the great risks in the business, but the leading families all showed great longevity. The lesson for the Scots in overseas trade, learned from the previous century, was that success was realized by establishing a network of personal contacts abroad. The Scots merchants were used to raising capital in Europe and had never restricted themselves to London, although they also worked the Scottish expatriate community there for funds when necessary - usually for short term credit.[3]

The Scottish merchant community was a well educated experienced group with extensive credit links and it had a disproportionate number of its own people abroad from which it was able to build commercial networks with ease. The merchant adventurers chose to deal with only a few Scottish merchants in Quebec, namely Moore and Finlay, and increased their involvement with Quebec only marginally for the remainder of the decade. This steady but hardly increasing Scottish stake in Quebec was possibly because their main contact Hugh Finlay, became increasingly involved with his duties as postmaster and less in trade after having to sell off many of his assets in 1765. It would have been out of the ordinary when so much of the Glasgow trade depended on personal contact, for these merchants to have been more deeply involved. They had bigger fish to fry, especially in the tobacco colonies, and Quebec was just a sideline in their overall pattern of trade. This decade saw the zenith of Scottish fortunes in the tobacco and sugar trade. The tobacco trade made up 40% of all Scottish imports in 1762 and, as a result, Scottish manufacturers were keenly tuned to colonial needs. An examination of cargo ownership of goods bound for Quebec shows that only one or two of the West Indies merchants were involved in the Quebec trade. This number is significant because they made up the nucleus of the overseas trading community and were the men most likely to take advantage of any new areas of trading activity within the empire. It is not enough to know who was involved in the trade and what the volumes of trade were like. It is just as vital to know how the overseas business worked.

By the eighteenth century it was standard practice for the supercargo or master of a ship to receive a 5% commission for selling cargoes.[4] This amount was the same rate given in the American colonies to factors by their London or Glasgow correspondents.[5] Commodities were purchased by the merchant in London on behalf of his factor on the longest terms possible. The idea was, of course, to extend the period of credit between the original purchase and the remittance from the colony. This need for extended credit gave rise to some specializations within each trade in terms of credit. Wholesalers, for instance, was a term used to describe the group of drapers and warehousemen who bought commodities on short credit and sold them to the overseas merchants on long credit. The credit extended for internal domestic sales was usually only for six months and thus the longer credit for overseas trade was one of the ways merchants encouraged exports. Credit arrangements were made easier because not only did the Bank of England discount bills, but bills of exchange were valid and transferable throughout Europe. If there was a problem with remittances then British merchants could borrow to cover the shortfall. This ability, however, was adversely affected by the credit squeeze of the 1760s. Trade to India, Southern Europe and the American colonies was facilitated by the increasing concentration of British merchants there. In Britain, economies of scale increased efficiency and, as we have seen, led to the emergence of credit facilities, in for instance, the linen and woollen trades. Problems in credit could and were overcome to a large extent by these adaptations within the merchant community. An examination of merchant successes and failures in the 1760s allows us therefore to see just how well their financial protective mechanisms worked.

Merchants were held to be a distinct group within society because there were so few of them, and of these, many acquired great wealth. It was also a high risk occupation. A recent study of English business in the 18th century has shown that bankruptcies rose steadily throughout the century. In the 1760s alone this number increased annually from 242 in

1760 to 408 in 1770.[6] One of the key determinants of success was the ability of the merchant to exert some control over the business environment; and this ability decreased in relation to the distances involved because the opportunity to gather information was impaired and reliance on middlemen increased. Some merchants combatted this problem by restricting their overseas trade to areas where they had special knowledge of the area through establishing factories filled with hand picked employees. But they could still be adversely affected by the time lag in information-gathering, and, in a crisis, this alone could see their business wiped out. At the same time as business failures and bankruptcies were increasing, the import-export business was growing by leaps and bounds. Exports from England grew by 188% between 1699-1774.[7] Studies suggest that while poor information and lack of control were important factors in business success or failure, it was short term changes in harvests, weather, peace and credit that were crucial. Trade with Quebec was a victim of both. It was a distant possession and there were few contacts between Britain and the merchants operating in the colony: certainly few that could be classified as agents, and no factors there at all. A poorly organized internal transportation network, inability to produce harvest surpluses, political indecision in Quebec and the credit problem in Britain meant that, for the moment, trade with Quebec was not considered to be an especially good risk. When one merchant skidded down the bankruptcy trail, the rest took note and made their short-term and long-term decisions accordingly. It has been estimated that while the business community increased by 58% over the course of the century, the number of bankruptcies rose by 168%.[8] This increase, of course, does not take into account the number of failures that did not undergo this legal process. Almost three quarters of bankruptcies came from five sectors: textiles, wholesale, food, drink and retail. Textiles led the way, and London was the most common place for failure when the country was broken into geographic region. Bankruptcies from textiles had trebled by 1780 but in the period 1741-60 ran at about 23%.

Barriers to entry made the overseas merchants a more exclusive group but because of their intricate networks of kin and credit, it also meant that when one stumbled he could take quite a few down with him. In the case of the Glasgow West India merchants, the theory that overseas trade was difficult to break into has been tested by an analysis of the social origin of this group. A high number were the sons of the Tobacco Lords of Glasgow.[9] The West India trade in sugar, rum and cotton involved a large cash outlay and the duties were payable on arrival in cash with no drawbacks; this financial consideration excluded all but the richest merchants and their families. Success depended on patronage and family connections. When St. Kitts was ceded in 1713, half of the land grants of 100 acres or more were handed to Scotsmen. Scottish merchant adventurers had a historic link reaching back into the 17th century, not only with the tobacco producing colonies of North America, but also with the Caribbean. Statements by English Surveyors General constantly complained of the high levels of Scottish involvement in the colonies before the Union when the English parliament held such activity to be illegal. It made sense that Scottish economic incursions would be made into areas where there was a formidable Scots expatriate community. For instance in 1754, Scotsmen were estimated to be 25% of the total landholders in Jamaica and this national presence in the Caribbean increased after the Seven Years War. In St. Vincent and Dominica in 1765, almost half of the fifty-nine land purchases made were by Glaswegians, and many of those remaining were made by Scotsmen. This Scottish build-up allowed a pool of men to be apprenticed in the overseas trade and gave a stable presence in one or more areas, allowing for an extension of credit and up to date knowledge of markets. Profits were used to diversify the Scottish industrial base.[10] The example of the Scottish merchant community is significant, but since most of the merchants engaged in the Quebec trade were operating from England, it is more useful to examine what we know of the commercial activities of overseas traders operating from London.

A good example of a London overseas merchant is Samuel Storke. Through his business activities, Storke Clothiers, became one of the largest transatlantic houses in Britain. He traded to Newfoundland and to the American colonies where he was involved in the fur trade. He exported woollens and hardware for furs, using the Livingston family of New York as his agents. The imported furs were sold to the London furrier Sperling who, in turn, exported them to Russia for hemp and canvas.[11] His Newfoundland trade brought him whale oil and fish which he used in a triangular trade with the American colonies for lumber and provisions. Storke was well known for handling any commodity and his volume was such that he charged only half of the standard 5% commission. He also obtained insurance for the vessels and cargoes at one and a half percent. Storke was able to decrease his risk by purchasing goods for export on commission, therefore tying up as little of his own capital as possible. When exports reached the Thames, he had already sold them to London dealers and charged all the duties and port fees to them. His risks and costs were further lessened by his practice of not advancing credit to his correspondents and of not buying commodities from them until he had their bills of exchange in hand. Storke faced many of the problems which we have mentioned before, especially weather and distance. At times he had to send vessels out in ballast. This necessity was not always a total loss for the ballast was often marketable. Salt was used if the vessel was expected to arrive in time for the fishing season, and Newcastle coal was popular in Boston.

Other merchants did not confine themselves to Europe or North America; Anthony Bacon, whose name appears on petitions of London merchants trading to Canada and who had provided Victualling services to the Admiralty at Quebec in 1759, was one such merchant. A member of Parliament and supplier to British troops in Senegal in 1758-63, he also obtained contracts to provide negroes for public works in the West Indies, owned Merthyr Tydvill and was granted the coal mines of Cape Breton along with army victuallers Adam Drummond and Samuel Fludyer. His interest in Canada extended to a petition for 2000 acres of the Magdalene Island for whale and seal fishing, in partnership with three other merchants.[12]

Perhaps a more typical London merchant was William Braund who was heavily involved in the Portugal trade. He was apprenticed as a merchant in Portugal, then later became involved on his own account sending woollens to English agents at the Lisbon factory who distributed this cargo for him as far away as Brazil.[13] There were great profits to be made in this trade because remittances were made in Brazilian gold. The export of gold bullion from Portugal was prohibited by law in 1325, but by 1760, an unofficial agreement allowed its import to Falmouth; from 1764-69 the value of bullion brought in was valued at £895,000. Braund always worked through factors and never through local Portuguese merchants. The Portugal trade was affected by the Lisbon earthquake and it has been estimated that it took merchants eight years to recover their losses. Braund was not directly involved in the North American trade but he did have an indirect interest as an underwriter to a number of prominent insurance brokers and merchants. In the early 1760s he underwrote Brook Watson, and in a separate venture, Gregory Olive. He also underwrote other prominent merchants involved in trade with Quebec, including Pigou, Barclay, Butler and Mauger.

Despite the fact that the Portugal trade was efficiently handled by a well established group of factors, there are some interesting parallels with Quebec. Firstly, the main export cargo to Portugal was not woollens but grain, and it was sent on English owned-vessels. As in the case of Quebec, the total tonnage of shipping increased in the 1760s while the number of vessels decreased.[14] Because of the nature of the import-export trade there was a disparity in cargo space needed on each leg of the journey. Textiles did not take up much space, nor did grain, but wine, fruit and salt which were exported from Portugal to England were far bulkier. The fur shipments from Quebec were tiny in comparison to the volumes of goods imported by Quebec. From 1763 until 1768 trade between England and Quebec was constrained by the short shipping season and the need to wait for the fur boats which arrived from Montreal in the fall of each year. Portuguese exports were not constrained so much by the vagaries of the weather as by the need to wait for the grape harvest. The vintage harvest was September to October and, as in the case of Quebec, timing was crucial. Wines were shipped out from Lisbon in November-December because they were not aged for more than one harvest. Fish which was imported from Newfoundland were caught in November and shipped to Lisbon by year's end.

English business with Portugal had contracted considerably by the early years of the 1760s through a combination of the Earthquake and the war, and annual exports dropped from £1,300,000 in 1756-60 to £600,000 in the period 1766-70. This decade saw the decline in the output of the Brazilian gold mines which affected Portugal's ability to purchase exports. It was also a difficult time for English merchants who were still recovering from the losses of the earthquake when the fire in the Lisbon customs house in 1764 destroyed £500,000 worth of goods, half of which belonged to the English. The British government had received special concessions in the woollen trade in 1703, but these concessions were under attack in the 1760s, as new duties were laid on English imports. English merchants were also experiencing difficulty in recovering debts from Portuguese merchants in the courts.[15] The losses in the woollen trade were made up by gains made in the grain trade because of a series of poor harvests in Portugal. Much of the shortfall was made up by imports from the American colonies on behalf of British merchants. If Quebec had been able to organize its wheat trade with the help of London merchants, it too could have taken advantage of this opportunity. Some shipments did arrive from Quebec but they were tiny in comparison to colonial shipments which by 1772 averaged £226,000 annually.[16] From 1764-66 the grain trade to Portugal was in the hands of only thirty-nine merchants, although three of these controlled two thirds of the trade. One of the big three was the London firm Holdsworth, Olive and Newman and they ranged as far as Halifax to get their grain. One of the partners Gregory Olive was the Olive of Watson, Olive and Rashleigh. They did not become involved in the grain trade, preferring to confine their already limited interests in Quebec to fur. The man to whom they agreed to send their goods at Quebec was Samuel Jacobs who was already heavily involved in organizing and buying up the surplus grain harvests of the countryside around the town of Quebec. Portuguese merchants found it next to impossible to break into the import-export market with England because they had no detailed knowledge of the English market and British merchants at Quebec were even worse off, for not only did they lack knowledge of the English market and international conditions, they also lacked specialized knowledge of the commodities for export from Quebec. The merchant community in London formed the nucleus of the transatlantic trade but this does not mean that all the merchants were English. There was in fact a large body of Scottish and Irish merchant adventurers living and working in London. The Irish presence counted for possibly as many as twenty-five merchant houses, including the Nesbitts and the Lynches. Irish involvement in the Quebec trade followed a similar pattern to the Scottish merchants. The Irish did not set their sights on North America; instead, they built up their European trade and by mid century controlled more of the Bordeaux and Cadiz trade in wine and brandy than either the Scots or the English.[17] This dominance was achieved partly because Irish merchants were barred from importing enumerated goods from the American colonies until 1780. Irish exporters did very well from provisioning the British army and outstripped everyone in the offshoot industries of barrelling and packaging.

The case of English trade to Portugal can give us a reference point against which to judge the types and levels of trade to Quebec, but a far more explicit example can be found in the India trade. One of the greatest areas of the English import-export business was India, and while it was highly regulated and off limits to interlopers, a considerable amount of trade was done outside the confines of the East India Company. There are some striking parallels to the fur trade in Quebec. In India private traders associated, not so much with each other, as with the local Indian population. They employed some as Banians. The system of using Banians worked in this manner: the Banian found the capital and the English traders used what influence they had to protect their joint investments.[18] The Banian worked as a secretary, bookkeeper, interpreter and broker to the English merchant, and he, in turn, brought all the privileges and exemptions unavailable to the locals. Later this relationship was formalized into Houses of Agency.[19] This type of association is reminiscent of the relationships found in an examination of the ownership of canoes and fur cargoes in the new colony. British connections were necessary for the exportation of furs to Britain, but local knowledge was crucial to the smooth running of the fur trade. The same could be said for all Quebec exports. Unlike those of New France, the local merchants in India had managed their own maritime commerce until they were swamped by private traders from England and Scotland who were given encouragements and concessions from the British government and the East India Company.

Descriptions of the decline of the indigenous Bengal merchant community in the face of the increase in the number of private traders, especially after the military defeat of the native rulers at Plassey, smack of Fernand Ouellet's ruminations on the character and mentalité of Canadians after the conquest. Descriptions of Indian merchants show them operating on individualistic principles, competing among themselves, refusing to pool their resources and not specializing in any one commodity. Conditions hindering or restraining business included differences in currency and, more importantly, a lack of rural demand for imported goods. The other identified problem was corrupt trading practices at the posts where customs duties could be overlooked through bribery. The fact that Governors were not above such practices is reminiscent of the prevalence of maladministration in New France under Bigot. There was also much ill will between the administration in India and the merchant community who felt victimized by the amount of patronage handed out to favourites both in Bengal and at home.

There was a large community of Scots in India, but none of them intended to settle; rather, they were there to make money. Some of them were Jacobites in flight, and almost all were from the upper classes and came either as part of the East India Company forces or the King's army.[20] Promotions came quickly within the East India Company and there were a lot of perquisites, such as cash presents from nabobs. One half of the Royal regiments in India after 1750 was raised in Scotland and once they were in India, it was hard to return home. Not only was the death rate very high, but, if the term of service was completed, soldiers were disbanded in India and had to pay for their trip home; this factor alone ensured that most soldiers either signed on again or tried to gain access to service in the East India Company. Life expectancy for European men in India was low and, among the civil appointments in Bengal, over fifty percent died there.[21] From 1757-66, approximately 59%, died not counting 25% of the European soldiers who died each year. Jacobites did not mind working for the Company because it afforded them the opportunity to make enough to buy back their family estates. The fact that three directors of the Company had Scottish connections, Pigou, Rous and Colebrooke, helped open the door for even more Scots. Once the estates had been rescued and the man in question returned home, he would commonly hold Company stock and maintain his English connections. Some historians have therefore argued that the East India Company and service in India helped to assimilate the Scottish and English upper classes in the post Union era.[22]

As in Canada, there were not large numbers of British settlers in India in the mid 18th century. In Bengal, in 1757, it has been estimated that there were seventy-six civil servants and under six hundred soldiers and officers in the area and less than one hundred British people unconnected with the government. The East India Company (EIC) recruited only men with previous experience abroad, usually in North Africa or the Levant, with a knowledge of languages, testimony of good character and with the ability to pay the penalty bond for good behaviour. The security for the covenant of good behaviour was £1000. After 1750 many men came as crews on foreign ships or as EIC crews, deserted on arrival and avoided paying the bond.[23] In 1750 there were only forty EIC men in Madras and the same in Calcutta. This situation began to change after the battle of Plassey, although there were still only seventy merchants trading in Bengal in 1760.[24] Until the incredible expansion of positions in the later 1750s, there was little opportunity here for merchants and North America was a far more likely destination for anyone who was not well connected. The barriers to entry were that one needed a working knowledge of commercial arithmetic and bookkeeping, but social connections were no less important and obviously, so was the ability to pay the bond of good behaviour. Similar bonds can be found in the fur trade in 1765, once this trade was re-opened.

Before 1757 all merchants in India were housed in a common lodge which was patterned on the great mercantile houses of London.[25] In the years that followed they were allowed to obtain their own accommodations, but the EIC fretted that they would lose control of the merchants once they were out of their sight. The social life of the merchants involved gambling and exotic animal fights. It was not possible to go to England on leave since the passage cost £500 and EIC salaries in the period ran at between £10-40 per year. The private or non-company traders worked within very restrictive circumstances - they could not export goods to England unless they could obtain space on the EIC or foreign ships, and since civil servants could trade on their own account, shipping space became a real problem.

As with other types of international trade, payments for purchases were made in advance and large amounts of money were involved. It has been estimated that the start up costs for Indian trade were £1000 plus an equal amount in bond money. This cost meant that the option of going to India was not realistic for everyone.[26] Financing for the trade was raised in India by its local merchants through an elaborate system of mercantile credit. The worst excesses of trading practices were brought under control during the Governorship of Bengal by Vansittart from 1760-64. But his measures were not considered to be strong enough action, and so the Government in London stepped in and recalled all merchants to Calcutta.[27] When Clive returned to India as Governor of Bengal, he attempted to reform merchant practices but few could forget how well he had siphoned the riches of the country.

Despite the flood of private traders that arrived in Bengal in the 1760s in search of a pot of gold, it was a period of depression in maritime commerce. At the same time, British merchants were having trouble breaking into the rural market because they had no authority as private traders and, therefore, no recourse when in trouble. From 1767 onwards they were also under increasing pressure to remain in Calcutta and faced increased regulation of their activities.[28] They faced one other obstacle - if successful they had to find a way to remit funds back to Britain. There was an annual quota for funds remitted to England - £300,000 in 1773. This cost increased the risk of doing business and decreased the chance of making a quick fortune.[29] British merchants in India not only faced a substantial financial investment to enter the business, but in the 1760s, were coming under direct attack, as a group, by the British government, at the same time as they faced a credit squeeze at home and a host of local problems.

Overseas trade to Europe, India and North America was controlled by a small number of Scots and English merchants. There were, to be sure, private traders in India but competition between them, civil servants, and officers trading on their own account was fierce and they faced many restraints in the operation of their businesses, some of which are similar to their Quebec counterparts. British merchants in India and in Quebec had to deal with a population which spoke another language and who had an unfamiliar, yet complex, culture and legal system. They experienced difficulty breaking into the rural markets. There was no EIC to stop the British merchants at Quebec from shipping goods back to England, but these men owned practically none of the vessels on the transatlantic run, had few credit contacts with London and had currency problems within the colony. They also had no political voice in the running of the colony. An important similarity in both Quebec and India was that in each case the merchants operated at a disadvantage. In both India and Quebec the settlements were run in the early stages by the EIC and by martial law. Merchants faced both a better educated and well placed elite, not only among the officers and civil servants, but in India, among the EIC personnel. Since the numbers of the British community in India did not really increase drastically until after the Seven Years War, it was unlikely that men who had seen service in India, or were engaged in trade, would also have operated from Quebec in the 1760s. There may well be some interesting parrallels in the circumstances of these two diverse parts of the empire for historians, but it is unlikely that contemporaries could have made the same types of connections.

British trade with the American colonies was also a costly venture for the beginner. It has been estimated that the start up costs ranged from £5000 to £10,000.[30] In the colonies the most noticeable change also came in the 1760s when indigenous merchants began to make their power felt. This change was in part possible because of the sustained need for grain in Southern Europe and the high prices that tobacco crops were fetching in England which brought an injection of cash in the late years of the decade.[31] The wealthiest colonial merchants traded to Halifax but remained uninvolved in the Quebec economy. This situation occurred because over the years they had held army provisioning contracts there, but never in Quebec. They had built up their network of merchant connections but had little or no contact with the newest colony, and did not know the collection of British merchants who had set up shop there. Colonial merchants were interested in the barter of goods and Quebec did not have enough of these products to become involved. In addition, Quebec was harder to reach than Halifax. These colonial merchants were neither disorganized nor without influence. They operated clubs and coffee houses from the 1750s onwards. In Boston the British Coffee House became an association of merchants in 1763 and later, a society which became politically active.[32] Throughout the 1760s colonial merchants petitioned on many of the same issues that bothered London merchants trading to Quebec.

British merchant banking houses had invested heavily in the colonies. Neale, Pigou and Booth, whose names appear on petitions for Canada, gave huge amounts of money to colonial traders. The credit crisis hit Massachusetts and New York in 1762 when rural buying power shrank as government contracts wound up and money became scarce.[33] Any hopes of breaking out of the business slump by trading with the new northern colony were hopeless, as ship after ship returned in ballast or with unsold goods aboard. No matter how much rum was sold for cash there were not enough consumers in Canada to help Boston, Philadelphia and New York out of their slump. By late 1765, the colonial merchants had determined to sign non-importation agreements against Britain until the new taxes were lifted, but this decision did not last long as the repeal came in spring of the following year. The same tactic was repeated in 1768 with the imposition of the Townshend Acts in November 1768, but only lasted through the 1769 shipping season.

The leading colonial merchants, Apthorp, Bayard, Delancey, Watts and Livingston had all been involved in army victualling contracts for Colebrooke and Nesbitt in London, but none of them extended their business interests to Quebec unless under orders from Amherst. Even fur traders, such as Phyn and Ellice, did not even consider operating out of Quebec until pushed into this course of action in order to re-route goods while the non-importation agreement was in effect. Ellice wanted to move the entire firm to Canada but was overruled.[34] The fact that Quebec was a garrison town did not generally help urban merchants, as they could not profit from selling to soldiers unless they had a contract for all of them. Well placed colonial merchants tended to do business on a large scale. Many were connected through family ties and with London politicians through provisioning contracts. One or two Albany merchants attempted to operate in Montreal because they were involved in the fur trade. Cornelius Cuyler for instance, sent his son to La Rochelle in 1758 to learn French, then set him up in business in Montreal in 1761. Unfortunately, the business shut down by 1765 because of declining profits.[35] Dirk Vander Heyden was sent to London as a merchant in the 1750s and, while one of his brothers worked out of Manhattan, the other, Jacob, ran a Montreal branch which operated between Montreal and Albany. The business prospered until the Montreal fire of 1765 and they never recaptured their earlier prosperity.

The lists of names found in the various memorials of London merchants and traders to Canada during the 1760s show that these men were no small-time operators and, almost to a man, they can be found in the London trade directories of the day.[36] Most of them were located within the main trade artery of London, centred on the merchants' financial district of Lombard Street, and they ranged in occupation from merchants to bank and EIC directors. As a community, they represented banking and credit interests as well as the textiles, lumber and iron industries. Had they been merchants of little or no consequence they would not have been listed in the Directories; and, in fact, Brook Watson did not even get a mention until 1765. The top men, Crokatt, Barclay, Neale & Pigou, Hanbury, Harley, Guinard, Mauduit & Wright, Lynch, Nash & Eddowes and all the others can be found in the Directories. Their names are also in the petitions of London merchants trading to Canada, asking for an assembly and as founding members of the Canada Committee which came to life to solicit relief for merchant losses in the Montreal fire of 1765. Cargo lists show that many of these merchants either owned the vessels involved in this trade or they supplied the cargoes and insurance for the trips. None except the firm Watson, Olive and Rashleigh entered into written agreements to supply English speaking merchants at Quebec with goods. Most merchants used the more traditional method of giving ships' masters the authority to sell goods at the other end, and then purchase a return cargo. As noted in an earlier chapter, there was a small group of ships' masters who returned year after year to Quebec - placing advertisements in the Quebec Gazette, giving return sailing dates and advertising space for freight or passengers.

Lack of contact between British merchants at Quebec and merchants in Britain may have been the reason for their arm's length approach to one another. Another reason was that British merchants at Quebec were not overburdened with capital and any system of barter would have been difficult to manage since it would have involved merchants in Montreal and Quebec as well as merchants in London. The merchant elite in London and other centres had their hands full with the changes in the market in Southern Europe, as well as the opportunities and problems in India. Domestic conditions in England from 1762-1768 forced a degree of belt tightening in merchant circles as credit dried up and bankruptcies increased. Their business was most successful when they had experienced people on site in the various ports with knowledge of local conditions. This situation did not prevail in Quebec.

One of the new merchants at Quebec who did briefly manage to break through the seemingly impenetrable barrier between British merchants at Quebec and those in London was Samuel Jacobs. He signed a contract with Watson, Olive and Rashleigh in November 1768. It set out what was standard practice in this sort of trade agreement - nine months credit at the end of which Jacobs had to pay 5% interest on any monies owing. The firm charged him two and one half percent commission on all goods bought and shipped to him, and one half percent commission for insuring the cargo.[37] If the London firm bought goods for him they would charge Jacobs a 5% commission. They also charged him a two and one half percent commission on all goods remitted by him and sold by them in London. This cost was standard fare in dealings with the American colonies, but the firm left Jacobs under no illusions about the special nature of this particular deal, stating that only previous personal contact with Jacobs and the character witness of George Allsopp had "induced (us) to deviate from our general rule not to ship goods without having some money in hand and to ship you half the goods on your order on board our ship the Canadian."[38] They explained later in another letter that all they made from this trade to Quebec was their commission and they would not "labour under an advance for any man". Soon they were made aware of the cash flow troubles Jacobs was experiencing, and told him that furs would do better than cash, writing that "it would be in your interest to remit in furs", and enclosing a list of all duties and prices for London fur imports. This experiment did not work out and they were forced to use their friend and sometimes agent, George Allsopp, to pressure Jacobs to pay up. He could neither pay nor persuade them to send more than one third of his order for the following season. They had sense enough to ease the pressure on him when word of the poor harvest reached London; he was given an extension until 1770.

It was unusual to find close economic ties between merchants in London and those in Quebec, although their names were familiar to one another from the petitions that crisscrossed the Atlantic. These petitions had to do with the merchant grievances at the sluggish state of business. The blame for this sorry state of affairs was not attributed to the London merchants but to James Murray. The British merchants at Quebec firmly believed that Murray meddled too much in the economy, and they felt that the only way to put a stop to this intrusion was to claim the rights which had been promised to them in the Proclamation. To this end they hired Fowler Walker as their London agent to promote their call for an assembly and to seek the recall of Governor Murray. Not all of the merchants were upset with their economic standing. Some merchants at Quebec did very well indeed, and to find out how this was possible, given the economic woes of the period, an examination of the financial, social and political connections of the British merchant community at Quebec with the merchant adventurers in Britain is essential.

PART TWO

CASE STUDIES OF THE QUEBEC EXPERIENCE - BUSINESS SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN THE COLONY 1760-1768.

There was a small group of men who appeared to do well from the moment they arrived in Quebec. Not all were the darlings of the administration, though the merchant most vilified by Murray did become a friend of Carleton in 1766 and was later able to take up the public office which had been denied to him under Murray. The key to success in Quebec was not necessarily the goodwill of the Governor, although this friendship certainly helped when it came to petitioning for land grants. Success lay in previous mercantile experience, and, more importantly, in the ability to mobilize credit through direct contact with the British merchants in the transatlantic trade.

William Grant was one of the immediate success stories. He was one of three brothers in trade; he came to Quebec after 1760 as the agent for his brothers' London firm. He was from a Jacobite family and, once in Quebec, entered into trade with two other agents of the firm, Peter Stuart and John Gray.[39] Not only did he supply goods and credit to merchants, he also became co-lessee with Thomas Dunn and John Gray in their monopoly of trade at the King's Posts in 1762. His London connections gave him the necessary cash to buy many properties in Quebec. In the registry of land transfers since 1764 he is shown to have paid 50,000 livres for a quarter share of the Fauburg St. Roch in 1764 and 22,500 livres for a lot on St. Peter's Street in Quebec.[40] His landholdings in Montreal outstripped his purchases in Quebec when, in August 1764, he bought all of the property of Charly Saint Anges for 100,000 livres, the Chateau Ramezay for 275,000 livres, and a number of seigneuries. He was also involved in the wheat trade with Samuel Jacobs. His standing in the community was buttressed by his marriage into one of the foremost Canadian families and by his economic activities in the Anticosti area. By 1768 his credit line from the London branch of the firm was £80,000 at a time when they were going under. His great success in Quebec was not the result of arriving in

Quebec penniless and unknown and building up his fortune from scratch; he came to Quebec with credit, cash and contacts, then made his fortune in real estate.

The early career of Edward Harrison was an even more clear cut case of connections and credit being the key to success. He was sent to Quebec in 1763 as the agent for London merchants Charles Crokatt and John Strachan to recover monies owing by Simon Mackenzie. The Crokatt and Mackenzie case lasted for a few years, but Harrison stayed on in Quebec as Crokatt's agent. With the financial backing of Strachan, he became a fur trade outfitter, counting Richard Dobie and Lawrence Ermatinger as his customers. His fur trade activities indicate that he had some mercantile training. Lawrence Ermatinger had come to Quebec in 1760 as a partner of Trye and Ermatinger of London. He set himself up in Montreal as a supplier to the fur trade, retailer to the general population and army officers and agent for transatlantic shipping. He did well until the death of James Trye in 1767 sent him into bankruptcy. He later recovered and went on to become very successful in the 1770s. In the early days of the 1760s he was also involved in the fur trade with William Grant.[41] Edward Harrison was also involved in the grain trade, although it was not until the bumper crops of the early 1770s that he built a granary at Quebec. His grain trade kept him wealthy until the 1790s. Harrison was not on the council at Quebec until 1773, thus it was not his involvement in local politics that helped him get ahead.[42]

One of the few successful merchants who did receive the patronage of Murray and Carleton was Thomas Dunn who reached Quebec in 1760. By 1762 he had been given the rights to lease the King's Posts for £400 per year with John Gray, and he kept this lease until 1786. Little is known of Dunn's financial background or political connections, but he did hold the post as agent for the deputy paymaster to the forces, and this position indicates that he had some London connections. He was a council member by 1767 and was friends with Thomas Mills, Receiver General, and of Murray's closest aide, Cramahe. His standing in the community was not hurt by Murray's departure; Carleton made him part of a commission set up to examine the public accounts of the government since 1764. His political fortunes rose when Cramahe filled in for Carleton in 1770 and he was made acting Receiver General, a post he held until 1777 when he passed the mantle to his friend William Grant. His finances were in good shape as well. He arrived in 1760 and within two years could afford £400 for the lease of the King's Posts. In 1764 he not only purchased a seigneury but also paid £2550 for a house and property on Rue St. Louis. He added to this property, buying the next door lot in 1769. Along with two others, he leased a riverside lot in Lower Town on which to build a wharf, for the sum of one shilling per year.[43] He was just one of eight involved in the St. Maurice forges but he sold out along with the other English investors in 1771. Their return on investment was 90 tons of pig iron each which was sold for them in London by one of the partners, Brook Watson. Dunn also had a very profitable business relationship with William Grant, which after Grant's marriage, brought them the trading lease of Mingan and Anticosti for fifteen years at the end of which they purchased most of the lots in the area from Grant's relatives.[44]

The best and perhaps only example of a British merchant who was directly involved in the transatlantic trade was Hugh Finlay. He is thought to have been one of the sons of Robert Finlay, a Glasgow tanner. Leather was one of the more substantial exports from Scotland to Quebec and some of it may have been a product of his father's shoe works and tannery. Hugh arrived in Quebec in 1763, his position as postmaster was arranged during the Bute administration and confirmed by Benjamin Franklin, deputy postmaster general for North America.[45] By the middle of the decade Finlay had less time to spend on business and devoted his talents instead to organizing the postal service. He became a member of the council in 1765, although he was often to be found in opposition to Murray. His political credentials were sound, as were his economic connections in Scotland. Along with Steven Moore, he owned the Bonny Lass of Livingston which as noted above, sailed almost continuously between Glasgow and Quebec from 1763 to 1765. The ship had a remarkably low turn around time; this speed was no doubt due to its ability to organize cargoes ahead of time. The two merchants dealt with top Glasgow merchants. Moore and Finlay bought a house on Rue St. Pierre and a bakery in Rue St. Charles for which they paid 21,000 livres cash. They then used the house as their business premises. They added to their holdings by purchasing a lot in Baie St. Paul and a seigneury in the Upper Richelieu paid for in gold and silver coin - 15,000 livres over five years. By 1764 the partnership was in deep financial difficulty because of the credit which they had extended to other merchants who declared themselves unable to pay - at least £6000 of this money was owed them by two merchants, one of whom was Charles Curtius (employee of Samuel Jacobs). Meanwhile, back in Scotland, Finlay's father's tannery passed to son John and from there, almost right away, into the hands of creditors; Hugh's economic link to Scotland was broken. Moore and Finlay were forced to sell their house in lower town which fetched £3000 and more or less ended their business dealings in the colony.

The careers of Moore and Finlay demonstrate that while it was not necessary to be under the protective wing of the Governor, it certainly helped. The career of George Allsopp, on the other hand, proved that while lack of favour could almost destroy a merchant's political ambitions, it did not necessarily affect his commercial plans. Allsopp had served in the Quartermaster's office as secretary to Lieutenant Colonel Carleton at Louisbourg in 1758.[46] It was there that he became acquainted with both Samuel Jacobs and Brook Watson. He later did business with Jacobs in Quebec and worked as an agent for Watson. After Louisbourg, Allsopp returned to England and was sent back to Quebec as the junior partner of the London exporters Jenkins, Trye and Company working as a general merchant.[47] The only clue to the amount of money and goods Allsopp had brought to Quebec was in his first argument with Murray over allowing another merchant, Jacob Rowe, leave the colony while he owed Allsopp £7000. It was standard practice after 1763 for everyone leaving the colony to apply for a pass to do so, as well as to state all their debts and name two others who would be responsible in the event that that person did not return.[48] Rowe's name is not on the list of passes so it is possible that he did indeed leave Allsopp in the lurch.

In politics, Allsopp soon made himself Murray's most outspoken adversary and, according to Murray, was the worst sort of man. Allsopp kept getting into trouble for heckling the military and for breaking rules. This trouble, of course, is a reference to the Lantern ordinance incident mentioned earlier. Murray had shown in his private correspondence that on previous occasions, he considered Allsopp's behaviour as intolerable. Allsopp purchased the offices of Deputy Provincial Secretary, Clerk of the Council and Registrar of Enrolments in January 1766.[49] But Murray found these appointments outrageous and blocked them when official word reached him in April; Allsopp did not take up office until 1768 after a commission was set up in London to examine his case. One of the commissioners was his London correspondent Brook Watson. He was allowed to take up his post which brought in almost £300 per year, after paying a £400 fee to the office holder.[50] After Carleton came to Quebec, Allsopp's situation was more settled and he was protected, even from other merchants who felt that he was not completely honest in his public office, especially in the delicate area of handing out trading licences for the fur trade and for taverns.[51] He was later suspected of being an American sympathiser and removed from his official positions.

As a junior partner of a London firm, Allsopp acted as a conduit for goods and credit until eventually becoming an agent for Watson, Olive and Rashleigh, handling their remittances and organizing their return cargoes.[52] Allsopp was also involved with a number of other merchants at Quebec in ventures that ranged from the wheat trade to potash works, but he suffered a number of setbacks which only his excellent London credentials could help him overcome. The potash works, the distillery and the forges all failed after short operating times. His foray into the fur trade with Edward Chinn and Joseph Howard of Montreal to trade at the King's Posts was thwarted first by Murray, and then, eventually by the Privy Council. He was also hurt in 1765 by the loss of goods stored in a house in St. Francis street in the Montreal fire. In the official documentation he declared a personal loss of £70 Quebec currency, but a total loss of £274, including the goods of agents who worked for him in Montreal.[53] This amount was small compared to the loss of William Grant which totalled £1600, or his fur trade partner Joseph Howard (£1737), or business partner John Welles (£1200) or, for example, Moore and Finlay's loss (£1867). In the mid 1760s the losses just seemed to keep adding up, and in a colony suffering from a shortage of specie, these amounts are significant.

Allsopp's most enduring contact was with John Welles, his partner throughout the decade in the wheat trade and wholesale importing, and with Samuel Jacobs who was one of their wheat suppliers and who was constantly in their debt.[54] Allsopp never wavered from his involvement in the wheat trade and in the early 1770s he began his own milling operations after buying two seigneuries with a grist mill on the grounds.[55] By 1768 he was producing almost one quarter of the annual flour production of Quebec and was an early advocate of exporting flour rather than wheat - an idea expounded in the early 1730s when there were harvest surpluses to export. Despite Allsopps efforts, however, diversification seems to have brought ruin rather than profit to the merchants at Quebec. Had they marshalled their capital and directed it into one or two ventures it might have been better spent, but instead, much was frittered away on joint ventures. In each case the intentions were good, but the lack of technical knowledge and limited capital available for the initial phase of production spelled disaster.

The best example of an English-speaking merchant who was active in diverse projects in Quebec in the 1760s was Samuel Jacobs.[56] He was one of the few successful merchants who did not have direct economic ties with London merchant houses, but he had other important connections. He had catered to one regiment of the British army since 1747.[57] One of the contacts that he had made was with General Wolfe whom he followed to Quebec in 1759. By 1762 he had bought a house in the town and was part way through building a distillery.[58] He had previously been involved in setting up a brewery at Louisbourg. Jacobs concentrated in the main on the retail trade, setting up stores at Crown Point to serve officers and soldiers, and one at St. Denis for the locals. Later he added outlets at St. Charles and St. Ours. His headquarters were at Quebec where he catered to the garrison. He was connected to the Jewish mercantile community in New York and Boston, an extensive network with ties in London which included the Franks family who were army contractors.

The foundation of his business ventures was wheat which he used like cash. The inventory from his St. Denis store in 1764 shows that almost three quarters of this merchandise was in textiles and haberdashery. He was one of only a few merchants who worked in the rural area around Quebec. His Crown Point outlet closed in 1764, as the number of troops decreased and business became less profitable. Jacobs was also instrumental in establishing a distillery at Quebec in partnership with two British merchants, but although it started off well enough in 1765, the returns were so poor and the supply of molasses so uncertain that there was talk of replacing the distiller before the first barrel rolled out of the front doors.[59] The distillery wound up early in 1768 with the death of one of the partners whose executors were not willing to continue the venture.[60] The following year a rival distillery opened. Jacobs in the meantime, had bought out his partners, and while he saw the potential of owning a distillery, "by distilling for others I'll get triple the investment from my money". He did not continue to operate.[61]

In 1766 Jacobs continued his chequered career and became a partner in a potash works. He became interested in this business after the arrival of James Stewart in Quebec under the auspices of the London Society of Arts. Stewart came to instruct the colonists in the production of alkalis.[62] Allsopp also became involved in this enterprise with Jacobs; the partners engaged Brook Watson as their London correspondent to sell their product. Stewart wrote to Watson, Olive and Rashleigh in August 1766 outlining his plans for the potash works in Quebec, but although he made it sound like an excellent investment, his sales pitch proved in vain. He promised them 70 tons for the beginning of the shipping season if the London firm would send a vessel.[63] The potash was expected to bring 40 shillings per hundredweight in England and the sample sent to London confirmed this fact, but when the first shipment reached England, the quality was disappointing and brought a far lower price.[64] In the meantime they had branched out into pearl ash which once received, was referred to by Watson as "the worst ever imported". It did not fetch enough to cover the cost of production, freight, insurance and commission.[65] Needless to say, the business wrapped up soon after. Jacobs was also involved in 1769 in a stave cutting operation on the lakes but refused to sell his product to Allsopp.[66] The reason for this was probably that he owed Allsopp so much money by then that he would not have been given cash for the staves.

Jacobs' main business, as pointed out earlier, was the retail trade and in the early part of the decade, this trade was mainly conducted through his store at St. Denis. In 1764 he opened a store at St. Francis and in the contract with his store manager, Mars Decougne, spelled out the conditions of his employment. The contract was for three years, during which time Mars was to sell whatever goods were sent to him, keep regular books and not trade on his own account. In return, he would receive half of all profits, but was responsible for all his own expenses and was responsible for half of all losses incurred by the end of the three year period.[67] In the same year Curtius, who had managed the St. Denis store, began trading on his own account after receiving an 8% commission on any sales from the store's inventory which had an estimated value of 24,000 livres.[68]

An important part of this retail trade was the grain trade. The difficulty posed by this trade was that, although the wheat was harvested in the winter, it could not be passed up the river until spring when the waters were high enough. This trade could only be managed in vessels that could hold just over 1000 minots.[69] Most transactions with the rural farming communities were in barter for wheat rather than strictly cash transactions. As an employee of Jacobs, Curtius was not only responsible for running the store, but for scouring the countryside in search of farmers with wheat surpluses and for obtaining a promise that these surpluses would be handed to Jacobs at an appropriate time. Despite this focus on gathering wheat in trade for retail goods, the records show that from 1762 to 1764, approximately one half of all transactions at that store were for cash. This fact suggests that Jacobs was not the only merchant working the area and that other surpluses were sold for cash which, in turn, was used for purchases at the St. Denis shop. The results of these rural buying sprees were often disappointing, and Curtius wrote Jacobs, after one of his wheat buying jaunts into the countryside, that he had been able to gather only a small amount because there were so many holy days in April and farmers were not at work.[70] The amount of wheat shipped out of the area by Jacobs rose from almost nothing in 1762, to about 4000 minots in 1763, then dropped dramatically in 1765-66 because of poor harvests.[71] The recovery of the next two years was followed by near total disaster in 1769, and then in the early 1770s, bumper crops finally made up for the earlier disappointments.

Not only did Jacobs face problems shipping his crop to Quebec, but the uncertainty of the surpluses which had plagued the economy of New France hurt merchants again in the 1760s. Jacobs also faced competition from another British merchant in the colony, William Grant whom he was unable to persuade to invest with him in cornering the whole Richelieu market. Until 1764 Jacobs had to deal with the intervention of the military Governor, Gage, in regulating the activities of merchants in the countryside and the regulation of bread prices to prevent speculation. He managed to work his way around the first obstacle by having Curtius apply for a tavern licence to maintain their presence in the area.[72] One focus of his extensive correspondence with Curtius was the need to buy wheat. As early as 1761 he exhorted him to "buy what you could get in this [corn] in exchange for rum, dry goods or, if you would like, to give some cash".[73] The responses of Curtius show that there was a lot of haggling over the price of the grain and that sometimes Curtius had to pay a higher sum than expected to fill his employer's directive.

Rum in return for grain was mentioned early on in their correspondence and, while it was well known that this product drained most of the cash from the colony, it was not rum that Curtius requested in his store orders to Jacobs. From 1762 to 1764 the items most regularly requested were building supplies, especially nails and panes of glass. In 1763 Curtius wrote that "I could get a lot of corn this year because there is a lot of houses to be built this summer in this river. Send limestones to balance your vessels - I could get a lot of corn for lime stones, nails, panes of glass".[74] Under military government there was also the problem of obtaining permission to move grain. Curtius was told to seek permission under his own name and not for the total amount all at once. Once permission was granted in May 1763 for 2000 bushels to be moved, the next obstacle was to find vessels to ship the grain in. Jacobs' vessel had long since been requisitioned for the use of the King's forces. Lack of vessels was a common problem throughout the military period but, for those involved primarily in perishable commodities, could prove disastrous. By June of 1763 Curtius warned that "the weed is in great danger of perishing all" if it remained stored in the countryside where it was kept after being officially purchased. There were no granaries in the countryside. In

August Curtius wrote in a panic that "The weed still being here - the corn is in fifty places." Still, Jacobs told him to buy more, even when they had run out of places to keep it and there was a danger that it would begin to rot.[75] But grain was not the only commodity that could be ruined by extended storage. Aaron Hart who was a friend of Jacobs wrote that the rats had eaten the cloth which Jacobs had sent to Trois Rivières to store on his behalf.[76] There was money to be made in the wheat trade and in 1764, Jacobs told his employee to spend up to $1500 in cash if necessary to buy 8000 minots to be ready for the opening of the river. This amount was a lot more than Curtius was used to purchasing and he responded that it would take more money than that to gather such a large crop. He was able to report, however, that he had gathered 6000 bushels in the garrets of the locals and hoped to collect the full amount.[77] By 1766 Jacobs was regularly supplying Allsopp with large amounts of wheat: 2000 bushels which increased in 1767 to between 5000 and 6000 bushels.[78] In 1768 Allsopp wrote that he would need 2000 to 4000 bushels and would give Jacobs the first chance at supplying this amount. They made a similar deal the following year. Jacobs bought and traded the same amount of wheat inside the colony as was exported annually from Quebec to Southern Europe in the late 1760s. It was on the heels of these successes that Jacobs talked the London firm into sending him goods on consignment, but the harvest surpluses ended at around the same time. Watson asked him to remit monies owed in furs and, in response, Jacobs directed Curtius, after the missive from the firm in the spring of 1769, to purchase as much wheat as possible for goods and to "buy all the furs you can".[79]

Jacobs had begun as a purveyor to the army with connections to Jewish colonial merchant circles, as well as to Brook Watson in London and George Allsopp in the colony. He started out in Quebec supplying the various garrisons but, when most of the regiments moved out this business, became less important. He was involved in the wheat trade from as early as 1761 and remained active in it throughout the decade. He was extended credit through his business dealings with Allsopp which extended past the wheat trade and into the import business, the distillery, potash works and, indirectly, into the forges as a retailer of St. Maurice iron stoves and tools. In 1770 he estimated his landholdings were worth £2700, but 183 debtors also owed him £5270.[80] Through his credit connections with London he became increasingly tied to Watson, Olive and Rashleigh, and it was like a stone around his neck until he paid off the balance owing with the proceeds of the bumper crop of 1774.

Jacob's abilities as a retailer show that he was able to break back into a rural market which had been virtually shut down during the war. He accomplished this with more than rum, offering a wide selection of textiles, tools and utensils and benefitted from a building boom near St. Denis. He tended to sell his wheat to whomever he used as an importer - exporter and in the 1760s, this party was the team of Allsopp and Welles. The result was that he was deeply in their debt by the end of the decade.

The ability of Canadian farmers to sell 8000 minots of wheat to one merchant, and more to others by 1767, was no mean feat. They faced the usual problems of climate and transportation that had plagued agriculture in New France. In the lean years the government of New France had been forced to regulate the grain trade to stave off famine. It was nothing new then when, in 1768, the government provided seeds for the next season's sowing. Before 1759 rural merchants were supplied on credit from Quebec with imports in return for their wheat surpluses in the spring, and any break in this delicate link could mean ruin for urban merchants. The difficulty for merchants during both the French and British regime lay in the inability of local authorities to gauge the amount of an expected surplus.[81] The Seven Years War had dealt the final blow to an agricultural sector already in decline. There had been a prohibition on exports every year from 1751, and this fact, as well as the combination of high prices for goods and an artificially depressed price for wheat, discouraged the production of surpluses.[82] It is estimated that during the latter stages of the French regime the average farm of 15 arpents produced only enough for a family of six, with no surplus left over to sell.[83] Surpluses had to come from farmers with at least 100 arpents. Shortages due to war drove the price of wheat up until it fetched 30-40 livres in 1760. It was such speculation that drove the military government to regulate food prices. The problems of poor harvests in the 1760s prompted a memorial from merchants and inhabitants of Montreal, asking for an embargo on corn exports because of its high price and because of perceived problems with the following harvest due to late sowing. Their worst fears became a reality when the crop was spoiled in 1768 by rain.[84]

Jacobs faced all these problems as he followed in the footsteps of the country merchants of the French regime. As in the past, most of the surpluses in the 1760s were used within the colony, leaving only a small amount for export. As crop surpluses increased after 1770, more merchants turned to the wheat trade as a source of profit.

The key mercantile figures of the Quebec economy in the 1760s were those few men who arrived in the colony as partners, agents or correspondents of major British overseas merchant houses. The London merchants were well versed in the problems and profits afforded by maritime commerce. The foundation of their success lay in establishing factors and agents in the trade area or when this arrangement was not possible, in their reliance on ships' masters to handle all commercial transactions. They kept their finger on the pulse of the market and kept their eyes and ears trained on the Board of Trade and other decision making bodies which could affect their profits. The British attempted to operate in Quebec, as their French counterparts had done, by placing agents in residence. The most successful British merchants in Quebec were the likes of William Grant and Edward Harrison who fully utilized their own reserves of coin in a place starved of currency. No matter what international or local conditions were, existing lines of credit and merchandise allowed them to ride out any economic storm. Most British merchants in Quebec had no such connections to rely upon. Their lack of credit and limited knowledge of this new market in Quebec led them more often than not into financial trouble and even failure. This hardship put Quebec merchants on the same footing as Portuguese merchants who could not do business in England because of their lack of market knowledge. During the French regime it had been difficult for local merchants to enter the overseas trade for exactly the same reasons.

Resident agents or junior partners were the only ones with enough credit to buy what they wanted, including urban land and seigneuries and to trade on their own account. Apart from these individuals the rest of the merchants at Quebec became mere shopkeepers. Unlike their colonial counterparts, the merchants in Quebec before 1763 did not make much officially from the presence of soldiers in the colony. The decline in army budgets, cost cutting measures and decreases in the soldiers pay meant there was less to spend even in the unofficial market. Most of the newly arrived merchants did not stand much chance of making their fortunes at Quebec, but it may have been better than trying to break into colonial networks which were already as well established as the London merchant community. The control and expected returns of the overseas trade remained firmly in the hands of British merchants who had all the necessary skills and necessary connections to make transatlantic trade profitable.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER TEN

1.T.M. Devine, "The Scottish Merchant Community, 1680-1740" in R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner, *The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment* (Edinburgh : John Donald Publishers, 1982), p.29.

2.The brief discussion which follows on the nature of the Scottish merchant community is indebted to the work of T.M. Devine, especially the following essay by T.M. Devine, "The Merchant Class of the Larger Scottish Towns in the Later Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries" George Gordon and Brian Dicks, *Scottish Urban History* (Aberdeen : Aberdeen University Press, 1983), pp.98 - 101.

3.T. M. Devine, "The Scottish Merchant Community", p.32.

4.T.S. Ashton, *An Economic History of England : The Eighteenth Century* (London : Methuen, 1955), p.135.

5.Jacob M. Price, "What did merchants do? Reflections on British Overseas Trade, 1600-1790" *The Journal of Economic History* 49 (1989). passim.

6.Julian Hoppit, *Risk and Failure in English Business, 1700-1800* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1987), Appendix One.

7.J.M. Price, "What did merchants do?", p. 271.

8.This discussion on bankruptcies and business failures relies heavily on the work of Julian Hoppit, *Risk and Failure*, pp. 47-60 and p. 161.

9.The discussion which follows on the nature of the west Indies trade is drawn from T.M.Devine, "An eighteenth century business elite : Glasgow - West India merchants, c. 1750-1815" *Scottish Historical Review* 29 (1976) : 47-52.

10.Ibid., p. 43.

11.For a discussion of Storke's business see, William I. Roberts, "Samuel Storke : An Eighteenth Century London Merchant Trading to the American Colonies" *Business History Review* 39 (1965) : 147 - 170.

12.For a fuller discussion of the economic activities of Anthony Bacon see, L.B. Namier, "Anthony Bacon, M.P., An Eighteenth Century Merchant" *Journal of Economic and Business History* II (1929-30) : 20-70. and the entry for Anthony Bacon in L.B. Namier and J. Brooke eds., *The House of Commons, 1754-90 Volume Two* (London : Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964).

13.Information on the trading practices and involvements of William Braund are taken from Lucy S. Sutherland, *A London Merchant 1695-1774* (London : Oxford University Press, 1933), pp. 17, 99 and 141.

14.The following insights into the Anglo-Portuguese trade rely heavily on H.E.S. Fisher, *The Portugal Trade*, p.41 and pp. 87 and 110.

15.David Macpherson, *Annals of Commerce, Manufactures, Fisheries and Navigation. Volume three* (Edinburgh : Mundell and Sons, 1805), p.457.

16.Fisher, p.42.

17.L.M. Cullen, "Merchant Communities Overseas, the Navigation Acts and the Irish and Scottish Responses." L.M. Cullen and T.C. Smout, Comparative Aspects of Scottish and Irish Economic and Social History, 1600-1900 (Edinburgh : John Donald, 1976) : 169.

18.Ian Bruce Watson, Foundation for Empire. English Private Trade in India 1695-1760 (New Delhi : Vikas Publishing House, 1980), p. 57.

19.The discussion which follows is indebted to the work of P.J. Marshall, East Indian Fortunes. The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 45 and pp. 190-228.

20.G.J. Bryant, "The Scots in India in the Eighteenth Century" Scottish Historical Review 64 (1985) : 22.

21.Marshall, pp.217-219.

22.G.M. Bryant, "The Scots in India in the Eighteenth Century" : 21-41.

23.Marshall, p.21.

24.Suresh Chandra Ghosh, The Social Condition of the British Community in Bengal 1757--1800 (Leiden : EJ Brill, 1970), p. 11.

25.Ibid., p. 95.

26.Marshall, p.40.

27.Ibid., p.130.

28.Ibid., p. 240.

29.Ibid., p.222.

30.J.M. Price, Capital and Credit in British Overseas Trade : The View From the Chesapeake, 1700-1776 (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1980), p.38.

31.Ibid., p. 128.

32.Charles McLean Andrews, The Boston Merchants and the Non-Importation Movement (New York : Russell and Russell, Reprint 1968), p.2.

33.W.T. Baxter, The House of Hancock. Business in Boston 1724-1775 (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1945), p.142.

34.Thomas Elliot Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 1686-1776 (Madison : University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), p. 218.

35.Ibid., p.200.

36.London Trade Directory 1760, The Universal Pocket Companion 1760, Complete Guide to All Persons who have any Trade or Concern with London 1763, The Universal Director 1763, A Complete Guide to All Persons who have any Trade or Concern with the City of London 1765. All are available in the Guildhall Library, London.

37.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 10. 14 November 1768.

38.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 10. 6 March 1769. Watson, Olive and Rashleigh to Jacobs.

39.Dictionary of Canadian Biography Volume V., 1801-1820 (Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1983), pp. 367-374.

40.MG11 Q Series, vol.4., April 1767. Mills to Carleton. One livre was equal to one Halifax shilling.

41.Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol.IV. pp 262-263.

42.Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol. IV. pp. 329-30.

43.MG11 Q Series. Vol.4. Grants of Lands and Lots since the Establishment of Civil Government - 30 March 1767. J.Goldfrap, Registers Office.

44.Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol. V. pp. 287-292.

45.Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol. V. pp. 314-319.

46.Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol. V. pp. 19-23.

47.David Roberts, "George Allsopp : Quebec Merchant 1733-1805" (M.A. Thesis, Queens University, 1974), p.3.

48.RG68 vol.213 : Passports, 1763 ; RG4 B58 Vol. 15 : General Passes to Leave the Province, 1766-1839; RG4 B28 vol.24 : Bonds of Debtors to Leave the Province,1764-1769.

49.Roberts, p. 30.

50.Ibid., p.36.

51.Hardwicke Papers, Additional Manuscripts 35915. 13 November 1768. Hey to Fowler Walker.

52.Roberts, p. 11.

53.C.O. 42. Vol.5. p. 216. Losses in the Montreal Fire 18 May 1765.

54.Roberts, p. 13.

55.Ibid., p.57.

56.Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol. IV. pp. 384-386.

57.Allan Greer, Peasant, Lord and Merchant : Rural Society in Three Quebec Parishes, 1740-1840 (Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1985), p.143.

58.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 1. 4 December 1762. Pat Fogerty to Jacobs.

59.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 9. 20 March 1765. Price to Jacobs, Price and Hay.

60.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol.10. 7 October 1769. Jacobs to Allsopp and Welles.

61.Ibid.

62.Roberts, p. 17.

63.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 9. 24 May 1768. Allsopp to Jacobs. In the letter he claimed that the sample sent to London was worth 38/- to 40/-.

64.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 10. 6 March 1769. Watson, Olive and Rashleigh to Jacobs.

65.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 10. 6 April 1769. Allsopp to Jacobs.

66.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 10. 7 October 1769. Jacobs to Allsopp and Welles.

67.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 9. 16 May 1764. Articles of Agreement between Jacobs and Decougne at Sorel.

68.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 9. 4 September 1764. Jacobs to Curtius.

69.Allan Greer, " Habitants of the Lower Richelieu : Rural Society in Three Quebec Parishes, 1740-1840." (Ph.D. Thesis, York University, 1980), p. 283.

70.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 9. 28 April 1764. Curtius to Jacobs.

71.One minot was equal to 1.1 bushels or 39 litres by volume.

72.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 8. 5 December 1761. Curtius to Jacobs.

73.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 8. 13 November 1761. Jacobs to Curtius.

74.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 8. May 1763. Curtius to Jacobs from St. Antoine.

75.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 8. August 1763. Curtius to Jacobs.

76.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 8. 23 November 1763. Hart to Jacobs.

77.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 9. 26 March 1764. and 28 April 1764. Curtius to Jacobs.

78.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 9. 22 March 1766 and 17 June 1767. Jacobs to Allsopp.

79.Jacobs Estate Papers, vol. 10. 6 November 1769. Jacobs to Curtius.

80.Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol. IV. pp. 384-386.

81.F.W. Burton, "The Wheat Supply of New France." Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, 30 : 147.

82.Jean Elizabeth Lunn, "Agriculture and War in Canada, 1740 - 1760" Canadian Historical Review 16 (1935), : 131.

83.R.C. Harris, The Seigneurial System in Early Canada. A Geographical Study (Montreal : McGill-Queens University Press, 1966), p.160.

84.MG11 Q Series. 8 June 1767. Petition to Council from Merchants and Inhabitants of Montreal.

CHAPTER ELEVEN - THE INNER WORKINGS OF THE BRITISH MERCHANT COMMUNITY AT QUEBEC IN THE FIRST DECADE OF BRITISH RULE

To complete this picture of the mercantile community that emerged in Quebec after the conquest, it is useful to look at the structure of day to day merchant activity. The main source for this task will be the pages of the Quebec Gazette, which offer the only clear picture of the week to week and year to year activities and interests of the resident British merchant community (this source is, of course, supplemented where possible and applicable with other documents). A number of conclusions can be reached from such a detailed examination: at first these merchants worked from rented premises, but by 1768, most owned or leased their own houses or shops; partnerships consisted of two men and when one partnership ended new partnerships were seldom entered into. By 1768 the number of partnerships advertised had dropped from double digit figures to only one. By the middle years of the decade the number of partnerships decreased rapidly either due to death of one partner, the return home of a partner or business failure, and this breakup is clearly demonstrated in the rise of the number of public auctions of the effects of a partnership and in the increase in goods and property seized by writ.

The most interesting aspect of the business community at Quebec is that it appears to exhibit characteristics which have long been associated with the Canadian merchants, and not their British counterparts. Because of their later tendency to co-operate with other merchants and move freely from partnership to partnership in the fur trade, the merchants who arrived in the colony in 1760 have been assumed to exhibit similar traits. As this discussion will show, this assumption must be discarded. Business partnerships began and ended on a regular basis. The peak came in 1765 and 1766 when nine partnerships ended in each of these years. The traditional belief that the British merchants were open to working with others and transferred easily from one business venture to another is called into question by the very personal nature of British partnerships. The startling fact is that once a partnership was dissolved it was highly unlikely that the respective partners would team up with anyone else. Some of the dissolutions, as noted above, came after the death or return home of one member of the team, and in only one instance did the partner left behind begin a new partnership (it was with a family member). It should also be kept in mind that it cost money to advertise in the Quebec Gazette, therefore it is probable that not all merchant activity was recorded here. From the pages of the Gazette we do know however that most merchants rented premises from which to live and work. This trend is revealed by the fact that their names do not appear in the official lists of lands and property which had changed hands since the beginning of the civil regime. Once established, there was little movement within the town.

The decrease in the number of partnerships in the middle years of the decade; the increase in public vendues and auctions and the seizure of property by writ for repayment of debts owed, testify to the difficult times within which the merchants operated. The Gazette gives a bird's eye view of the trials and tribulations of the merchants. It does not fulfil this mandate for 1766 because the paper was shut down while the Stamp Act was in effect. Other sources which tell something about the nature and background of the English-speaking community in Quebec in the 1760s are the four census lists. Two of these lists are for Montreal in 1764 and 1765, one is for the town of Quebec in 1764 and the last is the list of chimneys swept in 1768.[1] It was a town regulation that all chimneys must be swept to decrease the risk of fire, and the name of the head of the household appears beside the address of the property.

The three census lists were of Protestant householders, but this source almost certainly covered all of the new arrivals, including the small Jewish population. Montreal registered fifty-six Protestants householders in the autumn of 1764, but, one year later when expanded to take in the District of Montreal, it showed one hundred and thirty-six. Fifty-one of this number were deemed not fit to be made justices of the peace, either because they were absent from the colony, or because they had no fixed residence.[2] The Quebec census taken in October 1764 showed a total of one hundred and forty-four householders. Forty-four of these individuals were recognizable through their activities either in government or as merchants.

The Montreal census of 1765 is the best of the four lists because it gives details of previous occupation and of place of birth. There were, for example, twenty-nine men who listed innkeeper as their occupation, but only three listed this as their previous occupation. The bulk of the new entries into the innkeeping business were privates, sergeants and captains, as well as a few sutlers. In contrast, there was a higher number in the merchant category who listed merchant as their previous occupation. There were fifty-three entries for the occupation of merchant, two-thirds of which had been merchants before, the rest had been soldiers, clerks and sutlers. It is not known whether merchants arrived directly from their birthplace, but it is known that over half identified their place of origin as England, Scotland or Ireland, and a handful were from the colonies and from Europe. Men who claimed that their previous occupation had been mercantile, were predominantly of British origin. The information available for the town of Quebec does not offer the same type of detail but it is possible to track, for instance, the number of innkeepers in Quebec by examining the lists of those licensed to retail spirits in 1767. The town of Quebec had eighty-two licensed innkeepers, sixteen of which were female.

Most merchants did not own their own house or shop. However, this circumstance was not true of the well placed merchants. Moore and Finlay purchased a house on Rue St. Pierre for 18,000 livres; William Grant had purchased properties on the same street, as well as all of the St. Roch area. Moore and Finlay also leased land in lower town on which they hoped to build a wharf. Purchasing property was a popular aspiration because merchants were concerned with loading and unloading cargoes in a town where the port facilities were less than satisfactory. In the period between 1765 and 1766, seven more merchants bought properties in the town. Other grants to merchants between 1764 and 1767 were made for the ground near the Intendant's palace to build a house for Price, Hay and Jacobs for £5 a year Quebec currency; a grant in the same area for a house for Zachary Thompson for £2 sterling per year and a lot above the King's Stores in Lower Town to Samuel Gridley for £1 per year. Land purchases in the town were really few and far between, as were leases of land and houses. In 1767 the official reckoning given to Carleton showed that there were also six lots or houses purchased by British merchants or officials. Only seven land grants were made within the town, an equal number outside the district, and ten grants of seigneuries or parts of seigneuries. These records prove that the British hardly set the heather ablaze with their land grabbing schemes under Murray.[3]

The rest of the new arrivals rented premises or had bought properties before 1764. The merchants generally operated out of houses. Sellers of spirits worked out of inns such as the Scotch Arms, the Three Gun Tavern, the Three Cannons or the General Wolfe. Those in the business of selling imported European goods worked either from the house of another British merchant or had their store in a Canadian house. One such example was William and Steven Abbott of Parant's who set up a store on the first floor. In 1764, for instance, twenty three locations were given in the Quebec Gazette for the twenty-nine merchants advertising. Seven of these merchants had their store in someone else's building, an equal number worked from an actual shop or store, and four worked out of their own home. The rest worked from taverns.[4] Most of the partnerships either worked out of shops or owned a house which they used as a shop.

The following year the story remained much the same, although the number of businesses operating from either a store or a store in a house belonging to someone else made up just over one half of all known locations. The number of merchants operating from their own premises increased slightly. Only three merchants changed premises. James Hanna, the watchmaker, moved from John McCord near the Palace, to his own shop called the Eagle and Watch. Aylwin and Kerr who had operated from the house of Madame La Croix now moved to the new house built by Chartie opposite Parant's, in Rue Sous Le Fort and were replaced in the old premises by Francis Grant and Company. Between 1766 and 1768 the tendency of merchants to operate out of the house of another began to decline and they were more likely to work out of a store or from their own homes. The exceptions to this pattern were the latest arrivals who would be taken under the wing of a resident. Such was the case of Matthew Gemmill, a tobacconist from Glasgow. He worked from the premises of a fellow Scot, Lachlan Smith in lower town. Another example was Solomon Cohen, working from property owned by Eleazer Levy, in upper town.

The records of land purchases show few merchants bought houses or land (except for the hopefuls wanting to build wharves). Most merchants therefore, rented house or store space from Canadians. The top merchants were able to pull even further away from the others because they owned property or leased it on very reasonable terms. On the other hand, buying property involved large cash outlays at a time when business was not exactly booming. Moore and Finlay were experiencing serious financial difficulties by 1765, only a few years after their business was established, and they were forced to sell some of their property. There was not much movement within the town. Those whose fortunes were on the rise, such as Samuel Sills who moved from the dry goods and alcohol trade into strictly alcohol, naturally changed premises; as did James Hanna once his watchmaking and jewellery business expanded, but the rest stayed where they were.

Overall, there were fewer merchants working and advertising in the Gazette by 1768 and even fewer working in partnerships. In fact after the 1766 season only Jonas Clark Minot and William Minot continued to operate together; all other advertisers worked alone. Most business activity took place in lower town in the area from Rue St. Pierre on the west side in the Cul de Sac to Rue Sault au Matelot, even though merchant residences extended as far back as Rue des Pauvres and Rue St. Vallier (see map).

Partnerships in Quebec seldom seemed to work well, despite the sense it made to pool resources and knowledge. Once one partner died or left the other settled up their affairs. The partnership of Anderson and Fulton for example wrapped up business when Anderson died of flux in 1764 and Fulton followed him to the grave two years later. The successful partnership of Calvin Gay and J.C. Minot ended in 1765 when Gay died of smallpox - Minot later carried on a long lasting partnership with his family member William Minot; they worked from the Cul de Sac. In the same year, the partnership of Aylwin and Kerr fell apart after Charles Kerr drowned in the St. Lawrence. His boat cut loose from its moorings and he failed to survive the swim to shore. Franklin and Comte ended their partnership when Franklin obtained the post of Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia. Bayne and Brymer did not renew their partnership after coming into conflict with Governor Palliser, although they were still involved in the lawsuit against him until the end of the decade. Only one partnership ended in 1765 because of suspected fraud. Barkly and Hay (colonials) each accused the other of fiddling the books. Nine partnerships ended in 1765. The following year this trend continued, but the reasons had changed. Four more partnerships ended because one of the partners was returning home to England for good. Two others who left for England were merchants whose partnerships had ended the previous year, but they had stayed on to settle their business affairs. In total, eight merchants left to return to Britain and placed their affairs in the hands of other merchants. When someone wished to leave the colony he had to sign a debtor's bond. Naturally those left holding the bond wanted to make sure the merchant would return so they usually signed for friends. Sometimes partners signed, as in the case of Jeffrys and Faneuil, when Jeffrys left in 1765.[5] When Aylwin and Aitken left in 1768 they signed no bond and must therefore have cleared their debts before leaving. The outward migration continued until 1768. Fifteen merchants in 1768 advertised goods for sale and of these, two were by merchants closing down and only one partnership was left in operation that of J.C. and William Minot.

The environment within which the merchants operated had changed for the better by the mid 1760s. Firstly, many of the buildings levelled in the seige of 1759 had been rebuilt, and after 1764 the army population was not only smaller, but by 1768, it was completely different. The soldiers and officers who had taken part in the seige and who had run afoul of the merchants in Montreal were gone. As for communications with other centres, there was a post every two weeks in the summer and every month in the winter that reached New York from Quebec via Montreal and Albany. The overland distance was nearly six hundred miles. Contact with the American colonies was regular. Reports were made on road conditions inside the colony, especially the condition of the ice roads to make sure that contact between centres in the colony could be maintained year round.

Outsiders often had a different view of the town and colony. Francis Maseres arrived in Quebec as Attorney General in the fall of 1766 and wrote his friend Fowler Walker with his first impressions of the town. He found the place very dirty, with rubbish from the seige still on the streets. He thought the locals very lazy and even criticized their habit of having brick rather than wood floors in their houses and he seemed unaware of the fire hazard wood posed in the town. Nor did he like the folding doors on the windows instead of sashes. He did, however, compliment the English merchants who had lately built houses in the town in the English style which was much neater.[6] Of course Maseres was a Huguenot and had a total disdain for French Catholics. This attitude shone through in his personal correspondence.

The physical damage to the town was mirrored by its limited social life. It had been considered a delightful place during the French period, that it was no longer so was a fact lamented even by Carleton in 1769.[7]

Carleton and others also complained of the severity of the winters which lasted five months. Maseres, after experiencing one Canadian winter, could not help but comment on the cold climate. What was even worse though, he thought, was that the summer brought no relief because there "are no downs to ride upon, no pleasant green lanes, no parks or forests or gentlemens' seats to go and see or gentlemen to visit at them".[8] He went on to say that there were so few nice people in Quebec that he would rather have an average job at home than one with a huge salary in Quebec. There were no similar accounts left by merchants giving their impressions of the colony. The only counterpoint to the letters of the administrators in Quebec later in the decade, are in accounts of an embittered Walter Murray who thought it worse than exile and the letters of New York merchant John Watts who was unable to persuade a black cook to go north and work for Governor Murray because a stay at Quebec was thought to be a sentence of exile.

There were fewer military balls and public balls than in the French period. Indeed there were none to speak of at all until the arrival of Carleton, but merchants met in freemason lodges and had one or two social events to keep them busy. The new coffee houses were one popular diversion. Two new ones opened in the town in 1766 and a new public house opened just outside town which also sold coffee, tea and chocolate. These places were available for private business and lodging. Then there were the natural phenomena reported in the Quebec Gazette, which thrilled one and all - the large dead spermaceti whale seen in the Gulf or the fabled werewolf at Kamouraska which disguised itself as a beggar.

Many merchants joined in the subscription to import two fire engines in 1765, but when fire broke out in the Cul de Sac late in 1767, the engines were of limited use because the subscribers had failed to put any fire regulations into effect. In Montreal over eighty homes were lost to fire in early 1768. Merchants also took part in two committees in 1768, both were relief agencies; one to help the Protestant poor and one to raise money to buy seed to give to farmers to sow for the next year.

Good works were not the only occupation of the male population. Some men were worried by the adulterous behaviour of their neighbours while others were just interested in hounding the poor women who had left them.[9] The lives of women in the 1760s are shrouded in mystery except, in a few instances, involving death due to insanity, adultery or women who had run away from their husbands. Women appear in the pages of the Gazette in one other instance - as publicans. The publicans of the town of Quebec were mostly men, but sixteen of the eighty two named in the lists were women and while little can be said of those with English names, the Canadian women are all listed as widows. Few of the British merchants brought wives with them and some intermarried with local families of both English and Canadian origin. It was customary in the eighteenth century for small numbers of women and wives to be allowed to travel with the soldiers when they were on overseas duty, but there is no record of the numbers at Quebec, just a chance reference in the orderly books. Some soldiers' wives are mentioned in the Quebec Gazette, but usually only when they had either had an affair and run off, or when they had just run away. In these cases the purpose of the advertisement was not to ask the wife to return, it was to warn merchants not to give the runaway credit because the husband would not honour her debt. In a more subtle way it was a warning to the wife that there was no life for her without her husband. In one particularly nasty case the husband warned one and all through the pages of the Gazette that his wife had been behaving badly and had escaped, and he offered a reward of just over one dollar for her return.

There were one or two women who established themselves in the community through their medical expertise. Ann Strafford, one of the military wives, set up shop as a midwife at the sign of the Cradle in 1765. She did not advertise any other year and since the regiments had completely changed by 1768, it can safely be assumed that she moved on to another posting. Another midwife, Susanna Firth, was working in the town in 1767, as the advertisement of Hyman Myers publicly attested that, contrary to rumour, she was not responsible for the stillbirth of his child. Even in this profession the women faced competition from one of the recently arrived doctors who claimed also to be a midwife. English and Scottish women were not to be found among the ranks of merchants, but were most often found as wives or adulteresses. They did not receive much respect - when the body of one Ann Smith was found dead at the Wharf in 1766, the inquest judged that she had been a lunatic. Women did not play a visible role in the economic life of Quebec and this void was in direct contrast to the strong business role played by Canadian women before 1760. This positive role was not carried from the French period because few merchants brought their families with them. Fewer still chose to marry English or Scots women, preferring to remain bachelors or, like William Grant, marry well to a member of the Canadian elite. The census of 1764 saw fit not to name any but the male head of households. Perhaps it was a shortage in the number of available English-speaking females that caused a small but steady stream of them to run away from their husbands and take their chances elsewhere.

Merchants operated in an environment where ruined buildings still surrounded them, where they did business mostly with other men and where their leisure hours found them gathered in coffee houses or at lodge meetings in the tavern of Miles Prentice. The business community was small enough that they all knew one another and the rest of the population knew them, hence the lack of specific addresses or opening times in their advertisements. Some mentioned the name of the ships their goods came in on, and others did not. In the beginning there was no mention of what types of payment were acceptable but, as the years passed, and more partnerships ended, 'cash for goods' took on other forms. Among those merchants closing down their business, the majority specifically advertised that corn or commodities would be taken in barter or that one year's credit would be given to those placing a large order. By 1765 the scope of payments ranged from furs to oil. This method of payment became standard practice among those merchants closing down their businesses. Other merchants offered low prices or a certain proportion at cost if a small amount of the purchase was paid for in cash. For merchants wanting to leave quickly, and this desire seems to have been a susbstantial proportion of the community, the combination of ways to dispose of stock seemed endless, but in a country strapped for cash, and in the midst of a few poor harvests, sometimes nothing helped. From 1765 until 1768 the pages of the Quebec Gazette are filled with calls for debtors to settle up with merchants either leaving the province or ending partnerships. If a merchant was leaving he gave public notice in the newspaper that his affairs were being handled by a certain person or he warned that a suit would follow for bad debts. Suits were unusual before 1767, although the newspaper abounded with them that year and the next. There were many references to goods and properties seized by writ to satisfy suits of British merchants.

There had always been public sales and vendues, usually brought on by a merchants' inability to sell off stock after closing shop, but there were few auctions. All three methods, auctions, public sales and vendues increased in frequency after 1764. By 1765 there were eleven of these sales in one form or another, some of which included recently imported items, and two were of estates which were in the hands of trustees. There were three homes used as public auction houses. In 1765 advertisements for the service industries began - some looked to employ those with horticultural knowledge, others were for governesses, soapmakers and goldsmith apprentices. The rental business was given serious mention when British merchants began to let out buildings in 1765. The first storehouses and granaries were open to merchants who would bring goods in by the ton. One was at Cape Diamond and the other was in the Queen's Battery. There were three houses used to hold public auctions.

By 1766 there was a strong blend of public sales, public auctions and advertisements for retailers and wholesalers along with numerous calls to settle debts owed. No longer were sales from shops the most common, for there were so many partnerships ending, and merchants either dying or leaving, that public sales for a variety of different terms were necessary. When public sales of merchandise were not enough to satisfy debts, writs against property ensured payment of debts.

There seemed to be no rhyme or reason to failure or success. An examination of the types of goods stocked by merchants throughout the period, as seen in the pages of the local newspaper, shows that they all stocked a wide variety of goods. Some of the success stories such as Samuel Sills or James Hanna had specialized from the beginning. Hanna began as a repairer of watches and clocks at John McCord's but by 1765, he stocked a variety of jewellery and silver at his own shop which he sold for cash. In 1767 he advertised memo books with locks, pocket compasses, silver work and a ready made supply of Indian work. He branched out even further into mahogany chairs, tea tongs, punch ladles and other items for the discerning householder.

Success did not necessarily lie in having a great diversity of goods on hand because not all merchants could afford to have a large stock - for those not directly connected to the fur trade it made more sense to deal in a limited variety of goods. Partnerships could pool resources and were more likely to carry the great diversity of goods familiar to us from the cargo lists of incoming vessels. Partnerships were also the great casualties of the decade. As many as twenty-eight partnerships in total operated in the town of Quebec in the years 1764-1768. By 1768 there was only one partnership still actively advertising in the Quebec Gazette. Of course there were undoubtedly other partnerships in operation which were not publicized in the newspaper, but even if we are restricted to examining those in the Gazette, it is clear that local business was in a state of crisis by 1767, this situation did not improve in 1768.

Most merchants bought goods from the incoming ships and had no direct contact with London merchants. They were able to make some extra cash by acting as agents to sell freight or passenger space on vessels returning to Britain.[10] Due to cash flow problems, merchants sometimes had to put their houses or property up for sale. In 1764, five houses and one store were publicly advertised for sale. The following year two houses still remained on the market and they were joined by Samuel Jacobs' house and the house in which the Governor lived. In 1767 all the property of merchant Philip Payne in Quebec and Gaspé was publicly auctioned off, as was the Royal American Coffee House on the Great Road. Many properties just sat on the market and could not be sold. It was difficult, once in debt, to recover, when, as a last resort, properties which were to be sacrificed remained unsold. Even houses put up for lease were slow in moving. Murray's farm, Sans Bruit, was still being cared for in 1768 by a tenant. Property prices were seldom mentioned except in the strange case of Justin Franks. In 1766 he found himself in a lot of debt and, as a way to alleviate this problem, advertised for someone to give him $800 or else a wife who would bring a dowry of at least 200 Louis D'or. Failing that, he would take a genteel girl of British stock who was used to confinement, to be his housekeeper.[11] When no one stepped forward Franks tried to sell his house. It was a three storey house and he was prepared to sell it for £510 if a down payment of £250 was made within six months, with the rest in four payments. Failing a sale he was prepared to lease storey by storey - the shop for £40 per year, the first floor for £25, the second floor for £10 or on even better terms for a large cash advance. He was unlucky because it was seized on suits for debt and he was thrown in jail and was still languishing there in 1768.

The peak of overseas business came in 1766 with imports valued at approximately £366,000 and with a record £46,000 of goods exported back to England. In 1767 the import-export business was hit hard and imports dropped by 47%, then by another 48% in 1768. On the other hand, exports from Quebec only decreased by 11% in 1767 and by another 12% in 1768. This stability was the first real indication that changes in the previously stringent control of the fur trade and a slight revival in the fisheries were having an impact.

It was not until 1768 that the shocking drop in the number of vessels travelling on the Britain - Quebec run was really visible. In 1766 30 of the 36 incoming vessels were from Britain and 26 of the 52 outgoing were bound for Britain, but this scenario had altered within the space of two years. In 1768 only 12 of the 21 incoming vessels were from British ports and just under half of those outward bound were on their way to Britain. Export levels were steady but imports dropped considerably, undoubtedly affected by the local ability to pay for the goods because of a series of poor harvests. The great irony of Murray's tenure is that the years leading up to and including his recall were those when the merchants reached the height of their prosperity; after that it was downhill and shadows for the merchant community at Quebec. But was it the state of the international economy that pulled the colony's economy down into a state of crisis or was it affected by political changes at home and abroad?

In July 1766 the Rockingham ministry was dismissed and the question of a final settlement for Quebec was delayed yet again. The Board of Trade regained some of the influence which it had lost since 1763 and this increased status influenced decision-making on unresolved issues in Quebec. At the same time, the government decided that it should proceed by parliamentary legislation - a tactic which was time consuming. Finally, in 1767, pressure from the House of Lords brought some action, and the government created a new post, Colonial Secretary, in January 1768. It was hoped that the creation of such a position would streamline action on colonial matters. The new position was given to the Earl of Hillsborough who had been involved in framing the Royal Proclamation and who was prepared to stand by this document despite all of the issues which had emerged in Quebec in the ensuing five years. The combination of the shifting balance of power within the various government departments and the decision to proceed by parliamentary legislation made delays inevitable. The frenzy of information gathering undertaken by Shelburne at the Board of Trade also contributed to the delay in acting to resolve problems outstanding in Quebec. The British government was sincere in its desire to be fair to all parties concerned and come up with the best solution possible for the economic and political stability of the colony. But this very sincerity prolonged the whole process.[12]

There were also changes underway in Quebec. Murray was asked to return home to give a report on the state of the colony and was temporarily replaced by Guy Carleton, former Quartermaster General to Wolfe. Carleton left no private papers, therefore, what we know of his actions in 1767-1768 rely on Colonial Office documents which contain his correspondence with the English ministry.[13] Carleton ran into trouble almost immediately on arrival, disbarring Mabane and Irving from council and then misrepresenting the whole affair to the English ministry. Historians have always treated Carleton as the darling of the merchant community, but his championing of George Allsopp was widely considered an unwise move. Merchants could not understand why he protected Allsopp. Carleton's actions against two council members, Mabane and Irving, had the desired effect of giving him a tame and quiet council, but he ran into trouble with Maseres and Hey, the new Attorney General and the new Chief Justice, when he tried to block their attempts at judicial reform in preference to his own. He rejected their report on Quebec requested by Shelburne in 1768.

Carleton was by now not the only influential figure in the colony, for, unlike Murray, he had an Attorney General of some substance. Maseres addressed himself to a few problems which directly affected the merchants. The first was the collection of duties and the second was the bankruptcy issue which was all the more pressing as more and more merchants began to experience business failures. Maseres was of Huguenot stock and had been educated at Cambridge before being called to the bar in 1758. Until recently, historians paid more attention to the anti-Catholic bias of

Maseres than to his hard work on Quebec. When he received orders to proceed to Quebec he was not as unprepared for the job as his predecessor. Under the Rockingham administration, Maseres produced a report on Quebec while he was still in London in which he concluded that an Act of Parliament was needed to regulate the judicial, religious and financial settlement of Quebec. His report was handed to Charles Yorke, the British Attorney General, in April 1766 but it was not brought before the House of Commons because the ministry was already in trouble.[14] Maseres was certain that revenues from French wine, the importation of which was now illegal, would not be enough to meet the revenues; therefore, the best alternative source of revenue would be a new tax, to be imposed by Parliament rather than by Governor and council. He was not committed to the idea of an assembly either and believed that the Canadians felt more secure under the system in place.[15]

There were two major issues raised by Francis Maseres in his report to London which were directly concerned with the state of the economy in Quebec. The first issue, the revenue case, was lost first in 1766 and again in 1768 when juries brought in a not guilty verdict on merchants who refused to pay import duties on spirits. By 1769 this concerted merchant opposition brought Maseres round to their way of thinking and he believed that a new tax should be created. His friendship with Fowler Walker led to an interesting exchange of letters between them on these economic issues. Walker's interest was personal as well as professional, as he was the London agent to the British merchants at Quebec, and had hopes of being named agent to the colony. The two men shared a loathing of James Murray and a keen interest in the economy. Fowler Walker consistently tied the cause of an assembly to the economic fortunes of the colony, but Maseres was unconvinced. Both recognized that the state of the fisheries and the fur trade were the key to a healthy export economy.[16]

The other issue Maseres thought a lot about was whether or not to introduce English bankruptcy laws into the colony. This issue was difficult for Maseres: firstly because of local perceptions on the matter, and secondly because he believed that English or British laws did not automatically apply in the colony and were perhaps not even valid until Parliament had considered them. There had to be some mechanism with which to protect merchants in the meantime. The increased numbers of business failures and dissolutions of partnerships after 1766 posed a serious problem for the viability of all merchant enterprises. The merchants had their own way of dealing with such troubles - they handed their estates over to trustees who in turn settled with creditors for so many shillings on the pound. No one had seen anything wrong with such a practice until the Mackenzie-Crokatt case, but that matter had been settled in 1765 or so it seemed. The discussions that merchants in the colony held with Maseres led him to believe that they had a flawed or false impression of what was in fact legal. This belief became very clear in the case of Levi Solomons, who, when he could not pay his creditors, was advised by Maseres to declare himself bankrupt. Solomons petitioned Carleton for the right to do so and, though Carleton agreed initially, local objections caused Carleton to believe that bankruptcy might be a hot political topic. He did what any good politician would do and delayed the commission for bankruptcy, pending word from Shelburne.[17] In a letter to Shelburne he explained that although Maseres thought it a good idea, the local merchants were upset and he suspected London merchants might also react badly. This last thought was precipitated by a petition of the Quebec merchants in 1767 on the matter. Carleton went on to explain that "as the commercial interests of this province are intimately united with those of the Mother Country, the British merchants concerned in the trade thereof must be the best judges of the advantages or disadvantages likely to result to them from the execution of these laws".[18] Carleton thought that the merchants and not the Attorney General should be the arbiters in such matters, and he neither followed Maseres in this instance nor in other matters of the law.

The petition which followed on the heels of Carleton's letter was straightforward in its opposition to Maseres' position.[19] The merchants argued that the credit of the colony was already suffering and would dry up completely if a merchant could be made bankrupt if he owed anyone £100. They also argued that this law did not apply in Scotland, Ireland or the British American dominions and should certainly not be used in Quebec. From the reasoning behind their petition, it appears that it had been customary that when a merchant was deeply in debt with little hope of recovery, he was allowed to hold onto his effects until the best return could be made from them, thus increasing the return to his creditors. The bankruptcy law would end this privilege and make it a formal procedure. The pages of the Quebec Gazette show, instead, that by 1766 more and more estates were handed over to trustees. Justin Franks for one was not allowed to hold onto his property until he cleared his debt. The debate on bankruptcy shows just how vital credit was to the merchants, and, that it could take longer than one season to pay off debts. Local merchants stepped up their campaign by sending two of their number to London to lobby against the introduction of such laws into Quebec. Maseres explained to Fowler Walker that the merchants were unaware of the legal problems associated with the customary practice to which they clung so tenaciously.[20] When a business ended, the merchants put their goods in the hands of trustees and a credit settlement was agreed upon by all the creditors. This mechanism was chosen by Governor Murray in the case of Mackenzie-Crokatt. The problem arose when the partnership, which was in debt to a number of creditors, was forced to settle up the account to one major creditor, instead of settling with all their creditors. It had taken over two years to settle the Mackenzie-Crokatt case and from then on regular practice had been to settle with all creditors equally.

This end was accomplished in one of three ways. In the first case the merchant in trouble assigned his property to trustees who paid equal amounts to each of the creditors in proportion to the amount owed in return for discharging the balance. Maseres believed that this method was not fraudulent because everyone involved had to give their consent. In the second scenario, one creditor might refuse, but the others could go ahead anyway and be paid out equally. The merchants believed that this system was perfectly legal but Maseres thought that the merchant holding out could sue for the total debt owed and possibly win. In the last case, one merchant might wish to hold out but was compelled to give his assent in case it jeopardized the repayment of the rest. Maseres thought that this scenario could be considered fraud. In all three cases there was a genuine fear that, from a legal perspective, the system of assigning trusteeship in case of business failure would be invalid and result in total confusion.[21] The Attorney General found it impossible to convince merchants that there was anything wrong with the assignee system because they believed the creditor who held out could not sue and win. Maseres felt that without a bankruptcy commission this probability was entirely possible. In the end, he was unable to convince Carleton to agree to any judicial reforms and had to put his bankruptcy commission on hold.

Changes in personnel at the most senior level of the colonial administration in Quebec may have caused some initial excitement but they had little effect on the merchants in any practical sense. The merchants won their legal case against paying duty and convinced Carleton not to introduce English bankruptcy laws into the colony immediately. The arrival of Maseres brought the beginnings of a highly qualified administrative infrastructure sadly missing before 1766. Carleton was well liked by merchants, in part because their sights were still trained on Murray, but Carleton's popularity also stemmed from his perceived sympathy with the plight of the merchant community. But it is worth remembering that Murray had supported many similar schemes and never received the credit then or later.

Merchants with firmly established connections to the Scottish and English merchant communities managed to weather the economic woes of the decade, but no matter how many times Fowler Walker asserted that "easy fortunes were made", the very opposite was closer to the reality.[22] The arrival of Carleton did not make much of a difference to the running of the colony. He followed in Murray's footsteps by showing concern for the state of the fisheries and the Indian trade. Carleton held back from making any decisions on the bankruptcy issue, not because it could ruin what remained of the merchant community in the colony, but because of the negative effect which it might have on the involvement of London merchants in the trade. Although Carleton is often characterized as the merchants' friend, in his first contact with the colony, it was under his temporary leadership that the lease of the King's Posts to Dunn and Gray was renewed much to the chagrin of other merchants vying for the lease. He did not have to deal, as Murray had, with the problems stemming from a large army presence in the colony, and by 1768, most of the regiments there since 1759 had left. The regiments involved in the civil-military disturbances in the period 1764-1766 had moved on to other parts of the empire. It was one of the great ironies of the period that Murray had presided over a healthy economy. Under Carleton the merchants experienced considerable trouble. In reality it hardly mattered that Murray was replaced by Carleton. The economic problems that faced the colony in 1760 continued to plague it until 1774. In England the creation of the position of Colonial Secretary seemed, on the surface, to be a signal that the government was ready to accord special status to colonial problems. Instead, it began another round of internecine fighting and brought Hillsborough, a man committed to the 1763 settlement, back to centre stage. This attitude along with the manic information gathering and inaction of Shelburne meant more policy delays.

Murray had not been oblivious to the problems facing Quebec, but he also had to deal with the question of the military presence before 1763 and the deterioration of military-civil relations in Montreal. By the time Carleton arrived in Quebec the question of military-civil disputes were over and the split personality of the British community in the colony had been purged. The economic fortunes of the colony were on a downward spiral by 1767 and fears were expressed that total ruin lay ahead. The inability of the various administrations in London to decide what to do about Quebec only added to the turmoil and uncertainty of the decade. The characters of both Murray and Carleton grated on the nerves of a number of merchants in Quebec; Murray remained the focus of their grievances, allowing Carleton, who shared Murray's military - aristocratic attitudes towards control and power, to dodge the arrows of the merchants.

Despite the claims of Fowler Walker, economic success was not waiting around the corner for the young man of a speculative bent. The primary objective of Walker's missives was to prove that these merchants could not be the ignorant vagrants that Murray claimed they were. A few success stories went a long way to undermining Murray's assessment of the merchant community; he believed them to be too self-serving to be part of the political process. Murray's attitude did him more of a disservice than he realized. Fowler Walker, of course, did not mention that it was the merchants who were part of the Scottish and English mercantile circle who were successful in the colony.

British merchants in Quebec involved in the import-export trade with direct contacts to the London mercantile community did well in the colony. The cash, credit and goods which they had access to allowed them great flexibility in purchasing and selling, not only commodities for their principals, but real estate and Canada bills for themselves. Such stable backing gave these merchants the ability to ride out the credit squeeze in Britain, the rise and fall of fur prices and all the ups and downs of the internal economy of the colony.

It was not quite so easy for the other merchants who were limited by their contacts and credit, but their increasing participation in the transatlantic economy, as booking agents for ships, was one of the ways in which they established regular contact with merchants in Britain. The common vision of the British merchant's healthy approach to business, his capitalist-entrepreneurial spirit and his great success in capturing and controlling the colony's economy is not the reality found in the pages of the Quebec Gazette. Partnerships were in a sense inflexible and the majority were not diversified. There was a nucleus of well connected merchants in the colony and it is only here that the patterns which historians have sought to extend to the whole merchant community can be found.

By 1768 there was only one partnership remaining in the advertisement section of the newspaper. While many of the merchants had begun selling their goods from rented premises, the movement towards selling from their own shop or house was almost complete by the end of the decade. Murray had interfered as little as possible in the transatlantic trade, except in very helpful practical ways. He regulated the passage of the river from Bic to Quebec through a system of river pilots, and set port fees at a level comparable to other colonial ports. The impact of imperial policy on the colony was beyond his control. Merchants in Quebec refused to accept that their ills were partly a result of policy set in London and instead, some chose to victimize the King's representative, the Governor in Chief, James Murray.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER ELEVEN

1.MG11 Q Series. vol. 2. 26 October 1764. List of Protestant Housekeepers in Quebec.

2.MG11 Q Series. vol.2. List of Protestant Householders in Montreal 29 October 1764 and MG11 C.O. 42. Vol.5. List of Protestant Householders in the District of Montreal 7 November 1765.

3.MG11 Q Series. vol. 4. "Land Held April 1767." Mills to Carleton and "Grants of Lands and Lots since the Establishment of Civil Government" 30 March 1767. J. Goldfrap Registers Office.

4.See the Quebec Gazette all issues from 1764. Gunn and Murray, Baird, Hanna, Holland, Barkly, Douglas and Aitken, S. and Wm. Abbott : had stores in the houses of others. Johnston & Purss, Fulton & Anderson, Marder, Morin, Mooring, McKenzie-Grant, Jenkins & Allsopp : had stores. McCord, Moore & Finlay, Laing and Taylor : worked from their own houses. Sills, Jackson, Sinclair and two other merchants worked from Lower Town taverns.

5.RG4 B28 vol. 24. 1765. Bonds of Debtors Leaving the Province of Quebec.

6.Hardwicke Papers, Additional Manuscripts 35915. 14 September 1766. Maseres to Walker.

7.Kings Mss. 207, ff.1-58. 18 September 1769. Carleton to Hillsborough.

8.Hardwicke Papers, Additional Manuscripts 35915. f. 288. 27 May 1768. Maseres to an unknown correspondent.

9.Quebec Gazette, 1764-1768.

10.Quebec Gazette, 1764-1768 : The numbers of British merchants working shipping agents were as follows : 10 in 1765/ 9 in 1766/ 9 in 1767/ 5 in 1768.

11.Quebec Gazette, 12 June 1766.

12.The discussion which follows owes much to the works of Philip Lawson on Quebec especially The Imperial Challenge, Chapter Five "The Lost Years 1766-70." pp. 85-107.

13.The discussion which follows is taken from an analysis of Carleton's official correspondence. MG11 Q Series. vol. 4. Correspondence Between Lt. Gov. Carleton and the English Ministry, 1766-1767 and MG11 Q Series. vol. 5. Correspondence Between Lt. Gov. Carleton and the English Ministry, 1767-1768.

14.John Mappin, " The Political Thought of Francis Maseres," (M.A., McGill University, 1968), p.15.

15.Ibid., p. 22.

16.Hardwicke Papers, Additional Manuscripts, 35915. f. 253. 19 November 1767. Maseres to Walker.

17.A.L. Burt, The Old Province of Quebec, p. 134.

18.MG11 Q Series. Vol. 5. 21 November 1767. Carleton to Shelburne.

19.MG11 Q Series. Vol. 5. 17 November 1767. Petition of Sundry Merchants of Quebec to the Bankruptcy Act.

20.Hardwicke Papers, Additional Manuscripts 35915. 2 April 1768. Maseres to Walker.

21.Hardwicke Papers. Additional Manuscripts 35915. 2 April 1768. Maseres to Walker.

22.Hardwicke Papers. Additional Manuscripts 35915. March 1766. State of the Province - Walker to the Lord Chancellor.

POSTSCRIPT

A thorough analysis of the economic and political settlement of Quebec in the years following the conquest and the making of the mercantile community in the colony in the early years of British rule is long overdue, and it has been the purpose of this study to open the subject for debate. Traditional accounts of this period have not focused on the economy but have given credit to the immediate post conquest era for the later successes of many British merchants in Quebec. All of this work has been done with little or no understanding of the realities and mechanics of the import-export trade of the 1760s. Revisions to this picture can now be made. To come to a more complete understanding of the economy of Quebec we must broaden our perspective and take into account the role of the colony within the greater imperial web. Quebec could not be understood as a separate entity before 1759 without reference to France nor can it be understood after 1763 without reference to England. As a colonial possession there were certain procedures that one would expect to see in place in the economy. One such procedure was the use of the factory, factor or resident agent. The clear lack of this as part of the economic infrastructure in the decade after the conquest gives an indication that all was not well in the merchant establishments of London. The lack of such a system, which Miquelon and others have pointed to as a key element to a successful business for overseas traders in New France, had serious implications for Quebec after 1760. There was no great successful entity at Quebec within the British merchant community in the 1760s. Those who were a success brought cash with them into the colony and were part of the London merchant circle; the rest did the best they could in the face of the seemingly endless problems which they confronted. For the future more work needs to be done on what happened in the colony after 1768 to turn things around for the merchants. Such an extension of the time frame would also have not only to take into account local change but again involve political change. How did the English ministry cope with the problems of running a new colony in the face of political instability and confusion over which settlement would best suit the needs of this newest addition to the ever expanding British empire. The story is not simple but as complex as the imperatives driving the British to expand their territorial empire.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Customs 2 : English Foreign Trade.

Customs 3 / 62-68 : Ledgers of Imports and Exports to Great Britain 1697-1780 including a List of Prices.

Customs 14 : Ledgers of Imports and Exports, Scotland 1755 onward.

Customs 16 : Ledgers of Imports and Exports, North America 1768 onward.

Customs 21 : Miscellaneous Books, 1715-1787, including registers of seizures.

Customs 36 / 3 : Statistics of Trade and Shipping.

Customs 43 / 12 : Folios 331, 218-221.

C.O. 5 : Colonial Office, America and the West Indies Original Correspondence, 1606-1822.

C.O. 43 : Entry Books. Commissions and Instructions, 1763-1768.

C.O. 45 : Sessional Papers, Canada.

C.O. 47 : Ships returns 18th century.

C104-16 : C.M.E. Freight Rate Sources.

Adm 8 : Admiralty List Books 1673-1909.

Adm 18 : Admiralty Billbooks 1760s.

Adm 20 / 242-258 : Victualling Ledgers and Services, 1660-1836.

Adm 68 / 22-26 : Naval Accounts and Victualling Boards, 1696-1865.

Adm 68 / 200-201 : Ships paying Chelsea sixpences, 1696-1865.

Adm 111 : Victualling Board Minutes, 1701-1832.

Adm 112 : Victualling Board Accounts and Original Contracts, 1660-1831.

BT 6 / 185 : State of Trade of Great Britain, 1696-1773 (Charles Whitworth)

CTB 17 : Calendar of Treasury Books 18th century.

T46 : Treasury - Victualling Lists.

T64 / 276A : Treasury - Quantity of Furs exported from Canada, 1764-1767.

W.O. 24 / 384, 398, 413, 422, 426. War Office - Army Commissariat Records Victualling for 1760-1764.

List of Ships of North America Stations 1712-1776. Prepared by PRO Kew from Adm 8 / 12-52 and Adm 7 / 569-575.

30/6/66 Victualling contract for Canada in 1760.

BRITISH LIBRARY, LONDON

Kings Manuscripts 205, 206, 207 and 213 : Reports on Quebec.

Additional Manuscripts 11256 : Entries and Clearance, 1709-1779.

15485 : Commodity Values 18th century.

21668 : Account of Murray's administration at Quebec.

21697 : Correspondence with the English ministers.

21844 : f.408 Letter to the Commissioner of Customs.

28235 : f. 373, 386, 402. Original correspondence of the Caryll family.

21683 : Orders and instructions for officers and barracks at Quebec 1764-67.

21854-55 : Commissariat, 1767-1785.

32877 : f.300, 304. Correspondence with the Duke of Newcastle, 1758-67.

35913-35915 : Hardwicke Papers v. DLXV-DLXVII. on Canada.

38197 : Liverpool Papers v. VIII-XLVII.

38335 : Customs Report in the Liverpool Papers v. CXL.

45662 : f. 1b-45b. Blechynden Papers v. LXXXV. Journal of R. Humphreys of the 28th.

32887 : f.379. / 32906 : f. 259 / 32908 : f. 223 / 32922 : f. 443 / 32979 : f. 253 and 298 / 32985 : f. 437 and 439.

SHEFFIELD CITY LIBRARY, SHEFFIELD

Wentworth Woodhouse Muniments 62-68 : Board of Trade reports 1766.

CROMARTIE ESTATE OFFICE, STRATHPEFFER, ROSS SHIRE,SCOTLAND.

Letters and Miscellaneous papers, Bundle XXII, 57 1760-1776.

SCOTTISH RECORD OFFICE, EDINBURGH SCOTLAND.

RH4 /56. Correspondence of James Montgomerie on Quebec, 1767-1803.

GD 32. Elibank Muniments 1759-1766.

CC9 /13 1. Commissary Court. Edinburgh and Glasgow.

E501-520. Exchequer- Customs Accounts 1707-1831.

E503 / 46. Seizures 1760s.

E504:

- E504/15/10-16 Oct. 1760 - April 1769: Greenock.
- E504/1/7-10 Oct. 1758 - Oct. 1770 : Aberdeen.
- E504/28/9-16 Oct. 1758 - July 1769 : Port Glasgow.
- E504/22/9-22 Port Records Greenock and Port Glasgow.
- E508/58/6,8,9. Customs Cash Vouchers in Linen, Whale, Herring.
- E510/116-118. Collectors Incidental Accounts Greenock - Oct.1756 - Oct. 1769.

NATIONAL LIBRARY OF SCOTLAND, EDINBURGH SCOTLAND

Molleson Papers 1756 - 1792. Mss 5496-98: 5500-5501. Comptroller of Army Accounts.

Steuart Papers. Add. Mss 6405 : Letters of Attorney 1767-1777 from local Collectors of Customs North America.

M.S. 60. Imports and Exports between Scotland and the Colonies.

STRATHCLYDE REGIONAL ARCHIVES, GLASGOW SCOTLAND

B10/15/6660-7215 Register of Deeds 1760-1770.

PUBLIC ARCHIVES OF CANADA, OTTAWA.

AMHERST PAPERS

W.O. 34. vol.1. Letters from the Governor of Quebec to Amherst 1760-1763.

W.O. 34. vol.5. Correspondence of Amherst and Gage on the State of the Colony.

W.O. 34. vols. 57 -61. Letters from Bradstreet DQMG to Amherst. 1758-1763.

W.O. 34. vol. 62. Letters of T. Hancock and J. Appy on supply, 1758-1763.

W.O. 34. vol. 3. Letters from the C. in C. at New York to the Governor of Quebec, 1759-1763.

W.O. 34. vol. 66. Letters from the C. in C. to agents supplying provisions, 1759-1763.

W.O. 34. vols. 67-68. Letters from the C. in C. to commissioners of stores and provisions, 1758-1762.

W.O. 34. vol. 70. Letters fromthe C. in C. to the Comptroller HM Ordnance, 1756-1763.

Q SERIES - COLONIAL OFFICE 42

MG11 - vol.1 Colonial Office Correspondence with General Murray, 1761-1763.

MG11 - vol.2 Colonial Office Correspondence with General Murray, 1764-1765.

MG11 - vol.3 Correspondence with the English Ministry, 1766.

MG11 - vol.4 Correspondence between Lt. Gov. Carleton and the English Ministry, 1766-1767.

MG11 - vol.5 Correspondence between Lt. Gov. Carleton and the English Ministry, 1767-1768.

ERMATINGER ESTATE PAPERS

MG 19 A2 Series 3 vol. 80: Cash Book 1764-1767.

MG 19 A2 Series 3 vol. 81: Cash Book, 1764-1770.

JACOBS ESTATE PAPERS

MG 19 A2 Series 3 vol. 1 : Letter Books and Accounts, 1762-1763, 1770.

vol. 8 : Estate Papers, 1760-1763.

vol. 9 : Estate Papers, 1764-1768.

vol 10 : Estate Papers, 1769-1770.

MURRAY PAPERS

MG23 GII I vol.(1) : General Murray's Letters, 1759-1760.

MG23 GII I vol.(1) 2 : Letter Book, 1763-1765.

MG23 GII I vol.(1) 3 : Letters To and From James Murray, 1759-1789.

MG23 GII I vols. 2-7 : James Murray Papers.

MISCELLANEOUS COLLECTIONS

MG23 I, 13 : Sharp Papers

MG23 K1 vols. 1-14, 32 (folio 506) and 34 : Fraser Papers.

MG8 F99 vols. 1-2 : Gabriel Christie.

MG23 GIII 23 vols 1 and 3-6 : John Nairne Papers.

TREASURY

MG40 D9 TS II vols. 419-421 : Revenues, Seizures of Brandy 1760s.

Treasury 27 vols. 28-29 : Brandy dispute of 1762.

Treasury 28 vol. 1 : America Books 1763-1778 Selections.

Treasury 64 vol. 273 : Trade Returns for England 1713-1804 classified by country and given in total values, 1761-1769.

Treasury 64 vol 274 : Trade Returns 1713-1800 an account of corn exported from England in 1766.

Treasury 64 vol. 276a : Exports and Imports by Commodity.

Treasury 64 vol. 309 : Miscellanea . Extracts Unclassified, 1741-1800.

Treasury 64 vol. 312 : Unclassified, 1767-1777. Includes sailings to Quebec from Spain.

WAR OFFICE

MG13 W.O. 1/1 : In Letters North America, 1756-63. Loudon, Abercrombie, Wolfe etc.

W.O. 1/5 : In Letters, 1758-1768. Amherst, Monckton, Gage.

W.O. 1/6 : Letters North America, 1764-1765.

W.O. 1/7 : Letters, 1766. Gen. Gage and Gen. Carleton.

W.O. 1/8 : In Letters North America, 1767-1769. Gen. Gage.

W.O. 4/53 : Out Letters North America, 1756-1757.

W.O. 4/56-57 : Out Letters Selections, 1758-1759.

W.O. 4/74 : Out Letters from the Secretary at War, 1763-1764.

W.O. 55/1820 : Miscellaneous Books and Papers, 1758-1772.

W.O. 55/1822 : Ordnance Miscellanea - Returns and Estimates for Quebec, 1768-1772.

W.O. 12/3228 : Selections - Muster Books and Paylists, 1760-1767.

COLONIAL OFFICE - GENERAL

C.O. 44 (1) : Acts for Quebec no. 1-64.

C.O. 323 (15) : Board of Trade Original Correspondence, 1760-1763.

C.O. 323 (16) : Board of Trade Correspondence 1763.

S SERIES

Volumes 1-15.Civil and Provincial Secretary Lower Canada.

RG SERIES

RG4 A3 Entries of Ships in Port of Quebec, 1763-1764.

RG4 B58 vol. 15 : Ships Clearances, 1764-1774 : General Passes.

RG4 B28 vol. 24 : Bonds of Debtors to leave the Province, 1764-1769 and Powder Bonds, 1766-1767.

RG4 B28 vol. 28 : Bonds for Gunpowder, 1764-1768.

RG4 B58 vol. 15 : General Passes to leave the Province, 1766-1839.

RG68 vol. 195 : Ship Clearances from Quebec, May 1763-June 1764.

RG68 vol.202 : Register of Vessels, 1763.

RG68 vol. 213 : Passports, 1763 : Clearances and Entries, 1763.

RG68 vol. 294 : Ship Arrivals and Clearances, 1761-1762.

RG68 vol. 190 : Commissions and Grants, 1763-1777.

RG4 A1 vol.1. : S Series. Civil and Provincial Secretary of Upper and Lower Canada. 1760-1840.

WILLIAM L. CLEMENTS LIBRARY, ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN.

SHELBURNE MANUSCRIPTS

volumes 51,52,53,54,and 64.

PRINTED ORIGINAL SOURCES

Acts of the Privy Council. J. Munro ed., "The Unbound Papers". VI. 1912.

Buffalo Historical Society. Letterbooks of Phyn and Ellice, Merchants at Schenectady, N.Y. 1767-1776. vol.1, 30 November 1767-6 to September 1771. (B.H.S. Microfilm Publication No.1.)

Cartwright, George. A Journal of Transactions and Events during a residence of nearly sixteen years on the Coast of Labrador. 3 vols. This being vol.1. Newark: n.p., 1792.(authorized facsimilie of original book- University Microfilms International. Ann Arbor Michigan, 1981.).

Dunlop Papers vol.3 Letters and Journals, 1663-1889. selected and annotated by J.G. Dunlop.London : privately printed by Butler and Tanner Ltd., 1953.

Hervey, William. Journals of the Hon. William Hervey in North America and Europe From 1755 to 1814. with Order Books at Montreal, 1760-1763. Bury St. Edmunds: Paul & Mathew, 1906. Suffolk Green Books No. xiv.

Journal of Commissioners for Trade and Plantations

Journal of John Lees of Quebec, Merchant.Detroit: Society of Colonial Wars of the State of Michigan, 1911.

Journals of the House of Commons

Letter Book of John Watts merchant and councillor of New York. New York: The New York Historical Society Collections LXI, 1928

Maseres, Francis. A Collection of Several Commissions and other Public Instruments. S.R. Publishers Ltd, Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1966.

Quaife, Milo M. The John Askin Papers vol.1. Detroit: Detroit Library Commission, 1928.

HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPT COMMISSION

Dartmouth 14th Report.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Cameron, Christine and Trepanier, Monique. Vieux Quebec son Architecture interieure. Ottawa: National Museum of Man, National Museum of Canada, 1986. Publication of the History Division. Mercury Series #40.

Charbonneau, Andre., Deloges,Yvon., and Marc LeFrance. Quebec. The Fortified City : From the 17th to the 19th Century. Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1982.

General Staff(Historical Section). A History of the Organization, Development and Services of the Military and Naval Forces of Canada From the Peace of Paris in 1763, to the Present Time.vols.1 and 11. n.p., n.d.

Lacelle, Claudette. The British Garrison in Quebec City as Described in Newspapers from 1764 to 1840. Ottawa : National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada. Indian and Northern Affairs of Canada, 1979. Booklet #23 History and Archaeology.

Lacelle, Claudette. Military Property in Quebec City, 1760-1871. Ottawa: National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, 1987. Booklet #57 History and Archaeology.

McCullough, A.B. Money and Exchange in Canada to 1900. Toronto : Dundurn Press Ltd., 1984 in co-operation with Parks Canada and Canadian Government Publishing Centre. Supply and Services Canada.

McNally, Paul. Table Glass in Canada, 1700-1850. Ottawa: National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, Environment Canada, 1982. Booklet #60 History and Archaeology.

Namier,L. and Brooke,J. eds The House of Commons, 1754-90. vol 2 and 3. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964.

Price, Lynda. Introduction to the Social History of Scots in Quebec (1780-1840). Ottawa: National Museums of Canada,1981. History Division Paper # 31.

Richardson, A.J.H., Bastien,G., Dubé,D., and Marthe Lacombe. Quebec City : Architects, Artisans, and Builders. Ottawa: National Museum of Man, National Museums of Canada, 1984. Publication of the History Division. Mercury Series #37.

Rioux, Christian. The Royal Regiment of Artillery in Quebec City 1759-1871. Ottawa: National Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, 1987. Booklet #57 History and Archaeology.

Rioux, Christian.Quelques aspects des effefts sociaux et urbains de la presence d'une garnison Britannique a Quebec entre 1759-1871. Quebec: Parks Canada, 1983.

Ruddel, David T. Quebec City 1765-1832. The evolution of a colonial town. Ottawa: Canadian Museum of Civilization, 1989. Publication of the History Division. Mercury Series #41.

Shortt, Adam. and Doughty, Arthur G. eds., Documents relating to the Constitutional History of Canada 1759-1791. Ottawa: Printed by Order of Parliament, 1918.

Trottier, Louise. Les Forges du Saint Maurice : Their Historiography. Ottawa: National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, Environment Canada, 1980. Booklet # 42. History and Archaeology.

Vermette, Luce. Domestic Life at Les Forges du Saint-Maurice. Ottawa: National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, Environment Canada, 1982. Booklet # 58 History and Archaeology.

Whitfield, Carol M. Tommy Atkins : The British Soldier in Canada, 1759-1870. Ottawa: National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, Environment Canada, 1981. Booklet # 43. History and Archaeology.

NEWSPAPERS AND JOURNALS

British Magazine or Monthly Repository for Gentlemen

Gentlemans Magazine

Glasgow Journal

London Evening Post

North Briton

Public Advertiser

Quebec Gazette

DIRECTORIES : GUILDHALL LIBRARY, LONDON

London Trade Directory 1760. 8th Edition. London,1760 for Hitch, Hawes, Baldwin and Longman.

The Universal Pocket Companion 1760. London, 1760 for Hitch, Hawes, Keith, Rivington.

Complete Guide to All Persons who have any Trade or Concern with the City of London 1763. London, Rivington, Hawes, Clarke, Collins.

The Universal Director; or the Nobleman and Gentlemans True Guide to the Masters and Professors of the Liberal or polite arts and sciences; and of the mechanics, arts, manufactures and trades established in London in 1763 London, J. Coote.

A Complete Guide to all Persons who have any trade or concern with the City of London and parts adjacent 1765. London, Rivington, Hawes et al.

Lloyds Register 1764-66 Republished 1965 by the Gregg Press Inc, Farnborough, England.

The Register of Ships for 1768-1771 [Lloyds Register insituted in 1760-- Ist part A-L no longer exists - the rest is reproduced here and is part of the second oldest register of shipping]

PAMPHLETS

Brunet, Michel. French Canada and the Early Decades of British Rule 1760-1791. Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association Booklet,1981. Booklet # 13.

Burt, A.L. Guy Carleton, Lord Dorchester 1724-1808. Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association Booklet, 1968. Booklet # 5.

Eccles, W.J. The Government of New France. Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association Booklet, 1971. Booklet # 18.

Fregault, Guy. Canadian Society in the French Regime. Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association Booklet, 1981. Booklet # 3.

ARTICLES

Andrews, J.H. "The Problems in the Interpretation of the Port Books."Economic History Review 9 No.1 (1956-57) : 119-122.

Balls, H.R. "Quebec 1766-1774 : The Financial Arrangements." Canadian Historical Review XLI (1960) : 203-214.

Bernier,Gerald. "Sur quelques effets de la rupture structurelle engendree par la conquete au Quebec: 1760-1854." Revue d'histoire de l"Amerique francaise. (June 1981) : 69-95.

Bosher,J.F. "A Quebec Merchant's Trading Circles in France and Canada : Jean-Andre Lamaletie before 1763." Histoire Sociale / Social History X (1977): 24-44.

Breen, T.H. "An Empire of Goods : The Anglicization of Colonial America, 1690-1776." Journal of British Studies 25 (1986) No. 4 : 467-499.

Bryant, G.J. "The Scots in India in the Eighteenth Century." Scottish Historical Review 64 (1985) No. 177 : 21-41.

Bullion, John L. "The Ten Thousand in America.More light on the Decision on the American Army, 1762-1763." William and Mary Quarterly XLIII (1986) 3rd series : 646-657.

Burton, F.W. "The Wheat Supply of New France." Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada 30 3rd series : 137-180.

Canny, Nicholas. "The Ideology of English Colonization From Ireland to America." William and Mary Quarterly XXX (1973) 3rd series : 575-598.

Clarkson, L.A. "The Organization of the English Leather Industry in the late Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries." Economic History Review 13 (1960-61) 2nd series No.2 : 245-256.

Cole, W.A. "Trends in Eighteenth-Century Smuggling" Economic History Review X (1985) 2nd series No.3 : 395-409.

Couture, Claude. "La Conquete de 1760 et le probleme de la transition au capitalisme." RHAF 39 (1986) No. 3 : 369-389.

Craig, Robin. "Printed guides for master mariners as a source of productivity change in Shipping, 1750-1914." Journal of Transport History 3 (1982) 3rd series No. 2 : 23-35.

Davis, Ralph. "English Foreign Trade, 1700-1774." Economic History Review XV (1962-63) 2nd series : 285-303.

Davis, Ralph. "Earnings and Capital in the English Shipping Industry, 1670-1730." The Journal of Economic History XVII (1957) No. 3 : 409-425.

Davis, Ralph. "Seamen's Sixpences : An Index of Commercial Activity, 1697-1828." Economica XXIII (1956) New series : 328-343.

Devine, T.M. "An eighteenth-century business elite : Glasgow-West India merchants, c. 1750-1815." Scottish Historical Review 57 (1978) Nos. 163-64 : 42-67.

Devine, T.M. "The Colonial Trades and Industrial Investment in Scotland c. 1700-1815." Economic History Review 29 (1976) 2nd series No. 1 : 1-14.

East, Robert A. "The Business Entrepreneur in a Changing Colonial Economy, 1763-1795." Journal of Economic History 6 (Supplement, 1946) : 16-27.

Edelman, E. "Thomas Hancock, Colonial Merchant." Journal of Economic and Business History I (1928) : 77-104.

Fleming, H.A. "Halifax Currency" Nova Scotia Historical Society Collections 20 (1928) : 111-137.

Foust, C.M. "Customs 3 and Russian Rhubarb. A Note on Reliability." The Journal of European Economic History 15 (1986) No.3 :549-562.

Gwyn, Julian. "British Government Spending and the North American Colonies, 1740-1775." Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 8 (1980) No. 2 : 74-83.

Hoppit, Julian. "Financial Crises in Eighteenth-century England." The Economic History Review XXXIX (1986) 2nd series No. 1 : 39-65.

Igartua, Jose E. "The Conquest and the Marchands of Montreal." Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers (1974).

_____. "The Merchants of Montreal at the Conquest: Socio-Economic Profile" Histoire Sociale/Social History. VIII. (November 1975) : 275-293.

Jackson, Marjorie G. "The beginnings of British Trade at Michilimackinac." Minnesota History XI (September 1930) 231-270.

James, Francis G. "Irish Colonial Trade in the Eighteenth Century." William and Mary Quarterly 3rd series XX (1963) no.4: 574-584.

Jarvis, Rupert C. "Sources for the History of Ports." The Journal of Transport History III (1957-58) : 76-94.

John, A. H. "The London Assurance Company and the Marine Insurance Market of the Eighteenth Century." Economica XXV (1958) New series No. 97-100 : 126-141.

John, A.H. "War and the English Economy, 1700-1763." Economic History Review 2nd series VII (1955) No. 3 : 329-344.

John, A.H. "Insurance Investment and the London Money Market of the 18th Century." Economica XX (1953) New series No. 77-80 : 137-158.

Joslin, D.M. "London Private Bankers, 1720-1785." Economic History Review VII (1954-55) 2nd series No. 1 :167-186.

Jowett, A. O'Donnell, N. and E. Tait. "Leather Industry and Trade." Quarterly Economic Commentary Fraser of Allander Institute 7 (1981) No. 2.

W.B. Kerr. "The Stamp Act in Quebec." English Historical Review 47 (1932) : 648-651.

Kingsford, P.W. "A London Merchant : Sir William Blake." History Today XXI (1971) No. 5 :338-348.

Lane, Frederic C. "Tonnages, Medieval and Modern." Economic History Review 17 (1964) 2nd series No. 2 :214-233.

Lart, Charles E. "Fur Trade Returns 1767." Canadian Historical Review III (December 1922) : 351-358.

Lawson, Philip. "Parliament, The Constitution and Corn : The Embargo Crisis of 1766." Parliamentary History 5 (1986) : 17-37.

------."'The Irishman's Prize' : Views of Canada from the British Press 1760-1774." Historical Journal 28 (1985) No. 3 : 575-596.

Lunn, Jean Elizabeth. "Agriculture and War in Canada, 1740-1760." Canadian Historical Review XVI (1935) ; 123-136.

Lydon,James G. "Fish and Flour for Gold : Southern Europe and the Colonial American Balance of Payments." Business History Review 39 (1965) No. 2 : 171-183.

Mathias, Peter and Patrick O' Brien. "Taxation in Britain and France, 1715-1810. A Comparison of the Social and Economic Incidence of Taxes Collected for the Central Governments." Journal of European Economic History 5 (1976) No. 3 : 601-650.

McCusker, John J. "Weights and Measures in the Colonial Sugar Trade : The Gallon and the Pound and their International Equivalent." William and Mary Quarterly 30 (1973) : 599-615.

McCusker, John J. "The Current Value of English Exports, 1697 to 1800." William and Mary Quarterly 28 (1971) No. 4 :607-628.

McCusker, John J. "Colonial Tonnage Measurement : Five Philadelphia Merchant Ships as a Sample." The Journal of Economic History 27 (1967) : 82-91.

Miquelon, Dale."Havy and Lefebvre of Quebec : A Case Study in Metropolitan Participation in Canadian Trade 1730-1760." Canadian Historical Review 56 (March 1975): 1-24.

Moore, Christopher. "The other Louisbourg: Trade and Merchant Enterprise in Ile Royale 1713-58." Histoire Sociale/Social History 13 (1979) : 79-96.

Morgan,Kenneth. "Shipping Patterns and the Atlantic Trade of Bristol, 1749-1770." William and Mary Quarterly XLVI (1989) No. 3 : 506-538.

Morton, A.S. "Forrest Oakes, Charles Boyer, Joseph Fulton and Peter Pangman in the north-west, 1765-1793." R.S.C.Transactions 3rd series XXXI (1937) section II : 87-110.

Namier, L.B. "Anthony Bacon, M.P., An Eighteenth Century Merchant." Journal of Economic and Business History II (1929-30) : 20-70.

Nash, R.C. "The English and Scottish Tobacco Trades in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries : Legal and Illegal Trade" Economic History Review 35 (1982) 2nd series : 354-372.

Neal, Larry D. "Interpreting Power and Profit in Economic History : A Case Study of the Seven Years War." The Journal of Economic History XXXVII (1977) No. 1 :20-35.

Neatby, Hilda. "The Political Career of Adam Mabane." *Canadian Historical Review* XVI (1935) : 137-150.

North, D.C. "Sources of Productivity Change in Ocean Shipping, 1600-1850." *Journal of Political Economy* 76 (1968) no. 5 : 953-970.

Olson,Alison. "The London Mercantile Lobby and the Coming of the American Revolution." *Journal of American History* 69 (1982-1983) : 21-41.

Pares, Richard. "The London Sugar Market 1740-69" *Economic History Review* 2nd series IX (1956) no. 2 : 254-270.

Price, Jacob M. "What did merchants do? Reflections on British Overseas Trade, 1600-1790'" *The Journal of Economic History* 49 (1989) No. 2 : 267-284.

Price, Jacob M. "Buchanan and Simson, 1759-1763 : A Different kind of Glasgow Firm Trading to the Chesapeake." *William and Mary Quarterly* XL (1983) 3rd series No. 1 : 3-41.

Price, Jacob M. "Economic Function and the Growth of American Port Towns in the Eighteenth Century." *Perspectives in American History* 8 (1974) : 123-186.

Pritchard, James S. "The pattern of French colonial shipping to Canada before 1760."*Revue francaise d'histoire d'outre-mer* LXIII (1976) : 189-210.

Rich, E.E. "The Fur Traders: Their Diet and Drugs." *Beaver* III (1976) : 42-53.

Reid, M.G. "The Quebec Fur Traders and Western Policy 1763-1774." *Canadian Historical Review* VI (March 1925) : 15-32.

Roberts, William I. "Samuel Storke : An Eighteenth Century London Merchant Trading to the American Colonies." *Business History Review* XXXIX (1965) No. 2 :147-170.

Roth, Rodris. "Tea Drinking in 18th Century America : Its Etiquette and Equipage." Contributions from the Museum of History and Technology. U.S. National Museum Bulletin. Washington, D.C. 225 (1961) Paper #14.

Rothney, G.O. "The Case of Bayne and Brymer." *Canadian Historical Review* XV (September 1934) : 264-275.

Schumpeter, Elizabeth Boody. "English Prices and Public Finances, 1660-1822." *The Review of Economic Statistics* XX (1938) 21-37.

Scott, S.M. "Civil and Military Authorities in Canada 1764-1766." *Canadian Historical Review* IX (1928) : 117-136.

Shammas, Carole. "Consumer Behaviour in Colonial America." *Social Science History* 6 (1982) No. 1 :67-86.

Shepherd, James F. "Commodity Exports from the British North American Colonies to Overseas Areas, 1768-1772 : Magnitudes and Patterns of Trade." *Explorations in Economic History* VIII (1970) No.1 : 5-76.

Turnau, Irena. "Consumption of Clothes in Europe between the XVIth and the XVIIth centuries." The Journal of European Economic History 5 (1976) : 451-468.

Usherwood, Stephen. "Conquered Canada. General James Murray's Impressions, 1762." History Today XXIX (1979) : 349-357.

Walsh, Lorena S. "Urban Amenities and Rural Sufficiency : Living Standards and Consumer Behaviour in the colonial Chesapeake, 1643-1777." Journal of Economic History 43 (1983) No. 1 :109-117.

Walton, G.M. "Sources of Productivity Change in American Colonial Shipping, 1675-1775." Economic History Review XX (1967) No.3: 303-311.

Webb, Stephen Saunders. "Army and Empire : English Garrison Government in Britain and America, 1569 to 1763." William and Mary Quarterly XXXIV (1977) 3rd series No. 1 : 2-31.

Wien, Thomas. "Selling Beaver Skins in North America and Europe, 1720-1760 : The Uses of Fur-Trade Imperialism" Journal of the Canadian Historical Accociation 1 (1990) : 293-317.

ARTICLES IN BOOKS

Albrecht, Peter. "Coffee-Drinking as a Symbol of Social Change in Continental Europe in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries." in Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture. pp. 91-104. Edited by John W. Yolton and L.E. Brown. Madison : University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.

Cullen, L.M. "Merchant Communities Overseas, the Navigation Acts and the Irish and Scottish Responses." in Comparative Aspects of Scottish and Irish Economic and Social History, 1600-1900. pp.165-175. Edited by L.M. Cullen and T.C. Smout. Edinburgh : John Donald Publishers, 1976.

Devine, T.M. "The Merchant Class of the Larger Scottish Towns in the Later Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries." in Scottish Urban History. pp.92-111. Edited by George Gordon and Brian Dicks. Aberdeen : Aberdeen University Press, 1983.

Devine, T.M. "The Scottish Merchant Community, 1680-1740." in The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment. pp. 26-41. Edited by R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner. Edinburgh : John Donald Publishers, 1982.

Fleming, R.H. "Phyn, Ellice and the Company at Schenectady" in Contributions to Canadian Economics. vol.4. :7-41. Toronto: University of Toronto Studies History and Economics, 1932.

Joslin, D.M. "London Bankers in Wartime 1739-84." in Studies in The Industrial Revolution. pp. 156-177. L.S. Pressnell. London: The Athlone Press University of London, 1960.

LaFrance,M., and Ruddell, D.T. "Physical expansion and socio-economic segregation in Quebec, 1765-1840." in Shaping the Urban Landscape. pp. 149-163. G.A. Stelter and A.J.F. Artibise. Ottawa : Carleton University Press, 1982.

Macmillan, David S. "The New Men in Action : Scottish mercantile and Shipping Operations in the North American Colonies, 1760-1825". in Canadian Business History Selected Studies, 1497-1971. pp. 44-103. Edited by David S. Macmillan. Toronto : McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1972.

Murphy, Sean. "The Dublin Anti-Union Riot of 3 December 1759" in Parliament, Politics and People. Essays in Eighteenth - Century Irish History. pp. 49-68. Gerard O'Brien ed., Blackrock : Irish Academic Press, 1989.

O'Donovan, Jim. "The Militia in Munster, 1715-78". in Parliament, Politics and People. Essays in Eighteenth-Century Irish History. pp.31-49. Gerard O'Brien ed.,Blackrock : Irish Academic Press, 1989.

Ouellet, Fernand. "The British Army of Occupation in the St. Lawrence Valley, 1760-74 : The Conflict between Civil and Military Society". in Armies of Occupation.Roy A. Prete and A.H.Ion. Waterloo : Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1984.

Presnell, L.S. "The Rate of Interest in the Eighteenth Century." in Studies in the Industrial Revolution. pp.178-214. L.S.Presnell. London: The Athlone Press University of London, 1960.

Thomas, R.P. and McClosky, D.N. "Overseas trade and empire 1700-1860." in The Economic History of Britain since 1700. vol.1. pp. 87-102. Edited by Roderick Floud and Donald McClosky. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Vichert, Gordon. "The Theory of Conspicuous Consumption in the 18th Century." in The Varied Pattern : Studies in the 18th Century. pp. 253-268. Edited by Peter Hughes and David Williams. Toronto : A.M. Hakkert Ltd, 1971.

BOOKS

Albion, R.G. Forest and Sea Power. The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy 1652-1862. Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1926.

Alvord, C.W., and Carter, C.E. The Critical Period 1763-1765. 3 vols. British Series vol i. Springfield : Illinois State Historical Library, 1915.

_____.The New Regime 1765-1767. 3 vols. British Series vol ii Springfield : Illinois State Historical Library, 1916.

_____.Trade and Politics 1767-1769. 3 vols. British Series vol iii. Springfield:Illinois State Historical Library, 1921.

Andrews, Charles McLean. The Boston Merchants and the Non-Importation Movement. New York: Russell and Russell, 1968.

Andrews, K.R., Canny, N.P. and P.E.H. Hair eds., The Westward Enterprise. English activities in Ireland, the Atlantic, and America 1480-1650. Liverpool : Liverpool University Press, 1978.

Ashton, T. S. An Economic History of England : The 18th Century. London : Methuen and Co., 1955.

Ashton, T.S. Economic Fluctuatons in England 1700-1800. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959.

Barrow, Thomas C. Trade and Empire : The British Customs Service in Colonial America 1660-1775. Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1967.

Baugh, Daniel A. British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole. Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1965.

Baxter, W.T. The House of Hancock Business in Boston 1724-1775. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945.

Berg, Maxine. The Age of Manufacturers - Industry, Innovation and Work in Britain 1700-1820. Oxford: Blackwell Ltd., 1985.

Bliss, J.M., ed. Canadian History in Documents 1763-1966.Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1966.

Bosher, J.F. The Canada Merchants 1713-1763. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.

Bourne, H.R.F. English Merchants : Memoirs in illustration of the Progress of British Commerce. London: Richard Bentley, 1866.

Bradley, A.G. Sir Guy Carleton (Lord Dorchester). Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1966.

Brewer,John. The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783. London: Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1989.

Brunet, Michel. Les Canadiens apres la conquete 1759-1775. Montreal : Fides, 1969.

Burke, James. The Day the Universe Changed. Toronto : Little, Brown and Company, 1985.

Burt, A.L. The Old Province of Quebec 1760-1778. Toronto : McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1968.

Campbell, Marjorie Wilkins. The North West Company. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Cananda Limited, 1957.

Canny, Nicholas. Kingdom and Colony : Ireland in the Atlantic World 1560-1800.Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.

Clark, G.N. Guide to English Commercial Statistics, 1696-1782. London: Royal Historical Society, 1938.

Cochran, L.E. Scottish Trade with Ireland in the Eighteenth Century. Edinburgh : John Donald PublishersLtd., 1985.

Coffin, Victor. The Province of Quebec and the Early American Revolution. Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1970.

Cottrell, P.L. and Aldcroft, D.H. eds., Shipping, Trade and Commerce. Essays in Memory of Ralph Davis. Leicester : Leicester University Press, 1981.

Creighton, Donald. The Empire of the St. Lawrence. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1956.

Davis, Ralph. *The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade*. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1979.

Davis, Ralph. *English Overseas Trade, 1500-1700*. London : Macmillan Co. 1973.

Davis,Ralph. *The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eigtheenth Centuries*. Newton Abbot: David and Charles Publishers,1972.

Devine, T.M. and Dickson, David eds., *Ireland and Scotland 1600-1850. Parallels and Contrasts in Economic and Social Development*. Edinburgh : John Donald Publishers, 1982.

De Watteville, Col. H. *The British Soldier. His Daily Life from Tudor to Modern Times*. London : J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1954.

Dictionary of Canadian Biography.Volume 3, 1741-1770. Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1974.

Dictionary of Canadian Biography. Volume 4, 1771-1800. Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1979.

Dictionary of Canadian Biography. Volume 5, 1801-1820. Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1983.

Donnachie, Ian. *A History of the Brewing Industry in Scotland*. Edinburgh : John Donald Publishers, 1979.

Durie, Alastair J. *The Scottish Linen Industry in the Eighteenth Century*. Edinburgh : John Donald Publishers, 1979.

Easterbrook, W.T., and Aitken, H.G.J. *Canadian Economic History*. Toronto: Macmillan, 1956.

Eccles, W.J. *The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760*. Albuquerque : University of Mexico Press, 1983.

Elliott, Blanche B. *A History of English Advertising*. London : B.T.Batsford Ltd., 1962.

Everest, Alan S. *Moses Hazen and the Canadian Refugees in the American Revolution*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1976.

Fisher, H.E.S. *The Portugal Trade. A Study of Anglo-Portuguese Commerce 1700-1770*. London : Methuen, 1971.

Floud, Roderick and McCloskey,D. *The Economic History of Britain since 1700* vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Flower, R and Jones, M.W. *Lloyd's of London An illustrated History*. Newton Abbot : David and Charles, 1974.

Gagnon, Serge.*Quebec and its Historians : The Twentieth Century*. Montreal: Harvest House Press, 1985.

Gates, Charles M. ed.,*Five Fur Traders of the Northwest*. St. Paul : Minnesota Historical Society, 1965.

Ghosh, Suresh Chandra. *The Social Condition of the British Community in Bengal 1757-1800*. Leiden: EJ Brill, 1970.

Gill, Conrad. The Rise of the Irish Linen Industry. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1964.

Gill, Conrad. Merchants and Mariners of the 18th Century. London: Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd., 1961.

Graham, J.H. Outlines of the History of Freemasonry in the Province of Quebec. Montreal: n.p. 1892.

Greer, Allan. Peasant, Lord and Merchant : Rural Society in Three Quebec Parishes, 1740-1840. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.

Guy, Alan J. Oeconomy and Discipline. Officership and administration in the British Army 1714-63. Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1985.

Hamilton, Henry. An Economic History of Scotland in the Eighteenth Century. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.

Hamilton, Roberta. Feudal Society and Colonization: The Historiography of New France. Gananoque: Langdale Press, 1988.

Harrington, Virginia. The New York Merchant on the Eve of the Revolution. New York : Columbia University Press, 1935.

Higgins, Ruth L. Expansion in New York. Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1976.

Hill, M.H., Bucknell, Peter A. The Evolution of Fashion : Pattern and Cut from 1066 to 1930. New York : Drama Book Specialists, 1967.

Hitsman, J. Mackay. Safeguarding Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968.

Hoon, E.E. The Organization of the English Customs System 1696-1786. New York: Kelley Publishers, 1968.

Hoppit, Julian. Risk and Failure in English Business, 1700-1800. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Hoffman, R., McCusker,John J., et al. The Economy of Early America. The Revolutionary Period, 1763-90. Charlottesville : University Press of Virginia, 1988.

Innis, H.A., Select Documents in Canadian Economic History 1497-1783. Toronto : The University of Toronto Press, 1929.

_____.The Cod Fisheries The History of An International Economy. Toronto : The University of Toronto Press, 1954.

_____.Essays in Canadian Economic History. Toronto : The University of Toronto Press, 1956.

_____.The Fur Trade in Canada An Introduction to Canadian Economic History. Toronto : The University of Toronto Press,1962.

James Finlay & Company Limited. Manufacturers and East India Merchants 1750-1950. Glasgow : Jackson & Company, 1951.

Kalm. Peter. Travels into North America. Translated by John R. Foster. Massachusetts: The Imprint Society, 1972.

Kammen, Michael. Empire and Interest. The American Colonies and the Politics of Mercantilism. Philadelphia : J.B. Lippincott Co., 1970.

Kirkaldy, Adam W. British Shipping. Its History, Organization and Importance. New York : Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1970.

Langford, P. The First Rockingham Administration 1765-1766. London : Oxford University Press, 1973.

Lawson, M.G. Fur - A Study in English Mercantilism, 1700-1775. Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1943.

Lawson, Philip. The Imperial Challenge. Quebec and Britain in the Age of the American Revolution. Montreal : McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990.

Leach, Douglas Edward. The Northern Colonial Frontier 1606-1763. New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966.

Long, John. Voyages and Travel of an Indian Interpreter and Trader. London : n.p., 1791.

Lower, A.R.M. Great Britain's Woodyard. British America and the Timber Trade, 1763-1867. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973.

Lower, A.R.M. Colony to Nation - A History of Canada. London: Longmans, Green, & Company, 1957.

Macmillan, David S. ed., Canadian Business History. Toronto : McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1972.

Macpherson, David. Annals of Commerce, Manufactures, Fisheries, and Navigation in 4 Vols- this being vol 3. Edinburgh : Mundell and Sons, 1805.

Mahon, R.H. Life of General The Honorable James Murray. A Builder of Canada. London : John Murray, 1921.

Marcus, Jacob R. The Colonial American Jew, 1492-1776. Detroit : Wayne State University Press, 1970.

Marshall, P.J. East Indian Fortunes The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1976.

Marshall, P.J. and Williams, G. The Great Map of Mankind: British Perceptions of the World in the Age of Enlightenment. London : J.M. Dent and Sons., 1982.

Mathias, Peter. The Transformation of England. Essays in the Economic and Social History of England in the 18thC. London : Methuen, 1979.

Mathias, P. and Pearsall, A.W.H. eds., Shipping : A Survey of Historical Records. Newton Abbot : David and Charles, 1971.

Mathias, Peter. The Brewing Industry in England, 1700-1830. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1959.

McLynn, Frank. Charles Edward Stuart. A Tragedy in Many Acts. London : Routledge, 1988.

McCusker, John J. *Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1660-1775 A Handbook*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978.

McCusker, John J. and Russell R. Menard. *The Economy of British North America, 1607-1789*. Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 1985.

McGrath, Patrick. *The Merchant Venturers of Bristol*. Bristol : The Society of Merchant Venturers of the City of Bristol, 1975.

McKendrick, Neil. Brewer, John and J.H. Plumb. *The Birth of a Consumer Society. The Commercialization of Eighteenth Century England*. London : Europa Publishers Ltd., 1982.

Messier, Jean-Jacques. *Bibliographie relative a la Nouvelle-France*. Montreal : Les Editions Univers Inc., 1979.

Miquelon, Dale. *New France 1701-1744 "A Supplement to Europe"*. Toronto : McClelland and Stewart, 1987.

_____.*Dugard of Rouen French Trade to Canada and the West Indies*. Montreal : McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978.

_____.*Society and Conquest. The Debate on the Bourgeoisie and Social Change in French Cananda, 1700-1850*. Toronto : Copp Clark Publishing, 1977.

Moody, T.W., Vaughan, W.E. *A New History of Ireland IV. Eighteenth Century Ireland. 1691-1800*. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1986.

Murray, Arthur C. *The Five Sons Of "Bare Betty"*. London : John Murray, 1936.

Murray, Arthur C. *The Murrays of Elibank*. Edinburgh : Douglas and Foulis, 1917.

Namier, Sir Lewis. *England in the Age of The American Revolution*. London : Macmillan and Company Limited, 1961.

Neatby, Hilda. *Quebec the Revolutionary Age, 1760-1791*. Toronto : McClelland and Stewart, 1966.

Nish, Cameron ed., *The French Canadians,1759-1766: Conquered? Half-Conquered? Liberated?* Toronto: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1966.

Norton, Thomas Elliot. *The Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 1686-1776*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974.

Ouellet, Fernand. *Economic and Social History of Quebec 1760-1850*. Ottawa : Gage Publishing Ltd., 1980.

Pares, Richard. *War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763*. London : Frank Cass Co., 1936.

Payne, Blanche. *History of Costume From Ancient Egyptians to the Twentieth Century*. New York : Harper & Row Publishers, 1965.

Pentland, H. Clare. *Labour and Capital in Canada 1650-1860*. Toronto : James Lorimer & Company Publishers, 1981.

Phillips, Paul Christer. The Fur Trade vol.2. Oklahoma : University of Oklahoma Press, 1961.

Planche, James Robinson. A Cyclopedia of Costume. London : Chatto & Windus, 1876.

Price, Jacob M. Capital and Credit in British Overseas Trade: The View from the Chesapeake, 1700-1776. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Reynolds, Paul R. Guy Carleton. A Biography. Toronto : Gage Publishing Ltd., 1980.

Rich, E.E. The Fur Trade and the Northwest to 1857. Toronto : McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1967.

_____.Montreal and the Fur Trade. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1966.

Riley, James C. The Seven Years War and the Old Regime in France. The Economic and Financial Toll. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Rodger, N.A.M. The Admiralty. Lavenham: Terrence Dalton Ltd., 1979.

Sachs, Willian S. and Hoogenboom, Ari. The Enterprising Colonials; Society on the Eve of the Revolution. Chicago : Argonaut Inc., Publishers, 1965.

Sainty, J.C. Office Holders in Modern Britain IV Admiralty Officials 1660-1870. London : Athlone Press University of London, 1975.

Schumpeter, Elizabeth Boody. English Overseas Trade Statistics 1697-1808. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1960.

Shepherd, James F. and Walton, Gary M. Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of Colonial North America. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1972.

Shortt, Adam and Doughty, Arthur G. eds., Canada and Its Provinces. In 22 vols. The Province of Quebec vol xv and vol xvi. Toronto : Glasgow, Brook and Company, 1914.

Shy, John. Towards Lexington The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Sosin, Jack M. Whitehall and the Wilderness. The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775. Connecticut : Greenwood Press Publishers, 1980.

Stanley, George F.G. New France The Last Phase, 1744-1760. Toronto : McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1968.

Steele, Ian K. The English Atlantic 1675-1740 An Exploration of Communication and Community. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1986.

Stewart, Charles H. The Service of British Regiments in Canada and North America. A Resume based on Regimental Histories held in the Department of National Defence Library. Ottawa : Department of National Defence Library, 1964.

Sutherland, Lucy S. A London Merchant 1695-1774. London : Oxford University Press, 1933.

Thomas, P.D.G. British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1975.

Trudel, Marcel.An Atlas of New France. Quebec : Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, 1973.

Vaugeois, Denis. Les Juifs et la Nouvelle-France. Trois-Rivieres : Les Editions Boreal Express, 1968.

Wade, Mason. The French Canadians 1760-1797. Toronto : The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1968.

Wallace, W. Stewart. The Pedlars from Quebec and other Papers on the Nor'Westers. Toronto : Ryerson Press, 1954.

Waterer, John W. Leather in Life, Art and Industry. London : Faber and Faber Ltd., MCMXLVI.

Watson, Ian Bruce. Foundation for Empire. English Private Trade in India 1695-1760. New Delhi : Vikas Publishing House PVT Ltd., 1980.

Wilson, Bruce. The Enterprise of Robert Hamilton : A Study of Wealth and Influence in Early Upper Canada, 1776-1812. Ottawa : Carleton University Press, 1983.

Wright, Charles and Fayle, C.E. A History of Lloyd's From the Founding of Lloyd's Coffee House to the Present Day. London : Macmillan and Co., 1928.

Wright, Louis B. The Dream of Prosperity in Colonial America. New York : New York University Press, 1965.

Wrong, George M. A Canadian Manor and its Seigneurs. Toronto : The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1908.

Yarwood, Doreen. Costume of the Western World. London : Lutterworth Press, 1985.

Yolton, John W.and Brown, L.E. eds., Studies in Eighteenth Century Culture. Madison : University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.

UNPUBLISHED THESES

Arthur,Elizabeth. "The French-Canadian Under British Rule, 1760-1800" Ph.D. Thesis. McGill 1949.

Burke, Alice Amelia. "The English Merchants in Canada, 1759-1766" M.A. Thesis. University of Ottawa, 1968.

Craig, Isabel. " Economic Conditions in Canada 1763-83" M.A. Thesis. McGill 1937.

Greer,Allan. "Habitants of the Lower Richelieu : Rural Society in Three Quebec Parishes, 1740-1840" Ph.D. Thesis. York, 1980.

Igartua, Jose."Merchants and Negociants of Montreal, 1750-1775 : A Study in Socio-Economic History" Ph.D. Thesis, Michigan State University, 1974.

Long, Dorothy Elizabeth Toye. "Edward Ellice" Ph.D. Thesis. University of Toronto, 1941.

Lunn, J.E. "Economic Development in New France, 1713-1760" Ph.D. Thesis. McGill 1942.

Mappin, John. "The Political Thought of Francis Maseres" M.A. Thesis. McGill University, 1968.

Miquelon, Dale. "The Baby Family and the Trade of Canada, 1750-1820" M.A. Thesis. Carleton, 1966.

Plamondon,Lilianne. "Une femme d'affaires en Nouvelle France, Marie-Anne Barbel" M.A. Thesis. Universite de Laval, 1976.

Pritchard, James Stewart. "Ships, Men and Commerce : A Study of Maritime Activity in New France" Ph.D Thesis. University of Toronto, 1971.

Reid, Allana. "The Development and Importance of the Town of Quebec" Ph.D. Thesis. McGill University, 1950.

Roberts,David. "George Allsopp: Quebec Merchant 1733-1805" M.A. Thesis. Queens 1974.

Wetherell, Albert Anthony. "General James Murray and British Canada : The Transition From French To British Canada, 1758-1766" Ph.D. Thesis. St. John's University, New York, 1979.

APPENDIX ONE

Imports and Exports From England and Wales to Quebec
1760-1768

Season	Import	Export	Excess
1760-61	£14,015	£226,292	£212,276
1761-62	32,079	148,478	116,398
1762-63	26,856	149,539	122,638
1763-64	44,669	251,385	206,716
1764-65	39,034	213,509	174,475
1765-66	46,982	366,573	319,590
1766-67	42,044	194,406	152,361
1767-68	37,162	110,598	73,436

Source : PRO Customs 36/3 : Imports and Exports 1758-84 England and Wales.

APPENDIX TWO
List of Furs exported from Quebec, 1763-1768

FURS	1763	1764	1765	1766	1767	1768
Badger	-	3	-	-	-	-
Beaver	65,179	98,626	100,045	91,504	74,756	74,668
Bear	669	11,837	*	9,457	13,399	14,219
Cat	28,246	6,841	*	-	3,874	3,560
Elk	92	2,116	*	2,143	2,891	6,890
Fisher	1,312	3,771	*	-	3,607	2,941
Fox	934	7,991	*	-	2,898	1,750
Marten	42,144	41,878	*	34,245	57,906	58,770
Mink	813	1,659	*	-	4,081	2,825
Musquash	6,271	16,174	*	49,000	18,490	14,513
Otter	7,986	11,321	*	600	16,234	11,201
Raccoon	13,072	62,286	*	9,800	60,247	77,258
Seal	292	45	*	-	-	163
Tiger	1	1	*	-	5	1
Weasel	-	108	*	-	-	-
Wolf	296	637	*	-	625	1,195
Wolverine	157	117	*	-	132	143
Stags	1,336	-	*	-	-	-
Beaver cub	5,110	-	*	-	-	-
Bear cub	1,348	-	*	-	-	-
Caribou	3	-	*	-	-	-
Loupervine	362	-	*	-	-	-
Lynx	522	-	*	-	-	-
Woodchuck	7	-	*	-	-	-
Boars	4	-	*	-	-	-
Bucks	131	7,740	*	-	-	-
Roebucks	200	-	*	-	-	-
Beaver-lbs	1,289	-	*	-	-	-
Water rats	450	-	*	-	-	-
Wood rats	3	-	*	-	-	-
Deer	5,996	69,229lbs	£1676	£3,252	£2,452	£3,568
Buffalo	-	-	-	1	-	1
Lion	-	-	-	-	2	-

Total Furs (£'s)	*	33,758	29,000	27,158	29,144	28,462
Total Exports (£'s)	26,856	44,139	38,564	44,373	41,972	37,162

Source : PRO Customs 3/ 1764-68. Ledgers of Imports and Exports to Great Britain 1697-1780.

* No individual statistics for this year

APPENDIX THREE
Imports From Quebec to London 1764-1768
(A selection of the top ranking imports)

1764	
Furs	33,758
Whale fins	1,785
Drugs	1,325
Castoreum	864
Wood	485
Beaver (lbs)	16
Total *	44,139

1765	
Furs	29,000
Wood	3,000
Bar Iron	1,600
Drugs	1,440
Castor	742
Ginseng	430
Total	38,564

1766	
Furs	27,158
Wood	5,368
Train oil	4,195
Drugs	1,397
Ginseng	985
Castoreum	681
Whale fins	482
Potash	336
Iron bars	150
Total	44,373

1767	
Furs	29,144
Castoreum	5,232
Wood	4,099
Train oil	2,614
Ginseng	985
Drugs	433
Potash	96
Whale fins	73
Total	41,972

1768	
Furs	28,462
Wood	2,531
Train oil	1,638
Castoreum	567
Hemp	297
Ginseng	239
Flax	227
Pearl Ash	196
Drugs	157
Whale fins	126
Potash	70
Total	37,162

* Totals reflect annual totals and all values are in £ sterling.

Source : PRO Customs 3 /64-68 Ledgers of Imports and Exports to Great Britain 1697-1780 including a list of prices.